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DEDICATION

This 85th issue of the **Darshana International** *is most respectfully* **dedicated** *to the sacred memory of*

Prof. Dr. B. Kuppuswamy, M.A., D.Litt.
(25th Feb. 1907 — 25th Nov. 1981)

one of the Pioneers of Psychology in India. He contributed much to the fields of Animal Learning, Cross cultural studies, Educational, Social, and Ancient India Psychology. He was Professor of Psychology at Mysore University. After his retirement he joined the India International Centre as Joint Director and was associated with Unesco. He has been the President of the Psychology and Educational Science Section of the Indian Science Congress. He travelled widely in many parts of the world on different assignments. He actively served the cause of Psychology till his death. May his soul rest in peace

Anurag Atreya
Managing Editor

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I

The Lifestyle And Social Order Of The Baha’i Faith : A Participant Observation Study

Chris Johnson

> Mankind has a religious future, we have said. The religion of the future must not be viewed as being merely the outcome of inner and purely individual contemplation for each man, as mere sentiment, as an idea isolated from the totality of each individual’s sentiments. It must be an expression of mankind’s collective thoughts, the synthesis of man’s conceptions, and the rule for all of his acts. The religion of the future is called upon to take its place in the political order; but to be exact, when considered in its totality, the political institution of the future must be a religious institution.
>
> Henri de Saint-Simon

Statement of Purpose : The purpose of this article is to present a participant observation study of Baha’i Faith. As a social scientist and member of the Baha’i Faith, the author describes inside observations on the goals and lifestyles of this rapidly growing religious institution.

Observations of Baha’is : Shoghi Effendi (1944:365) stated that a ruling by an Islamic Appellate Court of Beba, Egypt, delivered on May 10, 1925, and sanctioned by the highest ecclesiastical authorities in Cairo, held that the Baha’i Faith was an independent world religion and not an Islamic sect.

Estimating the number of Baha’is worldwide is difficult. Although there is no information on the exact total membership of Baha’is, one can get a general idea from the statistics given. For example, the National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of Canada stated in a pamphlet in 1979 that there are Baha’is residing in 98,000 different localities in the world, that there are 130 National Spiritual Assemblies, and 25,000 Local Spiritual Assemblies worldwide.

In Ivan Ruff's 1974 article in *New Society*, he observed that the aims of the Baha'i Faith were "curiously nebulous", and that the life-style of Baha'is is relatively indistinguishable from the population at large. My observations do not coincide with this analysis. Instead, I see the Baha'i lifestyle as cogently distinct from what is normative in the general population. An indication of this can be seen in the heterogenic composition of the Baha'i social organization vis-a-vis other Christian and non-Christian denominations. For instance, after visiting Baha'i communities throughout most of the United States except the eastern portion and upon attending National Baha'i conventions, I have observed that Baha'i members come from all types of religious, racial and ethnic backgrounds. Moreover, I have been told by persons who have observed the worldwide Baha'i communities that the countries where most Baha'is reside (i.e., Iran, India, Viet Nam, South America, etc.) also follow these patterns. It is precisely this mixture that makes Baha'is sociologically unique from most religious groups in America—where religions are divided along sharp racial, ethnic, and class lines.

Costs of Being a Baha'i : To become a Baha'i or to join this religion is relatively easy. A person must profess a belief in Baha'-u'llah (the Prophet and founder of the Baha'i Faith), and accept His teachings and administrative order. Contrary to most religions or sects, there are no initiation rites, rituals, sacraments, or clergy involved. It is just as easy to withdraw from the Baha'i Faith by declaring that you no longer believe in Baha'u'llah. However, it is not necessarily easy to obey the rules and live the life that is required of Baha'is because it suggests a lifestyle that is quite divergent from what is normative worldwide. From a sociological standpoint, this lifestyle is problematic because : (1) it is a non Christian, independent world religion, in a country which is mainly Judeo-Christian. Consequently, Baha'is are often subjected to numerous stereotypes, prejudices, and misconceptions, often lodged by conservative Christian sects or uninformed scholars and/or observers; (2) every member must pray daily, in particular, say a daily obligatory prayer. This type of rule requires a kind of self-discipline that is difficult to engender in a predominantly protestant (e.g , Calvinist) society, one that encourages its members to 'do their own thing" : (3) every follower except pregnant women, the elderly, children, or the sick must fast once a year, between sunrise and sunset, for 19 days. Such ascetic practices of shared abstinence seems to have a unifying effect on the sentiments of the group. However, fasting is not usually practiced by most people in the United States and therefore is often a difficult prescription to follow : (4) every member must abstain from alcohol and drugs unless prescribed for medicinal reasons. This law is problematic for some, particularly due to the worldwide norm which stresses the sociability of drug and/or alcohol consumption : (5) every Baha'i must obtain parental consent if they wish to marry. This law was designed to maintain family unity, although it is difficult for some since many Baha'is marry across religious and racial lines, and have parents from other faiths; and (6) every member must attend services on "Feast Days" (once every nineteen days) which is comparable to going to church on Sunday for a Christian. The perceived spiritual rewards of following Baha'i feast and holy days (the Baha'i Calendar) is counterbalanced by the costs of living in a society that is totally oriented toward the Gregorian calender. Thus, the adherence to a conflicting calendar often causes strains for Baha'is in their social and/or job relations with others.

Rewards of Being a Baha'i : From observing the **Baha's lifestyle**, it is apparent that the reward elements seem to be less tangible. However, the rewards of affiliation in this religious group are : (1) varietism. Every member is exposed to a diverse number of people from all types of socio economic, racial, ethnic, and religious backgrounds. Baha'is believe that the bringing together of these diverse peoples and backgrounds into one fold will have a direct affect upon the eventual establishment of world peace; (2) every member is exposed to a community or "we" feeling. In a world where a person seldom even knows his neighbor a "grass roots" religion which meets in homes, and stresses close, interpersonal contact, has a definite appeal; (3) the universalism and/or ecumenism of this faith. Baha'is report feeling an acceptance of people from other religious backgrounds because they are taught the oneness and verities of past major religions (i.e., Islam, Christianity, Judaism, etc.), while at the same time accepting Baha'u'llah as the latest in a succession of Prophets who have come to this planet at different stages in history. This ideology diminishes feelings of alienation, anomie, and competition between Baha'i and other faiths, a problem of past religions, (i.e., the Crusades, the Northern Ireland conflict, the Iranian situation, etc). Also, with the dispersion of believers to over 98,000 localities throughout the world, a Baha'i can travel to cities in any country and find fellow Baha'is; (4) the broad scope of the Baha'i literature. Baha'u'llah wrote over a hundred books and tablets. with His own pen, dealing with issues geared to a modern age. He wrote such rational books as the *Kitab-i-Aqdas* (the book of laws), the mystical books like *The Seven Valleys*, to the numerous other prayer books or epistles. This diversity of religious literature in Baha'i has consequently attracted seekers who are looking for different dimensions of a religion; (5) every Baha'i feels important as an individual (part) in relation to the universe (whole). The Baha'i writings stress the significance of each believer in contributing to the "new world order" and the ultimate salvation of society; (6) closely related to the feeling of the importance of parts to the whole, is the optimistic element of the Baha'i Faith. Baha'is earnestly believe that they are building a "heaven on earth" by way of a world theocracy. Thus, the believer holds a positive view of humanity, nature, and society; (7) the feeling of having a special link with God, not in a Christian fundamentalist notion of an individual, exclusive rights to salvation, but rather in the idea that each believer is an instrument for God's latest message for this age; and (8) although set down a hundred years ago, the principles of the faith meet many of the needs of modern man. For instance, Baha'is believe in : One God, the oneness of mankind, independent investigation of truth, the common foundation of all religions, the essential harmony of science and religion, equality of men and women, elimination of prejudice of all kinds, universal compulsory education, a spiritual solution of the economic problem, a universal auxiliary language, and a universal peace upheld by a world government.

I have observed that the personal lifestyle of Baha'is is varies among its adherents, except that most believers attempt to follow Baha'i principles and laws. Even though there are internal differences in lifestyles, there is, at the same time, a communal element and a unity of vision to the congregation. For instance, a Baha'i tends to see the development of and potentials for order in the Baha'i world and yet sees disorder and conflict in society in general.

Baha'is and Social Disorder : We do know that Americans often treat social problems like a doctor often treats symptoms. The doctor will isolate the symptom (part) from the body (whole) and then try to treat it with drugs or therapy. For instance, sociologists have isolated the problem of racial integration, and have attempted to resolve it by laws (i.e., busing). The logic here is that an isolated element (law) is thought to effectively counteract the whole disease (prejudice). Contrary to the "symptom syndrome", a Baha'i does not attempt to deal with every isolated social issue (i e., racial problems, "Women's Lib", ecological issues, etc.), but rather views these symptoms as indicative of a whole pathology — the "old world order". Therefore, even though many Baha'is are marginally involved with various social groups (N.A.A.C.P., E.R.A., United Nations organizations, etc.), they are more concerned about directing their energies inward, toward the Baha'i movement (whole) rather than segmenting efforts to various external movements (parts) that are sympathetic to Baha'i principles. The notion here is that a unified "joint action" of Baha'is around the world is more effective in developing a world society (with common or shared norms, values, and ideology), than involvement in isolated causes.

Baha'is and Conflict : Internal and external conflict is inevitable within any social movement or organization. In order to discuss this issue one must first see how Baha'is institutions are organized. The core institution in the faith is the family. Baha'i communities develop out of individual believers and families of believers. When a Baha'i community reaches the size of nine or more adults, a Local Spiritual Assembly (L.S.A.) is elected. Here the concentration of authority and power becomes institutionalized at the community level through elected (by secret ballot, with no campaigning) representatives of the believers. The function of L.S.A.'s is that of promoting the best interests (the interests or needs which an L.S.A. administers to are too numerous to mention here) of the communities within their jurisdiction and act as intermediaries between the local communities and the elected body of nation representatives (National Spiritual Assemblies). As a participant in Baha'i community life, I have taken personal problems and conflicts to the Local Spiritual Assembly and received positive results from the group's decision. Moreover I have been elected to and served on L.S.A.s and have obtained inside observations of the interaction of members and the function of the group. In this capacity I observed that the effectiveness of this institution is guided by an exchange process referred to as "consultation". Consultation is an open and frank discussion, involving a discussion of facts, the spiritual and/or administrative principles involved, and prayer.

Members of the Assembly seem to be aware of an implicit notion of a de-emphasis on "advocacy" of personal ideas in meetings. Assembly members are instructed by the writings, that each L S.A. member's ideas that are presented during meetings are to be given freely and not "sold" (advocated). Thus, in a sense the idea, once expressed, is no longer owned by the part (the initiator) but rather becomes "owned" by the whole (the group) who then decide upon it's verity or weaknesses. The clash of differing opinions is encouraged. However, where the real conflict in Assembly meetings seem to arise is when it appears as though there are personality conflicts, personal ego involvements, or advocacy of personal ideas in meetings. These problems have to be resolved by the group, or the National Spiritual Assembly will send a representative to help. We must bear in mind that L.S.A. members are aware that these are potential problems and attempt to lovingly discuss and resolve them without outside assistance. Hence, the combination of prayer, frank and open consultation, and reference to the Baha'i writings for the spiritual principles involved in various issues and conflicts is the approach employed by the L.S.A.

I have attended meetings where the Assembly has consulted with community members who have brought a whole array of personal problems (i.e., domestic quarrels, inter or intra-family conflicts, business problems, psychological difficulties and the like) for the Assembly to consult and decide upon. These meetings are a forum for any or all personal or community problems to be voiced. Baha'is or anyone may come to Assemblies for advice and consultation. Hence, the Assembly can and has served as a structural and functional support system for the maintenance of equilibrium in communities.

Charismatic Leaders, the Holy Spirit and Social Order : Baha'is will tell you that they see history as an evolution toward social cohesion at progressively higher levels For instance, in the course of time humanity has created the family, the clan, the city, the nation, and now society is evolving toward world government. This social evolution has been affected by the appearance, throughout history, of charismatic leaders ("Messengers of God" or the founders of religions). Adam, for example, may be considered a symbol of the unity of personality, since through him humankind became conscious of free will. Abraham was the founder of a clan, Moses united the tribes, and Muhammad created the nation in its modern sense. Baha'is believe their prophet (Baha'u'llah) brought a religion whose social teachings, laws and administrative order is relevant for an urban society, and which can serve as the cornerstone for the eventual establishment of a world federal system.

Baha'is believe that the rise of a brilliant civilization is one of the proofs of prophethood. The "Holy Spirit" brings about change in individuals and society in three ways: first, the direct impact upon the followers who obey the social and spiritual teachings of the Manifestation; second, the overriding power of the Holy Spirit causes humanity in general to change and act to fulfill the Will of God (spoken through the Manifestation): and third, the decline of old or outdated social orders, hence, the "Dark Ages".

The Meaning of Being a Baha'i : When someone says "I am a Baha'i" it means the person believes in, and follows Baha'u'llah, His station, His laws and social teachings, as well as the administrative order. However, membership in this faith suggests more than that to followers. Baha'is are very committed to the previously described new society which "wages peace" and order by encouraging the establishment of the unity of religions, and the eventual development of a theocratic world government. Although the Prophet has enjoined Baha'is to be obedient to recognize governments, and to vote (yet remain apolitical), a devout Baha'i would say that spiritual and social revolution starts with the individual. It is individuals that "hear the message of Baha'u'llah", that become Baha'is, that adhere to the norms of physical and moral purity common to past religions, that accept the Baha'i idea of "unity through diversity", that obey the command of their Prophet to cooperate, and that accept and/or participate in exogamous marriages between people representing traditionally racially and ethnically different groups. Thus, a Baha'i is a religious and social revolutionary—a "grass roots" revolution starting with the spiritualization of individuals. To become a Baha'i is to gain access to a world "gemeinschaft". In our alienating, technological world one can see why it is a good feeling for Baha'is to find "friends" in each country they travel through. Further, no Baha'i in his own local community is isolated from other Baha'is, any personal problems or financial troubles are the responsibility of the community and/or L.S.A. In a society that appears to be disunified there is an appeal to these practices.

The Baha'i system is not vague as one author (Ruff, 1974) asserts. For instance, on a macro-level, Baha'is claim a system of law (outlined in the *Kitab'i'Aqdas*), and an organizational hierarchy which is part of a new society emerging out of the "chaotic conditions that prevail today"[9]. They look ahead energetically and seemingly optimistically to a world theocratic government. In the new order they speak of, there can be no weak nations. They believe that various world crisis will force countries to meet on relatively equal terms. Each government will be represented in a world parliament (the fruition of the United Nations). It was stated during a public meeting that in the future there will be a world executive council backed by an international peace-keeping force, which will enforce the laws necessary for satisfying the needs and adjusting the relationships between nations. Baha'i writings state that a "world tribunal" will settle various national disputes. The economic system will be a kind of democratic federalism with an emphasis on profit sharing in corporations. No matter how one might react to this utopian schema, one must say it is not nebulous.

Is Baha'i Utopian ? Will this new society ever come into existence ? Will the American "melting pot" experiment be taken to its logical end, namely the broader establishment of a world society ? Could the establishment of a world Baha'i Commonwealth ever come about ? One could argue either way. If one accepts the assumption that humans are naturally greedy. coercive, and prone toward habitual conflict, the Baha'i social order would not be possible. However, if one maintains that humans have free will, that humanity has, compared to the past, progressed through education and spiritual maturity (i e., the ability to become spiritual without clergy), that there are common threads between the worlds religions, that religion is the key to social order, and that a society run on spiritual (vis-a-vis secular) rules is perhaps more productive than secular laws, then one might see the Baha'i statement "the earth is but one country, and mankind its citizens" as realistic rather than utopian.

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II

The Heritage of Tamil Nadu

V. G. Ramachandran & R. P. Anjard, Sr.

In Bharat Punya Bhumi, Tamil Nadu occupies a significant place. Bharat is the cradle of civilization because man fully developed in the Siwalik range in Punjab, nearly a million years ago. The Vedic literature speak of Swayambhu Manu (the first Manu with his fullness of understanding) having appeared only in the Indus valley. The "western theory" that the valleys of Nile and Euphrates gave birth to the first man are incorrect. The Rig Veda is dated before 6,000 BC and refers to this Swayambhu Manu. The Rig Veda is accepted as the earliest known human document. The ancient heritage of Bharat includes 8576 BC when Emperor Swayambhu Manu (The Seventh Manu) produced the world's first calendar which heralded the Sapta Rishi Era. The Culture of Bharat is well depicted in Valmiki Ramayana (4400 BC) and Vyasa Mahabharata (3067 BC). In both epics, specific mention of the Tamil people and their Kings Pandya, Chola and Chera are mentioned. The capital of the second Tamil Sangam period, Kapatapuram is specifically mentioned in the Epics. It was later submerged in the Arabian Sea. Realize the Sanskritists of the North and the Tamils of the South co existed for over 10,000 years. Historians have dismissed the Epics are Myths and have theorized that civilization in India started only after the advent of the so called Aryans, in 1500 BC. In addition to the Epics and the Puranic Chronology of Indian Kings, there is definite evidence of the Harappa Mohanja Daro excavations. These established that the twin cities were built before 5000 BC and were destroyed about 3500 BC (before the Mahabharata War in 3067 BC). These archeological sites also determined that these cities were built also by the efforts of the Tamils (Vaisyas and Sudras).

There is a serious lack of appreciation of the Tamils. The three great Acharyas, Adi Sankara, Ramanuja and Madhva were from the South—i.e. Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka respectively. The glory of the Bharatiya culture is now better preserved in the south than in the north which was the scene of battles, floods and earthquakes. The tallest mansion in the south is the House of God—the grand exquisite Temples; in the north, the tallest is the House of Kings. Great thinkers, savants, saints were born in the south. The sacred river, Cauvery in Tamil Nadu ranks in its religious precedence next only to River Ganga. The Tamil Nadu was said to extend from Kumari to Vengadam i.e. Capecomorin to the Seven Hills of God Srinivasa of Tirupathy. These are the Exquisite Temples of the Goddess Kanya Kumari, the new edifice of Vivekananda Rock in Kanyakumari, the inspiring and numerous Siva and Subramanya Temples in Tinnevelly, Tirichandur, Madura, Tiruchirapalli, Tanjore, Chidambaram, South Arcot and North Arcot Districts, as well as the several Vishnu Temples in very many places including Trivandrum, Sri Rangam, Tirukkoilure and Tirupathy. These are all great monuments of ancient heritage. Their splendour, architecture, the inspiring three Kala poojas and Brahmotsavam festivals are unique. The literature of the Tamils goes into antiquity. The tradition is that Sage Agastya, the father of Tamil grammar, composed it more than eight thousand years ago. Agasthyam and other valuable literature were all said to have been lost in the deluge that sank the ancient Tamil land in Kumari Kandam (situated west of the present Western ghats.) The first deluge in 4800 BC submerged the southwestern part of Kumari Kandam, and another deluge in 2800 BC sunk the remaining northeastern section. The literature of the first Tamil Sangam academy (about 5800-4800 BC) and the second Tamil Sangam (ca 4800-2800 BC) were all lost in the deluges. The third Tamil Sangam period was from 2800 BC to 500 BC in modern Madura. Tholkappium, the second Tamil grammar was published after the second deluge. This Tholkappium exists today. The author, Tholkappier, was a brahmin who stated that the Tamil grammar was based on Indriyam, an ancient Sanskrit grammar. Tholkappium has many Sanskrit words in its vocabulary. This information establishes the co-existence of the Tamils and the Sanskritists. There is only one Bharatiya Race and not two erroneous Aryan and Dravidian Races. The term *Arya* first occurs only in Rig Veda and means only "Shrestha in conduct". Western historians misunderstood this term as of Race to substantiate their theory of a superior Aryan Race which invaded India in 1500 BC. Max Muller, who initially initiated the Aryan race concept later (ca 1888) said, "I have declared again and again that if I say "Aryan" I mean simply those who speak our Aryan language. To me an ethonologist who speaks of Aryan Race, Aryan blood, Aryan eyes and hair is as great a sinner as a linguist who speaks of dolichocephalic dictionary or a brachycephalic grammar".

Similarly the phrase "Dravidian Race" is erroneous. The Tamils were indigenous citizens of India before 6000 BC. When Indus Valley became over populated, people moved south. Those that moved south of Vindhyas were called Dravidas. Dhra in Sanskrit means "to move." Their land was Dravida Nadu.

Because of the controversy as to the existence of the first two Tamil Sangam periods, summarized information is now provided.

First Tamil Sangam 5800–4800 BC

(1) Agasthya's wife Lopa Mudra built temples for Sakti in three very ancient places e.g. Madura-Mathura Valli (Kali); Kanchipuram — Goddess Kamakshi; and Caranganoor (Kerala) — Goddess Baghavathy.

(2) The existence of Kumari Kandam of the first and Second Tamil Sangam periods is clearly referred to in Silapadikaram (11.3.7), in Puram Porul Venba — 14 and in Puran Nanooru — 335.

(3) Panchavati (Nasik) has an ancient Indras temple of the first Sangam period. The Indra image of this temple was removed by Lord Krishna about 3040 BC to subdue Indra's pride—"vide the Govardana Giri leela in Srimad Bhagavatham."

(4) The Mysore (Karnataka) Sthalapuranas reveal the Sthala Kshetras of (i) *Kodur*: Where Sri Rama met. Sugriva (more pertaining to 4100 of the second Sangam period (ii) *Neela Mangil*: Agasthya—Vatapi, Episode of about 3500 BC. (iii) *Sorab*: Abode of Jamadagni, father of Parasurama Avatar (About 4500 BC)

(5) Linguistic Archaeological evidence does exist from 5000 BC to 3500 BC. It established that the Tamils of Bharat colonized the western countries e.g. Sumeria. Two examples: (1) *UR* is a Tamil word. A town in the Sumeria is named, "Ur," locations Sumeria include Aariyur and Erur. (2) Sanskrit words such as *Ulavan* (meaning—tiller), *Thatchan* (meaning—carpenter), Vellalan, Vel are found in Sumerian seals. Modifications of sanskrit to sumerian also exist such as Brother is Bar in Sumer and Bratha in sanskrit. This indicates that both segments of Bharatiyas—Sanskrit and Tamil—colonized Sumeria estimated 3000 BC.

(6) The Harappan Mohanjadaro archeological evidence ca 5000 BC and the Lothal excavation, ca 4500 BC, note that the destruction of the twin cities occurred ca 3500 BC.

The Second Tamil Period—4800-2800 BC

(1) Sri Rangam Ranganatha Sthala Puranam described our idol installed there by Vibhishana (Ravana's brother, ca 4100 BC) with the help of Chola King Dharma Veera Chola. It was later renovated by another Chola King Killivalavan.

(2) The Valmiki Ramayana. ca 4100 BC include that Kapatapuram was the capital of the second Tamil Sangam; for the reign of Pandyan Kings in Kumari Kandam; that the Pandya King attended Dasharatha's Council of the Kings; and the references to Pothia Hills and Agasthya's Tamil academy. Sugriva wanted Hanuman to avoid this area to arrive on time in Lanka to locate Sita Devi.

(3) The Mahabharata (3100 BC) of Vyasa includes Kapatapuram as the Capital of Tamil Kingdom; Krishna conquered Kavata of Pandyas; the Pandya King attended Draupadi Swayamvaram; Sahadeva defeated the Pandya, Chera and Chola Kings in his Dig Vijayam vis-a-vis Raja Suya Yagam of Yudhistra; Krishna conquered Pandyas; the Pandya, Chera; Chola Kings and armies fought with the Pandavas against the Kurus; and Arjuna married Chitrangada who was the daughter of the Tamil Pandyan King of Madura.

(4) The Mahabarata War was in 3067 BC Astronomical data analyzed Vyasa Mahabharata established this date as well as the Aihiole Inscription being 634 AD. The event described in the edict during Pulikesi II's reign and occurred 3735 years after the Kali Era. Kali was in 3101.

(5) The Harappa destruction, in 3500 BC, was prior to Mahabarata was in 3067 BC.

(6) The age of Tholkappium is fixed as 2700 BC. It was in the reign of Maha Keerta Nilam Tharum Pandyan's reign that the Arangement was approved

(7) Konguvel, who wrote the Tamil Classic Perun Thogai, referred to the second Tamil Sangam.

(8) Tholkappium Urai referred to Lord Krishna as a member of the second Tamil Sangam. He is called therein as Thuvarai Koman (Thuvarai is Dwarka, Koman is King per Tamil Lexicon.)

(9) The three ports of Dwaraka, Rourika, Brighu in Kutch were destroyed. Dwaraka was later rebuilt at another site far in land. These ports established the expertise of Tamil mariners.

(10) Deodohas in "Historic Library," referred to Kapatapuram being the second Tamil Sangam.

(11) Srirangam Sthala Puranam's reference to the Temple havivg been built by the Chola King Dharma Veera and later renovated by King Killi Valavan is strong evidence.

(12) The linguistic archaeology basically was described earlier.

The Third Tamil Sangam—2800-500 BC

The Third Tamil Sangam Period is readily acknowledged by historians. It began with the final sinking of the Kumari Kandam.

According to Prof K. Srinivasa Raghavan in his *Chronology of Bharat*, "When finally the South Tamil country sank about 2787 BC, the Pandyan King established his Kingdom in the basin of Tambaraparani. A new Madura was then built on the Vaigai river. It is called *Koodal* in Tamil as it was built at the junction of rivers and roads in the vast basin of the Vaigai river. A new Port Town was built at the mouth of the River Tambaraparani named *Korkai*."

Kautilya, in Artha Sastra (1460 BC), mentioned the excellence of the pearls of Korkai. The third Sangam began from the building of the New Madura (Koodal) and continued until it was finally completed about 500 BC. The central temple, built by the Pandyan Empress Meenakshi, was named in her honor. Greek writers mentioned that Meenakshis' marriage was current at Pataliputra, ca 300 BC.

"Nakeeranar was the last President of the Madurai Tamil Sangam. Thiruvalluvar published his Thirukural at this time. The two Tamil classics, the Silapadikaram and Mani Mekhalai, were written soon after the dissolution of the Sangam."

During the period of the Third Tamil Sangam, Lord Buddha (1816 BC) and Adi Sankara (604 BC) were born. Prof. K. Srinivasa Raghavan fixed the Age of Buddha by reference to the position of stars. He states, "*Pari Padal* (a Sangam work) and *Mani Mekhalai* (a post Sangam work) mention that *Krittika* was the first of the 27 Nakshatras i e. Vernal Equinox was in Krittika. The vernal Equinox takes about 960 years to move over one Nakshatra. Therefore Buddha must have lived in the period between 2500 BC to 1500 BC (Refer to the date of Buddha's birth 1816 BC in my book on Puranic Chronology from Udhistra to Sali Vahana)."

"The Sangam and Post Sangam works like Ahananooru, Pura Nanooru, Pari Padal, Kali thogai, Silapadikaram etc. give plenty of information about the culture, religion, political and economic condition of Tamil Nadu during the period from 2500 BC to 1500 BC. It was during this period (2500 to 1500 BC) that Tamil Nadu received the influx of Buddhism, Jainism and many other new religions of North India, but the mass of the people stood solid by the ancient Vedic religion and the worship of the Vedic Gods just as the later violent onslaught of Islam, and the persuasive drive of Christianity have not made even a small dent in the social life of the upper and lower classes of Hindus during the last 1000 years (from 1000 AD)."

"Saint Nammalwar of 3031 BC lived long before the Third Sangam age and Adi Sankara (born 604 BC) established the Vedanta Religion and Shanmatha (worship of six Gods) and also the five Sankara Mutts at the end of the Sangam period. The political history was stable under the Pandyan Emperors and their vessals and blood relatives the Cholas and the Cheras. For short periods now and then Tamil Nadu was part of the *Maghadha Empire*. Social, religious and cultural unity of Bharat was always maintained."

Nammalwar (Satagopai) and Adi Sankara established the Vedic religion of Bharat. The worship of the six Gods (Vishnu, Siva, Ganapathy, Sakthi, Sun and Subramanya) by all Bharatiyas inclusive of the Tamils, clearly indicate that the latter are but a "clear stream of the mightly Ganetic Rever of Bharatiyas."

Further, according to Prof. K. Srinivasa Raghavan, the Mauryas built the road through the Podiyal Hills to the shrine of Saint Agastya. (This is referred to in Aga Nanooru—69·2.); a verse of the Age Nanooru referred to the defeat of the Pandyas in the battle of Mahur (near Madura) and of the beautiful roads laid by Mauryas; in the Aga Nanooru, another verse referred to Nanda's greatness as Emperor and to the great hoard of gold he had under the Ganges; and, "After 5000 BC, the country (Bharat) was cut up into a number of kingdoms. The march of the Bharatiyas extended westwards over the land and sea as far as the Mediterranean sea and east Africa eastwards over the Pacific as far as the Americas where first Empires of Peru and Mexico were established. The Tamils had a great share in this expansion."

Thus, even after the Sangam period (500 BC) the enterprise of the Tamils continued. It was the Cholas that discovered South America, long before Columbus. The Incas of Peru were the descendants of these Cholas and they were all sun worshippers.

Additional Details of the Tamil Saga

One important feature of the Harappa Mohanjadaro excavations is that multiple layers provide evidence of different towns. One can reasonably conclude that the ancient Tamil civilization existed over several thousands of years. Prof. Heras stated: "Thus the external and internal evidence of the inscriptions of the Indus Valley shows that the inhabitants of those cities were dravidians who spoke a Dravidian language. The Mohanjadaro civilization was not a civilization restricted to the Indus valley. It was a civilization that extended all over India and eventually we should find relics of this civilization similar to those of Mohanjadaro all over the Indian sub continent." Romila Thapor, in the "History of India" stated that the Harappa culture was the most extensive of ancient civilizations in once including not only the Indus plain (Punjab and Sind) but, also northern Rajasthan and the region of Kathiawar in western India "Later excavations south of Vindhyas located the Harappa in the valleys of Narmada, Godavary and Krishna, possibly in Cauvery also. Prof. Mathivanam Linguistic Scholar cited "Paavanar Dravida Thai", that ancient Chera Kingdom extended up until Gujarat. The Tamil navigators extensively travelled the seas. In Lothal port there is evidence of the Tamil seal used for sea voyages. The R.T.O. (Riddes of Three Oceans written by Russian author *Alexander Kandrator*) stated, "The structure of the ruins of Lothal, the oldest port in the world were found by Indian archaeologists in Kathiawar Peninsula."

Mahrishi Shudhamad Bharati, in an article in Delhi's Hindi Weekly "Dharmayug," dated 21-13-62 stated : "In the old maps of the world left by Romans, the southern part of India is called Lemurika because it was part of a great continent of Lemuria which was submerged by the sea at the time of the great Flood. Lemuria is also mentioned in the ancient literature of the Tamil Sangh. There were 59 provinces (tracts) in Lemuria...... In Lemuria there was a high mountain range called "Panbhale" and a very big river "Patruli"...... Two Sangams were submerged in the sea. The third prospered in Madura. The ancient geographers of the west, Periplus, Ptolemy and Pliny have mentioned it."

The spread of Tamils in various lands is evidenced by the divine ways of worship of the Tamil God Silva according to Prof. Mathiuanan. In the Philippines, the people worship Siva as "Sivappan". In the ancient town of *Sivas* in Asia there was the worship of Sivas Bull. In Indonesia there are ancient Siva Temples and still there are worshippers of Shiva. A sacred hill in Ceylon is called "Sivan oli pada Malai." In ancient periods "Sivo" was the deity worshipped by the Japanese. And in Korea there were Siva shrines in each street. Sivan is the name of a month recorded on ancient Babylonian clay plates. Siva was one day of the week in Acadia. Siva Linga has been found in the river beds of Egypt, thus suggesting that the Tamils had been there. The Tricumbarai Dance in Siam came from the ancient Indian Tamils. During the coronation festival in Siam, two lines of Thiruvambavai were inscribed in Pali and read to the king. The way of life of the Indus Valley (India) in its trade customs, agricultural operations, pottery, weaving, pictorial on potteries were the same as for Egypt and Sumeria. It was the ancient Tamils that made "cultural conquest" of these areas as early as 4000 to 3000 BC. The ancient Tamils exported the Indian peacocks and crows to Babylonia which had no such birds. Huge structures such as the great Granaries of Harappa were copied later by the Romans and the English.

In very ancient days in Punjab, there was a Tamil King Pravahana Saivali, who maintained a Tamil Academy. Ancient seers, as Gautama, continued their Tamil studies, as mentioned in Chandogya Upanishad 5th Prakatanam, 3rd Kanda.

The Cholas had lived in Sikkim and Tibet as is evidenced by Sola pass (Sola range). The Garo Hills in Meghalaya is the old Seran

Giri." An old Tamil dialect in Nepal was "Thangari." A district in Nepal is named *Chola Kola*. There is a tradition and an ancient legend in Kedarnath (the Himalayan region) that Lord Siva had a combat with the Pandya King. Thus we see the Cholas, Cheras and Pandyas extended their influence in parts of the Gangetic and Himalayan region. In the Bengal-Midnapore area on the banks of Rup Narayan, there was once an ancient Tamil Capital called *Tamulk*. Their Kings were of the Peacock dynasty. According to Prabuddha Bharata, 1921, in medieval times the Kings that ruled Bengal were the Tamils. Swami Vivekananda spoke highly of the ancient Tamil culture that prevailed in Bengal. He also stated in *Palas of Bengal*, that the Tamils carried their culture to lands on the Euphrates, Assyria, Egypt, and Babylonia.

Indian history is being rewritten including the Epics as historical events. This detailed information is provided because few, even in India, understand the ancient heritage of the Tamils.

III

Ataturk—More Than A National Leader

Turkkaya Ataov

Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (1881 1938) is the founder of modern Turkey, who emerged 25th leader of the Turks after their defeat in the First World War rallying them for a War of National Liberation and, following its success, for a reformation programme. His success stemmed from his realistic appraisal of the suituation in Turkey as well as in the world and his ability to gauge his own people's potentialities. It is true that he pulled his notion through the worst crisis that it ever had. But Mustafa Kemal Ataturk is much more than in outstanding leader, more then a national hero. This article aims to show that he is still our contemporary and that he was the pioneer of many of our present universal ideas.

The present generation may consider many principles today as a synthesis of the most progressive achievements of the international community, such as the right to resist subjection and occupation, the recognition of political independence and the quest for the equality of states. To be able to look forward, one sometimes has to cast a glance backwards to see the road covered, the progress made. We have to remind ourselves, however, of the epock making heroes who have initially put the foundation stones of ever-broadening movements that have later become significant factors in international affairs. Turkey's Ataturk, whose Centennial the whole mankind is celebrating this year, together with the Turkish nation, is a great name in the first part of the Twentieth Century linked with the anti-colonial revolution and the quest for a better world. If the national liberation struggles of peoples is one of the essential historical tendencies of modern times, it is only appropriate to recall that great Turk in this connection and perceive that had he failed and not exerted such a significant influence, the independence and freedom of nations would have come much later and in a more restricted manner, and hence the rift dividing the world would be even deeper today than it is.

It is time that the process of decolonization, political and social self-determination, the idea of the equality of peoples and the need to create new international relations on democratic and progressive foundations arose from the specific conditions of the post-World War II period. Even the term "non-alignment" itself came into use only in the late 1950's But the Turkey of Kemal Ataturk reflected all these progressive ideas and inclinations in the consciousness of its leader and in the international behaviour, of the new state he had created.

It is true that the countries, which later embarked more or less on the same road as that of Ataturk's Turkey, developed, in due course, a particular identity and, with national policies and joint proclamations, formed a category alienated from bloc-interests. During Ataturk's leadership (1919-1938), however, there could be no formal grouping, no organised voting of such countries. Even India in Asia was not free, and Africa was in chains. The struggle for independence and the abolition of colonies had to precede the appearance of non-alignment as a universal movement. Turkey happened to be the first among the societies that resembled her to achieve independence, tackle backwardness and pursue in Ataturk's words: "Peace at Home and Peace Abroad". Liberation in all its forms, however, was to him the sum total of his own experiences. In 1933 he had said: "As I look at the sun that will now rise, I see from after the awakening of all the Eastern nations. There are many brotherly nations that shall attain their independence and freedom. These nations shall be victorious in spite of all the hardships and obstacles and shall reach the future awaiting them. Colonialism and imperialism shall be annihilated from the face of this earth, and in their place a new era of harmony and cooperation between nations shall prevail, regardless of differences of color, race and creed."

Mustafa Kemal had come to the scene just in time for the Turkish people. But perhaps he was too early for the world movement of equity among states. There are decades between him and the almost universal realization of what he stood for. True, the material basis and wide consciousness of the independence movement was the result of the trends immediately following the Second World War. But for Ataturk, even the First World War has showed that the great powers had become the main source of armed clash and insecurity. It was long before Bandung that Ataturk had based his foreign policy on respect for each other's integrity, non-aggression, non-interference in domestic affairs, equality and peaceful co-existence. There were even, in Ataturk's time, different social systems in the world, but this did not prevent Turkey from pursuing peaceful relations with all.

This is not to say, however, that Turkey lacked a preferred set of values. Quite the contrary. It represented, above all, victory, in the early years of the Twentieth Century, of an underdeveloped people over the forces of imperialism. "The Sick Man of Europe", as the Ottoman Empire was then called, had been reduced to the status of a semi-colony. Initially, it had been the now-notorious Anglo-Ottoman Trade Agreement of 1838 which had forced open Turkey's frontiers for finished industrial products and exploitative foreign capital in return for cheap raw materials. It is no wonder, then, that it was Ataturk himself who said as early as December 1921, that we were struggling "against imperialism, which wants to destroy us and against capitalism, which desires to swallow us."

The success of the Turkish War of National Liberation (1919-1922), however, just a few years after the triumph of the October Revolution, was another breach in the world imperialist system, bringing hope to the other peoples of Asia and Africa, then chained to colonialism. For them, the Turkish Revolution signified the victory of the have-nots. Ataturk as well considered the Turkish defence of Asia Minor "not only as honouring a duty pertaining to its own life, but also serving as a barrier to attacks directed at the whole East." He said in July 1922 : "What Turkey actually defends is the cause of all the suppressed nations." There is plenty of evidence proving that this point of view was shared by many leaders of the Eastern peoples. A published doctoral dissertation by an Indian scholar shows how Ataturk's thinking and actions influenced Mahatma Gandhi. While the Moslem Indians named their newly-born sons "Mustafa Kemal", the Urdu language poet Mohammed Iqbal and the Bengali Nazrul Islam have written several verses in praise of Ataturk's emancipating role. The Algerian folk artists were drawing his pictures to decorate homes and public places, at the beginning of their own national struggle.

A close content analysis of the theoretical Turkish publications of the 1930's will show that Ataturk's Tarkey regarded national liberation struggles as independent movements and independence itself as a concept that needed ever-stripping of all limitations. It is no exaggeration to state that the struggle of our people, led by Ataturk, aimed nothing less than "full independence." The central theme in all his statements had been not only to clear our territory of the foreign troops, but also to achieve all-round sovereignty and economic independence, in full keeping with the programme of the Turkish Grand National Assembly of the 1920's. That Assembly had been set up in Ankara on April 23, 1920, as the natural outcome of successive peoples' congresses in several places in Eastern Anatolia while the Sultan's government, having capitulated to the enemy, technically continued to reside in the old capital of Istanbul. The concept of "full independence," that the non-aligned group of states value so high today. had been centrally located in Mustafa Kemal's mind and deeds. It has always been with him. Even his comparatively junior rank, during the First World War, in a hierachical organisation such as the army did not prevent him from opposing foreign encroachments. After all, it was this sensitivity, among other qualifications, that placed him to the leadership of the anti-imperialistic armed resistance.

Correct relations with the Soviet Union were rooted in the Turkish War of National Liberation. But the Turks sought collaboration with Britain and France, close understanding with the Balkan and Asiatic neighbours and respect towards the rest. As early as March 1, 1922, he stated: "Those who have recognised our right to full independence, we, at once, considered our friend. The consolidation of those close relations with Soviet Union, which has been the first to recognize openly and sincerely our full and true independence, is the basis of our foreign policy... This principle, naturally in no way, prevents us from renewing relations with any other power that would also endorse our full independence." Regarding relations with the Soviets, he said in January 1921: "We were not told to become Communists in order to hold discussions, nor did we say that we were ready to embrace Communism in order to become a friend."

However, as well known, Nazi Germany's actions in Central Europe failed to find supporters in Turkey during Ataturk's time. Ataturk regarded Mussolini as an adventurer flirting disaster. Showing lively interest in the Ethiopian cause, Turkey had been one of the pillars of the Mediterranean system against possible Italian reactions to the application of sanctions. Turkey was a member of the Committee of Five, set up in September 1935 to draw up a plan of reform and assistance to Ethiopia, where the Turkish Red Crescent did relief work. Turkish initiative also paved the way for the Nyon Conference in 1937 in defense of international shipping against piratical attacks. The records of the League of Nations may be consulted to see how active Ataturk's Turkey had been on the crucial question of disarmament. Turkey not only needed to spend her energy and resources to peaceful development, but she also wanted actively to contribute to the protection of mankind from the scourges of war. Ataturk's Foreign Minister Tevfik Rustu Aras was active in Geneva and all the capitals to realize a consensus on reducing arms.

Ataturk said in the years of turbulent events leading to the Second World War: "One must consider humanity as an indivisible whole and a nation its component part. Just like a pain at a finger's tip affects the whole body, a malady at any corner of the world should not fail to attract our attention. In case of such a malady, we should deal with it as if it were in our midst. No matter how distant the catastrophe may be, one should not fail to consider it close. Such an approach to international affairs will save the human beings, nations and governments from selfishness...If we desire a lasting peace, we should take fundamental precaution at the international level. The prosperity of the whole of humanity should replace hunger and oppression. The citizens of the world should be educated in such a way as to root out feelings of envy, covetousness and revenge". As for the Balkans, he thought it "necessary and useful to revitalize real bonds of unity, loosened or even forgotten on account of a thousand-and one human ambitions, religious differences and scars left over from history." He urged "cooperation in all fields, to create an entity that would deserve the applause of mature humanity".

Ataturk would feel perfectly at home with the overriding concern of the non-aligned countries today over the need for a change in the present international system. The Turkish historical experience also showed that political independence did not automatically liquidate all positions of imperialism. Ataturk's definition of full independence as freedom of action in the "political, economic, judicial, military, cultural and other spheres" encompasses the basic principles behind the communiques, declarations and resolutions of the non-aligned today. The present initiative towards a new international economic order is only a logical continuation of his way of thinking. After all, the terms that he successfully resisted at the Lausanne Conference of 1923 came to be known as "neocolonialism" decades later. He was confident that all the countries that resembled Turkey would attain full independence. Attaching due importance to early symptoms, he correctly evaluated Egyptian struggle, Indian revolts, Afghani reactions or the ferment in Arab lands. He made numerous statements revealing conviction that hundreds of millions from the underdeveloped world would awake to a new life demanding equality in all fields...Ataturk's prophesy has come true.

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IV

Liberalism and the Thesis of Attitude Retroversion

John Bryant

Present-day use of the term *liberalism*, particularly as it is employed to describe social and political beliefs, is surrounded by a maelstrom of confusion. Our intention in the present article is to clarify this confusion, identify its source, and in so doing to demonstrate a curious and apparently hitherto unrecognized phenomenon associated with liberalism which, for reasons that will become apparent later, we shall call *attitude retroversion*.

From a lexicographical point of view there are two meanings of the term *liberal*. The first of these refers to one who expresses dissatisfaction with the status quo and who is favorably inclined toward change, and is contrasted with *conservative*, or one who is (in general) opposed to change. The second meaning of *liberal*, as given by the *Funk and Wagnalls Standard Dictionary*, is "free from narrowness, bigotry or bondage to authority or creed; tolerant; broadminded." Evidently, then, when we speak of "liberalism", we are not speaking clearly unless we have made known whether we are referring to the liberalism of change and reform—which we shall hence forth call *reform liberalism*—or whether we are speaking of the liberalism of tolerance—which we shall designate *tolerant liberalism*. The blurring of these two distinctions has, I suggest, proved an important source of confusion in much of the political and social thinking of the present day. (My reasons for saying this will become clearer in a moment.)

But what, may we ask, is responsible for the blurring of these distinctions? One obvious hypothesis is that people have been

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sloppy in their language, by using *liberal* without specifying in what sense the word is to be understood. In my opinion, however, there is a more likely hypothesis than this. To explain, let us observe that conservatives, by being upholders of the status quo, are likely to be the principal wielders of power in any community; and thus any opinions or behavior inconsonant with the status quo (for which the reform liberals would be expected to be largely responsible) would tend to be threatened by this conservative power. From this, then, we see that reform liberals are often forced to justify themselves to the powers-that-be. But what, may we ask, is the justification that reform liberals are most likely to advance ? Now evidently, reform liberals cannot in this regard be expected to make much headway with conservatives by simply arguing for reform with those who oppose reform. Instead, I suggest, reform liberals tend to argue for tolerance of *all* opinions and behavior, since this not only justifies their own position but also tends to play down any threat to the status quo which conservatives might otherwise view reform liberals as presenting. This, however, means that reform liberals tend to act the role of tolerant liberals, and thus the word *liberal* in *both* of its meanings tends to denote the same class of individuals.

Now to assert, as we have done above, that the class of reform liberals and the class of tolerant liberals have a large membership in common is not of course to assert that there is any necessary connection between reform liberalism and tolerant liberalism. Indeed, radical rhetoric of the present day can leave no doubt that intolerance abounds in reform liberal circles. Further more, it should be evident that there is nothing to prevent the staunchest conservative from being a tolerant liberal, though in the present state of the language it might be inadvisable to call such an individual a liberal to his face.

Now in a manner similar to the way in which the two meanings of the term *liberal* have become confused is the way in which the meanings of the two terms *reactionary* and *ultra-conservative* have come to be confused. More particularly, a reactionary is a person who wishes to return to the ways of a former time, while an ultra-conservative is one who wishes to maintain the status-quo in a very uncompromising manner : but since reactionaries and ultra-conservatives have often found their respective causes best served by the same actions, the distinction between them has tended to become obscured. This distinction, however, is actually to the utmost conceptual importance, for it permits us to state unambiguously what we shall call the *thesis of reform liberal retroversion*, to wit : *The attitudes of the reform liberal tend in time toward reactionism.* Now this thesis is of course an empirical hypothesis, and thus, unlike the theorems of mathematics, cannot be proved conclusively, but rather can only be made more or less probable by citing the available evidence. There is, however, a considerable amount of evidence in its favor. Some of the more important of this is given below.

A few years ago, reform liberals spoke a great deal about love, peace, and the brotherhood of man. Peace symbols were everywhere. "Ban the bomb" movements proliferated. Unilateral disarmament was a watchword. Today, however, the principal features of reform liberalism are confrontation, violence, and revolution. The clenched fist is the reform-liberal salute. Arab terrorism is condoned, if not actually applauded. Cop-killing has been sanctified in that immortal proto-revolutionary slogan, "Off the pigs." "Planet of the Apes" has become a sort of "Common Sense" and *Uncle Tom's Cabin* rolled into one. And a new revolutionary army surfaces with every other bombing.

A few years ago reform liberals were deeply engaged in a struggle for freedom—first against Spanish fascism, then Nazism, then McCarthyism. Today, reform liberals flirt with, and often openly embrace the most obnoxious forms of totalitarianism, while hurling unmitigated invective of the most vitriolic sort against one of the most politically liberal of all governments—that of the United States. They shower violence-prone black organizations with exhorbitant gifts and grants. And while non-negotiably insisting on free speech for themselves, they appear quite acclimated to shouting down any opposing viewpoints.

A few years ago the great reform liberal *cause celebre* was racial integration and equality of opportunity for all. Today reform liberals tend to support favoritism of racial and ethnic minorities in occupational and educational opportunities without regard to actual qualification. In addition, they look with unblushing favor on black culture, black power, black separatism, and black pationalism. What is more, it has become the style of avantgarde musicians to emulate the monotonous and strident cacophony of "soul music". And for many reform liberals, fatback and blackeyed year have become the ultimate in capacean delights.

By very definition of the term, it is reform liberals who have been responsible for most of the social innovations of our culture. It is interesting therefore that reform liberals are now actively engaged in turning back the clock by their retreat to primitive communes and their advocacy of "natural childbirth", "natural food" and "organic farming," in addition to their recently-assumed roles as environmental protectors and conservationists. Furthermore, although it was the reform liberals who gave us pop art, and slop art, the only people besides octogenarians who wear nineteenth century costumes are hippies and other members of the far out reform liberal fringe.

For many years, family planning and birth control have been reform liberal preserves. At the time of this writings, however, there have been definite currents in the reform liberal community to oppose birth control, at least for minority groups, because of its presumably "genocidal" intent.

Ever since there has been such a thing as formal education, reform liberals have championed the cause of learning for all. Beyond this, reform liberals usually think of themselves as sophisticated and intellectually aware. In recent years, however, it has become traditional in reform liberal circles to discover matters of great philosophical weight between the lines of nothing less than L'il Abner, Pogo and Peanuts, and to attribute a magnitude of importance to such trivia as Marvel Comic Books and Pooh Bear Stories as passes all understanding. But more than this, while speaking with studied seriousness on the subjects of intellectual and academic freedom, reform liberals seem to spend an inordinate amount of time attempting to suppress honest intellectual viewpoints, such as those of Nobel laureate Prof. William Shockley, with which they happen to momentarily disagree.

The area of psychology has long been one in which reform liberals have been deeply involved. In particular, once psychology came to be established on a more-or-less scientific basis, reform liberals fought hard to see that scientific knowledge should replace superstition and taboo in such important areas as human sexuality and the treatment of criminals and the insane. Nowadays, however, appreciation of scientific knowledge by reform liberals has given way to the adoption of all sorts of unproved pseudo-scientific nonsense, including orgone boxes, touchie feelies. primal screams, and the theory that true maturity can only be achieved by returnigg to child-like behavior.

One of the great hoary traditions of reform liberalism in the United States, and an issue which has been vigorously debated ever since this country declared its independence, is the belief in a strong centralized governmental authority. This belief has also been manifested in the philosophies of world government and "one worldism", as sanctified by Woodrow Wilson and as transubstantiated by the founding of the United Nations. In recent years, however, reform liberals have joined in the conservative chorus for decentralized authority, local government, sovereign nationalism, do-your-own-thingism and provincialisms of every sort and description.

The final evidence which I wish to cite for the thesis of reform liberal retroversion concerns religious feeling. More particularly, in this age of scientific enlightenment, for which the forces of reform liberalism have been largely responsible, we observe that it is the reform liberals who have turned on the Eastern mysticism, made mantra chanting a social pastime, rediscovered yoga, spawned the proliferating population of "Jesus freaks," and injected new life into the moribund superstitions of astrology.

If this isn't reactionism, then there ain't no such animal.

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V

The Logic of Decision—Some Critical Observations

S. B. P. Sinha

This term has assumed more significance in recent times in view of the rise of existentialism and humanism because they have perhaps tried to attach more importance to this problem. But, it should be observed at the very out set, that despite this recent reeinforced emphasis on this subject-matter, it should not be held that 'our ancient and modern thinkers have not discussed this problem. As a matter of fact, this topic occupied important place right from the very inception of the philosophical wisdom—specially in the realm of morality and religion.

Now, so far this term 'discussion' is concerned, we may point out that this is understood generally in the sense of judgement or something like conclusion. This term is referred as follows—"The term 'decision' may be used (1) concretely, of the judgement which is affirmed at the conclusion of a period of deliberation.........or (2) abstractly, of the ability to come to a decision i.e. to bring deliberation to a conclusion".[1] So, we see that this word has both its concrete and abstract senses. The former sense is perhaps not so philosophically important and useful as the latter sense because, we 'as students or philosophy, are more concerned with the method or process as well as with the capacity to come to the decision. Again, the title also perhaps refers more to the second meaning of the term, i. e. to the process or the method as well as the capacity to come to a decision. Now, so far the process or the methodology of the decision is concerned, that also can be regarded to be less important than the capacity to decide for our purpose here. But this does not mean that the former side has to be overlooked. That side has also its role and importance. The process must be consistent. In other words, the conclusion must be based on premises and it must be validly deduced from the premises. It must also follow rules of logic and avoid formal and material fallacies of logic. To make it more clear. this means that we should arrive at decisions which should be both formally consistent and materially true. Again, we may add here that our decisions should be based on truth and justice. These are some broad hints so far the method or process of making decisions are concerned and we should bear them in our mind when we have to take care of the methodological side of the decision. This rule should be applicable to impossible subjects and fields.

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[1] James Hastings editor T. & T. Clark, New York *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, Vol. IV, p. 517.

Now, we further see that the decision can be of various types or kinds. This is quite intelligible in view of various subjects in which they are arrived at, e.g., legal decisions, moral decisions, social decisions etc. But, we are not so much concerned with these issues here because they are neither necessary nor useful in the present context.

So, we turn to the second sense of the term i.e. the ability or capacity to come to the conclusion. But, before, we take up this issue, it will not be unwarranted and unjustified to show that this problem of decision, whether taken in the sense of concrete conclusion after due deliberation or even if it is taken in the sense of the capacity or ability to do the same, essentially involves 'psychological crisis'. There are wants or desires—more correctly, there are conflicting desires. So, one has to choose or select among these conflicting desires. Of course, the choice or selection would be quite conscious selection. But, the fact remains that this concept of decision or choice is ultimately based on this psychological crisis and as such this involves different psychological stages like, wants, desires, conflict of motives, choice etc. But, again, it is not necessary to enter into these details. So, naturally, we come to more important issue in this context. In other words, we are commonly confronted with the controversy between determinism and the freedom of will. Determinists or necessitarians deny this freedom of will. whereas liberatarians subscribe to this doctrine of freedom of will. It is generally argued that either freedom of will is a fact or morality is a delusion. Kant is often quoted in this context who rightly held that 'ought' implies 'canst'. The various writers of the text books of ethics rightly affirm that the freedom of will is the first and fundamental postulate of moral judgement. This is quite intelligible and justifiable. If one has to morally evaluate some action, then the doer of the action has to be granted freedom of will or action, otherwise, it would be unfair to say that his or her action is good or bad. But, though, this doctrine is thus considered to be the corner stone or foundational concept in the realm of ethics, yet determinists do not subscribe to this doctrine. Describing this view, Prof. Margaret Chatterjee has observed thus—

"A full investigation of man's antecedent life, including physiological, psychological and social data will, it is claimed, to provide a complete 'explanation' of how he came to do what he did".[2] We may see, here, in this context that monists somehow facitly assume determinism because for them; there is one Ultimate reality e.g. substance of Spinoza or Bramhan of Samkara and everything is said to be based on that. It is seen that Spinoza, although, he is regarded to be the God-intoxicated philosopher. was charged by some for atheism and for denying freedom of will. It is also argued by some that Samkara's non-denialistic philosophy leaves no scope of ethics in this sense. So, instead of going into these historical details, it would suffice to see that apparently, monists were subjected to this charge and their doctrines can be subjected to this charge of determinisms in this sense. But, we see that this problem can be viewed from more developed ethical and religious insight. For example, in Samkara's philosophy, even from the ultimate point of view it can be said that he does not preach denial of ethics i.e. denial of distinctions between good and bad etc. It can be said that, there, realised souls know that they are Bramhans. It is rightly said in this context that the knower of Bramhans becomes Brahman.

So, there is something like super-moralism and super-theism there.

Again, we see that this controversy also finds important place in theology. Dr. Margaret Chatterjee has also remarked thus—"The problem first became pertinent in the context of theology, in the doctrinal exigency of reconciling human freedom with the omnipotence of God."[3] But, here also, we see that this problem is related to its counterpart in the field of ethics and its more consistent and satisfactory solution can be seen in Samkara's supertheistic theology approach. Of course, we see that in Christian theology this has been explained on the basis of "the concept of "original sin" (Adam's eating of apple given by Eve). Likewise, some Indian philosophers mention the doctrine of Karma and point out that law of Karma should be viewed as the manifestation of Divine nature and in this way also, some try to reconcile these antagonistic views.

Now, before coming to the recent emphasis on the concept of freedom, it would be in the fitness of things to point out here that the concept of determinism has also got its own scientific and philosophical significance. Dr. T. M P Mahadevan has also observed thus in this context— "Several types of determinism, determination at different levels...... physical determinism. vital or biological determinism, psychological determinism, ethical. moral. zoological determinism...... were either mentioned or expounded."[4]

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[2] Margaret Chatterjee, *Philosophical Enquiries*, New Age Publishers Private Ltd., Calcutta, New Delhi, 1968, p. 216.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 216.

We further add in this context that deterministic approach has perhaps assumed more importance and relevance in the modern period of sense and science. Newton (in his mechanics), Schopenhouer in his philosophy, Holbach in his concept of power and such others have avowedly advocated determinism. Again, Marxist philosophy can be referred to in this context. Dr. Margaret Chatterjee also says thus in this context— "The most fashionable kind of determinism in this century has been the Marxist variety, where the ultimate causal factors are located in the economic forces at work in society."[5] In this way, we find that this controversy is continuing upto the present era in different forms and fields. But, it would be proper to point out one thing here that the growth or progress of sciences should not be understood and interpreted in favour of determinism. This for two reasons. Firstly, because sciences alone cannot and should not be regarded to be the custodians of everything. Again, their limitations cannot be ignored. Man is not merely machine. He is much more than that. Secondly, we see that even in sciences determinism has perhaps become less significant in the present era It is said that there is no strict determinism in the sub-atomic world.

Now, it would be more appropriate to briefly refer to existentialistic approach in this context. This is not only desirable but also necessary in view of the title i.e. decision. This word has more relevance in their context. Of course, for them also, the problem of decision is more or less same as the problem of freedom. This is quite natural because decision presupposes freedom. As a matter of fact, choice, decision, and freedom. all these terms are inter linked, very clearly. Some may go a step further and may try to show that they may be considered to be synonyms. But in fact, they should not be so considered in the unqualified sense. Prof. Kali Das Bhattacharya has rightly remarked thus in this context :— "Freedom is thus over-natural. But this does not mean that it is antagonistic or even indifferent to all that is Nature... Over-natural freedom must, therefore, be represented in Nature also. At the level of Nature it is represented by what is called decision which, though an empirical event. is abrupt somewhere. Decision, be it noted, only represents freedom, it is not freedom itself. Its abruptness, another name of which is freedom, is only its adjective."[6]

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[4] *Indian Philosophical Annual*, Vol. Four, 1968, Centre of Advanced study in Philosophy, University of Madras, p. 81.

[5] *Op. cit.*, p. 220.

Now, instead of going in these minute details and distinctions, we may show here briefly that existentialistic thinkers have attached naturally considerable and central importance to this fact of decision-making, choice, freedom etc. in their scheme of the human reality. In this context, we should firstly refer to Kierkegaard, who may be regarded to be the pioneer of existentialism during the recent times. Prof. E. A. Burtt has rightly introduced him thus :— "The thinker who initiated the radical reaction that occurred was Soren Kierkegaard, whose provocative writings have been the fountainhead of both philosophical and theological existentialism during the century since his day."[7] We cannot discuss his philosophy in details here. That is neither possible nor desirable. It will be sufficient to refer to some salient features of his philosophy in this context. He was opposed to panlogism and to objectivism. He and his other followers attach considerable importance to individualism, subjectivism, intuitionism, romanticism and to emotionalism etc. He and his other friends and followers have depicted vividly and feelingly feelings of grief, despair, dread conflict etc. in their writings. They have overemphasised the importance of human freedom and the role of choice and decision in their works. In fact, the freedom of will finds pivotal place in their scheme. All these thinkers have harped on this tune of individual freedom in some way or the other. So far Kierkegaard is concerned, we see that he holds that the reality is essentially "ethical reality". We further see in him three stages or moments namely i.e. aesthetic, ethical and religious. Burtt describes his relevant views thus :— "For Kierkegaard, the moments in the dialctic are not steps in a self-unfolding logic as they were for Hegel; they are momentous crises, in each of which an existing individual makes his decisions... These decisions express a commitment of one's whole personality, and each of them transforms one's entire experience."[8] Here, it would be relevant to refer to David Swenson who remarks thus :— "The intellectual significance of the Kierkegaardian literature... consists in mapping out the sphere of the inner life, the subjective life of emotions, with constant reference to the ideal."[9] Now, we shall further quote Prof. Burtt as he has thrown more light on the problem at our hand. He asserts thus clearly :— "The key to the map lies in the conviction that life is basically a process of choosing and deciding, and that underlying all other choices in the choice of the self"[10] So, we see that he lays stress on subjectivity and the important role of decision therein. He himself. says thus :— "Only in subjectivity is there decisiveness, to seek objectivity is to be in error."[11]

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[6] Prof. Kalidas Bhattacharya, *Philosophy, Logic & Language*, Allied Publishers Pvt. Ltd., Bombay, Calcutta, Delhi etc. 1665, pp. 155-56.

[7] Prof. E. A. Burtt, *In search of Philosophic Understanding*, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1967, p. 61.

[8] *Ibid.*, pp. 62-63.

[9] David Swenson, *Something About Kierkegaard*, Minneapolis, Minn: Augsburg Publishing House, 1941, p. 69f.

Karl Jaspers also advocates his dynamic philosophy of existentialism and lays stress on the importance of subjectivity — inwardness — freedom etc. in his own way. Dr. D. M. Datta has commended him quite fairly thus :— Jaspers is more positive than Kierkegaard in his attitude towards life, and in his communication of existential faith and philosophy."[12]

Again, Martin Heideger studies Being inwardly through consciousness. This also shows influence of Husserl's phenomenology on him. Likewise, he seems to be influenced by Kierkegaard so far his emphasis on the subjectivity is concerned. He depicts curiosity, anxiety, happiness, boredom, fear, dread etc. in his works. Commenting on his philosophy, Dr. Datta says thus :— "Dread of death is a keymood of great significance. It makes man live existentially with a sense of his personal destiny, its responsibilities and duties. It pulls him into authentic existence out... i.e. his unauthentic, self-forgetful...[13] we may further add in this context that his conception of Being as self-revealing is of paramount philosophical importance. Again, we see that according to him, freedom is considered to be the essence of truth. He himself declares thus :— "The essence of truth is freedom."[14]

Now, we shall refer to Sartre's views in this context briefly because he is also very important thinker of this school. Besides this, his views should be also mentioned as he belongs to the different type of existentialism which is known as atheistic type. Now, without going into details here, it would be sufficient to show that he also, perhaps more fervently, believed in facts of despair, grief, anguish etc. and also subscribes to doctrines of subjectivity, freedom etc. in his own way. Describing his views in this context, Prof. Burtt has remarked thus :— "Though life may well appear brutal and nauseating, to face its absurdity in full awareness in a decisive step toward the acknowledgement of freedom and the acceptance of responsibility... Freedom, to him, is both an ontological and a moral datum in man's experience."[15] We further see that he clearly and fervently talks about freedom of man. He says thus in this context :— "man is free, man is freedom."[16]

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[10] *Op. cit.*, p. 64

[11] Kierkegaard, *Postscript*, p. 181.

[12] Dr. D.M. Datta, *The Chief currents of contemporary philosophy*, The University of Calcutta, Third edition, 1970, p. 529.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 534.

[14] Heidegger, *Existence and Being*, p. 330.

Thus, we see that these modern thinkers belonging to this school of existentialism have laid more emphasis to these facts of freedom, choice, decision in their works. That is why, it was hinted at the very out set that this problem of decision has assumed more significance in this background.

Now, it would be desirable to make some humble observations in the light of the above discussions. Firstly, we may see that this problem of decision, which may be traced back to the perennial philosophical of freedom and determinism should be studied in wider perspective. In other words, it has its significance not only in ethics and psychology or only in the school of existentialism. On the other hand, it has also its ontological and theological significance. To make it more clear, we mean that this problem can be better appreciated if it is more universalised. It is not possible to discuss this suggestion in details here. But, we may just try to show that the problem of decision which presupposes freedom on the part of the human being can be better understood and appreciated if the subject or human agent is viewed in the sense of self or soul and that again is somehow related to the ultimate reality or God. In this way, existentialism can save itself from its subjectivism and then it would be not possible to see "moral relativism" also there. We can further illustrate this point thus. If human beings are considered to be spiritual beings or something like that, then perhaps, we can better explain the fact of freedom than Kierkegaard and Sartre. Sartre, through, tried to save his position free from subjectivism, could not fully succeed. Unless and until, existentialism supplements itself with ontological idealism or spiritualism, its approach in the matter cannot be full and fair. If man is regarded as spiritual entity and is related to other co-beings and ultimate reality in some such essential manner (on line of Samkara, Radhakrishnan and others) then the approach can be much more satisfactory, synthetic and balanced. Secondly, so long man or human reality, as they like to call it sometimes, is depicted only in its willing and feeling aspect, the fact of choice, decision and freedom cannot be understood and appreciated in true perspective. Critics may safely see emotionalism romanticism and over voluntarism in such approaches in the same manner as panlogism or intellectualism is seen in Hegel and such others So, what is needed is synthesis or reconciliation of emotionalism, voluntarism and intellectualism and then, perhaps, we can do better justice to this problem of decision.

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[15] *Op. cit.*, p. 76.

[16] Sartre, Translation by Philip Mairat, *Existentialism & Humanism*, Methun & Co. Ltd., London, 1968, p. 34.

Thirdly, we may point out here that if this problem of decision and freedom is linked with the metaphysical approach (as suggested earlier), then in that case we can also try to reconcile the fact of freedom and determinism more consistently in the concept of self-determination. Man, as the spiritual being, limits his unlimited freedom (which is his nature or manifestation of nature) by self-imposed limits or laws. So, the limit is not external but internal. So, some kind of spiritualism has to be sought here to make our approach more consistent and balanced. Perhaps, Dr. Srinivasan hints at the same thing in another context when he observes thus : — "Subjective choice and objective values are thus both subsumed under a higher spiritual unity which overcomes their apparent discrepancy".[17]

Fourthly, we shall like to add here that this problem of decision has got also its pragmatic utility besides its philosophical significance. Human beings are said to be endowed with this unique capacity and in this respect, they are said to be distinct and superior to other beings. Again, we see that they are sometimes confronted with such situations that they have to exercise their this capacity. Arjuna was faced with such situation in Gita and he was feeling unable to decide his proper line of action. So, Lord Krishna helped him to decide by his sublime advice.

Fifthly, we may point out here that the majority of human beings have to make decisions, without any regard for its ontological and other implications. They should see that their decisions are broadbased, logical, bold and should be after due deliberation and should be based on truth and justice.

Here, it would not be improper and irrelevant to suggest that inactionism and the malady of indecision have to be mitigated as far as possible in the larger interest of the humanity. Here, we can be greatly profited and inspired long teachings and preachings of great saints and saviours of the world. In the present era, we can derive a good deal of inspiration from words of Ramkrishna, Vivekanand, Gandhi and such others.

Thus, we have tried to discuss some aspects of the logic of decision briefly and critically and hope to be condoned for some ommissions and commissions here and there.

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[17] Dr. G. Srinivasan, *Studies in East-West Philosophy*, p. 27, Arnold-Heinemann Publishers Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 1974.

VI

Buddhistic Humanism

Diwakar Pathak & Avinash Kumar Srivastava

Buddha was first to propogate the message of humanity, compassion, love and friendliness to the world. It would be right to say that humanism and devotionalism get their first genuine expression in Buddhism. In fact Buddhism has got its own ethics and social philosophy towards which scholars have hardly given their due attention. People generally complain that Buddhism does not have any social philosophy of its own. It teaches only 'Śunyavāda' and 'Kṣaṇikavāda'. This negative aspect, which is rather the initial aspect, has actually been taken to be the real purpose of Buddhism. But this initial negativism and pessimism is not the final picture.

Buddhist philosophy originated when the atmosphare was saturated with the vibrations of various philosophical speculations and religious beliefs. The Indian mind of that time was being dominated by two main currents of thought, i.e., Brahmanism and Sramanism and some of the questions were frequently raised as to whether there is life after death ? Is there heaven ? Whether Karmic theory is real or not, etc. On the other hand, the advocates of Brahmanism were advocating the vedic religion, which believes even in the cattle slaughter for sacrificial purposes 'vaidikī himsā himsā na bhavati'. Consequently, people raised their voice against ritualism and 'Vedic violence. In such a situation, the Upanisads came to rescue and the Āryan people rebelled against cattle slaughter. It was said that sacrifice is a heinous act and only 'Brahmjñāna' is the best. In this rebellious atmosphere Lord Buddha came on the platform with his humanistic preachings.

Infact Buddha gave a new dimension to the Indian culture and thus 'humancentric' thinking started. Prior to Buddha during the Upanisadic period, the entire thinking was God-oriented. The knowledge of 'Brahman' or 'Brahman realisation' was considered as the highest goal of life. Buddha opposed these and asked to use human thinking for the eradication of the burning problems of human life. To my mind it was Buddha who first of all preached to the world the spiritual detachment, lofty idealism, nobility of life and love for humanity. By humanism we mean that way of thinking which is always making efforts to eliminate the human suffering, which helps in the social and spiritual uprise of a man. This type of theory centres round man. It inspires humanity to develop its infinite potentialities. In this connection, it seems relevent to mention that Buddhism has been mainly a religious, spiritual, ethical and a social philosophy. That is why, Buddha always kept himself aloof from the metaphysical questions because these questions do not have any practical and pragmatic bearings in the human life. For him the problem of eradication of suffering is the vital problem. Thus, it can be said that Buddhism emerged in order to sublimate the Indian trend of cultural thinking on the path of humanism, spiritualism and idealism.

At the very out set, Buddha reacted against the inwardness of the upanisads and established the theory of non-eternalism (Kṣanikavāda) and dynamism i.e., the law of karma. He emphasized the law of dependent origination in place of eternalism. He always taught that every object is always in two states of flux, transitory and subject to decay. Every thing has its own cause. Hence the end of the cause will imply the end of the object also. That which has its beginning has got its end also. It is evident from Mahāparinibbāna Sutta that whatever objects are in the world have got their birth from their cause. They all are non-eternal.[1] What ever seems to be eternal and permanent has to perish. That which looks great has its downfall. Every meeting essentially presupposes separation, the death is inherent in the very nature of birth. There is not a single object in the world which can be said eternal. This theory of non-eternalism is also named as 'Kṣaṇikavāda' (momentarism). The existence of any thing is there only for a moment. One moment it is, other moment it is not. The momentarism is explained in Buddhism by the example of a flame. Every moment the flame of the lamp changes, one flame succeeds another although it looks to be constant. Like the flowing water of a river where every moment old water is replaced by the new one similarly, every object has got its momentary existence.

In fact this momentarism (kṣaṇikavāda) is sought to prove the metaphysical theory of motion or continuity. Here eternalism is criticised not to establish Nihilism. Hence it should not be considered as Nihilism. One has to sacrifice much while propounding a new philosophy. And that has been done here for making firm the metaphysical theory of continuity or motion. An object can get motion only when it changes every moment and this cannot be expected from eternalism. Thus, in order to put the Indian trend of thinking on sublimated spiritual path (Idealism) Buddha boldly refuted the eternalism and propounded the theory of momentarism and there by he tried to justify it with the law of dependent origination. This can be said to be as one of the important contributions of Buddha.

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[1] Aniccāvata sangkhārā uppādavayadhammino
Uppjitvā nirujjhanti tesamrupasame sukho ti"

Mahāparinibbānasutta, p. 120.

The law of dependent origination is of vital importance from various points of view It not only indicates the root cause of human suffering but it is also the fundamental basis of 'law of Karma'. According to this Karmic theory certain object causes certain object or events. Buddha is of the opinion that all external and internal, physical and mental events, have got some cause. There is no any uncaused event. This cause effect cycle moves round spontaneously. There is no say of any conscious agent. The assimilation of several things at a place gives birth to certain event. Through this cause effect chain Buddha has invented the cause of the suffering. From ignorance to Jarāmarana the twelve links became known through the law of dependent origination. The law can save us from the partial theories of sāśvatavāda and Ucchedavāda, Pūrnanityavāda and Pūrnaanityavāda. Due to this very reason Buddha gave it so much of importance that it was named as Dharma (Dhamma) At one place he himself has said 'Those who understand law of dependent origination understand Dhamma.[2]

In this connection, it seems relevant to mention that we cannot prove the existence of an object on the basis of its cause. This cause effect chain does not prove the existence of a thing rather it proves the 'Sunyatā'. The world of appearance is based on 'Sunyatā'. Thus, for existence 'Sunyatā' is needed and every fact may be understood in this background.

It will be interesting to mention here that in Buddhism an effort has been made to establish the coexistence of mind and matter as both have one and the same birth place. Prior to Buddha, in the Upanișadas, we find that out of consciousness matter emerged. The materialists, like the Cârvākas, have explained the emergence of consciousness out of matter. Buddhism goes a step further by estabishing the coexistence of mind and matter (Nāma rūpa). Buddhist also propounded the theory of non soul. For them there is not a separate entity like soul in a human body. Man is only the name of the combination of several parts of the body. As the aggregate of wheel, its circumference, hub, axis, horse, etc., combined together give birth to a chariot, in the same way, the aggregate of hand, leg, mouth, nose, consciousness, mental state, etc., give birth to a man[3]. So long this aggregate functions nicely as an organized whole the man will exist. With the disintegration of this organic whole the existence of man ends. Besides those aggregates there is nothing in the human body named 'Ātmā' which is eternal, unchangeable and immutable. In fact, man's life is a continuous flow of consciousness.

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[2] Yo paticcasamuppādam passti so dhammam passti; Yo dhamm passtiso paticchasamuppādam passti. *Majjhima Nikāya*, vo. I, p. 241.

The sole intention behind propogating the theory of non-soul was only to shatter the ignorance born attachment towards the life, which is the root cause of all the suffering. Buddha always taught his disciples to cast away the false notions regarding the soul. By accepting the soul as eternal one develops attachment towards it which results in suffering. That is why, Buddha has told at one place that to have a faith in a permanent soul is just like building a stair on an unseen and fictitious castle. Further he says that to have affection in a permanent soul is as ridiculous and fruitless as to love vicariously a beautiful damsel of an unseen and fictitious world.

The above Buddhist metaphysics is based on its epistemology. After refuting the several sources of knowledge the Buddhists accepted only two sources i.e.. perception and inference. While defining reality it has been made clear that it is always action-oriented and due to this very fact the sources of knowledge which are devoid of this character are not the real sources of knowledge, rather they are more imaginative or more verbal. It has got no reality of its own. Reality is always devoid of imagination that is why Buddhists have laid emphasis upon determinate cause of perception and refused indeterminate one. They have rather accepted two fold sources of knowledge i.e., perception and inference. Perception is the outcome of sense-object contact and inference is recollection of perception. Perception gives us actual knowledge whereas inference gives us imaginary knowledge. First takes the meaning, the other imagins that (vikalpayati). Perception is devoid of any imagination, rather imagination comes after perception. Perception is of one moment, it is acceptable. Imaginative perception is not perception at all. The first contact of the senses with the objects is unimaginative perception.

The above mentioned two sources of knowledge do not belittle the sense born knowledge. That which is beyond sense cannot be the object of knowledge. Therefore testimony (śabda) can't be the source of knowledge. Thus according to the Buddhists perceptive knowledge must not be deceptive. Perception can be accepted as a sources of knowledge only when it is devoid of any illusion.

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[3] Yatha hi angabhava hoti Saddo rathao iti
Evaṁ Khandhesu Santesu hoti satto ti śammutiti.
Milinda Pañha, p. 36.

Buddhists have rather refuted testimony as an independent source of knowledge. The 'Upamān' and 'Arthāpatti' comes under the Buddhist inference. Therefore there are only two sources of knowledge.

In fact we do not find any detailed description of the sources of knowledge and metaphysics in Buddhism rather it has emphasized its own ethics and social philosophy. It has for the first time tried to establish the relation of philosophy with yoga and also the sources of knowledge with yoga.

Buddhism gave a special emphasis over the fact that man must be fully free in judging his act. Almost all philosophical systems are surrounded by the religious boundary due to which man's freedom of thinking is not possible. Buddha himself has renewed his Dhamma i.e., 'Dhammacakka pabbattanam'. This individualistic freedom of Buddhism highlights the existential aspect of its philosophy. One has to decide one's path at one's own description. He will not have to expect for the grace of any unseen power. He has to be enlightened himself (Attadipabhava). This is the essence of the entire Buddhist teachings. Buddha has always indicated that man has to build up his own personality. He is the maker of his own destiny. For that he must break the craving, win the greed, hatred and delusion, control the mental tendency and embeded them for ever so that even the feeble desire for repeated existence be totally uprooted. Therefore entire longings and principles of thinking will have to be abolished. The climax of Nirvāna lies in breaking the self craving. Buddha has rightly observed in Dhammapada 'Tanhāya vippamuttassa natthisoke kuto bhayam'[4].

The essence of the teaching of Buddha lies in arising the unbounded compassion towards the humanity. In fact, the humanistic aspect of Buddhism indicates the annihilation of selfish motives and the cultivation of an altruistic one. Due to this very reason Buddha always emphasized to do away with the demands of the desire and passion of the self which create a hinderence towards the development of altruistic and compassionate feeling in man. So long as the ego, the 'I'ness is not fully dissolved altruism cannot emerge. That is why, Buddha has taught the lesson of compassion, love and friendliness for others. In this connection, it is relevent to mention that Buddha for the first time emphasized on the development of the feeling, compassion and service. After the discovery of the cause of suffering Buddha wandered over the land of India and preached the people the way of eradication of suffering so that by following

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4 *Dhamma Pada*, p. 216.

the path every one may achieve the state of salvation (Nirvāna). Thus, it is clear that Buddha gave a new dimension to the Indian spritualism by advocating the salvation of all (sarvamukti) in lieu of Mass liberation. It is well illustrated in the Mahāvagga by Buddha when he addressed the monks to make a world tour (cārika) for the entire humanity of the world. "Caratha bhikkhave carikam, bahujana hitāya, bahujana sukhāya lokanukampāya satthāya hitāya sukhāy deva manussānam"[5]. The above altruistic tendency of Buddhism indicates its devotional aspect. This devotional cult was indicated first of all in Mahāyāna Buddhism. Here the devotion is not God-oriented rather it is devoted to the humanity and is fully saturated with compassion. The source of the forlorn Buddhist devotion is Lord's teaching of human compassion. He always taught to eradicate the chain of suffering of which the humanity is bound externally and internally. Thus, when the 'Mahākarunā' emerges in any individual there arises devotional feeling. In this present life of individualistic thinking, where, for a petty self interest one is always ready to destroy others totally. The compassionate ethical teachings of Buddha have got unique importance. The present atomic age which is enriched of deadly weapons has firghtened the human beings by threatening their very existence. In such a state the Buddha's teaching of compassion, love and friendliness is greatly needed.

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[5] *Mahā Vagga*, Nalanda Pub., p. 12.

VII

The Riddle of the Self

Dinesh Singh

I

> "One who serves the body, serves,
> what is his, not what HE is,
> One who knows the body, knows what,
> Is the man's but not the MAN himself."
> ——Plato

The present article is an attempt to explore the possibilities and probabilities of what the MAN is? Or in other words what is the MAN himself. The problem was raised beautifully and intelligently in the article "who I Am"? by John Locke[1], in 'Philosophical Quarterly'. The present article is my own reflection on this same old, perennial and universal problem which is tormenting MAN's mind since the time when man became conscious of his consciousness. I am well aware of the magnitude and the complex nature of the present problem which in its ultimate analysis belongs to the realm of ontology and epistemology. The crisis posed by Mr. Locke is the problem of every intelligent man of today. It is a desperate search for identity.

II

I have first attempted to discover the methodology by which we can be able to answer this question. Then I have put forward my own solution to this perennial problem. My answer, in brief, is that I am an "IDEA" in the sense in which Hegel used the term.

III

Scientific methology is the methodology of analysis. First of all, we break the thing in easily comprehensible parts and then we analyse one part after another to understand the whole. The ultimate TRUTH is single and solitary but since it seems to us uncomprehensible so we study its different facts under different heads and then in the name of inter disciplinary approach, we synthesise our findings and try to construct the TRUTH which is solitary, single and ULTIMATE But this approach of analysis will not do. By analysing the parts, we can never understand the whole.

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[1] Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 29, No. 117, October 1979, pp. 302 3.

Illustration :—I will take the famous example of an Elephant. The whole i.e. the ultimate and the final TRUTH is an elephant. But owing to our incapabilities, we are unable to view the whole elephant, as a single unit. So in order to understand and comprehend this animal, we analyse its trunk teeth, tail and nail etc. under the heads of different disciplines and thereafter we synthesise our findings to understand the ELEPHANT in its totality and tonality.

But the aforesaid method is faulty and full of lacuna. It starts from parts inorder to understand the whole. But then what is the true methodology ?

The instrument of scientific methodology is 'reason' but reason leads us to quandary. In answering the metaphysical question who I am, one must take resort also to intuition. But how to distinguish between intuition and illusion ? Really, this bottleneck seems to be serious.

My contention is that intuition is indistinguishable from reason but in fact it is the "reason transcended" which henceforth I will write as REASON. Empirical knowledge is also a priori and rational. We smell,listen,see, touch and taste through our senses but in order to reach any conclusion, the data collected by our senses are processed in and by our MIND which is nothing else but the reason. So there is no opposition and contrast among the knowledge gained through our senses, reason and intuition but these are all hierarchical. Empirical knowledge represents the bottom or the lowest level. Then comes the rational knowledge. But the possession of reason is not the sole privilege of humanity. Even some intelligent animals like elephant, dog, and monkies possess the capacity and the capability of reasoning. Though the difference of degree is always there, but the essence of humanity is not rationality. Next, and it represents the apex of the knowledge-pyramid, comes the knowledge gained through intuition which is nothing but REASON.

IV

Plato's contention is correct that Elephant is nothing but the ELEPHANTNESS or to be more correct, true elephant is nothing but the 'IDEA' of elephantness. So man is nothing but 'manness' or to be more correct 'the idea of manness'. But what is manness ? What does manness consist in ?

Descartes told us long ago that manness consists in thinking. "I think therefore I am." But even animals are capable of thinking. So Descartes can be slightly bettered, but only on the linguistics plain—"I REASON, therefore I am."

So reasoning proves that I exist. But the problem remains "Who I am" ?

V

What is the problem before Mr. Don Locke. In the words of Don Locke himself.

"There are two questions in particular that I shall be concerned with. The first is whether, you or I could have been some one else instead of the person that you are. Certainly I can imagine that I am some one else, Nepolean Bonaparte for example............ And secondly even if this is an illusion, if it is not possible for an individual to be any one else, the question remains of what identifies him as that particular individual. In short, what makes it me—this particular Don Locke — that we are referring to, rather than some-one else ?"[2]

The problem before Don Lock is the problem of identity or a desperate search for identity. "Who I am"? My answer is that you are an "IDEA", in the sense of Hegel.

Descartes answered this question in his famous phrase—"I think therefore I am" implying thereby that I am nothing but 'thinking'. But thinking may be fanciful and therefore it no more remains thinking but becomes "Willing". But it is wrong to conclude that "I will therefore I am".

Illustration : I will like to pick up the example of Don Locke himself. Mr. Locke is certainly not Napoleon. When he assumes that he is Napoleon, actually he is not thinking but willing to become Napoleon. He imagines to be Napoleon as wearing Napoleon's cloth and standing where he stood, perhaps even with Napoleon's face and voice. Probably he might be "willing" to spend a night with the juicy, slim bodied, fair complexioned and beautiful Joshephine. My sympathies and good wishes are with you Mr. Don Locke:

But in order to understand the "self," one have to "reason" not to "think" and here Mr Locke is not even thinking but he is simply "willing" to touch the soft and lofty breast of Joshophine. One cannot understand oneself unless one transcends being above religion, wealth and desires. only then you will be free to understand the "self" which is simply "self" not oneself.

I then repeat that Mr. Don Locke is an IDEA. I will like to illustrate my point.

Illustration: Floating in air is an "Idea", Wherefrom does the "idea of floating in the air come ? The answer is that the 'idea' was always present but we were not conscious of it. Flying birds are seen by everyone many "willed" to fly like birds. several people thought over the "idea" finally Wright brothers materialised the "idea" of flying into concrete. Now the question is who were the Wright brothers ? They were also an "Idea". So the whole history is simply the unfoldment of "IDEA", which wants to become conscious of herself, in other words wants to realise herself.

So I am not Dinesh Singh, I am not Professor Don Locke. I am not Napoleon, I am not mere "thinking", I am not "willing" either but I am an "IDEA".

In the end philosophers should not make the world panicy by suggesting that they are Napoleon, or that Margaret Thatcher is James Callaghon or vice versa.

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[2] Philosophical Quarterly, "Who I am" p. 302.

VIII

A Critique of the Underlying Assumptions, Methodology and Research Techniques Based Upon Molecular Approach to Personality

Moazziz Ali Beg & Abu Sufyan Zilli

The aim of this paper is to present a critical examination of the underlying assumptions, methodology and research techniques which characterize the molecular approach to personality. and to discuss the view that this approach is a hinderance to our understanding of a wide variety of human experiences which, are subtle, highly complex, subjective and unexplorable through analysis.

I

Molecular approach in modern Psychology had its origin in the Philosophical contributions of Descarates, Hobbes. John Locke, Hume. Hartley, James Mill and John Stuart Mill who had developed systematically the empirical-analytic approach to problems of human mind and consciousness. They had laid down foundations for theories which are characterized by ideas of mental chemistry, reflexology, and mechanism. Descartes reflexology and his mechanistic views were subsequently developed by the French Materialists of the eighteenth century and they still constitute an integral part of the conceptual framework of a great majority of modern psychologists. The idea of mental chemistry served as a starting point for Wundt's elementism during the late nineteenth century. and by 1912 the molecular approach developed into credo for scientific psychology. It found its systematic expression in the theories of John B. Watson and his followers. Around the same time it got a firm foothold in Psychology through Pavlov's accidental discovery of conditioned reflex. and eventually it became a paradigm for all subsequent research and theory construction in the field of experimental animal psychology. Learning theories developed by the neo behaviourists like Hull. Skinner, Guthrie, Mowrer and others are all expressions of the molecular approach. Between the third and fourth decades of the present century operationism was introduced into psychology via the neobehaviouristic school which made this approach almost indispensable to scientific and experimental psychology.

The aim of molecular approach was to remove ambiguities, inconsistencies, vagueness and contradictions from the language of psychology and to make it immune from the subjective, philosophical and non scientific influences. Positively it aimed at objectivity. and a full fledged application of scientific methods to problems of psychology. Molecular approach, as the name suggests, places its entire emphasis upon breaking up complex functions into smaller component functions or units of behaviour which can be directly attacked experimentally and subjected to systematic observation. It assumed that such functions could possibly comprise of the smallest number of s r variables, and hence the simplest s-r units were considered ideal for purposes of scientific investigation. The s-r formula was therefore evolved for the explanation of observed functions. Behaviourists directed their entire efforts toward problems which could be readily investigated through experiments and focussed their attention entirely upon overt functions which. of course, were directly observable. Since experimental controls could be applied with much rigour upon animals they were used as ideal subjects for purposes of scientific study of behaviour. At the beginning of the later half of this century s r theory found a broader application of molecular concepts in the field of personality. A comprehensive attempt was made by Dollar and Miller to bring forth an s-r theory of personality. 'It was hoped". as Hall and Lindsey[9] have pointed out "that the simplicyt of lower organism would permit the establishment of certain fundamentals which. when elaborated through the study of complex human behaviour. might prove to be the core of a satisfactory theory of behaviour". These theorists believed that habit, which is the key concept of s-r theory and expresses simple functional relationships, could be used extensively for a scientific theory of personality. They therefore tried to explain all complex forms of overt behaviour through this concept because they assumed that laws of habit formation and learning governed the entire range of complex functions. Process of learning was explained with the help of four conceptual elements, namely drive, cue, response. and reinforcement. Environmental cues, they thought, determined the nature and manner of responses which were established in a hierarchical order through reinforcements, and constituted the reportory of human behaviour in its entirety. Following the lead given by Watson, Dollard and Miller explained reasoning as a process of substituting internal cue producing responses for overt acts. All those concepts which express certain functions of animal behaviour in learning situations, e.g. extinction, spontaneous recovery. etc, were systematically applied to explain functions of human behaviour. Human culture was described after the manner of a T-maze with having a similar impact upon human behaviour and conduct. Unconscious determinants of behaviour were regarded as "those cues and responses which through repression have become unavoidable to consciousness[10]." Repression was regarded as "a process of avoiding certain thoughts and avoidance was thought to be learned and motivated in exactly the same manner as any other learned response[11]." Conflict was explained through concepts of gradient of approach and gradient of avoidance, which served, to account for a variety of behaviour arising out of conflict situation also the varying degrees of the intensity of conflict The whole array of concepts of experimental animal psychology was thus applied to human behaviour at large. Other s-r theories of a strictly molecular order are less comprehensive in nature e g.. theories of R—R. Sears, Mowrer, Whiting and others... All of them typify the purely objective, molecular, quantitative and experimental approach to problems of human personality. They have undoubtedly generated a great deal of research. Criticisms levelled against the s-r theory of Dollard and Miller in particular have been summarised by Hall and Lindzey in their monumental book Theories of personality. We would not go again into these criticisms but would turn to a more fundamental critical examination of this approach after a brief presentation of its underlying assumptions.

II

The underlying assumptions of molecular approach in modern psychology arose out of the fundamental concepts which constituted the Zeitgiest characterising the intellectual background of the nineteenth century. These concepts stem forth from Newtoniam physics, chemical theories of Dalton and Avagadro and the nerve physiology of the first half of the nineteenth century[29]. These sciences were dealing mainly with the behavioural properties of organic and inorganic matter. The major underlying assumption of all scientific thinking and activity within these sciences was that the phenomena occurring at different levels of organisation of matter could be understood more thoroughly and satisfactorily through an analysis of the organised forms of matter and through application of the causal principle. The causal-mechanistic—deterministic view of reality dominated the nineteenth century scientific outlook. Causal explanation was possible only through the analysis of the structure and functions of matter which required systematic observation and a rigid application of the rules of experimentation. Matter could be broken into its component elements only through this procedure. It was therefore indispensable for understanding the essential nature of things, and for observing causes and their effects in the realm of microevents. Scientific endeavours, consequently, led to a rapid development and refinement of methods, tools and techniques through which the complex forms of matter could be rendered into their simpler and elemental forms. Besides, the logic of scientific enquiry required verifiable assumptions about the nature of reality and a generalisation of experiences about it. Generalisations were indispensable to make scientific enquiries meaningful and useful. They could only be made on the basis of complete experiences which could be rendered possible by scientific experiments only. As scientific enquiries took reality into their grips a drastic change also took place in the language which expressed different aspects of reality, and gradually the concepts of natural language gave place to concepts of scientific language. And the scientific language in turn bridged a number of gaps in our understanding of reality.

The issues of the language of science were then eventually crystallized in the present century through the writings of Wittgenstein, Russell, Carnap, Richenbach, Frank, Bridgman[31] and others. There was a general agreement that this language should not include concepts which are beyond verification. The underlying assumption was that meaning of reality included nothing beyond a tangible or a possibly tangible quantity which had scalar dimensions. Consequently a scientific concept which pertains to nothing but eeality must necessarily denote a measurable quantity. Bridgman laid down this cannon of scientific philosophy in his well-known book "The Logic of Modern Physics" in 1928, and since then operational definitions of concepts were regarded as the only truly scientific definitions. This language therefore included concepts like matter, causality, mechanism, determinism, dimension, quantity, measurement, analysis, objectivity, and so on, all logically related to one another, and all giving expression to ideas about reality, truth, knowledge and meaning. And the scientific psychology of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century incorporated all this. Perhaps it had to do so. Karl Mannheim in his exposition of the basic assumptions of modern psychology writes; "thus two fundamentally different tendencies characterize modern psychology. Both became possible because the medieval world which gave a single set of meanings to men in the Western world was in the process of dissolution. The first of these is the tendency to look behind every meaning and to understand it in terms of its genesis in the subject (the genetic point of view). The second tendency consists in the attempt to construct a sort of mechanical science of the elements of psychic experience which have been formalised and emptied of meaning (psychic mechanics)[13]

Modern quantitative psychology, psychometrics, behaviouristic psychology, molecular and field theoretical approaches are expressions of one and the same attitude, namely the scientific attitude of the nineteenth century. Molecular behaviouristic psychology started exactly with these assumptions and made a whole-sale application of the principles of scientific methodology. It is the main contention of this paper that the assumptions and methodology which have proved highly conducive to scientific developments in the fields of astronomy, physics, chemistry and physiology have turned out a major hindrance to knowledge in the field of psychology. We would therefore turn to substantiate this contention.

The attitude characterising molecular-quantitative approach led to a two-fold effort on the part of psychologists to attain the scientific aims prescribed by them. First of all they rejected some of the most meaningful concepts of psychology by labelling them as mentalistic, subjective and vague. They denounced them because they were non-quantifiable, non-verifiable, hence scientifically meaningless. This negative attitude did not allow these psychologists to touch even the periphery of a great realm of facts pertaining to genuine problems of human psychology. Consequently we do not find in this psychology even a trace of such things as aesthetic experiences, our inner reactions to a large variety of experiences related to interpersonal conduct, moral evaluations, sense of moral values, ambitions, aspirations, intentions, feelings of happiness, gloom and despair, patience, fortitude, forbearance, grace, and countless other facts of human experiences which are doubtlessly the subject matter of psychology. Mannheim has aptly pointed out "that this psychology actually constitutes a trained in-capacity to deal with problems of the mind accounts for the fact that it offers no foothold to living human beings in their daily life[13]." The concepts denoting these facts of human experiences could not possibly fit into the s-r paradigm of molecular psychology, nor they could be accommodated within the general framework of the quantitative, mechanistic and the technique oriented psychology. Behaviourists therefore let these things to philosophers, artists, mystics and "arm-chair psychologists", and got themselves busy with the study of overt and observable functions of human and animal behaviour. It was tacitly assumed that laws of animal behaviour could be safely generalized to cover every aspect of human behaviour and conduct. In order to confine their scientific endeavours to the most tangible functions, the behaviourists restricted themselves to the study of the problems of learning habit formation, drives and emotions. Their shaky and hasty generalisations could therefore cover only a very narrow segment of human behaviour within which the similarity between animals and men was only of a remote and superficial nature. This wholly negative and unwarranted attitude was a kind of self imposed limitation which resulted in feelings of aversion, disregard and often of an outright disparagement of the truly human problems of human psychology. No genuinely human problem was therefore allowed to enter the territory occupied by an army of quantitative researchers. Pointing toward this deplorable state of affairs Maslow writes "Inevitable stress on elegance, polish, technique, and apparatus has as a frequent consequence a playing down of meaningfulness, vitality, and significance of the problem and of creativeness in general. As a consequence it is possible for completely and obviously uncreative people to become "scientific" in spite of the fact that an uncreative scientist is as self contradictory as a mute orator[14]." The result of this attitude was the inevitable poverty of knowledge in the domain of psychology. There might have arisen a state of total bankruptcy in this domain had everyone adopted the same attitude. Professor Eliseo Vivas thus points out "consider for instance, that neither Freud nor Rhine (whatever the judgement concerning the validity of his speculations or experiments) could have even started on his work had he taken the behaviourists seriously[29]". But unfortunately this poverty of knowledge in psychology remained undetected. It happened mainly due to two reasons. Firstly, there was a blinding effect of the Zietgeist which did not allow any other perspective of knowledge to develop fully and systematically. Secondly, the continuous refinement and development of technique and the rapidly increasing volume of data in the field of experimental psychology created an illusion that knowledge was advancing with a pace which had no parallel in the history of psychology. It also led to an unwarranted conclusion that psychology was acquiring a status at par with the status of natural sciences.

The positive direction of their two-fold effort led behaviourists into attempts for the rectification and improvement of the language of psychology. This was done through a careful choice of concepts and by breaking up complex functions like anxiety, aggression, frustration etc., into smaller units denoted by concepts which could possibly have a direct correspondence with observables or, strictly speaking, with a set of operations. Choice of concepts was made on the basis of their scientific significance. Defining this criterion of significance Spence writes "By the significance of scientific concept is here meant the extent to which a concept or variable aids or enters into the formulation of laws. Significant concepts in science are those which are discovered to have functional relations with other concepts[25]". Since there were no rules for deciding a priori as to which concept would be significant, the best method to ascertain their significance was to try them out. This open attitude was fully akin to the pragmatic outlook of the American behaviourists. In view of the classification of conceptual levels made be Underwood[28] the behaviourist had chosen level 1, 2 and 3 concepts for their purposes because they were isomorphic with operations of a specifiable nature. Some indeed had to use level 4 concepts as well which are essentially hypothetical in nature. They interpreted everything in terms of habit formation and conditioning. This was the key-note of atomistic, analytic and molecular approach, and the backbone of their methodology. Hull, Skinner, Guthrie, Mowrer, Dollar and Miller, Sears[9] and others all did the same thing. Skinner even went to the extent of discarding theory altogether and admitted only pure data. Others however were more theoretical in their approach. But the ideal of all was to arrive at the level of pure observation where the s·r variables could be seen in their simplest and most direct relationship and could be determined with the highest degree of precision and mathematical accuracy.

The description of such observations and functions required a language conisting of protocol sentences for which, as Von Mises[16] defines them, are sentences through which a corresponderce between statements and experiencible events is established. Protocal sentences cannot be reduced further. The logic of reductionism and analysis implies that psychological functions should ultimately be expressed through concepts which are employed in the language of physics. In his logic of Modern Psychology Pratt[12] has pointed it out that the subject matter of psychology is exactly the same in kind as that of all other sciences, and reductionism was therefore unavoidable. The language of physics and mathematics was therefore considered to be the ideal language for this purpose. Consequently, operational analysis of concepts, operational definitions, methods of direct control and remote control of independent variables, and a wholesale quantification characterised the molecular psychology of s·r theorists and researchers. Operationism became a dogma for these psychologists, an attitude which Bridgman had himself abhorred. Thus he writes "I abhor the word operationalism or operationism, which seems to imply a dogma or at least a thesis of some kind."[2] It is interesting to see that the energy which was spent in controversies about operationism and the number of articles published on this topic between 1930 to 1955 has no parallel example in natural sciences. Many misunderstandings about operationism and their subsequent clarifications absorbed a great deal of time of psychologists. These misunderstandings as Gustav Bergmann believes were expressions of the philosophic naivety of some psychologists. This dogmatic attitude, apart from other damages which it has done to psychology, had a deadening effect upon thought and imagination which is the main spring of scientific ideas In their hectic frenzy to make an extensive application and use of scientific methods these psychologists forgot altogether that great scientists were always poor laboratory men. Einstein never performed a single experiment in physics in his life. He was a scientist with an imagination par excellence. The physicist Max Born has drawn attention to the fact that "faith, imagination and intuition are decisive factors in the progress of science as in any other human activity[7]". It is really strange that while psychologists were getting farther away from the natural language, the front rank physicists were realising the unquestionable meaning-fulness of this language. Warner Heisenberg has made a very clear statement about it. He writes "keeping in mind the intrinsic stability of the concepts of natural language in the process of scientific development one sees that after the experience of modern physics—our attitude toward concepts like mind or the human soul of life or God will be different from that of the nineteenth century because these concepts belong to the natural languages and have therefore immediate connection with reality. It is true that we will also realise that these concepts are not well-defined in the scientific sense and that their application may lead to various contradictions, for the time being we may have to take the concepts unanalysed as they are; but still we know that they touch reality"[12]. As a matter of fact psychologists were trying to catch up with a physics which had already become outmoded. Robert Oppenheimer has pointed toward this basic mistake of psychologists. He writes, "but for all of that I would like to say some thing about what physics has to give back to commonsense that it seemed to have lost from it, not because I am clear that these ideas are important tools in psychological research, but because it seems to be that the worst of all possible misunderstandings would be that psychology be influenced to model itself after a physics which is not there any more, which is quite outdated[17]". But psychologists could not help being influenced by the outdated physics because they had accepted the causal-deterministic viewpoiht on unquestionable grounds. The fallacy of their attitude has been brought to light by one of the foremost physicist Max Plank who believes that causal methods of research are not applicable to psychological problems at large. He writes, "the fact that there is a point, one single point in the immeasurable world of mind and matter, where science and therefore every causal method of research is inapplicable not only on practical grounds but also on logical grounds, and will always remain inapplicable. This point is the individual ego. It is a small point in the universal realm of being; but in itself it is a whole world, embracing our emotional life, our will and our thought. This realm of ego is at once the source of our deepest suffering and at the same time of our highest happiness."[18] It is due to this very inherent limitation of the causal method perhaps, that the behaviourists had to refrain themselves from attacking genuine problems of human psychology.

Following the method of reductive analysis, the molecular psychologists sought to discover laws in the realm of simpler functions governed by s and r variables. But methodological and theoretical difficulties of a serious nature arose when concepts and terms had to be defined exhaustively under the rules which specify how they were to be measured, altered or held constant. When direct controls were actually applied on motivated rats and guinea pigs their behaviour turned out to be fairly complex. Even the simplest functions obtainable under a well-defined set of stimuli required explanations for which Hull and Tolman had to resort to hypothetical and state variables, intervening variables and constructs of a different theoretical nature, i.e. those which were not directly and immediately observable but were permissible under rules of theorizing. But measurement of such organismic variables brought in the necessity of verifications through a reduction operation on the level of neuro-anatomy and neuro-physiology. So long as this operation remained impracticable the entire body of constructs had to remain tentative and purely logical. But operation of reducing concepts to neurological and bio-chemical level undoubtedly meant a shifting of explanation to an altogether different realm of facts. The description and explanation of the properties of molar functions through the laws which constitute explanations of the properties of infra-molar functions amounts to a kind of disjunctive analysis. Disjunctive analysis occurs when the explanation and description of any phenomenon is given in a language the sentences of which cannot be meaningfully related to functions which are observable, and discernible within the phenomenon itself. Disjunctive analysis, in fact is a scientific fallacy because it renders the explanation meaningless. For example, it is certainly meaningless to explain the behavioural properties and characteristics of water during the course of eddy formation or current formation through laws other than those of hydrodynamics. Similarly, it would be equally meaningless if we explain the characteristics and functions of human intentions in terms of laws which govern the electro-chemical behaviour of sodium ions when a nerve impulse is conducted through the axon; in spite of the assumption that nerve impulses might have something to do with human intentions. Reductive analysis, which is governed by the causal methods of research and the logic of quantification, inevitably leads to this obviously absurd methodology. As Eliseo Vivas has aptly noted" A false and utterly absurd quantification is introduced into subject matter that is not quantifiable. The triviality and the egregious absurdity of the results they obtained do not daunt the man bent on such spacious feats, since he does not take the slightest pains to inquire that makes one subject matter quantifiable and another not[29]". Unfortunately to the detriment of true and sound knowledge, this has happened everywhere in the domain of quantitative psychology and molecular psychologists have been especially prone to this blunder.

The admission of organismic variables without an adequate knowledge of neurophysiology raised a number of difficulties in their explanation. They were therefore given the status of mediating conditions or, as Spence has described them 'calculational devices which help to write the complete law describing the inter-relations between all of the intervening variables[26]". But the fact remains that these concepts were bound to remain vague and ill-defined under the strict logic of the verifiability theory of meaning. Nevertheless, they served as a jumping board for attacking problems of personality. The method of remote control of independent variables which takes into consideration mediating conditions has been extensively applied in personality research. Investigation of the problems of cognitive dissonance, fear, anger, and studies of aggression frustration, and conflicts, provide examples of this type of research. Franklin Schontz has recently made a valuable and exhaustive discussion and evaluation of the research methods currently employed in the field of personality. It brings us to the conclusion that efforts of this sort are not only ill-founded, they are also futile from the standpoint of knowledge. They frequently add to the refinement of technique, but rarely make a substantial contribution to knowledge. After his evaluation of the method of remote control of independent variables Schontz concludes; "as personality processes become more subject to restrictions imposed by the laboratory situation, they became proportionally less identifiable as real personality processes, To restrict behavioural possibilities is to limit the flexibility of the adaptive processes of the human organism; and these processes are the very essence of personality. To search for simplicity is to pursue a will-o the wisp. According to this view the ideal investigation of personality would be the one which is least controlled and best measured[20]".

III

In order to illustrate the futility of these research techniques and their inadequacy for purposes of scientific generalisations we would examine here an important investigation which employed the method of direct control in operant conditioning. We shall see that apart from its failure to and anything to our knowledge it is scientifically erroneous and hence untenable. Rheingold, Gewirtz, Ross and others[21] conducted a research on the conditioning of vocalisation in infants. Twenty two infants, all about three months of age were taken as subjects. In order to establish a 'baseline' of vocalization i.e., the rate at which vocal sounds were produced without reinforcements these infants were kept under observation for two days. During the next two days vocalisation produced by them were immediately reinforced. Reinforcements consisted "of a broad smile, three "tak" sounds and a "light touch to the abdomen with thumb and fingers of the hand opposed. Following two days, namely fifth and sixth, were extinction period in which the experimenter, displayed an expressionless face as in the baseline period. Number of vocalisation produced under the aforesaid three conditions were compared statistically; a marked increase was found from baseline to the conditioning period with a subsequent decline towards the extinction period. Results were significant. Judged from a strictly methodological point of view the study turns out to be an example of the stultification of scientific methods. The study fails to define exhaustively either the independent or the dependent variables and there is absolutely no specification of the measurement, variation or constancy of variables. There are no measurement pertaining to the "broad smiles" of the experimenter nor is there any quantitative record of the "tak" sounds which are called reinforcements. The term reinforcement would continue to be a useless blanket term unless we define it through precise measurements. For example we must know the exact length of the horizontal and vertical elongations of the checks and the oral cavity, duration of smiles, nd must necessarily have a graphic record of the sound waves produced by the "tak" sounds in order to measure wave lengths and amplitudes. Apart from these, we must have a precise measure of the amount of pressure which was put upon the abdomen by thumb and fingers. It is certainly true that only these measures which we have just indicated would constitute the operational definitions of reinforcements under the strict rules of verifiability. If these rules are violated then the procedure adopted for the study ceases to be a scientific procedure. Since a number of independent variables have entered into functional relationship with the dependent variable, we must determine their relationship with each other with the highest degree of accuracy. Systematic variation is impossible without it. But in the present study we do not know even the amount of any one of these variables which is the first step toward determining their relationship. These are, undoubtedly, some of the minimum requirements of a scientific study. None of them is met within the aforesaid study. Even if we dare to overlook all these requirements at least one thing canot escape our attention. There is not a single subsequent study of a verificatory nature to check upon the conclusions of such a complicated experiment. By no stretch of imagination can we say that a scientist would ever be prepared to make any scientific inference on the basis of this study. But the inference which is drawn by the investigators deserves mention. They conclude that such responses of adults to infants can be thought of as providing reinforcements in real life situations. The triviality of this conclusion is obvious. It hardly adds an iota to our existing knowledge of things. Smiles and gentle behaviour of an immense variety always provides reinforcement to vocalisation. Every mother and nurse is as clearly aware of this fact as the investigators of this problem. But contrary to their belief and conclusion these variables are never combined in real life situations by mothers and nurses. The conclusion is, in fact, meaningless in terms of situations. But even if we agree to accept their conclusion by setting aside all rules of scientific inference we are still left in utter ignorance about the implications and the effects of such reinforcements in real life situations. We do not know at all what would happen to infants with regard to their emotional life if they grow up under these artificially produced smiles and fondlings. Real experiences of life, tell us that the smiles, gentle caresses and the affection laden voice of a mother are of a very different nature from the scientific smiles and 'tak' sounds of the experimenters Reality therefore rejects their conclusion at the very outset. As a matter of fact the entire experiment and the conclusion based upon it is a systematic distortion of facts and reality and the very attempt to use experimental methods for a subjective, non scalar, and non-quantifiable phenomenon is an unqualified error. Scores of studies of this sort which have piled up in the domain of psychology are not only unproductive, trivial and meaningless, they are, in fact, examples of methodological blunders. They explain nothing, predict nothing, generalize nothing, and add nothing to our knowledge. On the contrary they distort our knowledge of reality. At the most, they are well written descriptions of poorly executed methodological exercises which are useless for all practical purposes. In the words of Sorokin they are a "painful elaboration of the obvious". We shall cite another example of this painful elaboration.

This study was done by Feshbach in 1955. The study was aimed at knowing the drive-reducing function of fantasy behaviour. The experimenter induced aggression among a group of students in a class room by expressing arrogant and insulting remarks. This group was compared with another group which was not insulted but allowed to indulge in fantasy behaviour. Within the insulted group comparisons were made between subjects who had a chance to indulge in fantasy behaviour and those who did not have such an opportunity. Attitude questionnaire, and sentence completion test were selected as measures of the degree of aggression. TAT test supplemented the scores obtained through these measures. Results indicated the presence of aggressive tendencies in the insulted group and comparisons showed that the effect of fantasy led to a decrement of aggressive tendencies in the Insult Fantasy group i.e. the group which was allowed to express these tendencies through fantasy behaviour. These conclusions are as trivial and commonplace as the problem itself. In spite of the fact that the study of Feshbach has better controls than the one which we have cited earlier, it certainly fails to add anything to our knowledge. We do not have to go too far beyond commonsense to understand what the investigator is telling us. We know very well that in an average normal person insult evokes aggressive tendencies which range from feeling of hatred and moral indignation to intentions of revenge and murder. But these things depend on so many factors that it is impossible for anyone to account for them through experimental methods. For example, the individual's temperament, his past experiences of a similar nature, momentary mental conditions, his life outlook and moral values, his judgement of the person throwing insulting remarks, the nature of the insulting language itself and a host of other humanly significant factors enter into the picture when we try to consider the problem seriously and much more rationally. All these factors doubtlsssly go to constitute the meaning of insult in human experience. The amount of insult and the amount of aggression which is claimed to have been measured by the investigator hopelessly fail to have any bearing on real life situations. These "amounts" vary so drastically in quality, kind, and degree from individual to individual, and from situation to situation, that by no means can we say that given this amount of insult the resultant aggression would have this much amount. The term 'amount' fails to signify anything experienced by human beings in their normal life. They never experience anger through 'amounts' but they do have its experience through such states which happen to be non-scalar and hence immeasurable due to their very nature. The term 'amount' in this context, therefore, carries no meaning which can be used for understanding the nature of human experiences. Hence, contrary to the belief of the investigator, it renders our experience meaningless if we try to interpret them through it artificially. Consequently, if we take the conclusions of the investigator seriously and try to do full justice to the scientific precision as well they will never come true in life. If at all they come true. they would cease to have the meaning which the investigator is trying to thrust upon them through artificial and unwarranted quantification. As regards the question of fantasy, it is again a very common place thing for whose explanation the investigator had to go through a cumbersome and confusing methodological exercise. But actually he explains nothing. That anger is often relieved through a kind of imaginary activity or behaviour is a fact of experience which can be understood much more meaningfully by taking a detailed account of the situations and subjective conditions from those who have actually experienced it. But when we use the term drive-reduction to describe the same thing it involves us into serious difficulties. It imposes upon us the conditions of scientific accuracy, because reduction here implies a graded minimization in the quantity or in certain amount of anger — a thing never possible in human experience. Consequently, the more we move in the direction of accuracy under certain basically false assumptions the more it becomes meaningless, till we are left with certain absurd statements expressing artificial quantities which have no relationship with facts of our experience.

Space does not permit us here to add examples of such researches. We would therefore confine ourselves to a brief comment upon the studies of Dollard and Miller. Their theory of personality is based upon experimental researches in this area. They made a systematic and extensive application of the terms and concepts which exist in the field of experimental animal psychology. This mass transportation of concepts and terminology from one realm of experiences to another which is radically different from the former is unwarranted both logically and from the viewpoint of methodology. We have already pointed out earlier that matter acquires a new set of relationships and new class of behavioural properties at higher levels of organization and, consequently, the concepts and laws which are applicable to its previous states of organisation exhaust themselves almost completely within that level or organisation. They have nothing to do with its behaviour at other levels. But Dollar's and Miller's theory replaced a meaningful set of concepts with the one which was less meaningful. For example they wanted to substitute the concept of T maze for the concept of culture. If we fully analyse this artificially imposed concept of T maze in terms of its meaning which are useful for denoting the characteristic of culture it would fizzle out in the course of analysis and would become redundant and useless. In the end we would feel that either we should define everything within culture after the manner of a T maze or else we should give up the concept altogether. In fact, the origins of a culture are so different from the construction of a T maze that it is impossible to use it even as a remote analogy. An exactly similar situation would arise if we reverse the whole process and try to explain the characteristics of a T maze in terms of the characteristics of human culture. If every historian, social thinker, and cultural anthropologist is required to work and think according to Dollard and Miller's theory then knowledge of human cultures would actually cease to exist. Goals and rewards in any culture are so different in nature from the goals and rewards of a T maze located in an animal laboratory that it would be ridiculous to identify and equate them. Similarly, the responses and reactions to these rewards, and the process of conditioning which goes on in the two situations has nothing in common. Bulk of the concepts employed by Dollard and Miller would be reduced to the same position if we analyse them thoroughly. Real life situations, real conflicts and real processes of learning, and real perceptions fail to verify the concepts of their theory. Superficially they do seem to bare some similarities but in this way they continue to be a set of blanket terms. But, however, they are excellent devices for performing methodological feats.

These researches and techniques and their underlying assumptions have caused a great deal of hinderance to knowledge instead of advancing it. New techniques, new theories, and improved methods of research in the fields of astronomy, physics, chemistry, biochemistry, biology and physiology have revealed to us thing like Uranus, outer galaxies, electrons, quanta, cosmic rays, urea, proteins, enzymes, bacteria, viruses, mitochondria, amino acids, synopses and nerve impulses — things which we never knew before. But in spite of an extensive use of statistics and scientific methodology and technical precision in the domain of psychology our knowledge is still so poor, scanty, shaky and unreliable that we often wonder as to how far we have really gone beyond the commonsense and commonplace observations. If at all there has been any notable advancement in this field it is certainly not due to these unproductive and useless feats of methodology. The epoch making contribution of Freud is largely a product of intuition, scientific imagination, versatality creative thinking, careful observation, understanding, rational enquiry and above all-faith. These are some of the inexhaustible sources of knowledge which have repeatedly created new epochs in the history of human knowledge. It may be pointed out here that the methodology and technique employed by the German experimental psychologists like Fechner and Wundt had a limited purpose with which they were fully aware. Wundt, as Boring[28] has pointed out in his History of Experimental Psychology, never believed or thought that any wholesale application of measuring techniques would ever produce good and useful results. He himself made a very cautious use of these things and confined them only to the study and investigation of tangible functions like sensations, attention, reaction time etc., and supported all his observations with introspective reports.

We can hope to make such advancem [illegible] future only with the help of those immense powers of hum [illegible] which have always been productive in the hitherto history [illegible]dge. Scholars of high erudition in psychology like Mary [illegible] Gordon Allport, A. H. Maslow[14], Carl Rogers, Rollo M [illegible] Horney[12], Erich

Fromm[8] Charlotte, Buhler, Adrian Von Kaam[27], and others have clearly realised this fact. They are among the foremost exponents of humanistic viewpoint in psychology. Besides them, many notable scientists and scholars of high erudition like Bertalanffy, Eliseo Vivas, Ralph Lewis, James Wiggins, Von Bonin, Peter Geyl.[22] Heisenberg, Oppenheimer(27), Sherrinton (23), Sorokin (24). Earnest Backer (1) and others have brought to light the fact that human values, human problems, and the natural language expressing reality most meaningfully have all been sacrificed brutally at the altar of a pseudo-scientific methodology and technique, and the fad of scientism has replaced the spirit of genuine enquiry. In order to restore this spirit again a drastic change in our attitudes is indispensable. We might have to abandon mechanical, physiochemical, electrical, mathematical and sub-human models of human personality, and turn out attention toward a genuinely human and psychological model. Concepts related to values, inner experiences higher processes, subjective states, and concepts originating from philosophy, ethics and religion might have to be incorporated in the language of sciences for constructing a human model of man. They are molar, unanalysable, non-scalar, non-quantifiable and immeasurable by their very nature. The currently practiced pseudo-scientific methodology is useless for their investigation. The major field of their application is not industry, propaganda and the advertisement, but the ethics of human conduct, interpersonal behaviour, mental health, cross-cultural understanding, personality growth, peak experiences, self-actualization, and countless other experiences with are distinctly human and radically different from the behaviour of sub human species. This vast realm of human experiences falls outside the scope of the technique-oriented mecanomorphic psychology, because its self imposed and unwarranted limitations tend to purge them out of its domain, However, they are the proper field of study of an open, broad-based and humanistically—oriented psychology which is now growing into a challenge for the existing zeitgeist.

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IX

Psychic Energy and Sadomasochism

M Lietaert Peerbolte

I Introduction

Usually a contribution to sadomasochism (s.m.) starts with a survey of Freud's researches in this field. I think, however, to have a good reason not to follow this use. The reason is that Freud's starting point was a biological basis, i.e. in his days the human psyche was thought to be a product of biological facets with the brain as its core. Athough this opinion is still the academic one, our starting point is quite another one. In our opinion psychic energy is a real energy, although it is an imaginative one, i.e. its velocities are faster than the one of light. This point of view is already elaborated a.o. in "A philosophical Energism (Darshana International. 1981) Moreover, a practical psychotherapeutical application of this viewpoint is made in my publication "Psychic energy and the conception analysis of borderline-cases" (Darshana International. 1981). The consequence of this difference in the interpretation of psychic energy can be demonstrated by the different interpretations of the engram-formation. According to the academical opinion an engram comes into existence when a sensory stimulus has excited some cells in the brain in such a way that these cells remain capable to reproduce (memory) this state of excitement. So, an engram needs a sensory stimulus as well as cells in a special area of the brain. The consequence of this hypothetical interpretation is that no engram can be found when 1. the sensorial apparatus does not function, and 2. when the brain does not function. This academic standpoint can be maintained as long as normally this apparatus and the brain function normally.

But there are in the embryonic state stages in which these two do not function, and even are not yet formed: the conceptional stage and the very early, e.g. the first three months after conception.

Consequently the academic standpoint is that in these early stages no engram can be formed. However, this standpoint is factually contradicted by the fact that one applies "congenital" abnormalities in e.g. borderline-psychoses. In such cases, namely, these 'congenital abnormalities" cause much abnormal reactions in postnatal life.

Quite another conclusion can be made when one interprets an engram as a formation of psychic energy which runs parallel with the formation of an atom. In physics it is well-known that the formation of an atom is based on the electrical attraction of a nucleus with a positive charge and one or more electrons with a negative charge. The result of this attraction is that the electrons become bound to the proton, circling around this proton. Here, the basis exists of all matter which starts with a hydrogen atom.

In a simplified way one can describe this change from a free and propulsive moving energy as follows; along a line which represents the propulsive movement this electrically charged energy shows waves, partly above and partly under this line. By this electrical attraction the propulsive movement is interrupted and the two parts of the wave, above and under the line, fall together in such a way that they form a kind of circle. In this circle, however the electron has two tendencies, the one centripetal tending toward the proton, the other centrifugal as remainder of the original propulsive movement which has lost part of its energy, the so-called binding-energy, i.e. the amount of energy which has to be added to this atom in order toget the two components, proton and electron, free from each other so that each of them can continue the free movement.

As to psychic energy a similar process is the basis of any engarm-formation; round a nucleus, as an ego, emotional qualities of psychic energy circle around, whereas the nucleus itself is related to the cause of this engram-formation. As to the emotional energies around this kernel the centrifugal components compel this ego to act outwards, whereas the centripetal components keep a contact with the nucleus, the ego (i.e. a consciousness as particle aspect). If the emotional qualities around the kernel are "synton" with the main stream of psychic energy, then the individual experiences pleasure, or lust. However, if the emotional qualities are "dyston" regarding the main stream of psychic energy, the experience is displeasure, or unlust.

This model about any engram-formation is applicable as well regarding prenatal conceptional engrams as regarding postnatal ones. Of course, this is in complete contrast to the generally accepted, academical concepts which, in comparison, seem rather "neurotic" by their limited scope, as can be illustrated by an everyday example.

If sex is only a matter of an ejaculation, the positivistic and academical standpoint may be sufficient. In this case "making love" is identical with the ejaculation and sexual intercourse means only an achievement, a proof and demonstration of potency. However, the emotion of love is lacking in it. Surely, this is a neurotic narrowing of the real sexual and orgastical experience.

II S. M. and engram-formation

A. The pre conceptional Ur ego as an Ur-engarm

In several publications (a.o. Psychic Energy, 1975; Cosmic Existentialism, Darshana International, 1981 and others) the existence of a consciousness about infinity, already present in the pre-conceptional field of attraction, is described and interpreted as a resonance between free psycoic energy in the cosmos and the field of attraction etween the two gametes with originally an instinctive character. Via this resonance the free psychic energy emits some psychons to the originally instinctive field of attraction. The addition of these psychons by absorption, causes the arising of the Ur-consciousness about infinity, whereas the originally instinctive forces become conscious as "love". So, the contents of the Ur-ego are consciousness about infinity with a conscious feeling of love.

When the sperm enters the ovum, the ideal situation would be a lustful, joyful and orgastical experience of space together with an emotional feeling of objectless love. However, in psychopathology which is based on conceptional disturbances, this ideal situation does not exist. On the contrary, in cases of schizoid as well as of cycloid borderline cases (c.f. Psychic energy and the conception-analysis of borderline cases", Darshana International, 1981) the entrance of the sperm together with the Ur-ego evokes reactions of resistance in the ovum under influence of the maternal psyche with some form of narcissistic structure. These resistances in the maternal psyche form the negative mirror-images of the entering sperm plus Ur-ego; instead of infinite love an infinite hate, regression instead of progression and, moreover, these resistances form engrams in the psychic energy of the new individual as a kind of paradosis.

In such borderline-cases the battle between a positive experiencing of joy and lust and negative resistances forms the starting point of s.m.-drives: who is the strongest, the maternal resistances or the own consciousness of infinity and love, and by the formation of an engram on the psychic energy of the new individual, this battle is incorporated (introjected) in this individual as a "cat and mouse-play", repeating itself lifelong if it is not treated by analysis.

On the one hand, in principle, this approach and interpretation of the psychopathology of such borderline-cases is not different from the analytical interpretations of any neurosis: on the other hand, it is quite understandable that the academic standpoint cannot be otherwise than "it is a congenital questions". If the psychic energy is a creation of man himself, the evaluation of such cases cannot advance further than a continued battle between thanatotic, s.m. tendencies without recognizing that the battle regards an engram caused by external influences: the maternal psyche.

In this engram the centripetal emotion, in the direction of the maternal ego, is a masochistic one; the centrifugal one a sadistic component: rage against the "maternal image".

Comparing the primal engram, or Ur ego with this "cat and mouse"-engram it is obvious that regarding the Ur-ego a syntony exists between the absorbed and the free psychic energy in the cosmos. The "cat and mouse"-engram with its s.m. character, on the contrary, is not synton, but strongly dyston regarding the entering Ur-ego.

Although I have not treated really psychopathical persons, it is my impression that the dominance of destructive tendencies, as well regarding the outside world as regarding the persons themselves, might be related to a very strong dominance of the introjected maternal image: the maternal refusal regarding the acceptance of the Ur-ego in the ovum, so, a more definite regression toward the maternal psyche.

Some readers may be amazed that such a "conception-shock", as Fodor already called it, can have such extreme and lifelong consequences. One can compare the arising of an engram with a photograph on a sensitive film. Although this photograph is caused by the addition of (light-) energy to the sensitive film, the photograph is no more similar to the original film. Moreover, one can enlarge this comparison when using the photograph for projecting aims: light going through the photograph projected on a screen. If one replaces the light by the Ur-ego, one receives a clear picture of the mixture of s.m. with love, whereas this love radiates from the Ur-ego as a tendency to realize this Ur-ego

III. Dominance and submission

It is not without a purpose that the s.m. is demonstrated at a conceptional level. First of all, it must be emphasized that the therapeutical approach of borderline-cases is possible along this viewpoints. Secondly, the psychodynamical interpretation of s.m. on this conceptional level is more simplified than e.g. in postnatal life where already many and different influences determine the s.m. engram. Of course, one can take e.g. birth itself as an example of influences which cause a s.m. engram. But in many cases the trauma of birth is already determined by many facets; if during the prenatal period some event happens, such as a threat of abortion, or the loss of one of a twin, then the influences at birth are already more complicated by the fixation of the prenatal, or conceptional disturbance.

In the s.m.-engram at the conceptional level the basic principle of all s.m. is very clear : it is the relation of dominance and submission. This is the core of the "multi-headed dragon", called s.m. Indeed, this dragon is multi-headed. Some of these heads can be mentioned :

1. At the social level dominance means power; it can be political, military, economical, etc. power which tends to subjection of other people;

2. At the economical level dominance and submission are already playing their role in the way the law of supply and demand is handled. Is there much supply, relatively more than demand, then the prices will be low; inflation, caused by the public circulation of relatively too much money, is one facet of the reversed situation of too much demand:

3. In the relation man-woman, also in marriages, the mutual efforts of dominance, subjecting the partner, are in itself a multi-headed dragon and regarding the education of the children the same principle is of value;

4. Also in the Freudian relation between the ego and the Id things are mainly in the same way of a sadistic ego, repressing the Id, and a masochistic Id "complaining" about the repression and looking for compensation wherever possible;

5. International wars. With regards to these a kind of belief exists that when people can satisfy their daily wants, the wish for war would not exist. It is doubtful whether this belief is a right one as it only focusses on the erotic levels of man's existence (erotic in a wide sense). It seems to me that war is a far too much collective symptom which points rather more to negative oceanic eruptions. Sure enough, economic depressions are mentioned as a cause of war. There exists, however, also an opinion which is rarely pronounced in public, that no economic system can be maintained in the long run without a war. This opinion might be true when one looks at any economic system which is ruled by s.m. traits of "who is the stronger and who is the one to submit": dominance and submission. But such a system is part of a whole cultural pattern with its s.m. traits and so, waz could be an accumulation of these traits as an aggravation of the unlust in culture which is caused by s.m.

Freud excluded investigations about prenatal psychodynamics and by this he was compelled to conclude that, indeed, thanatos would be a primary drive as an antagonist of libido. His observations about interhuman relations convinced him that the thanatotic ego-drives of s.m. were ruling the world together with the libidinal drives.

Just as owing to the researches connected with prenatal and conceptional psychodynamics the conclusion comes to the fore that s.m. is always a secondary drive with at its core the double-head of dominance and submission.

I mean with this accumulation of s.m. that it is not only a matter of the economic system. One can also say that as long as the majority of men-women relations factually is ruled by the mutual s.m., war will be an inherent symptom War and s.m. in cultural patterns are at the neareat connected with each other as the narrowing of consciousness, based on dominance and submission, with the suppression of the original oceanos, or consciousness about infinity, is the real source.

As to algolagny, the form, in which the causing of pain and suffering, by pain, takes a central position, the psychoanalytical literature estimates this form as a deviation. However, I do not see so much principal difference in the pleasures caused by these forms and the pleasures in all other forms of dominance and submission. If the merchant can make an extra profit by his dominant position, he experiences pleasure; if the other one realizes that he is taken for a ride, several conscious reactions are possible varying from cursing till admiration of this merchant. Similar reactions exist in the algolagnist-masochist who can have a deadly fear of being beaten and yet can be satisfied afterwards. It is my vague impression that in algolagnic practices the main characteristic of dominance and submission is accentuated by secondary psychotraumata and specially by such traumata during the prenatal stage.

IV. Conception-shock and s.m.

Psychodynamically s.m. appears to be based on conception-shock. I have already said that this shock is related to the origin of borderline-cases and psychopathy. But an estimation of the presence of this kind of shock, though in lighter forms, can be made when one realizes the percentage of women who show some form of anorgasmy This percentage might be about 60-70%. In these cases, as far as I have been able to study them, the most striking phenomenon is that these women think they have to submit themselves to their male partners and when doing so they do not experience a sexual orgasm. A masochistical dependency on their partners appears to form the break for their own oceanic orgastical experience : the inability to surrender themselves to their own orgasttical experience, substituting this by a surrender to their partner. The fact that in modern youth sexual norms are much more free does not make any difference in this respect. At the conceptional level this rather high percentage of anorgasmy causes also a resistance in the ovum against the entrance of the sperm together with the Ur-ego. This basic masochism together with, on the other hand, a crypto-sadism ; her efforts to dominate the partner, causes conception-shock.

For a large part her attitude in life is determined by some aspects. First of all, very many ages long the churchical dogmas taught that experiencing lust would be a sin and sexual intercourse was only tolerated when the aim would be propagation. Secondly, a very ancient, even pre-christian's opinion was that when the sperm was in the uterus, a child would be formed from this sperm. Moreover, just this opinion confirmed the male partner's supremacy over the woman as he would be the one who had the potency to give the woman her uterine-ability to transform sperm into a child. Round 1800 the German writer Goethe had this opinion : the "golden apples" to be put in the "silver bowl". The whole patriarchical structure of society was based on this opinion. The knowledge about the biological fact that for the formation of a child not only a sperm would be sufficient, but that also an ovum had to be available, did not yet exist. So, from this standpoint the woman had to be submitted to the man and the fact that propagation is based on the cooperation of the female (ovum) and the male (sperm) is only objectively known since about 3-4 generations. No wonder that the mutual traits of s.m. in man-woman relations are not yet replaced by mutually cooperative attitudes !

Psychodynamically these man-woman relations seem to be more important regarding war than the tides of economical ebb and flow, which only seem to give rise to the underlying s.m. tendencies.

From this viewpoint the conception-shock seems to be the expression of the s.m. drives between man and woman which at the same time forms the root of s.m. for the next generation (paradosis). The more these s.m drives become replaced by a cooperative attitude between man and woman, the more this conception-shock will be weakened and finally disappear. This cooperative attitude implies the personal surrender to one's own oceanic-orgastical experiencing where at the same time the unity of the two partners is experienced in a feeling of objectless love in which the one is not the object of the other anymore, but only a paradisiacal experience of unity. Moreover, in this experience the final unity of sexual orgasm in its mental aspect and a cosmic, or religious experiencing is to be found.

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X

Wholes and Parts of Things

Archie J. Bahm

The problem of understanding how the wholes and parts of things are related (which incorporates the problem of the one and the many) has troubled mankind for millernia. It continues to plague contemporary philosophers and scientists, and political, economic and other practical appliers of philosophy and science. Continuing controversies regarding particles versus fields in physics, cybernetics versus structuralism in systems theory, and individualism versus socialism in political theory, for example, remain unsettled at least partly because no satisfactory understanding of how wholes and parts are related has been achieved. The purpose of this paper is to explore the problem and to propose an hypothesis, or a complex of hypotheses, aimed at helping to improve understanding of the problem.

1. **Things.** Each existing thing is a whole of parts. "Thing" means "anything," including "events" and "processes."

2. **Interrelations.** The whole and parts of a thing are interrelated in several ways:

2.1. **Opposed.** The whole and parts of a thing oppose each other. Each is not the other.

2.1.1. The whole of a thing as not its parts is opposed to its parts.

2.1.2. The parts of a thing as not its whole are opposed to its whole.

2.1.3. Whole and parts are opposites. Each opposes the other. Each is opposed by the other. (The whole and parts of a thing are opposite opposites because, and to the extent that, they share in common the thing of which they are the whole and parts.)

2.2. **Complementary.** The whole and parts of a thing are complementary.

2.2.1. The whole of a thing is incomplete without its parts. The parts of the whole supply what is needed for the whole to exist as a whole of parts.

2.2.2 The parts of a thing are incomplete without its whole. The whole of the parts supplies what is needed for the parts to exist as parts of a whole.

2.2.3. The whole and parts of a thing are complementary because and to the extent that each supplies something needed by the other in completing their cooperative constituting the thing.

2.3. **Interdependent.** The whole and parts of a thing interdepend.

2.3.1. A whole is always a whole of parts. No parts, no whole. A whole depends for its existence and nature upon the existence and nature of its parts.

2.3.2. A part is always a part of a whole. No whole, no parts. The parts of a whole depend for their existence and nature upon the existence and nature of the whole.

2.3.3. Since each depends upon the other, they interdepend.

3. **Wholes.** What is "a whole"? What is the nature of "wholeness"?

3.1. A whole is or has "unity."

3.1.1. A whole is "a unit." A whole is "one," "an," or "a."

3.1.2. A whole is undivided. A whole is "a quantum."

3.1.3. A whole is "simple." Although a "whole of parts" is complex, the "wholeness" of a whole of parts as different from its parts is simple. It, merely as a whole, has no parts.

3.1.4. A whole is "an integer" and has "integrity."

3.2. A whole "unites" or "unifies" its parts. A thing functioning as a whole functions as a uniter, as an agent uniting or unifying its parts.

3.2.1. The whole of a thing is the same whole for all of its parts. It gives them identity (identifies them) as its parts. It functions as a universal in being something common to all of its parts.

3.2.2. The whole of a thing includes (is inclusive of) all of its parts.

3.2.3. The whole of a thing comprehends (is comprehensive of) all of the parts composing it.

3.2.4. The whole of a thing totalizes (is a totality of) all of its parts.

3.3. The whole of a thing is "immanent" in its parts. To the extent that a part depends for its existence and nature as a part upon the whole of which it is a part, the wholeness of that whole is inherent in its being as a part of that whole.

3.4. The whole of a thing "transcends" its parts. To the extent that a whole is not its parts, it transcends them.

4. Parts. What is "a part," "partness," or "partiality"?

4.1. A part has "partiality" as one of many parts of a whole.

4.1.1. A part is "other than," "different from," or "externally related to" every other part of a whole.

4.1.2. A part, as one of many parts, is "quantitative" or is "a quantity." It is "one part" among many.

4.1.3. A part is like every other part of a whole in being a part of that whole. Likeness is an internal relation. A part is internally related to every other of their whole in whatever way it is like them.

4.1.4. A part is complex in having many relations (and likenesses and differences) to all other parts of the whole.

4.2. A part "participates in" the whole.

4.2.1. A part is "constitutive" of the whole. It is a constituent of the whole. A thing functions as a whole of parts through the functioning of each part as a constituting agency composing it.

4.2.2. A part is included in, is contained in, is incorporated in, the whole of which it is a part. It is inside, and thus internally related to, the whole.

4.3. A part is immanent in the whole in whatever way it is internal to and constitutive of the whole.

4.4. A part transcends the whole to the extent that it is not the whole.

4.5. A part has two kinds of participation: It participates as one part among many parts of a whole. It participates in the whole as a constituent of the whole.

4.6. A part has two kinds of "autonomy," "independence," "entitiveness": It exists as something different from every other part. It exists as something different from the whole.

4.7. A part has two kinds of interdependence: It interdepends with the whole of which it is a part. It interdepends with all of the other parts for their part in constituting the whole of which it is a part.

5. Organic Wholes. What is "an organic whole" or "organic wholeness"?

5.1. A thing is "an organic whole" when and because its whole and parts cooperate in constituting it.

5.1.1. A thing functions as an organic whole when and because its functioning includes the cooperative and integrative functioning of its whole (as in 3., above) which is not its parts and of its parts (as in 4., above) which are not its whole and of their interrelations (including opposition, complementation, interdependence, as in 2., above) with each other in an organized way.

5.1.2. The whole and parts of a thing and their interrelations participate in constituting a thing as an organic whole.

5.2. The organic wholeness of a thing is what constitutes it as a thing, as an entity, as an existence.

5.3. All existing things exist and function as organic wholes.

6. **Holons**. What is "a holon"? What is "holonness" or "holonicity"?

6.1. When a thing as an organic whole functions as part of a larger whole, it is called "a holon." ["hol—"=whole, "—on"=part]

6.2. Every thing is both an organic whole and a holon.

6.3. The wholeness (i.e., organic wholeness, 5., above) and partness of a holon are *interrelated* in several **ways**:

6.3.1. **Opposed**. The wholeness and partness of a holon are opposed to each other. Each is not the other.

6.3.1.1. The organic wholeness of a thing functioning as a whole is not, and is thus opposed to, the whole functioning as part of a larger whole.

6.3.1.2. A thing functioning as a part of a larger whole is not, and is thus opposed to. its functioning as an organic whole of its own whole and parts and their interrelations.

6.3.1.3. The organic wholeness of a thing functioning as a whole and the functioning of a thing as part of a larger whole are not each other. Each opposes the other.

6.3.2. **Complementary**. The wholeness and partness of a holon are complimentary.

6.3.2.1. A holon is incomplete without the thing as an organic whole functioning as part of a larger whole. Functioning as a part of a larger whole supplies something needed by a thing as an organic whole to exist and function as a holon.

6.3.2.2. A holon is incomplete without the thing functioning as part of a larger whole also functioning as an organic whole of its own whole and parts and their interrelations. Functioning as an organic whole supplies something needed for a thing to function as a holon.

6.3.2.3. The functioning of a thing as an organic whole and the functioning of a thing as part of a larger whole are complementary because and to the extent that each supplies something needed by the other in their cooperatively constituting the holon.

6.3.3. **Interdependent**. The wholeness and partness of a holon are interdependent.

6.3.3.1. A holon is always a thing as an organic whole functioning as a part of a larger whole. No thing as an organic whole, no holon. A holon depends for its existence and nature upon the existence and nature of the thing as an organic whole.

6.3.3.2. A holon is always a thing as an organic whole functioning as a part of a larger whole. No larger whole, no holon. A holon depends for its existence and nature upon the existence and nature of the larger whole of which it is a part.

6.3.3.3. A holon as a thing as an organic whole functioning as part of a larger whole depends upon its functioning both as an organic whole and as a part of a larger whole and upon each depending upon the other for participating in constituting it.

6.4. A thing, in functioning as a holon, i.e., as a part of a thing as a larger whole, is participating in that thing as an organic whole (5., above). That thing as an organic whole is an entity (5.2.).

6.5. A thing, which is an organic whole, by functioning as a holon, i.e., as a part of a larger organic whole, is participating in two different organic wholes.

6.5.1. By participating in two different organic things, a thing as a holon contributes something to both. By participating in two different organic wholes, in one as the whole and in one as a part, a holon unites them and integrates them, both in their existence and natures, in its own existence and nature.

6.5 2. By participaiing in two different organic unities and by having two different organic unities participate in it, a holon exists as part of two entities and has two entities participating existentially in it. The two entities interexist partially in it.

6.6. Some (all?) things are parts of many (more than one) larger wholes. Each thing is not only a holon but also "many holons," one for each larger whole of which it is a part.

6.6.1. When a thing as an organic whole functions as a part of many large wholes, it exists and functions also as a whole or uniter of these many holonic functions. Each of these many holonic functions participates in it as a multiholonic whole. It is "a multiholon."

6.6.2. A thing, which is an organic whole of its own whole and parts and their interrelations, functioning as a multiholon thereby functions also as an organic whole in which each of its many functionings as a holon is a part. A thing as a multiholon is also a whole (multiholon) of parts (holons).

6.6.2.1. The wholeness and partness of a multiholon are interrelated :

6.6.2.1.1. Opposed, etc.

6.6.2.1.2. Complementary, etc.

6.6.2.1.3. Interdependent, etc.

6 6.2.2. A thing as a multiholon is an organic unity of its wholeness (as a multiholon) and of its parts (all of its holons).

6.6 2.2.1. Its wholeness is or has unity (as in 3.1.—3.4., above).

6.6.2.2.2. Its parts have partiality (as in 4.1.—4.7., above).

6.6.2.2.3. The wholeness and partness of a multiholon and their interrelations participate in constituting it (the thing as a multiholon) as an organic unity.

6.7. Each thing, in functioning as a multiholon, unites and incorporates both of two organic unities within its existence and nature. These two organic unities do not constitute it as two things, or as two different entities, but increase the complexity of its organicness and of its entitiveness. It is an organic unity of organic unities.

6.7.1. Not only does a thing functioning as a holon embody the interexistence of its own entitiveness (as an organic whole) and of part of the entitiveness of the whole of which it is a part, but also a thing functioning as a multiholon embodies not only its interexistence with the entitiveness of each of the holons in which it participates but also with the entitiveness of itself as a multiholon and as an organic unity of all of its holons. It is a complex organic unity of organic unities. It embodies multiinterexistence.

6.7.2. Although one may think of an organic unity of a thing as a whole of its own whole and parts and their interrelations as internal to it and may think of the organic unity of a thing as a multiholon as a whole of all of its holons and their interrelations as external to it, both are internal to it as an entity, as a complex organic unity of organic unities. Although one may think of the organic unity of a thing as a multiholon as more external because the wholes of which it is a part are partly, even mostly, more than, and thus external to, it, all of its functionings as a holon are parts of it, and its functioning as a multiholon is a part of it, and so are internal to it as an organic unity and as an entity. (As we shall see below, the parts of a whole function also as wholes of parts which have their own entitiveness and thus partial externality to consider in understanding a thing as an organic whole even without considering its holonic functionings.)

7. **Parthols.** What is "a parthol" ? What is "partholness" or "partholicity" ?

7.1. When a part of a thing as a whole, i.e., as an organic whole, functions as a whole with its own parts, it is called "a parthol." ["part—"=part, "—hol"=whole]

7.2. Every thing is both an organic whole and has parthols as its parts. i.e., every part of every thing is a whole of smaller parts of its own.

7.3 The partness of a part as a whole and the wholeness of that part as a whole of its own parts are interrelated in several ways :

7.3.1. **Opposed.** The partness and wholeness of a parthol are opposed to each other.

7.3 1.1. The partness of a part of a whole is not the wholeness of a part as a whole.

7 3.1.2. The wholeness of a part as a whole is not the partness of a part of a whole.

7.3.1.3. Since the partness of a part of a whole is not the wholeness of a part as a whole and the wholeness of a part as a whole is not the partness of a part of a whole, each is not the other and each opposes the other.

7.3.2. **Complementary.** The partness and wholeness of a parthol are complementary.

7.3.2.1. A parthol is incomplete without the part functioning as a part of a whole.

7.3.2.2. A parthol is incomplete without the part functioning as a whole of its own parts.

7.3.2.3. The functioning of a parthol as a part of a whole and the functioning of a parthol as a whole of parts are complementary because and to the extent that each supplies something needed by the other in their cooperatively constituting it as a parthol.

7.3.3. **Interdependent.** The partness and wholeness of a parthol are interdependent.

7.3.3.1. A parthol is always a part of a whole functioning as a whole of its own parts. No part, no parthol. A parthol depends for its existence and nature upon the existence and nature of the whole of which it is a part.

7.3.3.2. A parthol is always a part functioning as a whole of its own parts. No part functioning as a whole of parts. no parthol. A parthol depends for its existence and nature upon the existence and nature of the parts of which it is a whole.

7.3.3.3. A parthol as a part of a whole functioning as a whole of its own parts depends upon its function both as a part of a whole, and as a whole of parts, and upon each of these functionings depending on the other for participating in constituting it.

7.4. A parthol, in functioning as a whole with its own parts, is both a whole as opposed to its parts and a whole inclusive of its whole as opposed to its parts, its parts as opposed to its whole, and their interrelations. In this way it functions as an organic whole (as in 5., above). In this way it functions as an entity (as in 5.2., above).

7.5. By functioning as an organic whole of its own whole, parts and their interrelations (7.4.) and by participating in an organic whole of which it is a part (7.1.). a parthol participates in two different organic wholes.

7.5.1. By participating in two different organic wholes, it contributes something to both. By participating in two different organic wholes, in one as a part and in one as a whole, it unites and integrates them, both in their existence and nature, in its own existence and nature.

7.5.2. By participating in two different organic unities and by having the two different organic unities participate in it, a parthol exists as part of two entities and has two entities participating existentially in it. The two entities inerexist partially in it.

8. Levels. What is "a level"? What are "levels"?

8.1. Things as wholes of parts involve levels.

8.2. Levels within things. Each thing as an organic whole incorporates to levels, the parts existing as a lower level and the whole existing as a higher level.

8.3. Levels of things. When a thing as an organic whole functions as a part of a larger organic whole, it exists as a lower level and the larger organic whole exists as a higher level. When a thing as an organic whole has parts which function as organic wholes, it exists as a higher level and the parts as organic wholes exist as a lower level.

8.4 Things as trileveled. Each thing existing as an organic whole including parts as organic wholes and participating as part of a larger organic whole incorporates three levels of existence within itself. Three levels of existence interexist within it.

8.5. Things as multileveled. Each thing is part of a larger whole which is part of a larger whole which is part of a larger whole, etc., and each thing has parts which are wholes of parts which are wholes of parts which are wholes of parts, etc.

9. Archies. Although the word "hierarchy" is sometimes used to refer to "levels" without further connotation, more strictly it means "control" or "causal influence" of something lower by something higher. Since the wholes of things are causally influenced by, and in this sense "controlled by," their parts, a correlative term, "lowerarchy", is needed to indicate this kind of influence. Causal influences or controls at the same level may be called "coarchy." Hierarchies, lowerarchies and coarchies, etc., may all be called "archies."

Each thing as a whole of parts not only exists with its whole and parts as constituents, but as caused by them in whatever way their existence and nature are essential to its existence and nature. We sometimes use the word "cause" to indicate what brings a thing (or whole or part) into existence. But we also use it to indicate what helps to maintain a thing (or whole or part) in existence and also to indicate what helps to bring it to its termination. In this broad sense, all of the conditions necessary to, and all of the causal factors actually contributing to, the existence and nature of a thing are regarded as "its causes."

9.1. Things as wholes of parts involve "archies".

9.2. Archies *within things*. Each thing as a whole of parts involves at least three kinds of archies. Any control by the whole over the parts is hierarchical. Any control by the parts of the whole is lowerarchical. Any control of parts by parts, or of interrelations of whole and parts by other interrelations of whole and parts, is coarchical.

9.3. Archies *of things.* When a thing as an organic whole functions causally as a part of a larger organic whole, its influence is lowerarchical. When a thing as an organic whole has parts which function as organic wholes, its causal contribution to them is hierarchical.

9.4. Archies as *multileveled.* When a thing is causally inflenced by a larger whole of which it is a part, which larger whole is causally influenced by a still larger whole of which it is a part, etc., any causal influence from any and every higher level whole upon it is hierarchical control. When a thing is causally influenced by its parts which are wholes of parts which are wholes of parts, etc., any causal influence from any and every lower part upon it is lowerarcnical.

Further discussion of levels and archies will be postponed until after considering changes and times.

10. **Changes and permanences.** To change is to become different. To become different is to change. To be permanent is to remain the same. To remain the same is to be permanent.

10.1. Things as wholes of parts change and remain the same.

10.1.1. Things as *parts* may change and remain the same.

10.1.1.1. A thing may *change* its parts by (1) gaining a part, (2) losing a part, (3) exchanging a part (losing one and gaining one), (4) gaining many parts, (5) losing many parts, (6) exchanging parts (e.g., [a] many parts for many other parts, [b] gaining one and losing many, [c] losing one and gaining many, [d] etc.) When a thing changes its parts, it becomes a different thing, i.e., a thing with different parts.

10.1.1.2. A thing may *remain the same* by (1) not changing any parts, (2) remaining the same (both as a whole and as all of its other parts) while gaining a part, (3) ...while losing a part, (4) ...while exchanging a part, (5) ...gaining many parts, (6) ...losing many parts, (7) ...exchanging many parts (e.g., [a] many parts for many other parts, [b] gaining one and losing many, [c] losing one and gaining many, [d] etc.). When a thing remains the same while its parts change, it is permanent, i.e., it remains the same thing with different parts.

10.1.2 Things as *wholes* may change and remain the same.

10.1.2.1. A thing as a whole may *change* by (1) gaining a part (it changes from being a whole without that part to being a whole that includes that part), (2) losing a part..., (3) exchanging a part..., etc. When a thing as a whole changes, it becomes a changed thing, i.e., a thing with a (partly) different whole.

10.1.2.2. A thing as a whole may *remain the same* whole while it (1) gains a part (although changed and different because acquiring a part, it also remains the same, both in having all of the other parts remaining the same and in being the whole of all of those other parts). (2) loses a part..., etc. When a thing as a whole remains the same while its parts change, it is a permanent thing, i.e., is the same thing with (some) different parts.

10.1 3. Things having *interrelations* between their wholes and parts may change and remain the same.

10.1.3.1. When a thing as a whole of parts *changes*, either by changing its parts or by changing its whole, the interrelations of the whole and parts change (somewhat). E.g., when a whole changes by losing a part, it is no longer opposed to that part, it is no longer completed by that part, it no longer depends upon that part.

10.1.3.2. When a thing as a whole of parts changes, either by changing (some of) its parts or by changing its whole (somewhat), and by changing the interrelations of the whole and its parts (somewhat), it *remains the same*, or permanent, to the extent that it remains the same whole, retains all other parts as the same parts, and has interrelations between its same whole and same parts that remain the same.

10.1.4. Things as *organic wholes* may change and remain the same.

10.1.4.1. A thing as an organic whole *changes* (somewhat) when its whole changes and when its parts change, and it *remains the same* (or permanent) whole (somewhat) when its whole remains the same and when its parts remain the same and when the interrelations of whole and parts remain the same (somewhat).

10.1.4.2. The existence and nature of a thing as an organic unity of its parts (which may change and be permanent, 10.1.1. above) and of its whole (which may change and be permanent, 10.1.2.) and of the interrelations between its parts and whole (which may change and be permanent, 10.1.3.) constitutes it as *an entity* that is both changing (somewhat) and permanent (somewhat).

10.1.5. etc. Things as holons, parthols, levels, archies, etc., may change and remain the same.

10 2. Wholes and parts of change and permanence.

10.2.1. When a thing *changes*, each change is "a" change, is "one" change, is "a unit" of change, is one "continuous" change, is "a whole" change.

10.2.2. When a thing *remains the same* through change, each such permanence is "a" permanence, is "one permanence," is "a unit" of permanence, is one "continuous" permanence, is "a whole" of permanence.

Since change and permanence involve time and since time involves change and permanence, further consideration of wholes and parts of change and permanence will be delayed until temporal wholes and parts are explored in the next section.

11. Times. Each existing thing is a whole of parts. To exist is to be temporal. Each existing thing is a temporal whole of temporal

parts. What is "time"? Time involves two interdependent aspects: "events" and "duration."

11.1. What is *"an event"*? Each change is an event. To change is to become different. Each becoming different is an event. Each event is the becoming of a difference. There are as many kinds of events as there are ways of becoming different. How long does an event last? As long as it takes for a difference to become. Since some differences take longer to become than others, some events last longer, much longer, than others.

11.2. What is *"a duration"*? Each event is the same event as long as it lasts. It is the same event from its beginning to its end. Any remaining the same from beginning to the end of an event is "a duration." Since some events last longer than others, the durations of some events last longer than others.

11.3. Each event as "an event" or as "one event" is a (an undivided) whole. Each duration as "a duration" or as "one duration" is a (an undivided) whole. Each event and its duration are two asaspects of "a something" that needs a name: evenduration" or "durevent." *"Durevent"* is chosen here to name what is constituted by its two aspects: event and duration. What is "a durevent"? It exists as a whole, as both a whole event and its whole duration. Each existing thing is a temporal whole of temporal parts. Each existing thing as a temporal whole is a durevent. Each thing has temporal parts, each of which is also a durevent.

11 4. *Levels of time.* Observe, for example, your heart beating. A heartbeat, including auricular and ventricular pulsations, is one event (durevent) having at least two events (durevents), an auricular and a ventricular pulsation, as parts. Each heartbeat as a whole is one durevent among all of the heartbeats in your life as a whole. Each life as a whole is one event (durevent) lasting as in some sense the same temporal whole from its beginning (in fertilization of ovum) until its end. One life is one durevent in the life of mankind, which is one durevent in the duration of the earth, which is one durevent in the solar system, which is one durevent in our galaxy, etc. Each cell involved in each heartbeat is one durevent, composed of molecules each of which is a durevent, each of which is composed of atoms each of which is a durevent, etc. Levels of things as temporal wholes of temporal parts exist as levels of time.

11.5. Organic wholes are temporal. Each existing thing is a temporal whole of temporal parts, The organicness of a thing as an organic whole includes its temporal wholeness (dureventness) and its temporal parts (durevents) and their temporal interrelations (opposition, complementarity, and interdependence, etc.).

A thing as an organic whole is an entity incorporating not only the organic wholeness of its whole and parts and their interrelations

(5.1.2.) but also, what has been unstated until now, the temporal wholeness of its dureventness as a whole and the dureventness of its parts as temporal and the temporal interrelations between them. A thing as an organic whole is an entity incorporating not only its functioning as a multiholon and each of its functionings as a holon and the interrelations between them (6.6 —6.7.), but also, what has been unstated until now, the temporal wholeness (dureventness) of its functioning as a multiholon and the dureventness of each of its functionings as a holon and the interrelations between them.

The organic wholeness of a thing as an entity (or "eventity" or "dureventity") is thus a very complicated kind of organic unity.

11 6. **Temporal hierarchies.** In addition to temporal levels within things (8.2.) and temporal levels of things (8 3., 11.4.) and things as temporally multileveled (8.5.), any causal influences within and between organic wholes as temporal wholes of temporal parts and their interrelations, etc. (11.5.) involve such organic wholes in archies, i.e., in hierarchy, lowerarchy, and coarchy (9.—9.4.). Discussion is deferred until multilevel causation (12 2.4., 12.4.).

12. Causes. What is "causation"?

By "cause" we mean "cause of an effect" and by "effect" we mean "effect of a cause." The meanings of "cause" and "effect" involve each other. By "cause" we do not mean "effect" and by "effect" we do not mean "cause." The meanings of "cause" and "effect" are interrelated: they are opposed (are apposite opposites), are complementary (each is needed to complete the meaning of the other). and are interdependent (each depends upon the other for part of its meaning).

By "cause" we mean to include here what is sometimes called a "condition" of the existence and nature of a thing. By "cause" we mean not only a cause of change (the becoming of a difference) but also a cause of permanence (or of any continuance or remaining the same), and cause of termination (including maturation and cessation). By "cause" we mean causes and conditions internal to a thing as well as causes external to a thing and both immediate or direct causes and distant or indirect causes.

12.1. Things as wholes of parts involve at least causation of parts by parts, of the whole by parts, and of parts by the whole.

12.1.1 The *parts* of a thing influence each other causally, if not actively in the sense of causing changes, then at least passively in the sense of existing as conditions contributing to the existence of the other parts as parts of the whole. Parts may influence each other directly or indirectly, i.e., by one part influencing a second part by causing a third part to influence the second, etc.

12.1.2 The *whole* of a thing is causally influenced *by its parts.* They cause it to exist as the whole of them as its parts. Its nature is caused to exist by the parts because it is by nature a whole of the parts which compose it. A change in any part, whether loss of a part, gain of a part, exchange of a part, or a change in the nature of a part (which may be caused by another part or parts), causes the whole to become a whole with a changed part.

12.1.3. The *parts* of a thing are causally influenced *by its whole*. The whole is a causal condition of the parts being parts of this whole. Any change in the whole causes all of the parts to be parts of a changed whole.

12.1.4. When a change in parts causes a change in the whole, then the changed whole causes the parts to be parts of a changed whole. Such causation is *mutual causation*, i.e., the whole and parts causing each other. The whole and parts of a thing are interrelated (i.e., opposed, complementary, interdependent) and mutually caused. One may think of such mutual causation as an additional kind of interrelation or as exemplifying and as participating in opposition, complementation, and interdependence as interrelations.

12.1.5. When a part (or parts) has causally influenced the whole which in turn causally influences the part which in turn influences the whole which in turn influences the part, etc., such repetition of mutual influencing not only embodies effects of each within the other, but each then is influenced in turn by the effects of its own influence upon the other being returned through being incorporated into the other's existence and nature as a recurrent cause. This process is called "*dialectic*." Thus the existence and nature of a thing as a whole of parts is inherently dialectical.

12.1 6. A thing as an *organic whole* continues to exist as a whole of parts interrelated by means of perpetual mutual dialectical intercausation. Such dialectical intercausation is present when a thing as an organic whole is "static," i.e., remains the same by each, whole and parts, causally conditioning stable interrelatedness by remaining mutually unchanging in their causal contributions.

12.2. Things as organic wholes are also involved in causing and being caused by other things as organic wholes.

12 2.1. Things as organic wholes cause and are causally influenced by other things as organic wholes of "*the same level*." Such mutual causation is also dialectical.

12 2 2 Things as organic wholes functioning as *holons* cause and are caused by the larger wholes in which they are parts. Such causation is also dialectical. Things as organic wholes functioning as multiholons cause and are caused by each of the larger wholes in which they are parts. A thing as an organic whole functioning as a multiholon has a multiholonic organic unity of wholeness that is dialectically related with each of its functionings as a particular holon.

12.2.3. Things as organic wholes having parts functioning as *parthols* causally influence and are causally influenced by the parts of the parthols, even if indirectly. Such causation is also dialectical.

12 2.4. Things as organic wholes are also *multileveled*. In addition to having coarchical dialectic with other things as organic wholes of the same level, and to having dialectical interrelations by having lowerarchical influence as a holon participating causally in a larger whole and by being hierarchically influenced as a whole by the larger whole of which it is a part, and to having dialectical interrelations by having hierarchical influence as a whole of parts functioning as parthols upon the parts of its parthols and by being lowerarchically influenced by the parts of its parthols, a thing as an organic whole has dialectical intercausal relations with things as organic wholes of still higher and lower levels.

12.3. Things as organic wholes involve temporal causation. Causation is of two interdependent kinds: causation of change and causation of permanence. Causation of change, i.e., of the becoming of a difference (sometimes called "efficient causation"), includes all production of effects as different. Causation of permanence, or of anything remaining the same, includes all of the conditions of its existence and nature and its continuing to endure through changes. Both kinds are involved in all actual causation.

12.3.1. **Causation of change**, or of the becoming of a difference, involves succession. The thing existing before the change is followed by the thing existing after the change. Causation of change involves succession in which what exists before the becoming of the difference is followed by what exists after the becoming of the difference. The difference which is caused to become is called "an effect." The effect of a change succeeds, follows, results from, and comes after its cause. Causation of change is directional, from cause to effect. Causation of change is temporal and has temporal direction: the effect comes after its cause.

12.3.1.1. Causation of change involves both the becoming of a difference and *some remaining the same.* Something from the cause is carried over into the effect. So, although cause and effect are different they are also partly the same.

12.3.1.2. Causation of change involves the becoming of *new wholes*. Causation of change in things as organic wholes is complex, involving many causes in the becoming of one effect and involving the becoming of many effects from one (each thing as a) cause.

The usual symbolization of the relation of cause and effect by an equation ("C=E") is inadequate. Some minimum of symbols is required for conceiving the complexity involved in the most simple example of causation :



Symbolize all of the causes, simultaneous and successive, of a particular effect, *e*, by c^1, c^2, c^3, c^4, and c^5. If one thinks more causes are involved, he may add c^6, c^7, c^8, etc., until he has enough for symbolic purposes. The effect, *e*, which is caused by all of its causes, is, in a sense, completely caused. Nothing exists in the effect which was not caused to be there by its causes, singly and collectively. But also something does exist in the effect which existed neither in any or all of them singly nor in all of them together collectively, for it is "an" effect and has a unity or wholeness of its own which did not exist before. C^1 is not the only cause of *e*, for c^2, c^3, c^4, and c^5 are also its causes. C^2 is not the only cause of *e*, because c^1, c^3, c^4, and c^5 also cause it. Likewise for c^3, c^4, and c^5. The effect, *e*, is the joint effect of the five *c*'s, but there is something in it that existed neither in any one of the causes alone nor in all of them together, because their collectivity involves a manyness and an external relatedness of each from the others which does not exist in the one effect. This something is *new*, something newly *created*, in the effect as a new whole.

When the thing as effect then causes other effects and something from it passes over into its effects, its own novelty may participate in the effects it produces. When causes and effects are partly the same and partly different, some of what passes from a cause to its effect may pass on from the effect as cause to its effects, thus perpetuating sameness ("determinism"; or, e.g., "conservation of energy"). But to the extent that something new emerges in every cause-effect situation that enters causally into following effects, creativity also occurs constantly.

12.3.1.3. Causation of change in particular things involves not only several simultaneous immediately preceding causes but also many series of causation extending into distant pasts. Each of the many effects of the causation of change in particular things may have many additional series of effects into distant futures. Just as we have levels of existing wholes and parts and both hierarchical and lowerarchical kinds of causal influence within and upon things as organic wholes, so we also have past wholes of causation being parts of earlier wholes of causation which were parts of still earlier wholes of causation, etc. Whether some law of ratios of whole-part causal contributions as the causes have occurred in a more distant past, and some law of ratios of whole-part causal contributions as the causes originate in more distant higher levels, I do not choose to speculate. But problems regarding the relative importance of more distant and closer causal relations will continue to plague efforts to understand the nature of organic wholes.

12.3.1.4. Causation of change involves future effects. Does it involve future causes ? Can there be any causation of present effects, including present wholes and parts, by "future causes" ? No and yes.

12.3.1.4.1. No. Causation of change is directional, from past to present or from present to future. There can be no causation of a present effect by a future cause at the same level, i.e., to the extent that one thing or durevent as a whole causes another thing or durevent as a whole, In whatever way one existing thing follows another existing thing temporally, it cannot also precede it in the same sense at the same time.

12.3 1.4 2. Yes. When one thing as a temporal whole (durevent) causes another temporal whole (durevent) which, because existing as a whole, is the same whole from beginning to end, coexists with each of the two while each exists as its parts because each of the two coexists with it while each exists. When the two successive durevents participate interdependently in a larger whole, their occurrence is caused partly by that larger whole.

For example, a heart is designed to beat as a whole, and when an auricular pulse occurs and helps to cause a ventricular pulse, both the auricular and ventricular pulses contribute to the beat as a whole, and the beat as a whole contributes to both, i.e., each, and the heartbeat as a whole cannot make its full contribution temporally to the auricular pulse until the ventricular is completed also. Hence, the ventricular pulse, which is partly caused by and which comes partly after the auricular pulse, is necessary to the whole beat of which the auricular pulse is a part. When a whole-part causal contribution to a part which has ceased by a whole requiring causal contribution by a part that succeeds the ceased part, there is a sense in which the part that follows functions causally in the functioning of the part that precedes through their joint participation in the whole as a temporal whole.

12.3.2. **Causation of permanence**, or of a thing as an organic whole remaining the same through change, includes all of the conditions of its existence and nature and of the causes and conditions of its remaining unchanged. Some things are caused to be permanent by having perpetual recurrence of changed parts needed for their existence as wholes. Such things as wholes not only endure through changes but depend upon changes, and changing parts, for their endurance.

12.3 3. Things as organic wholes involve both causation of change and causation of permanence inherent in their existence and nature as temporal wholes of temporal parts.

12.4. Things as organic wholes are products of *multilevel* causation, and contribute causally to effects at many levels. Multilevel existence involves multilevel dialectical intercausal processes contributing causally to both permanence and change at each level. The wholeness of a thing as an organic whole retains some unity, simplicity, and entitiveness both as an effect of multileveled causation and as a cause of multileveled effects.



... ...

Although the foregoing twelve hypotheses (or sets of hypotheses) about the nature of the wholes and parts of things are inadequate because lacking inclusion of additional essential characteristics of whole-part relations, such as kinds, variations, degrees, importance, and other categories of existence, they may be sufficient to initiate further discussion about the nature of things as organic wholes.

Book-Review

Sadhu Ishwarcharandas, Dr. Srivastava and others : *New Dimensions in Vedanta Philosophy* (Two Vols.) 1981, pp. 938, Price Rs. 90/— Publisher: Publication Department, Bochasanwasi Shri Akshar Purshottam Sanstha, Shahibaug Road, Ahmedabad-380 004.

New Dimensions in Vedanta Philosophy in two volumes is a unique book in itself. It is a compilation of Philosophical articles by 83 eminent scholars from India and abroad. This is a book on Swaminarayan Philosophy, the most dynamic movement which has its influence in almost all the countries of the world. The articles appearing in these two volumes are comparative studies of Swaminarayan Philosophy and other Philosophies of East and West. Shastri Narayanswarupdas Ji, Pramukh Swami of this movement in Benedictions mentioned "Plans were chalked out to make this movement broad-based to cover writers, thinkers, social workers, industrialists, scientists, philosophers and others so as to embrace every section of society vertically and horizontally. This publication is a step in that direction". The book has been nicely compiled and edited by many eminent Indian and Western scholars who are on the Editorial Board of the Book. They are : John Carmon, I. C. Sharma and A. K. Sarkar (U.S.A.) Other Indian Scholars are : T.M.P. Mahadevan, S. Ramakrishnan, A. G. Javadekar, P. B. Vidyarthi, J. P. Atreya, R.N. Sharma, S.S. Raghavachar. S.G. Mudgal, R.S. Mishra, S.L. Pandey, M.V. Reddy, H.T. Dave, R.M. Dave, R.S. Srivastava, Swamis : Iswarcharandas, Atmaswarupdas and Anandaswarupdas.

Part I : Reflections of Swaminarayan Philosophy has been divided into four Parts : The First Part consists of 17 essays under the Philosophical Foundations of Swaminarayan Thought. They are : 1. Philosophy of Vachanamritam—H.T. Dave; 2. Vachanamritam, A Philosophical Text—P.B. Vidyarthi: 3. Vedanta Philosophy of Swaminarayan—R.M. Dave; 4. Swaminarayan and Indian Thought—Ramakrishna Puligandla; 5. Moksha in the Systems of Shankara, Madhwa and Swaminarayan—S.G. Mudgal; 6. Vachanamritam, A Philosophical Text — Miss Purnima M. Dave; 7. Shri Swaminarayan—A Philosophical Synthesis—G.N. Joshi; 8. Methodology of Vachanamritam—R S. Bhatnagar; 9. Swaminarayan and

Yoga—J.P. Shukla; 10. The Concept of Moksha in Swaminarayan Philosophy—Swami Atmaswarupdas; 11. Is 'Akshara' an unsolved riddle—R.M. Dave; 12. Philosophy of Swaminarayan and Ramanuja —Harsh Narain; 3. Shri Swaminarayan and Shabda Pramana—Purushottam P. Bilimoria; 14. Epistemology of Swaminarayan—Swami Bhaktavatsaldas 15. Yoga and Swaminarayan—Swami Shriharidas; 16. Vachanamritam: A Note-John Carman; and 17. Yoga with special reference to Yogavasistha and Shri Swaminarayan—J.P. Atreya; Part II Ethics and Social Philosophy consists of six essays : 18. Ethical Philosophy of Swaminarayan—D.M. Patel; 19. Shikshapatri—A Book of Ethical Precepts—B.G. Desai; 20. The Social Philosophy of Shri Swaminarayan—T.N. Ganapathy; 21. The Hindu Social System and Swaminarayan Reforms—Surendra Verma; 22. Sadhu Dharma and Social Responsibility—Mrs. Teresa Vijayan; 23. The Ethical Philosophy of Swaminarayan—L. N. Sinha; Part III Religion consists of Six articles; 24. Transcendental Revelation—Swami Anandaswarupdas; 25. Shri Swaminarayan and the Path of Devotion—L.K. Aravkar; 26. Mysticism and Shri Swaminarayan—P. M. Upadhye; 27. Progress in Hindu Religious Thought—Nanubhai Dave; 28 The Concept of Devotion as depicted in the Hindi poems of Swaminarayan saints—Rajam Natrajan; 29. The Concept of Devotion as depicted in the Gujarati poems of Swaminarayan saints-Miss Pratibha M. Dave; Part IV Swaminarayan Philosophy ; Its Perennial Relevance consists of 17 articles : 30. The Spirit of Reformative Synthesis in Swaminarayan's Teachings—N.K. Devaraja; 31. Swaminarayan and Indian Thought—H.K. Kapil; 32. Relevance of Swaminarayan and Contemporary Indian Thought—Arvind Sharma; 33. Spiritual Humanism of Shri Swaminarayan—H.M. Joshi; 34. Swaminarayan in the Benefit of Mankind — Swami Vivekjivandas; 35. Swaminarayan and Indian Renaissance—J.J. Shukla; 36. Spiritual Humanism of Shri Swaminarayan—Ramnath Sharma; 37. Humanism of Shri Swaminarayan—Ramjee Singh; 38. Swaminarayan in Contemporary Setting—G. Sukumaran Nair: 39. Swaminarayan and Hindu Renaissance—S.P. Srivastava; 40. Swaminarayan and Contemporary Trends—M.P. Gairola; 41. Humanistic Trends in Swaminarayan's Thought—Pushpendra Varnwal; 42. Swaminarayan and the Future—Archie J. Bahm; 43. Presentation of the Shikshapatri to Sir John Malcolm; 44. The Relevance of Swaminarayan in Contemporary Indian Situation—S. P. Banerjee; 45. Swaminarayan and India Thought—R.K. Tripathi; and 46. Swaminarayan and Renaissance of Hinduism—S.B.P. Sinha.

The Second Volume Swaminarayan in Eastern and Western Perspectives is divided into three parts : Part I In the Light of Eastern Philosophy and Western Thought which consists of 19 articles. They are : 1. Philosophy of Shri Swaminarayan and the

Upanishads—C.S. Awasthi; 2. The Philosophy of Shri Swaminarayan and the Upanishads—T.S. Datta; 3. The Philosophy of Swaminarayan and the Bhagawatam—R.N. Vyas; 4. Lord Swaminarayan and the Bhagawatam—S.N. Thapaliyal; 5. The Philosophy of Swaminarayan and the Gita—D.D. Bandiste; 6. The Philosophy of Shri Swaminarayan and the Gita—H.L. Chaurasia; 7. The One and the Many ; Reflections on Visishtadvaita Vedanta and Swaminarayan—Lawrence E. Johnson; 8. The Philosophy of Swaminarayan and Ramanuja—Carl Olson; 9 Shri Swaminarayan and Shri Ramanuja-S.S. Raghavachar; 10. Philosophy of Swaminarayan and Ramanuja-M.C. Bhartiya; 11. Swaminarayan and Vaishnavism-K.D. Bharadwaj; 12. The Philosophy of Shri Swaminarayan and the Pure Non-dualism of Shri Vallabhacharya-I.C. Sharma; 13. The Philosophy of Swaminarayan and Advaita Vedanta—D. Pathak; 14. Philosophy of Swaminarayan and Vallabhacharya-A.N. Jani; 15 Swaminarayan and Shaiva Cult-S. Gangadharan; 16. Swaminarayan and Madhvacharya—K.S. Ramakrishna Rao; 17. Albert Einstein and Metaphysics-A Comparison to Vedic beliefs and concepts of Swaminarayan-Most Rev. Dr. Eugene Whitworth; 18. Shri Swaminarayan and Taoism—Anil K. Sarkar; 19. The Yoga of Shri Swaminarayan and Aurobindo-R.S. Shrivastava; Part II Comparative Studies in Ethical Ideas and Social Philosophy consists of 11 article. 20. Shri Swaminarayan and Kant on acts from duty Warren Matthews; 21. Ethics of Swaminarayan and Christianity — Richard Desmet; 22. Shri Swaminarayan and the Christian Ethics-Benjamin Khan; 23. Ethics of Christianity and Swaminarayan—A.B. Shivaji; 24. Ethics of Swaminarayan and Islam—H.L Butani; 25. Swaminarayan and Sufism--H.L. Butani; 26 Ethics of Saminarayan and Islam-Miss Mehrunnisa Alvi; 27. The Ethics of Swaminarayan and Sikhism—O.P. Gupta; 28 Ethics of Jainism and Swaminarayan—Mrs. Kokila R. Furia, 29. Religious and Ethical Techings according to Judaism and Swaminarayan—C S. Dass, and 30 The Ethics of Jainism and Swaminarayan—A Comparative Study—Sagar Mal Jain. The III Part Religion consists of six articles : 31. Bhakti propounded by Swaminarayan and that of Tulsidas—S.N. Pande; 32. Swaminarayan and Tulsidas on Bhakti—J.P. Awasthi; 33. Swami Sahjanand and Goswami Tulsidas on Bhakti—S.L. Pande; 34. Shri Swaminarayan and Bhagawat Dharma of Maharashtra—Y.M. Pathan; 35. Bhakti propounded by Swaminarayan and that of Alvars—A.C. Bhattacharya and 36. Saintliness and Swaminarayan—T.M.P. Mahadevan.

This book is a unique collection of 83 essays connected with different aspects of Swaminarayan Philosophy and its comparison with different sects, religions and philosophers both of East and West. The scholars who have contributed belong to different fields of Philosophy of Indian and Western Universities. In the end

Glossary has been provided. This has added to the beauty of the book. This glossary will prove immensely useful for all those who wish to get them selves acquainted with the philosophical school of Swaminarayan which is one of the most important developments of Vedanta Philosophy. This book will not give idea of Swaminarayan Philosophy alone but of other systems and sects which have been dealt here. Shri Akshar Purshottam Sansthan has done a great service to Philosophy by bringing out such an important book which will have a lasting value.

◆

अखिल भारतीय दर्शन परिषद्

स्वामी प्रणवानन्द दर्शन पुरस्कार

१– स्वामी प्रणवानन्द दर्शन पुरस्कार प्रतिवर्ष अखिल भारतीय दर्शन परिषद् के अधिवेशन के समय दिया जायगा ।

२– स्वामी प्रणवानन्द दर्शन पुरस्कार की नकद सम्मान राशि ५००० रुपये होगी ।

३– स्वामी प्रणवानन्द दर्शन पुरस्कार हिन्दी में मौलिक दार्शनिक ग्रंथ पर दिये जायेंगे ।

४– पुरस्कार-प्रतियोगिता के लिये ऐसा कोई ग्रंथ उपस्थित नहीं किया जायगा जिसपर कोई पुरस्कार मिल चुका हो ।

५– इस वर्ष कोई भी ऐसा मौलिक दार्शनिक ग्रंथ जो हिन्दी में प्रकाशित हो और १-१-७२ से ३१-१-८१ के बीच प्रकाशित हुआ हो पुरस्कार-प्रतियोगिता के लिये विचारणीय होगा ।

६ पुरस्कार के लिये लेखक स्वयं पुरस्कार की शर्तों को स्वीकार करते हुये एक पत्र के साथ अपनी पुस्तक की तीन प्रतिया ३० जून १९८२ तक रजिस्ट्री डाक से भेज दें ।

७– पुरस्कार के लिये लेखक अपनी एक से अधिक रचना भी भेज सकते हैं ।

८– विश्वविद्यालय के दर्शन विभाग के अध्यक्ष या शोध संस्थान के निदेशक भी किसी दार्शनिक पुस्तक के विषय में पूरे विवरण एवं पुस्तकों की तीन प्रतियों के साथ पुरस्कार के विचार के लिये उपस्थित कर सकते हैं ।

९ पुरस्कार प्राप्त करने वाला विश्वविद्यालय या उसके बाहर का भी व्यक्ति हो सकता है ।

१०– वरण समिति का निर्णय सबों को मान्य होगा ।

डा. रामजी सिंह
अध्यक्ष

डा. जगत प्रकाश आत्रेय
महामंत्री

I

What is meant by 'Vedanta'?

Purusottama Bilimoria

Vedanta has and continues to mean different things to different adherents of a particular form of Hindu teachings. From a highly-flanked metaphysical system, through a spiritual form of life, a framework of psychology, to a cult of devotionalism (*bhaktivedānta*), have been some of the prominent nuances or variations of this time-honoured philosophy. But this is what Vedānta first and foremost is: a philosophy or *darśana* — 'way of seeing', a 'viewpoint', a 'perspective on' and an approximation to truth. In this regard Vedānta competes with physics and other metaphysical systems in its attempt to render explicable the mysteries and intricacies of *God, of nature, of man, and of the cosmos at large. But what is the foundation of this *darśana* or philosophy ?

The term 'Vedanta' is a conjunction of two words, namely '*Veda*' and '*anta*' which signify 'the end of the Veda'. In more literal sense, the 'end of the Veda' is the corpus of teachings called the Upaniṣads which are the more philosophical portions of the Vedas. The Vedas are said to be the corpus of scriptures which are identified as ŚRUTI or the "heard word" — the 'revelation' *par excellence.* Indeed all *Śāstras* or doctrinaire writings of the orthodox darsanas are said to be grounded in the wisdom of the Vedas themselves. The other chief 'schools of thought' (*darśanas*) that come under this classification are the Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṁkhya, Yoga and Mīmāṁsā. This of course does not mean that there cannot be other *darśanas* which are consistent with the wisdom of the Vedas. The Buddhist schools, though not strictly 'orthodox', are not inconsistent with the Vedas. The Buddha had no intention to deny the truth of the Vedas; he was wise, he kept silent. What he did question was not the authority of the Vedas, but their use and application by the priestly class of his time.

Now, the ancient sages and seers (*ṛṣis*) are attributed as having been amongst the first to "hear" the profound 'utterances" of the Vedas, which they passed down by word of mouth to the next generation, and so forth. Somewhere along the line these "heard words" (*śruti*) were recorded in writing and organised into a system of complex and inter-connected texts, codified into four major Vedas — namely, the Rig Sāma, Yajur and Atharva. Each Veda in turn consists of four portions representing different grades of teachings—viz., *saṁhitās, brāhmaṇas, āraṇyakas, upaniṣads* (The diagram illustrates their specific functions). It is sometimes claimed that there are other scriptures beside the Vedas that fall under *Śruti* as well, amongst which are named the *Bhagavad gītā* (part of the *Mahābhārata*, itself said to be the 'fifth Veda'), and some elements of the *Purāṇas* and *Pāñcarātra* — which otherwise come under *Smṛti* or 'recollected words'. However, it is important to recognize that the Upanisads are part of the Vedas and are the end-portion of the Vedas (thus : *Veda-anta*).

But in another sense, and more important here for our purposes, Vedanta signifies the 'concluding chapter or the *essential* wisdom of the Vedic *wisdom*', and as such, rather than referring to the corpus of scriptures called 'Vedas' (though this too), the signification here is that of "knowledge", or "the knowing which is wisdom-filled and liberating". Indeed this sense is derived from the root of the term 'Veda' itself, which comes from the stem "vid—" 'to know' — thus, the Veda is *that which is known*; known by whoever "hears" this profound wisdom—teachings of the *Śruti*.

Thus we see that Vedanta, while referring to a class of scriptures (or a portion thereof) which themselves are esteemed for their metaphysical and moral insights, at once signifies "knowledge", "intuition" which reveals these insights. In the latter respect Vedānta is a *darśana* or a system of *insights* into truth. And this is extracted, as it were, from the Upaniṣadic teaching — which is encapsuled in the terse maxim: *satyam jñānam anantam brahma*: Brahman is absolute being, intelligent-knowing and infinite. In later Upanisads this wisdom is expressed in the formula: *Sat-cit ānanda* — (Brahman) is Being-Consciousness Bliss (pure). If '*upaniṣad*' signifies in more literal sense 'the imparting of secret teachings by sitting nearby', then Vedanta can be taken to suggest this as well. Hence, while signifying a philosophy or *darśana*, Vedānta also suggests itself as a method of teaching or a means of knowing (viz., through the attentive "hearing" of the 'authentic word' — *śabda-pramāṇa*). Anyone reading the Upanisads may realize what depth there is not only in its teachings but also in the method of teaching, apparently pedgagogical, it deploys. Listening (*śravaṇa*), meditating (*manana*) and contemplating (*nididhyāsana*) on the words of wisdom are part of the intellectual process, as are the spiritual practices (*sādhanas*), such as, ritual worship of a chosen deity, devotion (*bhāvāna*), observances of rites of householders, penances and so forth.

In concluding, it may be remarked that what is so striking about Vedānta is that it is an all-inclusive *darśana* or philosophy that embraces a metaphysics, on which it is grounded, suggests a means of knowing, and maps out a form of life for a way of being — which is more elevated and in some ways an alternative to the mundane and more materialistic life-style prevalent in modern times. The highest expression of Vedanta is said to be found in Advaita Vedanta, championed by Sānkarācārya (8th A.D.) which maintains that ultimately the *self* (*ātman*) of the individual personhood and that of Godhood (*Brahman*) are non-different or 'non-dual' (*advaita*) — i.e., there is ultimately 'one' of whatever is the absolute principle of *being*. But since "one" itself is a qualification-determination, Advaita speaks in terms of the 'non-dual', following the *via negative* of the Upaniṣads — namely, *neti neti* 'not *this*, *not* that' analogous to the Mādhyamika Buddhist use of *śūnyatā*: '*that* is emptiness'. Advaita Vedanta is amongst the most coherent and sophisticated systems of thought, it might be argued, as is by Professor Eliot Deutsch and S. Radhakrishnan.

ŚĀSTRAS

The authoritative scriptures of Hinduism

Śruti — the 'revealed word'

Vedas :

* *Rg veda* — metrical hymns
* *Yajur-veda* — ritual incantations
* *Sāma-veda* — chants of power
* *Atharva veda* — magic spells

each veda consits of :

* *saṁhitas* — invocatory songs
* *brāhmanas* — formulae for rituals and explanations
* *āranyakas* — forest reflections and practices
* *upañiṣads* — esoteric and metaphysical aphorisms concluding the Vedas ('Vedanta')

further division into :

* *krama-pāṭha* — meters for recitation
* *karma kaṇḍa* — work-ritual treatises
* *upasana kaṇḍa* — worship-meditation
* *jñāna kaṇḍa* — knowledge-wisdom

Ten principle Upaniṣads summing up the Vedas :

Īśa, Kena, Kaṭha, Praśna, Mūṇḍaka, Māṇḍukya, Aitareya, Taittirīya, Chāṅdogya, Bṛhadāranyaka.

Smṛti — secondary or 'recollected' scriptures extending the teachings of the Vedas :

- * Epics — the Mahābhārata ('fifth Veda') which includes the *Bhagavad-gītā*; *Rāmāyaṇa*.
- * *Smṛtis* — codes of moral, householders and legal rulings — e.g., Manusmṛti, Yājñavalkya.
- * *Itihāsas* — historical and legendary treatises.
- * *Purāṇas* — mythological-philosophical treatises
- * *Āgama* — manuals of worship and sacrifice
- * *Sūtras* — philosophical aphorisms of *darśanas*

II

Verifiability As A Criterion of Meaning: A Re-examination

Veena Singh

In this paper it is proposed to examine verifiability as a criterion determining the significance of a statement. Although a number of discussions have been made about verifiability both by its proponents and opponents a reappraisal necessitated because of some new lights thrown over it in recent times by various philosophers, for example, William P. Alston, H. G. Hempel,[1] J. L. Austin,[2] L. S. Kohen[3] Weismann etc.

It is supposed that linguistic constructions having the form of grammatically correct sentences may, for various reasons, appear to be devoid of any meaningful content. This leads to the formulations of criterion other than grammatical ones to determine the distinction between meaningful and meaningless sentences. The criteria of cognitive meaning that have exhorted most influence on contemporary thought were designed primarily for that class of sentences whose truth or falsity is said to be contingent rather than necessary. Moreover, these criteria are usually based on the general, though obviously vague, assumption that a meaningful sentence must refer in some fashion to what is observable, so that on these criteria a sentence is meaningless if no conceivable observations can serve as evidence for its truth or falsity proposed rules for distinguishing between meaningful and meaningless sentences that one based on this assumption are commonly called verifiability criteria.

The criteria of verifiability states that, "A statement is held to be literally meaningful if and only if it is either analytic or empirically verifiable".[4] Again Ayer explains the term 'verifiable' by making a distinction between weak and strong sense of verifiability. "A proposition is said to be verifiable in the strong sense of the term, if and only if its truth could be conclusively established in experience", but that "it is verifiable, in the weak sense, if it is possible for experience to render it probable. And I then give reasons for deciding that it is only the weak sense of the term that is required by my principle of verification".[5]

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[1] Hempel, C. G., *Philosophy of Language*, 1964.

[2] J. L. Austin *Philosophical Papers*, 1971.

[3] L. S. Kohen *The Diversity of meaning*, 1962.

On the basis of the principle of verification Wittgenstein holds that the meaning of a statement is the method of its verification.

In order to examine the criterion of verifiability let us first analyse the method of verifiability and the various activities involved in verifying a statement. Friedrich Weismann takes the method of verifiability of a statement as 'determining the way it is to be used'.[6] Let us take an example; if there is a metal ball and I have to find out whether it is charged with electric current or not what I do is to connect the ball with an electric scope and find out whether the gold leaves diverge. If it is so we say that the ball is charged with electricity. Now it is clear that in this process I connect two statements —first, 'the gold leaves of the instrument diverge' and second, 'the ball is charged with electricity'. This is definitely a relation of inference, the second we deduced on the basis of the first. Again on the basis of the inference, 'the ball is charged with electricity' I can pass on the other statements connected with observable situations regarding the ball. This is nothing but describing the use of the statement. This is why Weismann says "explaining its verification is a contribution to its grammar."

In fact, whenever there are known words in a statement ('known words' have stands for the words where uses we are familiar with) we do not need any verification. For exampte, there is a statement 'Dog runs'. Here we are not after any verification because we are acquainted with the uses of the two terms 'Dog' and 'run' and also with their mutual relationship. But if there is a statement like 'Dog reads' we raise certain interrogations and we may need some sort of verification. So ultimately we come to the conclusion that explaining the verification is explaining the meaning.

However, it may not be proper to say that any particular statement is identical with these propositions which provide evidence for it. In other words any statement is not exhausted by the statements which are there to explain up its meaning. A material object statement though it is connected with sense-datum statement is not just an abbreviation for them and is not equivalent to any truth function of the latter one.

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[4] Ayer, A. J. *Language, Truth and Logic*, Second edition, p. 9.

[5] Ibid., p. 9.

[6] 'Verifiability' in the meaning and knowledge ed. by E. Nagal and R. B. Brandt., Harcourt, Brace and World, 1965, p. 38.

The above point may need further elaboration. Let us take for example a material object statement. "There is a wolf in the field", which we have to verify. Now the question is what will be the method of verification? Certainly I may go to the field and find for myself whether there is a wolf. Suppose that I see the wolf, does this verify the statement conclusively? Is it not possible that the wolf which I see is made of straw? It can be argued that I may somehow instigate him to move and then it can be said that this is wolf but again a question can be raised, what is the guarantee that the animal which I see as a wolf will not grow into a tiger? In nutshell we can say that there are material object statements whose meaning is not exhausted by the sense data statements regarding them. In other words even material object statements cannot be conclusively verified. Moreover, there are circumstances in which we cannot be certain whether something is real or illusion. This is because of the fact that most of our empirical concepts are not delimited in all possible direction. In other words, we don't have, exact definitions of material objects. However, we can argue that there are exact definitions in sciences and there we can have conclusive verifications but even in science we can at least imagine a situation when the given definition may not fully be exhaustive. For example we know the exact definition of gold. Now suppose we find a metal which satisfies all the test of gold and still it has some more quality which is not found in gold. Although such things do not happen usually but there is the logical possibility of such a situation.

A note of caution may be required here. Sometimes it becomes difficult to define a situation or a thing due to its vagueness. But the possibilities mentioned above are not those arising out of vagueness. It is due to what Weismann says 'The open texture"[7] "Open texture is a very fundamental characteristic of most though not of all empirical cencepts and it is this, texture which prevents us from defining conclusively most of our empirical statements".[8]

The verifiability criterion involved certain other difficulties also. First of all it can be mentioned that "The verifiability requirements rules out all sentences of universal form and thus all statements purporting to express general laws, for these ean not be conclusively verified by any finite set of observational data'.[9] Hempel points out certain other defects in the verifiability criterion.

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[7] Ibid., p. 40.

[8] Ibid., p. 40.

[9] Hempel, C. G. Problems and Changes in the empiricist criterion of meaning. International Journal de philosophy, Vol. 4, 1950.

1. Let us suppose that there are two propositions S and N, S being a proposition to which verifiability criterion is applicable and N being a proposition to which the criterion attributes no empirical meaning. (e.g. 'the absolute is perfect'). Now the alternation SvN (the expression obtained by connecting the two sentences by the word 'or') will be such to which the verifiability criterion will be applicable because if S is a consequence in some finite class of observation sentences than SvN is also a consequence of the same class but certainly the empiricist criterion of verifiability does not intend to include such propositions as verifiable and consequently meaningful.

2. Suppose there is an observation predicate P. Now a purely existential sentence having P as its predicate will be completely verifiable because it follows from any observation sentence asserting of some particular objects that it has the property P but its denial being equivalent to the universal sentence (nothing has the property P) is clearly not completely verifiable. We have shown above that the universal proposition are ruled out by the verifiability criterion. Now it is a peculiar situation. A sentence is verifiable but its denial is not.

William P. Alston points out that the verifiability theory supposes that all meaningful expression do refer to something but this presupposition is unjustified.[10] In the first place there are conjunctions and other components of language like 'and' 'if' 'is' 'whereas' etc. which serve an essentially connective function. Nobody can deny that these expressions are meaningful but do they stand for something ? So 'to be meaningful' is not identical with 'to be verifiable'.

The contemporary empiricist keeping in view the shortcomings of the verifiability criterion try to supplement it with other criteria e.g. translatability, testability etc. These criteria lead one to subtle linguistic discussion which are beyond the purview of this paper. We can conclude that verifiability criteria stands outdated, incomplete and abondoned even by the empiricists.

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[10] Hempel, C. G. *Philosophy of Language*, p. 14.

III

The Paradoxes of Omnipotence and Omniscience: A Critical Study

Hirendra Prasad Sah

"The traditional arguments for the existence of GOD have been fairly thoroughly criticised by philosophers. But the theologian can, if he wishes, accept this criticism. He can admit that no rational proof of God's existence is possible. And he can still retain all that is essential to his position, by holding that God's existence is known in some other non-rational way. I think, however, that a more telling criticism can be made by way of the traditional problem of evil. Here it can be shown, not that religious beliefs lack rational support, but that they are positively irrational, that the several parts of essential theological doctrine are inconsistent with one another, so that the theologian can mention his position as a whole only by a much more extreme rejection of reason than in the former case. He must be prepared to believe, not only what can not be proved, but what can be disproved from other beliefs that he also holds".[1] Mentions J. L. Mackie, an eminent critic of theology. This gives an idea of the trend and intensity of modern criticism against theology. Modern critics have a belligerence to knock down theology. In their attempt on this line of criticism they bring many exigmatic questions into light, of which the paradox of omnipotence and the paradox of omniscience are likely to be very pernicious to theology. Mackie in his famous essay, while trying to give a severe jolt to theological beliefs by way of his 'more telling criticism' concerning the problem of evil, concludes with one of these paradoxes—the paradox of omnipotence.

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[1] 'Evil and Omnipotence'—by J. L. Mackie, published in 'The Philosophy of Religion' edited by Basil Mitchell (Oxford University Press, page 92).

Though there are more than one notions about the attributes of God, the three attributes—Omnipotence, Omniscience and All goodness are essential that almost every religion accepts somehow or the other. An image of God cannot be formed without any one of them. It is clear that no being can be conceived as God unless he is omnipotent. A God having limited power—a poor, helpless God—would be absurd. Similarly omniscience also is essential. And the last—All goodness—too, is not the least. Even when a being has unlimited power to do whatsoever and no dimension is left out of his knowledge, would not be regarded as God unless he is wholly good. Otherwise he would be no God but just the anti God—the devil. Hence we see that the image of God is constituted of these three concepts. Modern critics, in their attempts, to dethrown theology, try to prove that these three concepts, taken together, lead to some logical inconsistency, or even considered singly result into some enigma. In our present essay we shall keep ourselves confined to the examination of only two such enigma viz. the paradox of omnipotence and the paradox of omniscience.

What is the paradox of Omnipotence ?— Omnipotence, as we have found, is one of the essential attributes of God and literally means—the unlimited power to do whatsoever. God, in most of the religion, is regarded as the sole creator of this vast universe. So naturally He is attributed with omnipotence, because without having unlimited power such a vast creation is impossible.

The concept of omnipotence appears to be very simple. But while making disquistion into this matter, we find the cancer of a paradox sprawlling forward with both its claws ready to clasp and smash the whole theological outlook and swallow it in one gulp. Can God create or do something that He Himself cannot control afterwards?—is the question that naturally arises before us when we want to go in the depth of 'omnipotence'. If God can do *everything* then naturally He should be capable of doing this too.

But we would hardly answer— 'Yes' to this question because that will simply mean that just after such a creation the omnipotence will be delimited, lost. And if we chose the other alternative--'No', then immediately we are accepting that omnipotent being too, can't do atleast one thing; and this will tantamounts to say that an omnipotent being is not an omnipotent being. Thus neither 'Yes' nor 'No' can rescue us from this situation. This is the paradox of omnipotence to which Mackie exploits in his aforesaid essay to demolish the edifice of Theology.[2]

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[2] "This leads us to what I call the Paradox of Omnipotence : can an omnipotent being make things which he can not subsequently control?.........

Before suggesting any solution to this paradox, we should consider the another paradox... The Paradox of Omniscience, somehow similar to the first.

What is the Paradox of Omniscience ?— Omniscience is another essential attribute of God. This means the unlimited knowledge. Ordinary human beings' knowledge is limited. Human mind is capable of storing a certain amount of information. Even the extra-ordinary minds who are popularly called—alive computore too stores myriad of information but not *all*. Their knowledge also is delimited with the unknown course of future. (Here we are not taking those persons into consideration who *see* future too. They can be of two sorts—one, who are the experts of sixth sense and the other—the prophets, the seers. The second, it is deemed, are parcels and portions of God himself, e.g. incarnations. So they are not regarded as simple human minds. And the first ones are merely knowers of tricks to control their mental power in a certain direction which again is limited in dimension, for the dimension of extra sensory perception also is limited. The most important source of human knowledge is his intellect which explores new dimensions. Intellect has opened new fields of knowledge before man and given him advancements in science. Yet, Intellectuals are not 'all-knower'. A genius knows many things about a subject but lacks many other things of other subjects.

Above all the most prominent character of human mind is that it can't know many things or even two things at the same time. When one thing is in the focus of knowledge, other things rest in oblivion. So man is oblivious and forgetting occurs in human mind which can be explained by the theory of sub-conscious and unconscious. But so far as the notion of God's mind is concerned, it can't be oblivious of even a single thing because in God's mind 'subconsciousness'' or 'unconsciousness' can not be attributed. No religion accepts that God is forgetful or he commits mistake out of ignorance. Everything in God's mind is present: nothing is past nor future. (Here we can take from Acquinas and Leibnitz that for God all possibilities are actualities).

Thus the above discussion takes us to the point that omniscience means the awareness of everything of all dimensions.

It is clear that this is a paradox: the question cannot be answered satisfactorily either in the affirmative or in the negative. If we answer 'Yes', it follows that if God actually makes things which he can not control or makes rule which bind himself, he is not omnipotent once he has made them. There are then things that he cannot do. But if we answer 'No', we are immediately asserting that there are things which he cannot do, that is to say that he is already not omnipotent.'' Ibid—P. 101-102.

Now a question about omniscience arises. 'Does God know his omniscience ? We would be tempted to answer 'Yes'. But just with this answer the cancer of a paradox again starts raising its clumsy visage. If God knows his omnipotence then he should also know *that he knows his omniscience*. Again he must also know *that he knows, that he knows his omniscience* and so on. Hence God's omniscience becomes an endless cycle. This cycle will effect the notion of omniscience in either of the two following ways—first, the cycle will stop somewhere. But then God's knowledge will remain incomplete, for he will not know the further folds of knowledge that would occur later on.

Second, the cycle will move endlessly: then God's knowledge will remain incomplete, for the process of knowing is not yet finished.

If, in order to escape from this puzzling situation, we answer to the former question—Does God know his omniscience ?— 'No', then we are accepting God's ignorance immediately. Thus neither 'Yes', nor 'No', is a satisfactory answer. This is the paradox of omniscience.

Why do these Paradoxes occur ? :— The first and very obvious reason of the formation of these paradoxes is the meaning of the term — Omnipotence/Omniscience. The paradox of Omnipotence occurs because of the meaning that we have taken for the term 'Omnipotence'. As we grant "unlimited power to act and to do whatsoever—to the term 'Omnipotence', it ensues to the question—whether an omnipotent being has power over his power of doing whatsoever, arises; and this gives rise to the Paradox of Omnipotence. Similar is the case with omniscience. So to change or atleast to fix the scope of the meaning of the term may be a suggested solution. But fixing the range of omnipotence/omniscience is to plunder the import of these terms and thus consigning God to semantics. Hardly any theologian would accept it. Hence this sort of change in meaning is no solution.

A second attempt can be made to solve the problem by distinguishing the two different orders of application of the term 'omnipotence/omniscience'. One can argue that while we take about God's omnipotence/omniscience we mean to apply it in connection with the objects of his creation/knowledge e.g. things of universe. Here the sense of omnipotence/omniscience holds good. But when we intend to ask about God's power over his power of creation and controlling/knowledge of his knowledge of everything, we apply the meaning of the terms to a second order. But this way we confuse two different order of application of a term. That is why the problem arises.

The above argument seems to be plausible but then some difficulties come forward. While considering God's omnipotence, if we put a restriction on the application of the term, God's omnipotence is delimited in a different way. If God's omnipotence means only the power to do whatsoever and does not include the power to control this power, he will become a puppet of the power itself. Then he will not be deemed as 'potent' either, what to speak of 'omnipotent'! Similarly if God's omniscience is restricted to know everything of universe, and not to know this knowledge then God will prove to be oblivious, what he is not.

Thus we find that distinguishing the two different orderers of application of 'omnipotence'/'omniscience' and to fix the range of application to the first order only may be a proper solution to these paradoxes if and only if we find a way in which we can legitimately shun the question of the second or any further order of application of the terms.

Diagnosis and Remedy :— Now our only task is to find what the basic point is that necessarily takes us to inquire about the power over the power to do whatsoever/the knowledge of the knowledge of everything. If we ponder deeply over this matter we find that this is the objective mode of grasping things. By the phrase — 'Objective mode of grasping things', I mean the way of thinking in which we see everything by dividing them necessarily into subject — object relationship. In such a way of thinking we seperate the object necessarily from the subject. In the paradox under discussion this very mode of thinking is the root-cause. In case of paradox of omnipotence when we ask whether the omnipotent being has power over his power to do whatsoever, the seperation of the object from the subject is presumed therein. This will become more clear if we take first the paradox of omniscience. This paradox arises out of questioning whether an omniscience being knows his omniscience. Here it is clear that while we ask about this second order of knowledge, we presume that this knowledge also should be on subject — object pattern. But this pattern holds good only for the knowledge of first order and not to the second or any higher order, because in that case even the first order knowledge will be impossible. With the help of an example it will become more clear when we are looking at a tree, we know the tree. Here the tree is the object of knowledge and I am the subject. But this is only the first order of knowledge and the function of knowledge does not end just here. In our knowledge of tree the underlying knowledge that — 'I know the tree' is also functioning, though subconsciously but not less significantly. If this second order of knowledge will not function the data sense will come before our mind and vanish moment to moment as if it were a camera not loaded with film which can get any impression of the object. Hence knowledge will be impossible even on first order. Only bare sensations will be sparkling all the time but no signification will be possible which is must to mould the sensation into knowledge. So this second order of knowledge — 'I know that I know a tree' — is very important. But as this is subconscious phenomenon (It is not the direct object of our present consciousness), it is not in the form of subject — object duality. It is a *knowledge from inside*, which does not consist in any divisioning process.

Some one can object here that knowledge worth the name, by its very nature, is a divisioning process. Knowledge would be impossible unless there is seperation of object from subject. This objection is sustainable. Yet our original stand-point is not damaged by it. What we require here is simply to stipulate a new term for this second order of phenomenon to distinguish it from that of first order to show that they are different in kind. We also are taking it to be granted that these functions are different in kind, for the first is conscious whereas the second is subconscious. So it does not matter if a new term is stipulated for the second order of the phenomenon which we are calling second order knowledge. Till such a term is introduced and accepted, we, for our present purpose, will use the 'second order knowledge'.

As we saw the second order knowledge is not in the subject — object pattern, our presumption that all knowledge must be in this form, will prove to be prejudice and dogmatism. In second order of the phenomenon, any inquiry from this point of view is pointless and confusion-based.

This discussion gives us a clue to remedy our paradox of omniscience. We saw that there is a kind of knowledge which is not framed in subject — object duality: it is not knowing from outside but *from inside*. God's knowledge of his own omniscience also is a knowledge from inside. His knowledge of his omniscience is involved in his knowing everything. In the very process of knowing everything the second order knowledge underlies. The knowing everything is not a seperated object of this second order of knowledge. So the paradox does not arise. But one factual question arises then, whether such a second order knowledge can be a conscious phenomenon? (For we have seen that in case of God subconscious phenomenon cannot be attributed). This is a logical question as well, because the answer depends also upon how we define — 'conscious phenomenon'. But to reach some conclusion now we require more to explore a little deeper into the process of knowing than mere fumbling into the box of semantics.

Husserll found in his phenomenological search that purely objectively given to our consciousness is the *experiencing of an ob-*

ject and *not worldly things objects*. To begin the phenomenological process he asks to 'Epoche' the world and reduce our consciousness *to experiencing* of things. By so doing we become just aware of the phenomenon that we are calling the second order of knowledge. Now what happens with worldly things or what we call the first order knowledge? As Husserll also has accepted that though 'epoched', the worldly objects do not disappear. They too are presented to our consciousness but now they have become subordinary and experiencing them has become prominent. Now a question arises—can we say that the first order phenomenon has now become second order?, or in other words, are they in our subconscious layer? There would hardly be any sense to call them so. Now the first order is the process of experiencing and if there is any second order (Husserll accepts that there is) it would be the underlying knowledge of this experiencing phenomenon. (So far as the things of world are concerned, can we say they are completely out of the reference of our conscious process? No, this can't be said either. They are presented to the consciousness though not directly but not subconsciously either. This is a new type of state of affair for which we yet have to coin a new term). But by knowing the experiencing of these objects we know their essence. Husserll gave a list of such essences. In the line of our previous talk we can say that by thus knowing from inside we do not lose the things of the world, rather we know their essence, their very core.

Now we apply it to our problem. God's knowledge of his omniscience is of this very sort, or being accurate the very knowledge of God is of this sort. His knowledge is always *from inside*, and thus he knows the essence of everything. This is the right meaning of omniscience. Because God's knowledge is of this kind, he knows things not part by part but the whole of everything without any gap of time.

Now the similar solution can be presented for the paradox of omnipoted as well. God's power to do whatsoever does not mean that he creates and controls every creature directly, as a potter makes a pitcher by himself and uses it. God's omnipotence lies in his power to generate and control unbound power. His power (or will) to generate and control unbound power is the second order of omnipotence that underlies the first order of omnipotence e.g. the power to create whatsoever and control them in whatever manner. Indeed God is said to be omnipotent not because of this superficial or first order of power but because of the second order. That means, God is omnipotent in the sense that he has the power to generate boundless power and control it. By this boundless power is created the whole universe and controlled, hence ultimately God is called the creator and the protector of the universe.

Conclusion :— We saw that the paradox of 'omnipotence' and 'omniscience' occurs only due to the objective approach of our thinking. Breaking into two subject and object is our habitual way of thinking. It is useful for thinking about factual world. But God is necessarily more than the world. To be accurate, any pursuit of God is basically the intention to transcend the—world. Though God manifests himself or his attributes in universe, he is not *only that* (otherwise he would be no better than a worldly stuff). And to know the rest is to transcend the process of world. So the thinking which is applied in conceiving the universe is to be transcended in order to know or to think about God. This transcendence of the thinking process about world results into what is known as Subjectivity. We saw, thinking about God by grasping his attributes *from outside* creates trouble. But as we transcend this way of grasping things 'from outside', we are left in the dimension of grasping from inside e.g. the dimension of subjectivity, and then no problems rest. Kierkegaard was right in holding — "God is not in externality".

IV

The Twenty-One Conceptions of God

Robert C. Whittemore

Forty years ago Charles Hartshorne, seeking to sharpen the distinctions between the various meanings of the term 'God' as that has been historically understood, proposed in his *Man's Vision of God*[1] a formal classification of possible conceptions of deity. A decade later, his vision having widened to encompass the wisdoms of the near and far east, he offered in his *Philosophers Speak of God*[2] two further schemes of classification. Each of these served its declared purpose of resolving the ambiguities arising from the failure of the generality of philosophical and doctrinal theologians to render their respective conceptions of God rational and precise. Given these classifications it appeared that no room remained for vagueness and vacuity in the idea of God, and yet the ambiguities persist.

There are, of course, good and sufficient reasons why this state of affairs should continue to prevail, principal among them being the perennial concern of theologians to justify religious beliefs antecedently accepted on cultural or emotional grounds. From the apologetics of Augustine to the hermeneutics of Hegel philosophers of religion have understood their task as the reconciliation of reason with religious orthodoxy. American religious thought is imbued with this same purpose. Royce and Whitehead are but the most eminent recent examples of metaphysicians attuned to vindication of Christian insight. The current development of process theology in the works of John B. Cobb Jr. and the Claremont group has, to judge by the contents of *Process Studies* no further object than this. In most western theologies this purpose and concern takes the form of a compulsion to pay compliments to God, one prime example being the insistence by St. Thomas Aquinas that God's permission of evil is a good[3], another being the fear and loathing exhibited by virtually all classical theists for pantheism and, more recently, panentheism. That Hartshorne himself is not entirely immune from this compulsion is evident in his effort to accommodate his position to the classical view. Thus he allows in his 1967 Morse Lectures that the classical conception of God, abstracted from His contingent qualities, is "largely correct,"[4] the while confessing that this judgement rests on faith (NTT 95) If this compulsion is to be overcome, and overcome it must be if there is to be any real progress in philosophical theology, it would seem that a renewed effort is in order to awaken the realization that the classical conception of God[5] is simply one among a number of alternatives. To this end. I suggest that it is germane to revive the question of classification.

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[1] Charles Hartshorne, *Man's Vision of God* (New York: Harper & Row, 1941), 8 9. Hereafter cited in the body of the text as MVG.

[2] Charles Hartshorne, *Philosophers Speak of God* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 16 17, 512 Hereafter cited in the body of the text as PSG.

With Hartshorne the basis of classification is the Supreme or Perfection exhibited in its degrees and attributes. Classifications One and Three (see information sheets) presuppose characterization by degrees; Classification Two isolates five cardinal attributes. The actuality of the Supreme (Perfection) in itself and for its Other, as well as the Other (the world or universe) in itself and for the Supreme, is also presupposed. If these presuppositions are accepted the logic of the classifications follows as a matter of course, albeit I would submit that room for debate remains with regard to some at least of Hartshorne's specifications under classification Two.

But need the presuppositions be accepted ? I think not. Attention to the history of philosophical and religious idealism instances a variety of oriental and occidental systems which explicitly or by implicate call in question the existence of God, the world and natural man. The panauxotheism[6] of the *Purusa Sukta*, the Advaita of Gaudapada and his school, the Absolute Idealism of Radhakrishnan, the Integral Yoga of Aurobindo, Nishida tetsugaku, and, in the west, the spectrum of theologies ancient and medieval deriving from Plato, Origen, and Plotinus are but the most prominent of those who would deny the assumed realism of Hartshorne's presuppositions.

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[3] *Summa Theologica*, Part I, Q. 19. art. 9, reply obj 3

[4] Charles Hartshorne, *A Natural Theology for our Time*, Morse Lectures 1964 (LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court, 1967) 44. Hereafter cited in the body of the text as NTT.

[5] According to the classical conception, as that is understood by Hartshorne, "there is a being in *all* respects absolutely perfect or unsurpassable. in no way and in no respect surpassable or perfectible." (MVG 11) That is, God is to be conceived as pure act (*actus purus*); from which it follows that He is eternal, immutable, omnipotent, omniscient, and goodness itself. This conception, it is contended by Hartshorne and others, is logically contradictory (insofar as it simply denies change, variety, complexity, receptivity, sympathy and suffering as relevant to the conception of God) and existentially unintelligible (in its treatment of evil).

[6] Panauxotheism, from the Greek, *pan* (everything), *aux* (o) *esis* (expansion) *theos* (divinity); hence panauxotheism, everything as the expansion of divinity. The conception is found in various Vedic hymns, most specifically in the *Purusa Sukta*, *Rg Veda* X. 90. 2-4.

Moreover, all presupposition aside, the Hartshorne classifications are somewhat less than exhaustive. Their symbols are extrinsic to the precise categorization of some important contemporary conceptions of God, for example, the Christian neo-Platonism of Edwards,[7] or Dewey's idea of God as the bundle of ideal possibilities unified through imaginative realization,[8] or Santayana's envisagement of God as spirit arising, spirit as the consummation of matter.[9] In fact none of these three are included in the "Views" rehearsed and classified in PSG.

Several years ago, in an article arguing a new interpretation of the Edwardsian conception of God, I proposed a classification scheme having as its basis the logically possible relations of God to the universe. That scheme, subsequently expanded to allow for categorization of a number of Asian theologies, comprises classification Four (see informotion sheets). Students of elementary logic will recognize its source as a simplification of the Venn diagram. I would not claim any finality for it. It is a tool, nothing more. Its value is its usefulness. It has the advantage of putting the matter of God in a manner with which every theologian and religious can, indeed must perforce identify, since who among us is not immediately concerned with the relation of themselves and their world to deity. It has, I submit, the further utility of permitting an accurate classification of those several views which the Hartshorne classifications do not readily accommodate. But its principal worth, which it shares with its three predecessors, is that it makes plain the multiplicity and diversity of the ways in which God has been, or may be, logically and coercively conceived, thereby confuting that secular humanism which thinks to have disposed of the case for religion by exposing the logical and existential contradictions inherent in classical theism.[10]

The basic contradiction, as Hartshorne and others, myself included, see it, is apparent from an inspection of the circles. Figures 1,

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[7] See R. C. Whittemore, 'Jonathan Edwards and the Theology of the Sixth Way,' *Church History*, XXXV (March, 1966), 60-75.

[8] John Dewey, *A Common Faith* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1934), 50

[9] See R. C. Whittemore, 'Santayana's Lay Religion,' *Southern Journal of Philosophy*, 10 (Summer, 1972), 253-261.

[10] See footnote 5.

6, 11, and 16 illustrate the logically possible variants of the classical theistic position. God, symbolized by the circle 'G', antecedent to (before creation) and independent of (qua actus purus), and the universe, symbolized by the circle 'U'. In figure 1 (the orthodox view) the creation of the universe by God would be indicated by an arrow pointing from the circle 'G' to, and touching, the circle 'U'. God's independence of the universe would be indicated by a second arrow pointing away from the 'G' circle. The contradiction is specified by the separation of the circles and the asymmetry of the arrows. Similarly in figure 6, which, I have argued elsewhere, characterizes the Christian neo-Platonism of Jonathan Edwards. Here we have an overt attempt to evade the contradiction explicit in the orthodox view (figure 1) by positing the universe as a theophany, in Edwards' more colourful language, the world as the image or shadow of an unimaginably independent God. The converse of this position, illustrated by figure 11, counts no advocate that I know of, and the same, I am reasonably certain, is true also of the position denoted by figure 16.

As for the remaining possibilities, six of them (illustrated by figures 7, 12, 13, 14, 17, and 20) remark positions of no known exemplification. Three others, figures 5, 10, and 15 may have advocates. I now incline to think that figure 5 represents the kenotic theology of Altizer, while figure 10 specifies a theoretical possibility within theological idealism. Figure 15 is of some particular interest in that it seems to express Hartshorne's conception of the relation between the Absolute (Supreme, Unsurpassable, Perfection) qua abstract,[11] and the Supreme qua concrete, i.e., as eternal-temporal consciousness knowing and including the universe. On the other hand, there are in Hartshorne's works passages too numerous to mention which make plain his espousal of a panentheistic realism (in the present classification scheme identifiable as figure 4). Which figure, 4 or 15, correctly represents Hartshorne's view? Without attempting to answer this questin, I would remark only that the circles indicate a difficulty, perhaps even an inconsistency, not readily noticeable in other analyses. My own opinions with respect to the positions smbolized by figures 2, 3, 18. and 19 are indicated on the data sheet. I would emphasize that these classifications, like all of the others, are open to debate. In the event, what matters most is not whether any particular classification is self-evidently correct, but the range of alternative conceptions of God is recognized and discussion of them fostered.

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[11] An extended account of the absolute qua abstract is offered in *The Divine Relativity* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948), 67-88. See also MVG 17, 46, 67, 113, 128. 192, 226, 231, 237, 245, 344; PSG 501-502, 511; NTT 70, 76, 86, 104.

Given the two terms 'God' and 'Universe', the combinations noted in the classification are exhaustive and exclusive—or so I thought when I was working them out. Subsequently, however, I had occasion to read extensively in the literature of the Veda, and I came shortly to the realization that there was still another conception of deity, and that of no small significance not only in the context of Indian religion but also that of our own religious epoch. This is the conception, celebrated in the *Purusa Sukta* and in several other hymns of the *Rg. Veda*, of the universe as the expansion of God. Since the conception has never been otherwise identified than by the catch all misnomer 'pantheism', I call it panauxotheism (from the Greek. *auxesis*, to expand). That it is not pantheism, but a species of panentheism, I have argued elsewhere[12]. Its significance for our time is, I suggest, not merely the case for panentheism so long and ably argued by Charles Hartshorne but also its serviceability as a basis for reconciliation in the current controversy between the partisans of scientific creationism and those who aecept the modern scientific world view with its evolutionary corollary. Of course the position as expressed in the archaic Veda, or even as given later in the Bhagavadgita and the Puranas.[13] is hardly adequate to the explanation of the origin and evolution of the cosmos as the astrophysicists conceive it. However, those who are familiar with the works of Paul Davies, most particularly with his latest though-provoking account of the state of current cosmological thought, *Other Worlds*[14] will find nothing bizarre, or even strange, in the panauxotheistic idea of the God-Universe relation. The conception of creation as a primordial big bang initiating a purposive process of cosmic expansion is today a cosmological commonplace.

It will be said, indeed it has been said many times and in multiple contexts, that the alternative conceptions of God here hypothesized are irrelevant to religion which, it is claimed, properly concerns itself with matters beyond the purview of classification. Certainly this is the case as the true believer sees it. Whether there are other, more scientifically and logically plausible coneeptions of deity than that which he or she has accepted is for the true believer of no import whatever. Nor is it only the true believer who argues thus. Radhakrishnan, assuredly one of the most distinguished and ecumenical of twentieth century thinkers, maintains in his *An Idealist View of Life* that a, "purely speculative theology which cuts itself off from religious tradition and experience and works from premises which are held to be universally valid cannot serve as an adequate philosophy of religion."[15] Why not? Because, he adds, "religion is not a form of knowledge...While religion implies a metaphysical view of the universe, it is not to be confused with philosophy."[16] True enough, *if* religion is, what Radhakrishnan and those like-minded assume it to be, that is, a cultus of worship based upon the intuitions of the human soul taken as facts. But facts, as our distinguished author is well-aware, differ from epoch to epoch and from one religion to another. No matter, says Radhakrishnan, "this difference means that the facts are more complex and require closer study."[17] But this concession is fatal to the claim that religion is properly divorced from speculative thought! For what can "closer study" mean if not the search for some common denominator? And what can this common denominator be except a seeking after meaning? Only if religion is defined not as a body of dogma or as a cultus but as assent to meaning is progress in religion possible.

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[12] R. C. Whittemore, 'On the Purport of Vedic Authority,' *Darshana International*, XVI (January, 1976), 17-28.

[13] R. C. Whittemore, 'The Panentheistic Gospel of the Gita,' *The Southern Journal of Philosophy*, 11 (Winter, 1973), 351-357; 'The Philosophical Office of the Purana,' *Darshana International*, XIII (April, 1973), 54-58.

[14] Paul Davies, *Other Worlds, A Portrait of Nature in Rebellion; Space, Superspace and the Quantum Universe* (New York: Simon & Shuster, 1980).

Allow this possibility and we are right back at Hartshorne's starting point, i.e., the effort to elicit the most reasonable among the logically possible conceptions of God. To those of us who view the most important task of the enterprise of religion in this light, what really and truly matters is that humankind find a justification for believing that there is some purpose, value, order or meaning to li and in all things. Whether the source of that meaning is called Go the Father almighty, the Absolute, the Unsurpassable, the Unity of the Field, Brahman, Buddha, or Allah is of secondary significance. Of course, as John Dewey noted nearly half a century ago in his Terry Lectures, it is probably asking too much of the partisans of particular religions to "surrender the whole notion of special truths that are religious by their own nature, together with the idea of peculiar avenues of access to such truths."[17] In lieu of that most unlikely happening, the case for classification rests upon the distinction of the religious from religion and the renewal of Dewey's call for the emancipation of the former from the latter.

An expanded version of a classification scheme by R.C. Whittemore, 'Jonathon Edwards and the Theology of the Sixth Way,' *Church History*, XXXV (March 1966) 66-67.

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[15] Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, *An Idealist View of Life* (London: Allen & Unwin, 68. 1929).

[16] Ibid., 69.

[17] John Dewey, *A Common Faith*, Terry Lectures (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1934), 33.

Explanation of Symbols :

G (unbroken circles)—God as the Real (Being) or *actus purus* of Christian, Jewish, and Muslim scholasticism; alternatively, the (Bradleian) Absolute, the (Whiteheadian) Principle of Concretion, the One.

G (broken circles)—The manifestation (theophany) of God as god; alternatively, the illusory Isvara of Advaita Vedanta, the dead God of Christian atheism, the Deweyite bundle of values or ends in view, the pure abstraction to which on concrete content attaches.

U (unbroken circles)—the real Universe; Nature; alternatively, the Field, the Cosmos, the Whole.

U (broken circles)—the Universe as a manifestation, appearance, image or shadow of God: alternatively, the Vedantic realm of maya.

The figures on page Twenty-four (24) represent the possible combinations of the two terms of the relation God-Universe.

THE REALITY AND RELATIONS OF GOD : Four Classifications of Theistic Doctrine

Descriptions :

figure 1 —God other than the Universe and both real. Classical theism. Aquinas, al-Ghazzali, Maimonides.

figure 2 —God and the Universe in partial interaction and both real. Ehrenfels, Brightman.

figure 3 —God as the Universe and vice versa and both real. Pantheism as commonly defined. Zen Buddhism.

figure 4 —The Universe in God and both real. Panentheism. Fiske, Royce, Boodin, Pratt, Montague, Whitehead, Hartshorne, Pittenger.

figure 5 —God in the Universe and both real.

figure 6 —(the real) God other than the manifest (less than real) Universe. Edwards.

figure 7 —(the real) God and the manifest (less than real) Universe in partial interaction.

figure 8 —(the real) God manifest as the less than real Universe. Job Durfee.

figure 9 —the manifest (less than real) Universe in the reality that is God. Plotinus as interpreted by P.B. Pistorius.

figure 10—(the real) God manifest in the less than real Universe.

figure 11—the purely abstract (less than real) God as other than the real Universe.

figure 12—the purely abstract (less than real) God and the real Universe in partial interaction.

figure 13—the real Universe conceived as the purely abstract (less than real God and vice versa.

figure 14—the concrete (real) Universe in the abstract (less than real) God.

figure 15—the abstract (less than real) God manifest in the concrete (real) Universe. Dewey (A Common Faith).

figure 16—God other than the Universe and both less than real.

figure 17—God and the Universe in partial interaction and both less than real.

figure 18—God as the Universe and vice versa and both less than real. The Advaita Vedanta of Gaudapada.

figure 19—the Universe in God and both less than real. The Advaita Vedanta of Sankara.

figure 20—God in the Universe and both less than real.



fig. 1



fig. 2



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

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

fig. 5



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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

fig. 19



fig. 20

V

On the Meaning of Value Judgements

Jagat Pal

The purpose of this paper is to maintain the following points concerning the main contentions underlying R.M. Hare's logical analysis of the meaning of value judgements :

(A) Hare's claim that all sorts of value judgements necessarily do have prescriptive meaning is false;

and

(B) Hare has not given a complete meaning of value judgements in his logical inquiry.

A. According to Hare value judgements, and more specifically, moral judgements contain two kinds of meaning, descriptive and prescriptive. "An expression which, in certain context, has descriptive meaning and no other. I call a descriptive term, word, or expression, as used in that context; one which has prescriptive meaning (whether or not it also has descriptive meaning) I call a prescriptive term; and one which has both kinds of meaning I call an evaluative term. A value judgement or evaluative judgement is a judgement in which such a term is used" *Freedom and Reasoning* p. 26). *In the Language of Morals* he uses 'evaluative meaning' for the 'prescriptive meaning'. But the sense in which all sorts of value judgements necessarily contain two kinds of meaning, descriptive and prescriptive, is explained by him in *The Language of Morals* in the following way: Value judgements have descriptive meaning in the sense that they are invariably used in accordance with standards or principles. For instance, when you say 'X is a good thing' or 'X is a right action' you are, in effect, saying it conforms to some standard; and thereby you are describing it for those who know what your standard is. Hence, "To know the descriptive meaning is to know by what standards the speaker is judging" (p. 146). The criteria of application determine descriptive meaning of the value judgements.

But it must be taken into consideration that the criteria of application alone do not constitute the entire meaning of value judgements. Beside this kind of meaning, value judgements also do contain prescriptive meaning in their use which differentiates them from desciiptive judgements. They do contain prescriptive meaning because they directly/indirectly guide choices/actions our own or other people's, now or in the future. For instance, when you say 'X is a good thing' or 'X is a right action' this means you are, in effect, guiding or directing yourself or some other people to do something or to make some change in the state of affairs, that is, to choose X or to perform action X, now or in the future; thereby value judgement 'X is a good thing' or 'X is a right action' does have prescriptive meaning in use. In making this sort of claim that all value judgements do have descriptive and prescriptive meaning, Hare very carefully excludes other kinds of uses, for example, the inverted commas, ironic and conventional uses of value judgements. He says that in these sorts of uses value judgements lack their prescriptive meaning (See *LM* pp. 124 125). Moreover, besides these mentioned uses he holds that other sorts of value judgements necessarily contain descriptive and prescriptive meaning.

So far as the case of descriptive meaning is concerned there is no problem. All sorts of value judgements will necessarily have descriptive meaning. We can't deny this fact. But what about the prescriptive meaning. Do all sorts of value judgements necessarily contain prescriptive meaning in Harean sense ? Of course, there are some cases in which we can't deny the prescriptive meaning of value judgements. They do contain perscriptive meaning in their use. Such cases are found in the context of action. These value judgements necessarily do contain prescriptive meaning which logically follows from their 'contextual implication'. But this is not the only context in which value judgements are made. To think that it is, would be to limit the scope or range of the use of value judgements. There are other cases where it would be very difficult to accept in any sense the prescriptive meaning of value judgements. Such type of cases we do find in the context of valuation. Thus there are two kinds of uses of value judgements : (i) value judgements which are given in the context of action where their purpose is to determine choices/actions; and (ii) value judgements which are given in the context of determination of values where the purpose is not to guide choices/actions but, instead, to valuate conduct or character of a person/object. All sorts of uses of value judgements come in one or the other category. In case (i) value judgements express prescriptive elements directly/indirectly; hence they do have prescriptive meaning. This prescriptive meaning is revealed by the contextual implication of the judgement itself. The nature or logical function of value judgement in the context of action reveals that the giver of value judgement directly/indirectly prescribes or directs to himself or other people to do something or to make certain change in the state of affairs, now or in the future. For instance, when you say 'X is a good thing' or 'X is a right action' in the context of action this means you are, in effect, guiding yourself or others to choose X or to do action X, now or in the future. This logically follows from the contextual implication of the use of value judgements like 'X is a good thing' or 'X is a right action'. In this context the main question for which value judgements are given is, 'what shall I do' ? And to answer the question is to tell someone directly/indirectly to do something or to make change in the state of affairs, now or in the future. Thus, in this context Hare is absolutely correct in making his claim that value judgements do contain prescriptive meaning.

But in case (ii), Hare's analysis does not work because our purpose in making value judgements in this context is quite different. In the context of valuation/value assignment, our purpose is not to tell someone directly or indirectly to do something or to make change in the state of affairs but, instead, it is to assign values. We do not answer the question, 'What shall I do' ? The questions which are answered here are of a different sort. For instance, when you say 'X is better than Y' (the term 'better' is a value term), in the context of valuation this means your are, in effect, assigning more values to X than to Y. This logically follows from the contextual implication of the use of value judgement 'X is better than Y' itself. You are here answering the question, 'Who, between X and Y, is a better person? rather than the question, 'What shall I do' ? And to answer the question, who is better person between X and Y is to assign values to them not to tell anyone, directly or indirectly, to do something or to make change in the state of affairs, now or in the future. Why does the value judgement 'X is better than Y' lack prescriptive meaning ? Because the purpose of the speaker is to assign values not to give guide lines about action, And when values are assigned under certain context, we cannot infer that the speaker's judgement is necessarily prescriptive. The question of prescription does not arise at all. Similarly, when you say 'X acted rightly in 1950' this means you are assigning right making values to X and answering the question, Did X act rightly in 1950' ? This logically follows from the contextual implication of the use of value judgement 'X acted rightly in 1950' itself in the context of value assignment. The nature/logical function of the use of value judgement 'X acted rightly in 1950' does not allow us to say that the speaker while making the judgement is directly/indirectly telling to himself or other people to do something or to make change in the state of affairs, now or in the future. The question of prescription does not arise in such context at all. Therefore, in case (ii), it would be very difficult to hold the view that value judgements do contain prescriptive meaning in their uses as Hare held. He could not distinguish between the two types of cases and mistakenly asserted that all sorts of value judgements necessarily to contain prescriptive meaning, while the fact is that they do contain prescriptive meaning only in the context of action, not in the context of value assignment.

B. Even if we accept that all sorts of value judgements necessarily do contain prescriptive meaning, his logical analysis of the meaning of value judgements does not appear to be comprehensive because he excludes the emotive meaning of value judgements which they, in my understanding, necessarily do contain, whatever be the use of value judgements. It is not possible to exclude the emotive meaning of value judgements. Because value judgements are partly derived from the individual's attitudes, preferences and expreiences etc. While making any sort of value judgement the speaker directly/indirectly expresses his subjectivs attitudes (pro—and—con) which constitute one of the most important elements in the entire meaning of value judgements. We can't exclude this element. They do have more than one meaning because, as is evident from their own logical nature, they do serve more than one purposes. For instance, when the speaker, 'A' addresses the value judgement 'X is a good thing' or 'X is a right action' to 'B' in the context of action, the logical function of the use of value judgement itself reveals that 'A' is not only giving 'B' a prescription to choose 'X' or to perform an action 'X', but besides that, he is also expressing his subjective feelings and attitudes, that is, he desires/wants 'B' to choose 'X' or to perform action 'X' in the context. It is not the case for 'A' to say 'X' is a good thing or 'X' is a right action, but I don't want or desire, you to choose 'X' or to do the action 'X'. If 'A' makes such a statement then it would be understood that 'A' is asserting inconsistent statements. Logically, it is impossible for 'A' to hold both sorts of views unless he commits some kind of fallacy. This is an insignificant question to ask whether emotive meaning of value judgements is primary or secondary. Therefore, in the explained sense, 'A's value judgement 'X is a good thing' or 'X is a right action' does contain emotive meaning in its use and to exclude this sort of meaning would not be intelligible at all. Similar case is found in other sorts of value judgements which are given in the context of value assignment. For instance, when 'A' says 'B' 'X' is a good man' or 'X is a right man' in the context of valuation this means, by the contexual implication of the use of value judgement itself, that 'A' is not only assigning values to 'X' but 'A' also likes or approves of those features which 'X' possesses. To lik or to have feeling of approval is a sign of subjective feeling or attitude. It is not the case for 'A' to say 'X' is a good man' or 'X' is a right man' but I don't like him. Such sort of subjective element is always found in such value judgements. If 'A' claims that 'X' is a good or right man but he does not like 'X', then it would warrant some specific explanation in the absence of which it may be deemed inconsistent and unjustifiable. It is not possible to hold both the views without committing some fallacy. Thus, we see that all sorts of value judgements, in the explained sense, necessarily do contain motive meaning. It is quite different matter whether this kind of meaning is primary or secondary.

This specific characteristic of value judgements we do not necessarily find in descriptive judgements. For instance, when you say 'This P has p, q and r characteristics' thereby this does not logically follow that you have some subjective feelings or you are expressing your subjective feelings/attitudes in any way. What follows from the logical nature of the judgement 'This X has p, q and r characteristics' is simply that you are describing or informing or referring that this X has p, q and r characteristics. Apart from this, nothing is revealed by the logical function of the judgement itself. To make a contrary claim is to misunderstand the logical behaviour of descriptive judgements. On the other hand, in case of value judgements we necessarily find subjective elements. The emotivists are correct in making this claim that value judgements do have motive meaning but they commit the mistake of making it the whole meaning of value judgements while the fact is that they also have other sorts of meaning. Since, Hare did not include emotive meaning in his logical analysis of the meaning of value jndgements. his analysis is not comprehensive.

VI

Co-operative Mindedness

M. Lietaert Peerbolte

A. Co-operative mindedness as a spiritual motive of a culture.

I. Psychodynamical basis

In "A philosophical Energism" (Darshnna International, 1981) besides energies with an infinite velocity, 3 kinds of energies are mentioned with velocities which are faster than those of light: 1. oceanos, the fastest of these three; 2. eros and 3. life-force as the slowest of these three.

In connection with e.g. a culture, the way in which these three kinds of energy are experienced by man is important because in a way such a culture is the projection on the 3, or 4 dimensional level of human daily life. Specially oceanos and eros contribute to culture.

1. Oceanos. I have discerned 3 facets of the way in which man experience oceanos: (a) the disappearance of the ego in so far as this ego is bound to physical, sensorial perception, (b) the experience of timelessness and unlimited space, or infinity, (c) the experience of unity with a partner, or with nature, or with the cosmos. As such the emotional value of oceanos can be called a feeling of objjectless love.

How can these qualities be called when projected on our 3, or 4 dimensional life which is bound to the physical-sensorial perception! I propose to call such a projection disinterestedness. Here, however, a difference exists concerning the emotional value. Disinterestedness can be associated with carelessness, or on the other hand, with objectless love: a careless, or a loving disinterestedness as a sense of totality. In the case of a careless disinterestedness such a sense of totality is not present as a cultural basis, as this kind of disinterestedness is the consequence of the suppression of oceanic experiencing. It forms the emotional basis of sadomasochism, i.e.

the double tendency of dominance and submission as expression of the efforts to suppress oceanos as a form of psychic energy.

2. Eros. Whereas oceanos is not bound to the experience of limited time, or object, eros, on the contrary, is always bound to time as well as to object. In "A philosophical Energism" I have indicated that for man in his daily life eros keeps on an intermediate position between oceanos and life-force. Eros is bound to the physical sensorial perception, but it has the ability of transcending toward oceanos. Perhaps the most direct illustration of this ability is the sexual experience of orgasm.

In many cases the sexual orgasm only refers to the physical aspects which can be perceived by our senses. In these cases the orgasm can be called a sexual achievement, proving one's sexual potency. One step further is that this achievement is performed without the emotion of love regarding the partner. But it is also psosible that the sexual orgasm is experienced by a kind of consciousness which is not bound to the physical perception anymore : the experience of a "mental orgasm" which has the oceanic characteristics: it is objectless in so far as consciousness about one's physical existence has disappeared; it is a "mental unity" with the partner which essentially is timeless and of unlimited space. Some people call it "heavenly" : an experience of objectless love.

When the sexual orgasm is only a sexual achievement, the lust-principle refers to the own maintenance as a living being, at the nearest connected with one's life-force; proving one's potency is at the same time proving one's life-force. The ego as carrier of consciousness is seemingly strong, even stronger than the erotic ego which does not suppress the oceanic experience, as in the latter case the erotic ego tends towards a losing of this consciousness by the transcendence into the oceanic experience and the oceanic consciousness. The root, however, of sadomasochism, formed by the effort to suppress oceanos, plays its role in the seemingly strong ego based on the erotic drives. As long as this ego can dominate by subjection of other people, it seems to be strong, but as soon as it is submitted it becomes weak and "suffering".

This description of the erotic ego illustrates the present situation in many societies; as long as seemingly the consumption in its widest sense suggests as having an infinite character, there exists selfconsciousness; as soon as, however, the infinite wishfulfilment appears not to be infinite, but limited, the masochistic (c.q. sadistic) tendencies come to the fore by strikes, etc., destructive tendencies which latently were already present during the belief in the infinite wishfulfilment which in itself is an unrealistic attitude (a.o. the so-called waste-economy). In "Rise and Decline of a culture" (Darshana

International 1981-82) is already mentioned that the mixture with sadomasochism is responsible for the decline and final disruption of a culture.

Whereas the notion "oceanos" is specially derived from psychoanalytical researches in prenatal psychodynamics, the classical psychoanalysis concerning postnatal life has overlooked one facet. Apart from the development of postnatal eros the question is whether the prenatal oceans has some way of continuation in postnatal life. In this respect Adler was right to introduce the term "sociotherapy" as a drive "to belong to". First, a belonging of the child to the mother, then to the family, the class, the club, and finally to society. Sociotropy, as a secondary oceanos, is the striving after unity. In itself, however, it lacks with reference to the original oceanic experience of timelessness and unlimited space, or infinity. I suggest therefore the notion "cosmotropy" which is, moreover, important regarding sociotropy in so far as cosmotropy enables man to transcend his sociotropic drive toward an objectless love. If the secondary, postnatal oceanos would only be constituted by sociotropy, the differentiation between eros and sociotropy would nearly be impossible. Postnatal eros has a characteristic tendency to strive after satisfaction of lust by contacting a fellow-being. In the practice of daily life this characteristic is nearly identical to the original sociotropic experience after birth in which the baby experiences himself, together with his mother, as one totality in a still oceanic, or cosmic sense.

Here, an important facet comes to the fore, how by education in postnatal life the oceanic essentials concerning experiencing infinity are suppressed during early you h so that sociotropy and erotic striving seem to coincide, becomirg synonymous. But here, moreover, an important germ is hidden of the increase of sadomasochistic tendencies as a result and p cjection of the suppressed real oceanic experiences. The sense o reality is narrowed, only accepting reality for what can be perceived by our physical sense-organs: the so-called positivistic attitu e in life. Then oceanic experiences are called "supranatural", or even not really existing "fallacies". The destructive tendencies which are the consequence of this suppression of oceanos, are overlooked, or one tries to weaken these by more erotic lust satisfaction and so, as a matter of fact, increasing the existing destruction, or disruption of culture. From a psychodynamical point of view the principle point is that in order to avoid in culture the mixture with sadomasochism, and by this mixture the start of disruption, culture has to cultivate oceanos as well in some way or other regarding the original oceanic experience, as in its secondary way of sociotropy together with cosmotropy.

II. Individual attitude in life

Philosophically Hegel stated the three terms of thesis, antithesis, synthesis, whereas this synthesis evokes a new antithesis, and so on. Based on a sadomasochistic trend this trilogy seems to be right. The question is, however, whether this Hegelian trilogy is also valid regarding the interactions between eros and oceanos: 1. is there a synthesis between these two which evokes a new antithesis, and 2. does this interaction mean that the one is always the antithesis of the other. Both questions can be answered in the negative as, in contrast with the Hegelian set of three, the interaction between eros and oceanos has a cooperative character: they miss the principle question of which of the two is the strongest in a sense of dominating the other. Indeed, specially in younger times the erotic impulse will have the lead, whereas the oceanic experience as a mental orgasm can be the consequence, whereas in older ages making love more often can start by an oceanic impulse with as a consequence the physical-erotic action. In this way one of the impulses is stronger than the other, but instead of a partly submission of the weaker one the interaction remains a co-operative one in which the one drive is the complement of the other one. The one is not the antithesis of the other, although principally eros is bound to time and object, whereas, on the contrary, oceanos is timeless and an objectless unity. This co-operative interaction can be experienced very clearly during maithuna.

In order to avoid misunderstandings, in this co-operative interaction is no place for sadomasochistic traits based on the suppression of oceanos. It is right that in such cases the Hegelian set of three can be used in that sense that the sexual impulse of the one partner can be stronger than of the other partner. In such cases a thesis and an antithesis exist with as a result a synthesis, or physical orgasm which evokes a new antithesis (e.g. the weaker partner feels him-, or herself overruled by the stronger one).

As to the co-operative interaction between eros and oceanos I must refer to my publication "The ancient Greek logos: a logosophy" (Darshana International Vol. V, 1965, 51-56). This ancient Greek logos does not only mean "word". It is also the result of a relation. So, in the relation a : b=c is c the logos. Moreover, a hieros logos exists which in Latin is called sectio divina with the mean proportional like a : b= b : (a+b). This relation was used in ancient Egyptian architecture as well as in some greek ones. It is also used in European Gothic architecture (cathedrals). In the co-operative interaction of eros and oceanos this formula seems to be the best representation, a : b=b : (a+b). In this formula it is not important whether "a" represents oceanos and "b" eros in younger ages, or whether "a" represents eros and "b" oceanos as the mean proportional in older ages. The most important point is the final sum total (a+b), namely (eros+oceanos) as the symbolic expression of the orgastical experience of space with the transcendence of eros into oceanos.

There exists a great difference in the approach of fellow-beings between those whose attitude in life is based on this co operative interaction of the erotic and oceanic interaction, and those whose attitude in life is based on the question who is the strongest in the Hegelian sense. If the sum total of (a+b) represents two people this (a+b) means a form of empathy which has not to be confused with sympathy. Whereas sympathy means the ability of sharing the feelings of another, empathy means the power of losing one's sense of identity in contemplation e.g. of a person. This losing one's "sense of identity" parallels the transcendence toward oceanos, whereas in sympathy one's sense of identity is not lost, nor transcended.

The conclusion is that co-operative mindedness requires a form of empathy in relation with fellow-beings which is familiar with the emotional aspect of oceanos: a love of one's own which is able to transcend into an objectless love: losing one's own identity as a living and erotic being. In the final (a+b) empathy means transcending one's sense of identity into a sense of totality: one's own identity plus the identity of one's fellow being.

III. The sense of totality

After the description of the intrapsychical sense of totality of (eros+oceanos), and the one of the interpersonal sense of totality, now the description is wanted of this sense of totality on the social level, where "all is connected with all": personal strivings are not only connected with social-economic situations, but also with many other social facets such as a.o. culture and cultural aims.

These stages of the development of co-operative mindedness can be symbolized via the sectio divina. If the first stage of eros and oceanos is symbolized by a : b=b; (a+b), then the next stage regarding interpersonal relationship is represented by (a+b) : (a+2b) in which the empathy is expressed by (a+2b). A third stage of social totality will be represented by (a+2b) : (2a+3b). But here, the difficulty exists that in a social totality of (2a+3b) the word "social" has many facets so that this term can become a purely theoretical abstraction. Therefore it seems better to discuss this third stage of development of co operative mindedness by taking an example on the social level.

B. Co-operative structures of society: a preliminary sketch

The fact that I am not an economist, nor a sociologist, causes me to restrict myself by only suggesting such co-operative structures which, on the one hand, enable each member of the co-operation socially to be independent: no relation of employer-employee, but only co operating people. On the other hand, such structures have to enable each member to develop a sense of social totality. As different facets of co-operation I discern three forms : 1. a producer-co-operation; 2. a consumer-co-operation; 3. a workers-co-operation. In each of these kinds two aspects are very important : (a) each co-operator has the necessity to accept the own responsibility as the co-operation is a community of interests; (b) these interests require that each co operator develops a sense of totality, first concerning the totality of the own co-operation, then the one of the other co-operations and the mutual competition, then the national economic totality, etc. In this way co operative structures of society can stimulate the development of a sense of totality on the social level as a spiritual motive on the social level.

a. Producer-co operation

In such a preliminary sketch it would be a matter of pure theory to try to make a detailed description of such a co-operation. However, there exists quite another problem. Seemingly, the name producer-co-operation could be replaced by production-co-operation, as the co-operative producers have the aim to produce some products.

We start with a fictive example. Some farmers produce sugar-beet. They decide that when doing so in co-operation, their profits can be higher. They establish a plant for sugar refinery, they appoint a man as director of this plant and this director recruits a staff and further workers. From the standpoint of these farmers this plant is their co-operative property. But does this mean that this plant can rightly be called a co operative sugar plant ? This depends completely on the organization of the plant itself and of the workers in it. If the organization is based on the principle of employer employee, this plant is not a co-operative one in itself and the proprietors of this plant, the farmers, are as a matter of fact only its shareholders. If the organization in this plant would be a real producer-co operation, this plant would only have co-workers, co-operative workers who would share in the profit of the plant. In this second case the sugar production would be done by two producer-co-operations : 1. the farming co-operation cultivating sugar-beet and 2. the plant-co-operation producing sugar, whereas the farming co operation, moreover, would be the sole shareholder in the plant-co-operation as they made the investments for the plant. In the first case, when the organization of the plant is not a co-operative one, the farmers co-operation could be called a production-association in sofar as it aims at the production of sugar, rendering a staff and workers for this aim.

This fictive example illustrates how in the first case with a staff, etc., in one's service, the structure in the plant has a sadomasochistic trait of dominance and submission : the farmer's co-operation dominates the persons who are on duty. And, indeed, the possibility exists that in the long run the roles of dominance and submission are turned upside down, when the plant economically would become so strong that the original "servants" (of the farmers) become masters and the farmers the servants who have to deliver their beets to the plant. In the second case, on the contrary, dominance and submission are eliminated in the mutual relation.

In view of the first case, more or less idealistic co-operators have evaluated the consumers co-operation higher as from a consumer's point of view the pursuit of gain is then eliminated as a sadomasochistic facet.

As soon, however, as the consumers co-operation would start to establish its own plant for producing, the same problem would come to the fore as regarding the fictive farmers co-operation.

b. Consumers-co-operation

Historically this form of co operation, as an organization, is perhaps the first one, based on the consideration that consumption ought not to be an object for pursuit of gain. As to the antagonism of producing and consuming, which surely is apt for the question "who is the stronger", it seems more realistic to admit both forms of co-operation so that the factor "power", which essentially is not a purely economical factor, can come to the fore in order to be corrected. The reason is that a consumer's co operation, which itself starts to produce the goods which are wanted by the members, does not recognize the human drive to produce as a vital drive. If the producer is subordinated to the consumer, the result will be that in some way or other the production, or/and the products become second rate.

c. Workers-co-operation

This form of co-operation is a new one. It refers to the facet "labour". Far too often labour is only evaluated as a necessity to earn one's daily bread. Essentially labour means self-realization. One facet of this is, indeed, self preservation in its widest sense. The other facet of self-realization is aiming at mental maturation. In present day's society these two facets conflict with each other. This is caused by the fact that the facet of self-preservation in its material aspects has been made as efficient as possible (labour-division and specialization). This facet of labour tends not only toward self-preservation, but also toward the benefit of the community and public.

In the workers-co operation, however, an important task exists regarding the mental maturation. When the staff, including the director(s) are members of the worker's co-operation together with the other members of this co operation, the communication between all the members becomes possible. There is a difference between the workers in so far as the staff and specially the director, are not only "co-workers", but they have also the responsibility of the creation and preservation of the co-operation as such, e.g. the commercial problems involved by this aspect. Mostly the other members of a plant have no understanding about these problems, as these are related to e.g. workers income and prices: automation, training and retraining, unemployment, free-time. In the workers co-operation every member can receive a general view of the whole co-operation. A central point has to be formed by the self-realization in and by labour. Here also, the opportunity exists to correct eventual pursuit of gain as a symptom of sadomasochism.

C. Sadomasochism and co-operation

The sketch about a co-operatively structured society, mentioned above, is a short one. The reason is that, although it seems that the sociotropic needs of man can be satisfied by such a structure so that man feels himself to "belong to" a co operation, it is not said that the full co-operation between eros and oceanos in the orgastical experience of space is represented in this projection on the social level.

Sociotropic tendencies as such are a mixture of eros and aspects of oceanos, but the experience of timelessness and unlimited space is not yet recognizable in the social projection. It is right that mankind wishes that this experience could be realized on the economical level. But economy is and remains the science of scarcity, the fulfilment of our wishes is limited. Moreover, in the economic conjunctures an ebb and flow exists. The projection of oceanos in its aspects of timelessness and unlimited space would be a cornucopia which, however, cannot be realized: there are no trees growing into heaven. Here, the most important source of unlust in culture, in whatever form it is structured, is to be found. This unlust forms the crucial point where sociotropic tendencies are reverted into sadomasochistic reactions, like war, revolution, etc. Here, the psychodynamical cause starts of what Toynbee has called the split between the mass of people and the minority as carrier of the cultural patterns, when what Toynbee has called the "mimesis" appears not to render a cornucopia.

This viewpoint forms a good reason to question why one would emphasize one form of culture over another one. Every culture will be confronted with the same problem regarding the wish for a cornucopia.

However, one consideration is in the favour of co-operative structures. In history, and even in pre history, societal structures seem to have been based on dominance and submission (also slavery). As long as the dominant leader, or king, is seen by his subordinated people as a divine person, one can suppose that the veneration of this leader has an oceanic character, tending to timelessness and unlimited space as attributes of this leader. But after a few (often 2 or 3) generations reality teaches that such a leader is less divine and, moreover, exercizes power over his citizens. The mythical veil is torn away and the sadomasochistic structure shows itself. No wonder that the majority has no opportunity to discover the individual oceanos, except some mystics and sages; the majority is forced to look after its own interests, but can only do so from day to day, on short term. Nobody, namely, knows the plans of the ruler of this society, plans which can make the individual plans impossible. The result is a narrowing of the individual consciousness.

It might be that co operative structures offer a better chance for the development of a sense of totality and by this a view in which the own interests can be fitted together with those of the other members of the co-operation; this would mean a consciousness expansion on longer term.

Co-operative mindedness as altered state of consciousness

This sense of totality as a state of consciousness seems so important that it is a necessity to expatiate about it. It is namely. a state of consciousness which is very badly understood in a pattern of culture in which the sadomasochistic traits of dominance and submission are prevalent. In the sadomasochistic situation the weaker is to the stronger as the stronger wishes it. It is true that the realization of this wish of the strongest can evoke new situations in which the stronger one appears to be the weaker and that thereby the original relation of a weaker and a stronger one can change, but such a change cannot be predicted as the defeat of the originally strongest one cannot be foreseen. This characteristic is inherent in every sadomasochistic relationship, which means that a pattern of culture based on sadomasochism remains a continual battle field which essentially is anti-co-operation. Co-operative mindedness means quite another interhuman relationship. When starting with one member of a co-operation this co-operator is to the co-operation as the co-operation is to this co-operation plus this co-operator.

First of all, this interhuman relationship points to the fact that in principle there is no question whether this co-operator, or the co-operation is the strongest. The attitude of the single co-operator as well as of the co-operating group is tending toward this group plus the single co-operator. Here, if it belongs e.g. to voting, this means that the rule of the half plus one vote is excluded as the half minus one vote has to submit itself. The decisions cannot be made by the half + 1 vote. On the other hand, the single co-operator is also conscious of the totality of the group plus himself. So he has to fit his own interests into the interests of the co-operation as a whole. This is a very peculiar situation in a pattern of culture where the actual ego tries to realize its own purposes and feels defeated as soon as these efforts fail. In other words each single co-operator, as a member of a co-operation, has to develop a sense of totality how to include the interests of the co operation as a whole plus one's own interests.

Moreover, if the society is structured in a co-operative way each kind of co operation, producer's–, consumer's–and worker's co-operations, has some form of a surveying top by which the development of a sense of totality can progress toward e.g. national interests.

However, this study does not propose to a kind of model for a co operatively structured society as such. The first importance is the insight in a co perative mindedness with the abolishing of sado-masochistic interhuman relationships. The structure of a society will always be the reflection of the basic interhuman relations. In these interhuman relations the man-woman relation is one of the most important ones: are they based on co-operative mindedness, or on "who is the strongest". When this basis is a co-operative one, the co-operation between eros and oceanos is enabled and by this man and woman can develop a sense of totality in which the partner is included.

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VII

The Prism and the Sphere : Reflections on Interdependence

Edgar B. Schick

Calendars and watches; road maps; oceanic and astronomical charts; historical summaries and analyses: all of these help us to understand where we are now, where we have come from, and where we might go in the future. Without them we rapidly become disoriented and confused, easy victims of self deception or the misleading lures of demagogues. We are like the blindfolded child who is pushed about and ridiculed. Even entire societies can lose their sense of direction.

To help us maintain a sense of direction the social critic, the educator, and the historian of ideas seek to chart the maps and to put the myriad current events into some larger perspective so that we see a grander design in an otherwise confusing tapestry. When organizing these many data and putting them into an objective frame of reference, the historian proceeds like an individual standing close to a mirror: if he wants to see more of himself and the room in which he is standing, he must step back from that mirror. And so now, after the hectic pace of the rebuilding following 1945, after the social and economic turmoil of the 1960's in our cities and our universities, and after the shock effects of "Watergate," we must step back, reflect, and identify the landmarks and put the torn off pages of the calendar into some kind of meaningful order. To do this we review the characteristics of the post-war period and begin to identify both the nature of the age which we have entered as well as our response to it, namely, our tendency to look backward to the security of the past while we are defining the name of this new era.

While we may not have realized it, the post-war period ended sometime ago. Although historians may need another generation to sketch the transition, several obvious benchmarks are clearly visible:

- the eruption of urban violence which revealed how the economic boom had emphasized the differences in social expectations and standards of living between the white middleclass, on the one hand, and the black and Hispanic communities, on the other;
- the outburst of campus unrest which signaled the end of academic "business as usual";
- the emergence of a broadly based ecological awareness;
- the rising disillusionment in our society with our involvement in Vietnam at least five years before our last soldiers were withdrawn;
- the astounding visit by the "cold warrior," Richard Nixon, to the People's Republic of China, radically changing our relationships with China and the Soviet Union;
- the decision by West Germany to enter into a new understanding with Eastern European countries and also with East Germany;
- the success of the space program in landing men on the moon who took pictures of our earth, our sphere, while standing on another body in space; and
- the rapid growth in the number of countries belonging to the United Nations, whose main Secretariat building, the tall prism in Manhattan, was increasingly filled by delegates with dark skins and flowing robes.

These trends marked the close of the post-war era which had concentrated on the rebuilding of cities, societies, and nations out of the catastropic rubble of central Europe, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki, and out of the nauseating, dumbfounding horror of Buchenwald, Auschwitz, and Dachau. It was easier to rebuild structures than to heal battered bodies, minds, and spirits, but we tried not to look too closely at the repugnant and festering sores left from the War. Instead, we built great monuments to our own sweat and to the endurance of the human spirit: super-highways; industrial complexes; athletic arenas, governmental office complexes; skyscrapers; and new universities. — Artists (as well as architects and civil engineers) had to make up for a generation lost to the rape of fascism and war. When we once again enjoy the American or European films of the firsr decade and one-half after the War, we are impressed with the sense of optimism and faith in the future which they contained. Perhaps it is this longing for what is now imagined to have been a simpler, more wholesome and optimistic age which explains the nostalgia for the 1950's.

Reconstruction and optimism were accompanied by an unparalleled burst of prosperity. We all came to expect an ever higher standard of living; vacation trips abroad; color TV; a second car;

central air conditioning; economic and political stability; low inflation; short work weeks; and increased access to higher education. In Western Europe four decades of social, political, and economic change were compressed into two. American technology was exported and improved abroad. Hard work was rewarded. Productivity rose. And we all were sure that prosperity was our right and would continue to increase.

This affluence was fueled not only by hard work and technological advances but also by the one-time infusion of three generations' money into one generation of expenditures. Before World War II the only major form of personal debt had been a mortgage: people had saved until they had the money to buy what was needed. In the early 1940's we earned well, but with shortages and price controls there were relatively few luxuries available. Up to the mid-1950's we spent individually and through our governments the savings which had been built up from before and during the War, and by 1965 we had spent, in addition, our current income as well as the income of our children through the floating of bonds, governmental deficit spending, and a major increase in consumer credit for those luxuries of life which we had already come to call necessities.

Coincidental with this economic explosion there was a burst of Liberal optimism similar to the Enlightened optimism of the Age of Reason. All of civilization was a continuous upward movement toward an ideal future with no limits to growth and possibilities. The belief in education and its benefits for the individual and society led to a nation-wide doubling of higher education enrollments and new career opportunities in what had previously been a stable "industry". Many of us educators ignored the ills on our campuses and concentrated on expansion and on our own careers. When Liberal leaders beheld a problem, they tended to assume that it could be cured were large amounts of money to be poured on it. Perhaps no other public figure better epitomized this solid, optimistic, intelligent, hard working, honest, enthusiastic, patriotic Liberalism than Hubert Humphrey who lifted the spirits of many in spite of personal disappointment and the cruel ravages of cancer.

The late Senator was only one of a series of political leaders who were identified with World War II and the post-war period. After the secure, father-figure leadership of Dwight Eisenhower, we sensed, still in a post-war glow, a renewed injection of vigor with the arrival of John Kennedy in the White House. His stirring call to service in his Inaugural Address will long be remembered as a high point in American optimism and the Great Society proposed by Lyndon Johnson seemed to promise more expansion of society's benefits, until the worm of Vietnam gnawed away that hope. Harry Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon were all men who could identify themselves with the success in victory of World War II and with the "containment" of Communism immediately thereafter.

This "Great Society," as we now look back upon it, marks in many ways the final years of the post-war period. It had lasted more than two decades, in contrast, for example, to the short life of democracy in Germany from 1919 to 1933. Unlike 1939 with the attack on Poland (twenty years after the treaty of Versailles), 1965 did not mark the beginning of a new, international conflagration. Nonetheless, our society was undergoing a series of shocks, no one of which could mark or cause the end of an era but which, taken together, were signs of change. The Enlightened Liberalism of the 1950's was giving way to the neo-Romantic, irrational, often drug-related pessimism and confusion of the late 1960's. The Liberal Democratic Party came under attack for having, some felt, betrayed its own constituents The "melting pot theory" of social assimilation was rejected by a rise in ethnocentricity. Black Americans were no longer willing to be relegated to the back seat of the nation's bus. The American army was not always invincible or honorable. Even the Church had entered a time of turmoil. Pope John XXIII had radically altered the papacy and the relationship between the Roman Catholic Church and the rest of Christendom: the reforms eventually growing out of the Second Vatican Council outdistanced, in many ways, the mainline, conservative Protestant denominations. In our families new stresses were being felt. The authoritarian role of the father had given way to new familiar interrelationships based on trust and cooperation. Women were beginning to expect equal treatment with men inside and outside the home. The divorce rate grew. Members of religious communities, still professing to be devout Christians, "leaped over the wall" in increasing numbers, and many of those who remained in religious communities shed centuries-old garb in favor of apparel which might more clearly identify their interrelationship with both the everyday world as well as with the life of the spirit.

All of these tensions in our basic social institution indicated (as we have now come to understand) that we had left the relative "comfort" of a way of life and had entered a new temporal place which as yet had no name.

When societies — like individuals — leave one age and are about to enter another, there is a tendency to long for the security of the past, and this hesitation to leave the secure "shell" of the post-war era may explain several trends which we have felt in the 1970's: a tendency to search for meaningful "values" in the past; a desire to conserve; a search for a mythology from the past as a foundation for the future; and the rise of a new set of public figures who have sensed this change, who are not yet able to articulate its character and meaning, and who lead through their personality more than through their specific definition of the new age

This look backwards is one of the more benign characteristics of the mid-1970's in the United States and Western Europe. In North America television programs are set in the 1950's, and movies from that decade are the subject of study and discussion. In Western Europe there is a frantic search for furnishing from the past, and agents comb villages for otherwise useless furnishings which can be sold for handsome prices in cities even if they had been stored away in attics as being tasteless relics of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. And those who can afford it discard their modern furniture of the late 1950's and early 1960's in favor of "old fashioned styles" while remodeling their homes—down to the replacement of door frames—to acquire an appearance of a solid, safer past.

Many people not only wish to *pre*serve the past, but they also urge us to *con*serve concepts and things. Until new energy sources are identified, energy must be conserved. At colleges and universities there are calls for a return to the "core" requirements in place before the chaos of the 1960's. The authors of the influential study "Limits to Growth" have argued that we need to conserve what we have. At a recent meeting of a major Christian church body, this very theme was chosen as the topic for study by its leadership, the message being that the Church will not grow numerically and that the challenge now is to conserve membership. Similarly, in our economic world trade unions have been placing increased emphasis upon the conservation of jobs and, therefore, membership. Academic unions, as well, are evaluated by present and potential members in terms of their success in conserving positions rather than identifying new ways of facilitating personal and professional development. The public at large and, therefore, major political parties in North America and Western Europe have begun to reject the post-war concept of increased governmental involvement in everyday life, and rarely do any political leaders dare to propose additional services or regulation which must be paid for with higher taxation. The working class is seeking increasingly to conserve and preserve its hard won gains rather than experiment with new social, political, and economical forms.

This caution about the future and need to solidify the foundations on which societies stand is also found in other parts of the world, as well. For example, in East Germany, the German Democratic Republic, the party leadership had spent almost thirty years emphasizing the fact that the GDR was not the heir of anything left over from the German past except, of course, for the influence of such people as Marx, Engels, Liebknecht, Luxemburg, and Thalmann among others. But recently the leadership has realized that people need a sense of "roots," of belonging to a spatial and even national tradition. In an effort to counteract the sense of being cut off from both the past and the present in the rest of the German speaking world (which had led to a sense of aimlessness among the younger generation), the German heritage is once again being revived. There is a new fascination with certain aspects of the writings of Goethe, Schiller, Herder, and others, and tourists visiting the Prussian palaces of Frederick the Great in Potsdam are now told with pride of the accomplishments of "our Master Builder" who only a few years earlier had been ignored or vilified by the same guides.

But perhaps the most vivid example of this trend can be found in Iran. While there were many factors which contributed to the overthrow of the Shah, there clearly was an erosion of traditional social values under the ousted monarch's regime. Shortly after the Shah had left Iran, a leading West German magazine, *Spiegel*, portrayed the coming trend on its cover with a drawing of a Moslem warrior in full attire, mounted on a horse, with a veiled woman behind him, dashing "back into the Middle Ages." The religious "shadow government" has made international headlines with its emphasis on the Koran as the ultimate prescription for living and for punishment in a country which had been considered to be one of the most "advanced" in the Moslem world. For many the future was uncertain, and before moving into a new era, there was a need to step back and take stock.

This search for the "mythology" by which man can live and die has a much less violent but far more reaching parallel in North America and Western Europe. In the absence of any external military threat to mobilize our societies into a spirit of selfless patriotism, we have been searching for our own self-regeneration either through a refreshed expression of traditional values or through some new world view. Fresh political faces have been sought, for example, in the United States, Canada, Sweden, Great Britain, and Italy. This situation may help explain the political quandary facing the United States after the turmoil of "Watergate." In particular, we may now better understand the phenomenon of a Jimmy Carter, both his surprise election and his subsequent difficulties. He did not belong to the list of heroes of World War II. He could not be identified with the strengths or the failings of the post-war period. He had no national or international political record. Instead, he was a fresh face with an apparently positive, if only vaguely articulated, vision. The public, apparently sensing the end of an age and the need for a different yet also traditional view of our country's possibilities, found a wholesome, decent, family man who is industrious, church going, and seemingly honest, a man who could lead the country safely and democratically into the first years, at least, of this new era. But Carter's problems began as soon as he assumed office because he was neither able to identify this new age's spirit nor was he able to focus it on the challenges facing him and the country. He first emphasized Human Rights, religious values, and human decency. Increasingly he has had to make the kinds of pragmatic compromises that are common in the world of politics. When these compromises fail to please large numbers of people or when they smack of vacillation or confusion, the public has tended to withdraw its support since it had probably elected him because of his apparent insight into a new world vision replacing the political manipulations of the past.

And so both American political parties are searching for other leaders. None has, as yet, clearly emerged with a voice and a vision to compel attention. In the Republican Party the only national figure, Ronald Reagan, is a figure from the past, preaching doctrines which were clearly valid in our post war world and which appear, therefore, to be "safe." — Among the Democrats many of the party faithful have turned to a personality which seems to offer a vision of a better America, Senator Edward Kennedy, but, interestingly enough, Senator Kennedy is not really a "new" personality. He brings with him the aura of the early 1960's when his brother was in the White House and when America had an almost regal "first family" whom it could admire for its youthful vigor and idealism. In turning their allegiance to him some politicians (in addition, of course, to sensing a "winner") may be opting for the safety of the past, for just one more encore, before facing up to the tough realities of the future.

But leaders can emerge suddenly who, by their boldness and personalities, radically alter the course of major social institutions. In the Church, as well as in the political arena, leaders have captured the public imagination because of their personalities rather than the popularity of their message.

This trend is quite clear in the Roman Catholic Church. After a generation of traditionalistic papal leadership under Pius XII. the Sacred College chose a man who was probably expected to be a "caretaker" until future directions were thought out. But John XXIII will go down in history as an ecclesiastical reformer with few historical parallels. While maintaining established tradition, he revitalized the Roman Catholic Church simultaneously forging new bonds with other Christians and stimulating in them, as well, an awareness of the need for reform. Before Vatican II could complete its work, the Sacred College chose a Pope who would both carry out the reforms and also consolidate the Church's position before moving on the additional new ideas. After the death of Paul VI (whose personality failed to mobilize the imagination of large numbers of people) the Cardinals elected in quick succession two men who, by the very force of their personalities, stimulated further change. Interestingly enough, both Popes John Paul cautiously chose names linking them with their predecessors while also breaking ground by selecting a double name, seeking to bridge the past and the future.

These men have exemplified the power of leadership by example, personality, and persuasion rather than by ecclesiastical fiat. Although in office for only a month, John Paul I won the hearts of people everywhere by showing a ready smile, his genuine Christianity, and the warmth of his calling. And now John Paul II has undertaken several major international journeys. In Latin America he rephrased the Beatitudes to apply them to the plight of the impoverished, while in Poland he re-emphasized the Christian message for spiritually thirsty men and women in all countries. In the United States he combined a modern, "mass-media" approach with a theologically conservative message. His homilies show a traditional mind, but one which has come through the fire of a different and demanding purification and one which is grappling with the problem of expressing the Christian message on an international and worldwide scale.

Although John Paul II is a product of the War and the post-war period, he is clearly attempting to speak to people both in the wealthy and in the impoverished nations. Like many other leaders he is aware of the current tendency to focus primarily on materialism, but he has been pointing to the crucial importance of the creative and religious potential of the human spirit.

The Pope's visit to Poland underscored the differences in ideology at this turning point in history between Marxism/Leninism and Christianity. To be sure, Marxist/Leninists would argue that this new age we have entered is the last crisis of capitalism before the great triumph of "democratic socialism," as they call it, that is, a centralized police and welfare state, under the direction of a small leadership elite, moving toward Communism in some future, golden era. While admitting that the standard of living in the "socialist" states is below that in capitalist countries, Marxist ideologues view this situation as a temporary discomfort in anticipation of a far better life in a generation yet to come. We dare not, of course, overlook the benefits of a welfare state with free education, free medical and dental care, low costs for vacations, theater, opera, and the basic necessities of life, safe streets and parks, and the guarantee of a job—security and modest welfare at the price of enforced conformity and limitations upon expressions of the human spirit. But this vision of the age into which we are now entering is based upon philosophical presuppositions arising out of the abuse of 19th century exploitative capitalism.

On the other hand, those of us in the democratic West do not view such a world as desirable or inescapable. We are being tested to ascertain which kind of political and social system will be most flexible and best allow for the growth of the human spirit in a natural and beneficial evolution. The challenge we face in identifying the new age and then using the new insights which we have gained may be temporarily overlooked because we do not face the same overt threats of war, terror, and oppression common early in this century.

The symbols for World War II and the post-war era include the various insignia of fascism, the red star, and the mushroom cloud of the thermonuclear bomb. While we cannot be oblivious to those symbols, we might look at two other symbols, two solid geometric shapes, to help us grasp the character of the new age upon which we have entered. The first is a slender, rectangular prism, and the second is a sphere.

The prism is the tall, Secretarial building of the United Nations. If the League of Nations collapsed, the U.N. has stood, as imperfect as it may be, for over a generation. It has provided a forum, at the very least, where people of all colors, religions, cultures, political goals, and geographic backgrounds can come together and talk with each other both in public and in private. Increasingly its membership has become numerically dominated by delegates from non-Western, non Caucasian countries, and these nations now substantially outnumber Europeans and North Americans. They represent:

— masses of people who cannot be ignored and who are no longer willing to tolerate subservience to Europeans and Americans;

— people with dark skins who demand the satisfaction of their basic needs and also desire the creature comforts which we have come to enjoy;

— parts of the world where the superpowers are fighting their battles with and through their surrogates;

— nations on continents which have become increasingly common in the headlines of our newspapers: Indo-China; Africa; Latin America; and the Middle East;

— the places in the world where the greatest opportunities for the development of natural resources and industrial expansion are to be found;

— the producers of raw materials from the earth itself (oil, metals, coffee, sugar) on which we depend, and into whose treasuries vast amounts of our wealth are flowing;

— and, above all, the people with whom we must interact as partners and not as masters.

Just as the prism symbolizes one aspect of our interdependent future, so, too, does the sphere, our planet earth. While we were busy rebuilding after the War and creating the United Nations, we may have missed the fact that we are all alone together in this vast universe. It was not until man propelled himself away from earth into outer space that he could gain the objectivity to look back and see all of this globe, a lovely, lonely, living planet, hanging in a black, hostile universe. Only then did for many of us the new-age clearly begin as we started to gain a new perspective and, paradoxically, find that the view from outer space brought us home again with a new appreciation of the beauty and fragility of our precious little world which we must share with each other.

This view of this sphere has begun to drive home certain basic concepts which we cannot ignore :

— our world is finite, fragile, and beautiful;
— we are all on it together: there is, as yet, nowhere else to go;
— since we must live here together, we must care for this sphere for the benefit of each other today and for the welfare of our children in the future;
— and we must look toward the prism, among other places, where we can talk and work with each other.

The prism and the sphere provide us, then, with the clue to the character of the new age into which we have entered. The name for this new age, to follow the post-war era, is *interdependence*, not a new word, but certainly a concept which we must accept and upon which we must base our actions.

Once again, proponents of Marxism/Leninism would argue that such a definition justifies their own emphasis upon "collectivism," that is, an enforced self negation for the average citizen in order to serve the welfare of the larger community. But the pressure from the leadership elite for such a collectivism has failed to create a new, socialist man as though he were a thing which could be "stamped out" on a machine. Instead, the urge for individualism has never been greater, and until now, at least, Marxist societies have essentially stultified the individual's imagination, ingenuity, and creativity in the name of conformity, to the detrement of society as a whole. Indeed, as the educational level of citizens rises in the Soviet-dominated countries, people there exhibit an ever greater skepticism about official propaganda and constantly expect more of the "good life" in terms both of materialism and also freedom of expression. Those regimes have their greatest problems not with factory workers but with the white collar "intelligentsia" whom they have favored with education and higher status and who now long for the more positive aspects, at least, of the Western European social and cultural order.

But if the theorist of Marxism/Leninism proposes collectivism, many North Americans have been preaching a gospel of rugged individualism as the success model for the development of the United States and Canada. They would argue that pioneers and frontiersmen were sturdy individuals who left the security of east coast communities to cut a path through the wilderness. They might also cite the examples of the great barons of railroading and industry whose brash, bold, egocentricity forged the economic foundation for the capitalist prosperity of the masses in the 20th century, even if their motto occasionally was "the public be damned!" Bold heroes always stand out in history, be they doers of good or ill, and they capture the imagination with their creativity in the arts or their freshness and forcefulness in politics and economics as they "make" things happen. Yet whether they are aware of it or not, their vision is invariably a larger one of an entire community which will be effected, and their boldness is usually not to be confused with foolhardiness. The pioneers in our North American history were keenly aware of the interdependence of their lives and efforts. They traveled in caravans and circled their wagons against attacks. They developed a string of forts. They built villages and towns to serve (and profit from) each other in an often harsh environment. They built railroads to strengthen the economic interdependence of our country in tapping its vast resources. Over 100 years ago they fought a bloody civil war to maintain the concept of union and interdependence for strength, defense, and mutual aid. And while local concerns and selfishness exist, the great leaders of this country have had ever broader ranges of vision, perceiving the national issues as having a priority for the welfare of our society as a whole and for its individual citizens.

The model of interdependence in the United States is rapidly on an increasingly global character. When one OPEC country curtails production, the results ripple throughout the world. A poor harvest in a heavily populated country such as India or the Soviet Union effects markets, prices, and food availability in many other countries. A decision by the United States temporarily to ' ground" the DC-10 domestically throws much of international air activity into confusion. The continuing bloodshed in Indo-China, resulting in a massive number of displaced persons, places a moral and financial burden on countries everywhere. Above all, we are ecologically interdependent. The rain forests of the Amazon create life giving oxygen for much of the world. The great oceans provide harvests for many countries. On the other hand, above ground nuclear tests spew radioactive materials across the face of the earth, and untreated industrial wastes in one country can pollute the air and waters of a neighbor. And man made satellites can fall to earth in countries other than those which had launched them.

More than ever, then, wise statesmen are forced to think in global terms, and the range of options open to us is often limited by our awareness of effects on others now or in the future. While we all naturally have our own familial, local. regional, national, or continental interests at heart, our modern world increasingly expects us to develop our priorities in international, interdependent terms as we influence, serve, teach, or hurt each other.

Our mutual interdependence does not only limit us but also gives us creative opportunities, as well. Our finest minds are challenged more than ever to plan with long-term, international results in mind. We are expected to be aware of our interdependence with our brothers and sisters today and also with our heirs in the future. The new challenges will lie in the areas of increased efficiency and productivity, the discovery of better ways to feed and clothe the less fortunate, the wiser development of priorities and utilization of our resources, a greater emphasis on quality (rather than only quantity), a more selfless concern for the welfare of others (particularly as we are only beginning to develop new technologies), and the ability to think in four dimensional frames of reference.

We stand at the early stages of a new Age of Interdependence after the conclusion of the post-war period and a brief time of conservatism and confusion. We now face the challenge of translating the awareness of this new age into concrete forms of action. We need to understand that the Age of Interdependence places constraints upon us which we ignore at our peril while also offering us fascinating opportunities and choices to serve others. Our guiding charts for the future will be marked in terms of interdependence. In this Age our most creative minds must think and plan timelessly and synoptically for the welfare of a large spectrum of people than had ever been the case before—the challenge of the prism and the sphere.

VIII

Some Problems of the "Yoga-Sutras" of Patanjali

Kantcho D. Kanev

In fact this investigation is a first attempt for a Marxist interpretation of the classic "Yoga-Sutras". It is traditionally thought that the author or compiler of this first Yoga-compendium is the ancient Indian sage Patanjali, who lived between the IVth and the IInd centuries, A.D.

Primarily fixed in one of the oldest, richest and most difficult languages—the Sanskrit (in Devangari writing), the first Yoga-treatise consists of 196 sutras, set out in four sections (Padas). The first section is entitled *Samadhi Pada*, which literally means "Section of Concentration", and contains 51 sutras. The title itself of this section suggests, that the central problem in it is the concentration of mind (*Samadhi*). One of the multitudes of discussion problems here is the first definition of the term "Yoga", set out by Patanjali as early as in his second sutra, by the Sanskrit phrase, "YOGA CITTA VRTTI NIRODHA".

The discussions about the translations and interpretation of this key aphorism being from ancient times and still go on these days. The own translation-interpretation of the author reads : "Yoga is control (direction, curbing, detaining) of the modification of mind". Simultaneously the author holds to the standpoint, that the word "Yoga" is a derivation from the Sanskrit root "yuj", whose archaic meaning is "harnessing" or "curbing". Thus in the Yoga literature Yoga begins traditionally to be translated as "union", "tying together", "uniting", "unity", "harmony", etc. But according to us it is not enough to proceed only from the etymology of the word "Yoga", because it does not become clear what a "unity", "harmony", etc., is meant. As for example Yajnavalkya speaks about the unity between universal spirit—Brahman, and the individual spirit—Atman. But this concept is not accepted even by the vedantist Madhvacharya, because Patanjali would at least have quoted this.

Our endeavour towards an objective translation and interpretation of the sutra, as well as the interpretation of "Yoga" as "unity", "harmony", etc, gives us reason to make a first attempt for a Marxist philosophically methodological determination of the term "Yoga" as it follows : (1) in a tighter meaning of the word "Yoga" means "unity" "harmony", etc, between the physical and the spiritual in man; (2) in a broader sense it means "unity", "harmony" etc. between the subject and the object of concentration.

According to us not less discussionable is also the term "*Samadhi*" (with its two basic stages : *Samprajnata* and *Asamprajnata*). In this case too, the followers of idealism and religion defend the point of view that the end purpose of the yogist Samadhi was a peculiar "confluence" or uniting of mind (*citta*), or of the intellect with the spiritual (Brahman, the God Ishvara, etc.), or as a mystic self knowledge and "liberation". We think however that the end purpose of Yoga's *Samadhi* has not been to assure only a "confluence" or "intercourse" with the transcendental, or to realise a mystical "trance", but mainly and on the first place, consciously and aimingly to direct and coordinate the physical with the spiritual (resp. cognitive) activity of man. Or in other words, the specific Yogist *Samadhi* supposes the conscious directedness of man's mind (citta) towards a super-energetic activity in respect of entering into the deeper crux of the mind concentration objects, resp. its cognition, The first Marxist interpretation of Yoga *Samadhi* was deservingly appraised by some foreign scholars (e.g. the Soviet Cand. Phil. Sc. A. Kontratov, etc.) The problem of the gist, role and significance of Ishvara in Patanjali Yoga is also an object of continuing discussions. Both the objective translation of the relevant sutras and the standpoint of a number of eminent authors or Yoga-adepts, give us reason to support that there are no grounds for Yoga to be characterised basically as a religious system. Ishvara is not a god in the traditional sense of the word, but rather an indefinite abstraction that could (after the ultimate intention of Patanjali) also be used by the religious believers as an object of concentration, i.e. a peculiar mantra, and nothing else.

The second section is known under the title "Sadhana Pada" (which literally means "The Section of Practice"), having 55 Sutras. One of the many cardinal problems here is the one about the "degrees" and "means" for realising the special Yoga mind concentration, or *Samadhi*. In Patanjali's model a number of 8 such degrees or means are postulated, with which Patanjali-Yoga becomes world famous as an "eight-stage Yoga" or *Ashtangayoga*. These stages are: *yama*, *niyama*, *asanas*, *pranayama*, *pratyahara*, *dharana*, *dhyana*, *samadhi*, which are examined by us separately.

In connection with pranayama we give our own interpretation also of *Prana* as it follows : (1) Prana — with the meaning of "expiration" called prasvasa, pracchardana etc. *Recaka*, and (2) prana —with the meaning of "air of life", "life breath", "life creating force", etc. But one should keep in mind that *Prana* is neither breathing in the common sense of the word nor any "cosmic force" existing out and independently from us (resp the alive human body) although being the same thing that manifests itself as "force". In our opinion *Prana* should be treated as a peculiar "life air", "life breath", "life creating force", "life biocurrent", "energy", etc. but in the sense of something achieved by the human organism itself. At the same time *Prana* should be treated also as a result of an inconscious (resp. instinctive) or fully conscious and intentional guiding of the wholesome breathing process with the active participation also of the mind and the interaction among the basic life systems of the living human organism. Patanjali speaks in this section also about the so called "additional means" (however not in the sense of obligatory ones, but as possible means for practice). Such "means" e.g. are ,"the worship to Ishvara" provided especially for religious believers as one of the eventual objects of the specific Yoga mind concentration. Other "additional means" are the so called *ascesas* or *tapas*, supposing super-physical or mental efforts with the aim to achieve physical and mental effects includingly effects of the mind.

The third section bears the title *Vibhuti Pada*, which literally translated means "The Section of Powers" (*Siddhi*), of 56 sutras. The object of a comparatively more detailed examination here are at last three "degrees" or "means" : *Dharana*, *Dhyana* and *Samadhi*. As a matter of fact these are also the most complex states or modifications of the mind (*citta*). And always in this connection it is also spoken about the specifically Yogist three-unit term *Samyama* (which includes *Dharana*, *Dhyana* and *Samadhi*). According to Patanjali and also to the commentator of his sutras, and also according to a great many contemporary authors, the successful practice of the specifically Yogist *Samyama* leads to a multiplicity of natural and parapsychological phenomena which are implied in nearly 30 of the sutras. Some of these are practised since a very long time in this country too (e.g. fire-dancing, clairvoyance etc.). Suggestopedy, as practised in Bulgaria, can also be ascribed to the specific Yogic self-relaxation or *Savasana*, representing a peculiar application of Yogic mind concentration. And with all the above mentioned phenomnea it is according to us a question of real concentration of mind or attention, and not of some fallacious concentration etc. with which some authors speculate in explaining a number of para-psychological phenomena.

The circumstance that Patanjali dwells in his "Yoga-Sutras" more detailedly upon the effects of *Samadhi*, may—according to us—create a false impression, that he has paid an extraordinarily great importance to the shown results. In fact however Patanjali aimed with this at illustration mainly and extremely only the huge and increpible power, role and importance of the Yogist concentration of mind. In general *Samyama* and the ensuing effects have not been a self-purpose of the yogins. Just the opposite. Patanjali himself stresses word for the word that "these are hinderances for the full Yogist concentration (*Samadhi*)", but that "they are powers of the state of earth" (III. 37). Why and how some of these effects are "hinderances" of the Yogist mind concentration is quite known and stressed by us in the course of our exposition. But for us the fact that Patanjali considered *Samyama* and the ensuing practical effects as "powers of the state of earth" and not as supernatural phenomena, which a number of erudite authors allege even up to now, has a more essential significance.

The last section bears the title "*Kaivalya Pada*" (which literally translated means "The Section of Independence" or "The Section of Liberatian", containing 34 sutras. Already in the first sutra it is said that the "Siddhis" (the para powers—K K.) are acquired by birth, by means of drugs, mantras, self-curbing (ascesis) and Samadhi. In fact Patanjali informs by that, that besides by means of the specific Yogist *Samyama* for achieving some of the mentioned phenomena, there are other methods too, which are mentioned already in ancient literary sources.

A central problem in this section are the nature and forms of the spiritual "independence" of "liberation" (Kaivalya). We consider that the real spiritual "independence" or "liberation" (Kaivalya), in fact presumed for Patanjali the deep knowledge of the visual and the hidden in man himself and in the universe, the deep mental penetration into the crux of objects or phenomena in universal variety. And as the only means to achieve all this Patanjali shows the specific Yoga mental concentration (*Dharana*), meditation (*Dhyana*) and the unique *Samadhi*, representing apogee of Yogist mental concentration, resp. knowledge, too.

The circumstance that Patanjali adhered to the philosophic dualist conception for the simultaneous existence of two supreme or substantial principles—the matter (*prakriti*) and the spirit or soul (purusha) is, we think, a sufficient proof that the sage Patanjali has suffered the influence of dualism and religion. But one cannot challenge the influence of materialism too because just according to it, inherent to the matter (*prakriti*) are its three basic qualities or characteristics, the so called *gunas* (*sattva rajas*, and *tamas*) through which the creation of the whole universal variety incl. the modifications of mind (*citta*) can be explained. Having all this in mind, we adhere to the standpoint that Patanjali had no other possibility to make his *Ashtanga Yoga* more admissible for the then-conditions, in which idealism and religion were governing.

In the concluding part of our monographic investigation we accentuate on two moments, having the same significance. The first refers to the rational in the gnosseo-perspective aspect of the Yogist *Samyama*, which (as well as a psycho-physiological method) has been used by nearly all basic ancient Indian philosophic systems. *Samyama* (like dialectics) can even today be used simultaneously by the followers of materialism idealism and religion. In general the non-scientific and mystic must be put aside, evaluating the rational and taking the useful out of the Yogist *Samyama*; this is also the task of our Marxist socialist science. Naturally. such must be the attitude towards Yogism altogether. The second moment accentuated by us is connected with the health pro-phylactic and therapeutic effects which are a unique consequence of practising the specific Yoga asanas, Pranayama and especially meditation (*Dhyana*). But all this is intimately connected not only with Raja-Yoga, where *Samyama* is a central problem. but also with the later established sections of Yogism (resp. Hatha-Yoga, Laya-Yoga, Mantra-Yoga, etc.) which are comparatively more detailedly exposed in the later works of the Yoga-classics (Goraxa-Sathaka; Gheranda-Samhita; Hatha-Yoga Pradipika; Shiva-Samhita; Yoga-Vasistha; "Bhagavad-Gita", etc). But for the author the "crown" of Yoga-classics are the earliest and here contemplated "Yoga Sutras" of the sage Patanjali.

PUBLICATIONS OF K. D. KANEV ON YOGISM :

1- *Some Philosophical Interpretations of the Term "Yoga"*—Filosofska Missl (Phil. Thought), No. 1, 1969.

2- *About the Rational and Mystic, Referring Mental Concentration in Yogism*—Fil. Missl. No. 5, 1969.

3- *Out-of-date Interpretations of Yogism in a New Book*—Fil. Missl, No. 6, 1971.

4- *What a Teaching is Yogism ?* —Politiceska Prosveta (Polit. Enlightenment), No. 8, 1971.

5- *Philosophic Thought in Ancient India* —(a Para. about "Yoga"), Fil. Missl, No. 1, 1972.

6- *A Conversation on Yogism* —(a generalising discussion article). Newspaper "Orbita", No. 13, 1974.

7- *Jawaharlal Nehru on Yogism* —Fil. Missl, No 4. 1980.

8- *About the Yogist Mental Concentration* —Darshana International, Moradabad — India, No. 72, 1978.

9- *An Attempt for Philosophical-Marxist Interpretation of the Term "Yoga"* —Darshana International, Moradabad — India, No. 71, 1978.

10- *Some Problems of the Yoga-Sutras by Patanjali* —Sc. Report before the 56th Session of the Indian Phil. Congress, 1981.

IX

Subject-predicate Logic, Substance-attribute Metaphysics and Prepositional Phrases

Djordje Vidanovic

The purpose of this paper is to indicate that subject-predicate logic and subsequent substance-attribute metaphysics cannot be validated within the context of modern grammatical theory. In the initial contention the reader may see that I shall be siding with D. Davidson and certain of his views published several years ago (Davidson, 1970).

Davidson employed some devices used by formal logic to show that, for instance, adverbial modification viewed logically is "on a par with adjectival modification" (Davidson, 1970). Our task, however, will be to see whether the same thing can be done using relevant linguistic devices. The language in which we shall try to show that, in certain respects, adjectival modification and adverbial modification are one and the same type of modification, is Serbocroatian. Of course, the examples will be simultaneously translated into English, for the convenience of the reader.

If we succeed in showing that adverbial and adjectival modification do not differ, in the sense explained above, then the following conclusion can be formed : subject-predicate logic and its corollary, substance-attribute metaphysics, are but by-products of a mistakenly applied grammatical apparatus. This means, further, that the dichotomy NP-VP can, and ought to still hold, but within the confines of the linguistic model. Any metaphysical, far-fetching results if they stem from a dichotomy-based grammar are not to be extrapolated.

This attempt, then, is a little paradoxical because it shows that the main tenets of its methodological foundation are shaky. On the other hand the attempt itself is extremely rewarding : one can see that the devices at the disposal of the transformationaly-minded linguist are quite penetrating and malleable; they make it possible for him to take a journey into their own entrails !

Let us consider these two sentences :

(1) Covek *na brdu* je moj dugogodisnji prijatelj.
+ The man *on the hill* is my life-long friend.
(The plus sign indicates English sentences)
(2) Kuca *u planini* je napustena dugo godina.
+ The house *in the mountains* has been abandoned for many years.

The underlined segments are so-called "defining syntagms" in Serbocroatian. In English they are labelled as "prepositional phrases". The function of these is, in both languages, clearly adjectival, or attributive. However, in (1) and (2) the linguist can look for the "deep structures", where the essential relations and logical propositions are revealed; So, in (1) :

(Covek se nalazi na brdu) (Covek je moj prijatelj)[1]

Since *covek* (the man) from the first proposition and *covek* (the man) from the second proposition are coreferential, these are through the process of relativization, relativized :

+ (The man is on the hill) (The man is my friend)

The relative *who* in English, and the relative *koji* in Serbocroatian are inserted, so we get :

(la) Covek koji se nalazi *na brdu* je moj dugogodisnji prijatelj.
+ The man who is (placed) *on the hill* is my life-long friend.
This same process can be applied to sentence (2).

The prepositional phrases which in (1) and (2) functioned as adjectivals in (la) and by the same token in (2a) serve as adverbials, QED.

This result means that we can show that superficial adjectival modification is, as a matter of fact, adverbial in deep structure. One should bear in mind that only the modification by prepositional phrases is being discussed.

Now we shall attempt to show the process in the other direction. We shall attempt to show that adverbials are, logically, nothing else but adjectivals.

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[1] In Serbocroatian the verb "nalaziti" means "to be placed", "to be in a certain position". Though transformational-generative theory does not allow any other verb but BE, HAVE in relative clauses, I think this can and should be done (Vidanovic, 1979: 16-24)

(3) Jovan je dosao u radnju.
+ John arrived at the store.

If we consider the sentence above to be a proposition *W* then we can embed it into (4) :

(4) __*W*__ je iznenadjenje za vlasnika.
+ __*W*__ is a surprise to the proprietor.

Out of this we get :

(5) Jovanov dolazak *u radnju* je iznenadjenje za vlasnika
+ John's arrival *at the store* is a surprise to the proprietor.

In (5) the proces of nominalization was employed.

We succeeded in showing that adverbials turn into adjectivals and this completes a whole cycle : adjectivals into adverbials, adverbials into adjectivals.

We hope that we have succeeded in pointing out invalidity of subject-predicate logic and substance attribute metaphysics by presenting the reader with proof of the complete vagueness of adjective-adverb binarism. Since these are supposed to modify NPs and VPs respectively, we can see that their tentative antecedents are very hazily outlined, as well.

In our opinion, this paper stands very strongly in favor of the views presented by Davidson. It also shows that what we probably have in propositions is made up by events and states (in which the shift from traditionally defined "substantive" to "verb" is continual).

Possible topics for further investigations concerning the problem we have discussed could be the temporal issues of events and states, by which we mean the aspectual side of these and the constraints that these could pose on adverbial-adjectival cycles. However, this may well be a topic for another paper.

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1. Davidson, D., (1970) "The Individuation of Events", in *Essays in Honour of Carl Hempel*, N. Rescher (ed.) Dordrecht, Reidel.
2. Vidanovic, Dj., (1979) *Adverbial and Prepositional Phrases as Postnominal Modifiers in the Novels of J. Cary*, Master's thesis, University of Belgrade.

X

Some Aspects of the Impact of Science on Western Civilization

Henry Winthrop

1. The Study of the Social Effects of Science and Technology

The area of concern which we speak of loosely as the study of *the social impacts of the science and technology* is without specifiable limits. This is true in part because of the diverse matters which can be the foci of attention under the rubric which we have italicized. It is also true because of the fact that since science and technology evolve with time—remaining always unfinished business —the nature of the social impacts of science and technology will also evolve with time. Most — though not all, of course — of the developments in science and technology cannot be foreseen and because this is the case the problems they generate will always be largely new and our institutional modes of adaptation to them, when our approach is rational, will also ideally have to be innovative with the passage of time. The appropriateness and success of our adaptations will be a function of the *rate of change* of science and technology. If that rate becomes so great as to constitute information overload for the human nervous system — which is precisely what is happening now — we get a situation of confusion which is almost ubiquitous psychologically. This is the situation in which most of us do not quite know what is happening to us nor what to do about it. That situation has been called "future shock."

If we include within the developments of science and technology the entire range of intellectual creativity posed by scientific method, pure and applied mathematics, statistics and research design, technical, philosophical and logical analysis, theories and techniques of measurement, particularly for social and behavioral data, and similar considerations — all of which may be spoken of as *scientific thought-*

ways — then we enlarge still further the area to which we have already referred as the *social impacts of science and technology*. This enlargement takes on separate significance when its features are emphasized, in the particular development of the social and behavioral sciences.

The study of the social impacts of science and technology can therefore be regarded as one of the largest and richest areas of contemporary social science, most particularly of sociology but without prejudice to the professional concern with this area, which is also displayed by economists and historians. Many contemporary thinkers — in and out of social science — regard the area as, in fact, *the most extensive* area of concern in social science. They do so because it is generally readily admitted that *most* of the social change that will be taking place from now to eternity is generated by the developments in science and technology. This has been markedly true for the industrial revolution since, say 1760, a revolution that has been more or less haphazard. It will be more true in the post-industrial society into which we are moving and in which a persistent effort to achieve *rational control* of social change — largely by regulating scientific research, technological development and the creation of modes of analysis that can unify our understanding of the social system that we have, ourselves, created — will be a social ideal that will come increasingly to the fore. These points make conspicuous our previous assertion that the study of the social effects of science and technology is not only one of the most extensive areas to be cultivated by sociologists but is also one for which the effort to produce a taxonomy must be prosecuted with care, so that the taxonomy ceveloped does not turn out to be a straight-jacket.

The upshot of the preceding considerations is this. The scope of the area which we have called the social impacts of science and technology becomes so vast and the accretions to it over time so numerous, that the construction of a scheme of classification for the numerous and diverse aspects of this area becomes well nigh impossible. This is true even if we assume that we do not challenge the practical worth of such an effort. For reasons such as these we shall not attempt to devise any such taxonomy in this paper. Instead, we shall choose to highlight certain features of the social effects of science and technology in order to provide a rough and necessarily incomplete map of the terrain. The themes we shall choose to emphasize are necessarily subjective. That limitation is inescapable and will always reflect the writer's interests, his value-outlook and his feeling for what is of central importance in the area.

Our approach will then consist of selecting themes within this field in terms of what we regard as of crucial importance. As we go along we shall impose upon our subject matter only such intellectual order as, we feel, will sharpen the sense of the importance of the topics we have selected for treatment.

2. The Post-Industrial Society

For many decades now Western thinkers have realized that the most potent factor for social change in our lives is the development of science and technology. This development largely generated the industrial revolution that almost everyone has read about. In our time most science and technology and the research associated with them have been consciously organized on a large scale, both in industry, in the university and in the independent, non profit institution. This organizational aspect, together with the radically new developments that have appeared largely since WW II, are ushering in what has been called "the post-industrial society." Among the new developments in science and technology that are creating a post-industrial society are the following: computer technology, which has been called the information processing revolution: the many spin-offs from the scientific and technological developments that have accompanied space exploration and research; miniaturization and micro-miniaturization; robotics: molecular biology; advances in instrumentation; programmed learning; transportation; prefabricated housing; cybernation and the almost completely automated factory; oceanography; etc.

What, then, are the characteristics of the post-industrial society towards which the West — particularly the United States — is being moved by some of the current and emerging forms of new science and technology ? *In general*, the following are the features of the post-industrial society. It is a society in which (1) the economy is moving from being predominantly engaged in the production of goods to focusing attention on the supplying of services, research, education and the amenities; (2) the major social group is beginning to consist of persons in the professions and of persons who are technicians and specialists in areas requiring high skill and extended training; and (3) the changing social, economic and political relations are more and more dependent upon advances in *theoretical* knowledge that are increasingly being codified. In the post-industrial society the intellectual institutions are becoming the primary ones. The products of these intellectual institutions — the professional classes, the technicians, the specialists — are becoming the advisors, policy-framers and researchers for statesmen and politicians.

The characteristics most frequently associated with the concept of a post-industrial society are shown in the table given at this point.

A Sample of Some of the Characteristics Most Frequently Associated with The Post-Industrial Society[1]

1. Per capita income about fifty times the preindustrial

2. Most "economic" activities are tertiary and quaternary (service-oriented), rather than primary or secondary (production-oriented)
3. Business firms no longer the major source of innovation
4. There may be more "consentives" (vs. "marketives")
5. Effective floor on income and welfare
6. Efficiency no longer primary
7. Market plays diminished role compared to public sector and "social accounts"
8. Widespread "cybernation"[2]
9. "small world"
10. Typical "doubling time" between three and thirty years
11. Learning society
12. Rapid improvement in educational institutions and techniques
13. Erosion (in middle class) of work-oriented, achievement-oriented, advancement-oriented values
14. Erosion of "national interest" values
15. Sensate, secular, humanist, perhaps self-indulgent criteria become central

The meaning of certain terms that occur in this table should, perhaps, be made clear. A "consentive" as defined by Robert Theobald, consists of productive groups formed by individuals who will come together on a voluntary basis simply because they wish to do so. Members of these consentives will produce goods which will not compete with those produced by cybernated firms. Instead, they will produce custom-designed goods which are fast disappearing from an economy based upon the principle of mass production. The phrase, "doubling time," refers to the period in years required for a given population to double in size. A "sensate culture," as defined by Pitirim Sorokin, is one whose needs and aims are merely physical — one in which individuals seek the maximum satisfaction of their needs. Such satisfaction is not pursued through an effort to modify oneself and reduce the frequency of expression of our animal-like propensities but rather through the manipulation and control of the environment, persons, institutions, situations and things. The latter is attempted basically in one of two ways. Most often it is attempted through the most efficient modification, adjustment, readjustment and reconstruction of the external milieu. At other times it is attempted through a parasitic exploitation and utilization of external reality, the latter being viewed as a means of obtaining sensual pleasures.

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[1] The post-industrial society is sometimes referred to as "the post-mass consumption society."

[2] The term, "cybernation," refers to automated production in which the industrial functions of automatic equipment are regulated and controlled by computers or information processing equipment.

But the important point in the present connection is to realize that the very shape of what has been called the post industrial society is almost always the product of the social impacts of science, technology, invention and scientific thoughtways. Sometimes this impact is direct as when new and advanced modes of air transportation make the world smaller and bring us closer together physically, if not ideologically. At other times the impact may be indirect and unintended, as when the early automobile of the 20's often parked in out-of-the-way Lovers' Lanes and its occupants made love or engaged in sexual cohabitation without fear of prying eyes or interruption. Clearly, in this sense, certain social and sexual life-styles in the 20's could be said to have been made possible by automotive technology, even though these same life-styles were never intended or foreseen either by automotive engineers or by those who run the automobile industry.

Efforts to *predict* the nature, shape and activities that are expected to be characteristic of the post-industrial society—and particularly when these features are associated with new science and technology—are now the province of a special field known as *studies of the future.* We shall have little more to say about this new field in the present paper.

3. The Social Costs of Technology

Technology, of course, is not an unrelieved blessing to society. Although two of the major reasons that technology is welcomed in the West is that it generally increases the productivity of labor and raises the standard of living, it also often carries social costs that are heavy. By a social cost is meant any *loss*, direct or indirect, that flows from the use of technology by entrepreneurs in order either to meet economic competition, increase productivity, reduce costs, meet increased demand, capture new markets or a bigger share of existing markets, or similar considerations. It should be understood that the *losses* of which we speak are losses of something which society *in the aggregate* values. Thus new technology almost always displaces human labor by rendering existing skills of production obsolescent. It renders them obsolescent because the mix of human labor and new types of machines that are bought into industrial use, are exploited precisely because the new mix increases human productivity, that is to say, the new mix guarantees a greater output per worker or per man-hour than the labor and machinery previously used. The commodities or services that constitute the new output may be *identical* with the commodities or services that were the old output. Then, again, the new commodities and services may be entirely different from the old output but they meet the *same consumer needs* as the old output. In either case, however, the increase in productivity will generally be reflected in the fact that more units of the commodity or service will be turned out per worker or per man-hour than before.

This way of talking about the displacement effects of new technology *is only one of many ways* in which one can speak of an increase in productivity. An even more familiar way of speaking about changes in productivity — whether from technological or other factors, or both — is to speak of the change in the dollar value of Gross National Product (GNP) per employee, in the entire, private economy, expressing our dollar values in *real dollars*. By this is meant that we express the dollar value of output, over some range of years, in terms of prices prevailing in a base period, that is, in terms of the prices prevailing in the year or years in which we began collecting our data for the measurement of annual changes in productivity. But no matter how we measure productivity it will almost invariably be the case that many people will lose their *existing* jobs as a result of new technology and this will be true whether or not they find *new* jobs. The unemployment hardship thus created has traditionally been the most widely known and most widely feared of all the social costs of technology.

Because technology is now the most potent factor in social change and because the relationship of technology to productivity is so central to both society and our industrial economy, we have decided that it should be treated as a separate paper by itself. We shall therefore say no more about it here but stress once again that the unemployment that results from new technology is one of its most important social costs. Technological unemployment, then, is one of the *major losses* to which we are referring. Let us, however, confine ourselves in this section to other types of losses that can be regarded as part of the social costs of new technology.

Losses that can be regarded as social costs of technology show up, of course, in many other ways. They show up in the form of damages to human health in industry and in the reduction of the industrial worker's life span. The variety of ways in which health can be impaired in industry has been rather fully delineated by Dallavalle.[1] Losses as social costs may receive expression through the destruction or deterioration of property as in the loss of rich topsoil through poor land management or in the creation, through neglect, of relatively useless and overgrazed land. Losses may occur through the premature depletion of natural resources, as a result of human greed for quick profits, or through an allocation of irreplaceable resources to end-uses that are immediately profitable but which meet less important social needs than some other needs that are being currently neglected.

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[1] J. M Dallavalle. *The Industrial Environment and Its Control.* New York: Pitman, 1948. 225 pp.

All of the preceding are examples of *visible* losses. Losses, however, may also be *invisible.* By this is meant that material regarded as industrial waste, such as wood shavings, shelled cornoobs, or the rinds of peeled citrus fruits, may really be potential resource materials for commodities that we now need. Such materials, however, may be thrown away only because no research has been done to establish their value as industrial by-products to meet certain, existing human needs They will even be thrown away when their potential by-product values are known to industry but the supply of these waste materials is so large and ensured for so substantial a period of time, that entrepreneurs are not willing to spend sufficient funds to research these potentials or to create a competitive demand for end products into which such wastes could possibly enter as raw materials. Then, again, such potentially useful waste materials may be neglected because of the currently existing abundance of various types of raw materials that are now used to make the same goods that would presumably be the commodities for which such industrial wastes could be used. Nor should we overlook the fact that even when the annual supplies of industrial wastes exceed by weight the annual amounts of raw materials currently used for the manufacture of goods — goods that could, perhaps, be made from these same industrial wastes — these by-product materials will still be ignored if the costs of processing them are estimated to exceed the processing costs of the starting materials currently used. Nevertheless, these abandoned industrial wastes can still be regarded as losses that are part of the social costs of technology if only because little research is being done to find ways of reducing the processing cost of these wastes to the point where they can become competitive with the currently used, standard, raw material supplies.

It would take many volumes to deal with the social costs of technology in modern society, remembering that these social costs can be classified in many wasy. A few of the taxonomic categories that could be used would be visible and invisible; economic and non-economic; social and psychological; or inescapable wastes and unnecessary wastes. Such a *bare taxonomy* for the social costs of technology will not be attempted here. However, if the reader is interested in the classification of waste as just one form of social cost, he will find such taxonomies provided by the author[2],[3],[4],[5] in the publications cited below.

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[2] Henry Winthrop "Waste As A Form Of Social Pathology." *The American Behavioral Scientist.* Vol. 5, No. 2, October 1961, 18 21.

The leading *social* costs of technology which currently concern all technologically advanced societies are well known. These are the ecological costs of modern technology in the form of air and water pollution and the destruction of the natural environment, such as the denudation of forests by the lumber and paper industries and the unnecessary destruction of the creatures of forest, field and stream. Let us say something first about this last type of ecological cost, namely, man's wanton destruction of the other living forms on mother earth, his interference, as it has been phrased, with "the web of life."

The wanton destruction of animals is not, of course, in any sense *directly* due to modern technology. Rather it is traceable to a primitive enjoyment in killing for the sake of killing and a lack of a feeling of relatedness to living things. It is also reinforced by a thoughtless conviction that earth's creatures exists to meet man's needs — a conviction often justified in terms of a too literal and unfeelingful interpretation of bibbical passage that gives man dominion over all that moves on earth and water as well as all that moves above the earth and below the seas. Technology contributes *indirectly*, however, to this destruction by helping to carry out man's ignoble love of killing for the sake of killing, with greater efficiency. Just as the justifiable need to capture and destroy other life for food is made more efficient by progress in the technology of fishing, cattle raising and slaughterhouse processing, so too the wanton destruction of living creatures for sport is made more efficient by other types of technology that cater to the hunting instinct.

One of the ways in which modern technology has made its contribution to this destruction is through the improvement of firearms used for hunting. There is a profit in this improvement as any reader can discover for himself by studying the activities of the National Rifle Association of America, whose lobby in Washington has rushed to protect its economic interests when our rising, national concern over the need to save the American environment resulted, *in part*, in a growing public support for conservation and an

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[3] Henry Winthrop. "The Economic Nature of Technological Waste." *The Indian Libertarian* (India) Vol. 16, No. 5, June 1, 1968. 12-14.

[4] Henry Winthrop. "The Measurement of Technological Waste." *The Indian Libertarian* (India). Vol.16. No. 7, July 1, 1968. 11-13.

[5] For a fuller treatment of the themes taken up in references 3 and 4, given above, see the following: Henry Winthrop. *Vistas Of The Future: Prospects And Problems.* Tampa: University Of South Florida, 1971. 250 pp. Chapter 12, "The Economic Nature Of Technological Waste", pp. 179-188 and Chapter 13, "The Measurement Of Technological Waste," pp 189-198, are the chapters in question.

increasing national criticism of hunting as a sport. Technology has also aided in the sadistic hunting of deer and other large game by hunting and shooting them from airplanes and generally doing this only after they are on the verge of collapse from fear and the exhaustion that has accompained their effort to elude their pursuers. Technology has likewise made its contribution to the wanton destruction of the American eagle which has been shot out of the skies from fast-moving helicopters.[6] In this case the hunting has been rationalized on the grounds of the unproven allegation that eagles capture lambs from the flocks of sheep-raisers. Improvements in fishing technology used for sport and for capturing large-size, fish trophies in the form of such sea-creatures as marlin and barracuda, may, if continued, eventually reduce the population of big fish of certain species until they are threatened with extinction. If skuba diving becomes more widespread, the possibility exists that weapons technology for both subsurface offense and defense will improve and may result in the future, unnecessary and widespread destruction of big fish that live beneath the surface of the sea. And when the current experiments on underwater living and research, engaged in by the distinguished, French scientist, Yves Cousteau, and by the U.S. Navy, reaches a stage sufficiently advanced to develop undersea communities for living and for ocean farming and mining, more destruction of living things may follow. With large number of men and women roving the ocean's bottom we can expect new technologies for deep sea sport and deep-sea defense to be developed, aimed, of course, at the larger creatures who make their habitat there.

The destruction of living creatures for sport by hunters is both ecologically and economically short-sighted. The new technologies to which hunting gives rise may also, unfortunately, produce an increase in the social costs of these same technologies. These social costs will, of course, be reflected in the form of ecological losses expressed not only through the reduction of game but also through the destruction of the delicate network of interdependence among living things and between flora and fauna — a network that has been called "the web of life" by Storer.[7] The motives for hunting and big game sport may largely reflect the lack of a "reverence for life" as Krutch[8] emphasizes, but the technologies that subserve these blood-lust passions must, as we have been trying to emphasize, be regarded as contributing to the social costs of man's leisure-time activities. The developed technologies are, of course, morally neutral, but this does not prevent them from being used to create social costs through their misuse by man.

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[6] See the following. ' Sheepmen vs. eagles — slaughter in the sky." *Life*. Vol 11, No 8. August 20, 1971. 37 38.

[7] John H. Storer. *The Web Of Life*. New York: Signet Books, 1965. 128 pp.

[8] Joseph Wood Krutch. "Reverence for Life. The Vandal And The Sportsman." 129 145. This is chapter 9 of *The Great Chain Of Life*. New York: Pyramid Books, 1966 190 pp.

But by far the largest social costs of technology in our time have been the extensive air and water pollution whose abatement now engages our national government. Both forms of pollution are health hazards. What is less often realized is that air pollution is also an agricultural liability and can impair the growth of certain crops. Water pollution is recognized as biologically destructive to marine ecology and economically destructive to such industries as fiishing, shrimp gathering and oyster dredging. The reason that phenomena such as these can be regarded as includable among the social costs of technology is that both air and water pollution are largely the product of industrial effluents into air and water—industrial effluents that are by-products of various manufacturing processes. In addition, a large part of water pollution is due to municipal waste rather then to industrial waste but the municipal waste, is, itself, often the product of the inadequate technologies used to eliminate such waste. These inadequate technologies exist in the form of archaic sewer systems not geared to the current volume and nature of household waste and the lack of up to date water treatment plants in some of our large cities. Even more to the point is that water pollution, in the form of household wastes, comes from non-degradable, modern detergents carrying excess phosphates and from other materials that cannot be broken down by the chemical and bacteriological processes in rivers, lakes and streams. These are processes which help to maintain the cleanliness and potability of the water bodies involved, Recognizing that chemicals used for household cleaning purposes and for the cleaning of fabrics and apparel are, themselves, technologies—since the term, "technology" includes raw materials as well as machinery and equipment—we can then say with justice that a major social cost of chemical, cleaning technologies has been the exacerbation of water pollution in our time.

Other chemical technologies that are producing social costs in the form of risks to health and life are the food-growing and food-processing technologies of our time. These social costs are now widely known to the public as a result of a growing, critical and informative literature on the subject, as a result of the public activities of a large number of consumer oriented individuals and as a consequence of criticisms of the mistakes and negligence of the Food And Drug Administration. Chemicals used in agriculture, like DDT, to destroy insect pests and general-purpose chemicals used as insecticides, pesticides, fungicides and herbicides, are all in this category. The risk they carry for public health and accidental mortality are now regularly discussed in both newspapers and periodicals. Similar risks to public health and mortality arise in the food-processing industries where many of the chemicals employed to preserve the shelf life of food, to improve its appearance, to enhance its texture or palatability, and so forth, have been found dangerous when they are chronically ingested in human consumption. Both these types of social cost are discussed by Rudale[9] who has catalogued many of the questionable chemicals used in agriculture and food processing. Ralph Nador's associate, James Turner,[10] has provided ample confirmation of the risks to human beings involved in the chemicals used in food processing.

The social costs of technology can be physical, social or psychological in nature. When they are physical in nature they are directly visible for all to see. When they are social or psychological in nature—as is the case where technology via industrialization has increased the amount of alienation in the working population or where technological unemployment has decreased the self respect of the unemployed—they are occasionally totally invisible but usually only partly invisible. In cases of the latter sort, a considerable amount of interpretation of those social phenomena that reflect the social costs of technology, are in order. In addition, an extensive amount of experimentation may be required in order to show that alienation is present in the working milieu, as was done by Mayo.[11] It is likewise true that a considerable amount of interviewing, field surveys and the analysis of industrial data, may have to be done, in order to prove that alienation is created by the industrial-technological milieu. Approaches of this latter sort were used by Friedman[12] and Blauner.[13]

It would be tempting to classify the visible social costs of technology as *direct costs* and the invisible social costs of technology as

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[9] J. I. Rodale et al. *Our Poisoned Earth And Sky*. Emmaus, Pennsylvania: Rodale Books, Inc , 1964. 735 pp. The relevant portion of this volume is Section 1, "The Food on Our Plates," 13-333.

[10] James S. Turner. *The Chemical Feast*. The Ralph Nader Study Group Report on Food Protection and the Food and Drug Administration. New York: Grossman Publishers, 1970. Foreword by Ralph Nader. 273 pp.

[11] Elton Mayo, *The Human Problems Of An Industrial Civilization*. New York : The Viking Press, 1963. Third Printing With an Introduction by F. J. Rothlisberger. 187 pp.

[12] Georges Friedmann, *The Anatomy of Work. Labor, Leisure And The Implications Of Automation.* New York: The Free Press Of Glencoe, Inc., 1961. Translated by Wyatt Rawson. 203 pp.

[13] Robert Blauner, *Alienation and Freedom. The Factory Worker and His Industry*. Chicago: The University Of Chicago Press, 1964. 222 pp.

indirect costs. But such a classification would certainly not do justice to the facts. One important reason for this assertion is that the invisible costs are not only bound up with the use of modern technology but they also reflect the greed, social indifference, inhumanity and social irresponsibility of certain types of entrepreneur whose single-minded obsession is with profit and nothing more. When entrepreneurial motivation is both socially irresponsible and socially immature, the social costs of technology increase both in volume and in intensity.

A clearer idea of the nature of the social costs of technology is obtainable, we believe, by actually enumerating a small sample of some of the insults to our physical environment and our social environment, caused directly or indirectly by technology, where the term "insults" is here to be taken as equivalent to the phrase, "social costs." In Tables 1 and 2 we have listed a sample of social costs in each of these two categories.

TABLE 1. SOME INSULTS TO THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT

Air pollution

Water pollution
Water shortages
Urban noise

Urban congestion

Urban stress

Highway and traffic problems

Improper physical design of cities
Urban population explosions

Improperly designed environments in our cities
  our factories
  our schools
  on farms and in cattle-grazing areas
The relation of current agricultural practices to health

The relation of urban, physical pathologies to public health
The problem of chemicals in food
Environment and cancer
Radiation, fall-out and human health
Ecological, urban imbalance and public health
Depletion and destruction of animal resources
Premature depletion of energy resources
Soil erosion, soil depletion and deforestation
Malfunctioning in the distribution of consumer goods and services
Malfunctioning in the provision of transportation and trafic services to and from the local areas
Wastes of all forms in urban life and their local expressions
Idle and neglected physical resources currently needed

TABLE 2. SOME INSULTS TO THE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT

Overly centralised and uncoordinated public services
Impairments of the human factors of production
Improper displacements of human personnel by new developments in science and technology
Difficulties in finding employment for workers with limited skills
Idle but needed human resources
Disorganisation and poor health conditions in the work enviroment
Crime and juvenile delinquency in the urban environment
Sources of the discontent and dissatisfaction expressed by students in the area
Mental ill health in the local area

The rise in the use of drugs and other stimulants among members of the younger generation
Political disorganization in urban communities
Various types of social disorganization in urban communities
The relationship of imbalances in the skill and educational requirements for employees, as community inputs, to welfare transfer payments as community outputs
Morbid social relations and social attitudes associated to some degree with the contemporary, urban community
Morbid forms of the quality of urban life, to be expressed through research with the types of *social indicators* used by Raymond Bauer and Bertram Gross

There are many factors that help to bring about the tendency to use technology in ways that create enormous, social costs for us. Perhaps, however, the most important consideration is that "technology creates its own imperatives." This notion has been stressed and developed by the distinguished, French thinker and social critic, Jacques Ellul.[14] There are four important meanings of this phrase, that should be mentioned here. 1. Technologists and entrepreneurs show a thoughtless tendency to use science and invention in ways that abuse the needs of both man and Nature. We use new technology without prescience and without feeling. 2. In applying technology, all that is demanded is that it be used efficiently and profitably, without worrying about moral considerations in the short run and without speculating about the long-run consequences of its use. 3. If we find that technology is producing some highly undesirable consequences in one or more sectors of our economy, we naively assert that we need more and different technology to counteract what technology has wrought elsewhere. 4. If we ascertain that a certain scientific discovery can be made, a new invention can be developed, or a new technology can be brought into being — given funds and talents for the necessary research — we immediately set about to realize these objectives. In short, if we discover that the state of knowledge and of the industrial arts indicates that the *potential* exists for bringing about certain scientific and technological innovations, we immediately invest in bringing these potentials to fruition. *We act on the principle that, if it can be done potentially, it should be done in actuality.* The motivational dynamic here is similar to the answer to the question "Why do men climb high mountains, risking life and limb to do so ?" The answer is almost always "Because the mountains are there to be climbed." Analogously, if an invention or discovery can be made, we often try to make it if only because it is there to be made. The persistent applications of these aspects of the imperatives of technology makes the creation of social costs that are a burden to all, inescapable.

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[14] Jacques Ellul. ***The Technological Society***. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964. Translated from the French by John Wilkinson. 449 pp.

Among the many uses to which modern technology is put are the building of roads, the developments that result from real-estate operations, the building of supermarket complexes, the bulldozing of giant camping grounds and recreational sites, and the establishment of military bases, in part to give work to local residents and to in part provide terrain for military games. Our superior technology is also used to establish hunting areas and to build new factories near as yet, unpolluted, wilderness lakes and streams, together with the roads and railroad sidings needed to carry out the finished products. In addition to the technologies of machines and equipment by which the list of "achievements" just mentioned, is effected, are all the chemical technologies used to protect agricultural activity—the insecticides, pesticides, herbicides and fungicides. In doing all of these things our superior technology succeeds in destroying wooded areas and regional ecologies and—most tragic of all—succeeds in wiping out entire species of animals that have roamed the earth for, perhaps, hundreds of millions of years. All the considerations just mentioned return us to the subject of ecological degradation as a social cost. The use of our technology may be dominated by the profit motive but the efficiency of that technology is dominated by human ingenuity and ecological indifference.

The possibility of wiping out of hundreds, if not thousands, of important species of animals is, then, as much a social cost of technology as it is of human greed. As a social cost it is one of the few which are not *reversible*. Once a species is gone, it is gone forever. Today, as a result of the fact that technology has its own imperatives, let us note that 829 species and subspecies of the world's wildlife are in imminent danger of extinction. The naturalist, Roger

Caras,[15,16] points out that among the animals threatened with extinction are many that we are all familiar with, from visits to the zoo. These include various species of elephants, lions, tigers, zebras, cheetahs, wolves, leopards, eagles, falcons, hippopotamuses, rhinoceroses, monkeys, apes and polar bears. Russia protects the polar bear but in Alaska hunters are permitted to track these bears with airplanes and than shoot them down so that some tourists can go home with a trophy to show off to their friends.

Many animals have already become extinct as a result of man's predatory instinct, whose efficiency is enormously multiplied by his technology. Among the large mammals the Indian Cheetah became extinct in 1952. The Balinese tiger, the Sumatran tiger and the Mexican grizzly bear all became extinct in 1969. The California grizzly bear disappeared in 1922. The recognition of the social costs of technology, in the form of ecological destruction of our wildlife, mammalian and otherwise is emphasized by many ecologists, including the distinguished scientist, Darling.[17] Chandrasekhar[18] notes that the continents of Asia and Africa will probably be empty of animals by 1984. The same writer points out that

> "... we are ruthlessly exterminating the wild life on this planet. The process of destruction, which has been going on for a long time, has accelerated to an alarming degree in the last few decades. Indiscriminate hunting and organized poaching are taking their disastrous toll every year, and there remains only a pitifully small fraction of the game that existed fifty years ago. The rapid deforestation and devegetation brought about by the rise in human population are pushing the animals from their natural habitats, so that even the few that remain have little chance of survival." (p. 190)

It may still be possible to prevent the extinction of many mammalian species, through the establishment of sperm banks and the permanent protection of several, tame females of each mammalian species in special land areas, so that the numbers of each species can be increased by artificial insemination, when necessary. Other biological techniques may also prove appropriate in this connection. Ironically various *technological* possibilities exist as a result of biological research, any of which may be able to offset the grim expectations presaged by Chandrasekhar. If nothing is done, however, we may yet have to face the greatest social cost of all—certainly along ecological lines—namely, the permanent extinction of all the mammalian species on the face of the earth. None of the advantages that technology is able to offer us, seems worth the price to be paid for so tragic an eventuality.

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[15] See the feature section entitled "Inside Our Family Circle." *Family Circle*, Vol. 78, No. 2, February 1971. p. 6 and p. 81.

[16] Roger Caras. "The End Of The Animals". *Family Circle*. Vol. 78, No. 3, March 1971. p. 2, p. 24 and p. 110.

[17] Frank Fraser Darling. *Wilderness and Plenty*. The Reith Lectures 1967 New York : Ballantine Books, 1971. 112 pp See chapter III "The Technological Potential," 37-56.

[18] S. Chandrasekhar. "A Prosperous But Unbeautiful World?" 189-190 In Vol. 2. *The World In 1984* (Nigel Calder, ed.). Baltimore : Penguin Books, 1965, 205 pp.

Books-Reviews

Vishwanath Tandon: *Selections from Vinoba*, pp. 356, Sarva Seva Sangh Prakashan, Rajghat, Varanasi 221001 (1981) Price Rs. 50/—

The compiler of this great work is Dr. Vishwanath Tandon, Retired Reader and Head of the Department of History at Moradabad. After his retirement he is serving almost in honorary capacity at the Gandhi Smarak Nidhi, Rajghat, New Delhi. He is a great admirer of Gandhi and Vinoba and has made his personal life in the image of these two great men of India.

It is indeed a great work of Vinoba and Dr. Tandon has done an admirable work in bringing out the basic ideas of Vinoba on practically almost all important matters having social and political implications for English knowing people. The original ideas of Vinoba are mostly available in Hindi. Dr. Tandon has collected these ideas and classified them after thorough study and made available this book for the English Readers. It is a compendium of Vinoba's thought on several aspects of his political and social philosophy.

The book has been classified into fifteen chapters : Self Introduction and Analysis, Philosophical Ideas, Ethical Ideas, Ideas on History and Revolution, Sarvodaya, Social Ideas, Economic Ideas, Political Ideas, Constructive Work, Educational Ideas, Planning, Satyagraha, The Age, Various Isms, and lastly Miscellaneous. Besides these fifteen chapters he has given the Glossary of Indian words and explained their English equivalents so that the thoughts are clear to those also who are not well acquainted with Indian culture, and these terms.

Dr. Tandon has very ably selected from the vast literature of Vinoba and compiled this great monumental work which will in nutshell provide Vinoba's ideas on many aspects of life. I am sure the book will attract Indian as well as foreign scholars who are interested to know much more about Vinoba and his ideologies. It is a great reference book in English and Dr. Tandon deserves our admiration and we congratulate him in bringing out Vinoba's ideas particularly for Westerners who have leanings towards Gandhi and Vinoba. This book will prove useful for those Indian Readers who do not have much time to go through the vast literature of Vinoba. Dr. Tandon's thorough study will prove immensely beneficial for those who wish to be acquainted with Vinoba's thought in nutshell. The style of the book is very charming and one is tempted to read the whole book in one sitting. The Publishers deserve our thanks for doing this great service by bringing out such a nice standard book on Vinoba's known thought and making this leader known for his thought beyond the Indian boundaries.

K. Bharadwaj : *A Philosophical Study of the Concept of Visnu in the Puranas*, pp. 404, Price Rs. 150/- Cloth Bond. Pitambar Publishing Company 888. East Park Road, Karol Bagh, New Delhi 110005 (1981).

The author of 'A Philosophical Study of the Concept of Visnu in the Puranas' is Dr. K. Bharadwaj, A Senior Lecturer in Sanskrit, Atma Ram Sanatam Dharma College (University of Delhi), Delhi.

Dr. Bharadwaj has really done an immense service to Hinduism by bringing out such an authoritative book on Visnu. The whole book has been very exhaustively written and deal with different aspects of Visnu. The whole book has been divided into ten chapters: I. The Puranas: A Bird's Eye View; II. Vishnu in the Vedic Literature; III. The nature of Visnu; IV. The Maya of Visnu; V. Visnu in Trimurti; VI. Visnu, the Supreme; VII. The Paths of Yoga or Communion with Vision; VIII. Devotion to Visnu; IX. Visnu Condescends to Descend and X. An Aesthetic Approach to the Final Achievement.

This book of Dr. Bharadwaj is an authentic addition to the existing literature on the cult of Visnu, the second Deity in the triad of the Divine manifestation in the Hindu pantheon. The author has very ably traced back the Puranic version of Visnu to the Vedic statements. This special feature of the book attracts its readers. This gives weightage to the time honoured axiom that what Shri Veda Vyasa propounded in his Mahabharata and the Puranas was really an enunciation of the Vedic truths.

The unique feature of this book is that the author has thoroughly discussed Divine immarence and transcendence which has been illustrated through diagrams. This has added to the beauty of the book. The concept of Tripad and Trivikrama contained in the Vedic Texts is thoroughly and clearly explained. This seems to be Dr. Bharadwaj's original contribution. The original References given has added to the utility of this book.

The other diagrams through which Dr. Bharadwaj has delineated and illustrated the twenty four figures of the Lord in pursuance of a concise formula enjoined by ancient experts in iconography.

I hope the book will attract the attention of scholars of Theology and philosophy. It is indeed a great and valuable work on Visnu. The author and the Publishers deserve our admiration for this great work which will have lasting value.

Seyyed Hossein Nasr : *Knowledge and the Sacred* (the Gifford Lectures, 1981), pp. 342, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh 22 George Square, Edinburg (1981) Pounds 11.00.

Seyyed Hossein Nasr, is the leading scholarly interpreter of Sufism. In 1981 he was honoured and was invited to deliver 1981 Gifford Lectures at the University of Edinburgh. Many eminent personalities have been invited in past to deliver these lectures and they include: James, Frazer, Eddington, Whitehead, Schweitzer, Sherrington, Niebuhr and Bultmann. Since 1889 Gifford lectures are being delivered by an eminent men in the field. More than 90 Gifford Lectures have been delivered by scientists, philosophers, Theologians of Europe and America. These lectures wielded extensive influence in the modern world.

The whole book is divided into ten chapters besides Preface and Index. The chapters are : I. Knowledge and Its Desacralization; II. What is Tradition; III. The Rediscovery of the Sacred; The Revival of Tradition; IV. Scientia Sacra; V. Man, Pontificial and Promethean; VI. The Cosmos as Theophany; VII. Eternity and the Temporal Order; VIII. Traditional Art as Fountain of knowledge and Grace; IX Principal Knowledge and the Multiplicity of Sacred Forms; and X. Knowledge of the Sacred as Deliverance.

It is a very thorough and exhaustive treatise based on the Eastern and Western Theologies and philosophies and has been traced back from very early times. The author of this book has very thoroughly studied the various philosophies to produce such a monumental work. He has referred to almost all the philosophers of India, Greece and West and the Islamic Philosophy. He has taken into consideration recent theologians as well. His work is of great importance from philosophical and theological point of view. A large number of references have been provided after each chapter. It will help the research scholars to do further research in the field. Notes along with references have made this book immensely useful for future generation to ponder over further.

In chapter II. What is Tradition ? The author has dealt with it from several points of view from the historical perspective Hinduism, Islam, Taoism, Theravada and the Manu and Western. While going through the book, one is astonished to find limitless references. The book is exhaustive and thorough and opens the vistas of knowledge for those who wish to acquaint further and dive deep to know about the Sacred.

Seyyed Hossein Nasr deserves our most heartfelt congratulations on producing such a nice and exhaustive book *Knowledge and the Sacred*. The treatment of the subject is very thorough and exhaustive and the Notes after every chapter have added to the utility of the book. Edinburgh University deserves a hearty vote of thanks in inviting an extraordinary man in the field of philosophy, theology and science to deliver this address. Such great books are great reference manual for further research and enriching the knowledge of those who go through them. Such books should come in Paper back edition as well so that more readers in poor countries may obtain their personal copies. The book is a very well documented publication which should occupy place in every Library.

All the chapters from one to ten are thorough and illuminating. The style, method of treatment, the language of the book, references and notes are exemplary. It is indeed a marvellous contribution in the field of Philosophy and Theology.

G. Srinivasan : *Recent Trends in Western Philosophy*, pp. 152, BAPPCO The Banagalore Printing and Publishing Co., Ltd. No. 88 Mysore Road, Bangalore 560 018 Price Rs. 28/— (1981).

Dr. G. Srinivasan the author of this book is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Mysore and has to his credit many books on Philosophy published earlier. The present book is an answer to a long felt need for an expository and comparative evaluation of the different view points in Western Philosophy.

The book has been divided into ten chapters as follows: 1. Recent Types of Absolutism which has been further subdivided into 7 sub-headings : (i) Two Chief Currents, (ii) Detailed Exposition of Bradley's Absolutism (iii) Bradley and Bosanquet (iv) Bosanquet's Objective Idealism; (v) Coherence Theory Truth (vi) Degrees of Truth and Reality, and (vii) The Absolutism of T. H. Green. In chapter II, Philosophy and Personalism he has discussed Absolute Personalism of Royce and Theistic Personalism of B. P. Browne and A. C. Knudson; Chapter III. Pluralistic Reaction to Absolutism has been subdivided into two : (i) Philosophy of William James, and (ii) Pragmatism and Instrumentalism; Chapter IV. Philosophies of Evolution which is further subdivided into : (i) Emergent Evolution of Morgan and Alexander and Creative Evolution of Henry Bergson; Chapter V. Philosophy of Sense Data: has been further subdivided into Neo-Realism, Critical Realism, Realism of G. E. Moore and

Russell's Analysis of Knowledge; Chapter VI. Analytic Philosophy: Russell's Logical Atomism; Logical Postivism and The 'New' Wittgenstein; Chapter VII. Philosophy of Value : has been subdivided into : (i) The Problem and Scope of the Philosophy of Value, (ii) Brief history of the Value notion. Process of Valuation and Theories of Value; Chapter VIII. The Philosophy of Existentialism: Chief characteristics of Existentialism. Theistic Existentialism of Soren Kierkegaard, The Metaphysical Existentialism of Martin Heidegger; The Atheistic Existentialism of Jean Paul Sartre, and Critical remarks; Chapter IX. The Organic Philosophy of A. N. Whitehead and discussed Theory of Actual Entities, Theory of God and Existentialism; Chapter X. Whither Philosophy ? A Retrospect and a Prospect. Besides the above mentioned ten chapters he has added two more: The Problem of Alienation and Space and Time: Philosophical Estimate of Some views.

Dr. Srinivasan has very lucidly and in a clear style discussed recent trends in Western Philosophy considering the views of main philosophers Dr. Srinivasan has very thoroughly and briefly discussed Absolutism, Personalism, Pragmatism, Theories of Evolution, Philosophy of Sense-Data; Analytical Philosophy, Philosophy of Value. Existentialism Organic Philosophy of Whitehead, The Problem of Alienation, Space and Time. His style is illuminating, simple and clear.

Every one interested in knowing the recent trends of philosophy will find this book rich in material and contents. This book will prove a very good introductory book on the recent trends of philosophy. The author in the next edition should give a comparative estimate with Indian Philosophy as far as possible. This will prove more helpful for both the Indian and Western readers. The author has given reference from Indian sources but more of this should be included to make it a comparative treatise Dr. Srinivasan deserves our thanks for bringing out such a simple, brief introduction to the Recent trends in Western philosophy. Such introductory books on various branches of Philosophy should appear.

Nils Bjorn Kvastad : *Problem of Mysticism*, pp. 368 Scintilla Press, Oslo 1980.

The author of this book Nils Bjorn Kvastad is a well known author who has to her creait many books on Mysticism and allied subjects. This is a collection of various articles published earlier in English in different International Journals such as *News letter-Review* (Montreal, Canada), "*Sophia*" (University of Melbourne, Australia) and "*Darshana Internationa*"' (Moradabad, India) by the author herself. Mysticism has been her favourite subject and she has dealt them in a very interesting, simple and clear style.

The book has been divided into fifteen chapters : 1. Introduction 2. What is Mysticism ? 3. The Methodology for the Scientific Study of Mysticism. 4. Scientific Theories of Mysticism. 5. Mysticism, Consciousness, and Ego. 6. The Epistemology of Mysticism 7. Metaphysics, Ontology, and Mysticism. 8 Logic, Semantics, and Mysticism. 9. Ethics of Mysticism. 10. Mysticism and the Meaning of Life. 11. Religion and Mysticism. 12 The Empirical Proof for the Existence of God. 13. Pantheism and Mysticism. 15. Mysticism and Life after Death. In the end she has given an exhaustive list of books on Mysticism which she has referred chapter-wise. This has made this book a reference book for even further researches in the subject.

The author has ably discussed Mysticism in different aspects and in relation to different branches of learning. It is an exhaustive scientific introduction to Mysticism. The subject has been dealt in different tone from the past traditional method of dealing. In Chapter I Introduction The author has described Mysticism, its characteristics. The common characteristics of extrovertive Mystical experiences are : (1) The Unifying Vision, all things are experienced as One, as united. (2) The subjective feeling of the One as an inner subjectivity, or life, in all things. (3) Sense of Objectivity or reality (4) Feelings of blessedness, peace, etc. (5) Feeling of the holy, sacred, or divine. (6) Alleged to be paradoxical. (7) Alleged to be ineffable and two more were added by the author (8) Feeling of love and (9) Sense of Beauty.

The common characteristics of the introvertive experiences are : (i) The Unitary consciousness e.g. as the One, the Void, pure consciousness. (2) Nonspatial, nontemporal, and other characteristics from 3 to 9 are the same which are in extrovertive Mystical experiences. She has very ably explained the characteristics of the Extrovertive and introvertive experiences. The other common accompanying characteristics pointed out are : Light, suddenness, Transiency, After-effects, Accompanying feelings, Cosmic consciousness, Newness The "Now" is what counts, knowledge, certitude, Experience of God, Immortality, Separation, Levitation, The All rightness of the Universe and Ethical Impact.

The above characteristics have been classified in different ways : Mainly relevant for the emotions and those mainly relevent for the intellect, between "empirical" ones and those expressing beliefs. Another distinction is between those characteristics expressing a loss and those expressing a gain. The mystic may, e.g. lose his anxiety, his sense of sin, his fear of death, or his experience of space and time. But other characteristics express gains. The mystic gets e g. joy, peace and knowledge.

The Phenomena related to Mysticism are: Visions and Auditory Hallucinations. The other definitions have been considered such as Dr. Max Nordan's "Mysticism is the expression of the inaptitude for attention, for clear thought, and control of emotions, and has for its cause and weakness of the higher cerebral centres". Noack says: "Mysticism is formless speculation." Arny Naess defines a "representant for the view that man can be united with God by means of a kind of introversion". J. H. Leuba suggests "It (mystical) will mean for us any experience taken by the experiencer to be a contact (not through the senses, but "immediate", "intuitive") or union of the self with a larger-than-self, be it called the World-Spirit, God, the Absolute, or otherwise". Then further she has subdivided mystical experiences into: Intellectual—emotional; Monism-Dualism; Spontaneous and Acquired Experiences, Good and bad experiences.

In chapter III, The Methodology for the Scientific Study of Mysticism the author has very ably discussed: Mysticism, Philosophy and Science: and then Experiments in Mysticism have been considered. The Mystic Experience can be studied directly as well. In chapter IV Various scientific theories about mysticism have been considered. In other chapters Mysticism has been related to various aspects and considered in that context, such as Mysticism, Epistemology, Metaphysics, Ethics, Logic, Religion, Art and Life after Death.

It is indeed a very illuminating book on Mysticism and its various problems. The traditional things have not been deleted from the purview and instead modern scientific knowledge has also been considered thoroughly. All students of Philosophy, Psychology, Religion, Mysticism and even general readers should go through this book which is written in a very simple and clear style. The author as well as the publishers deserve our heartfelt congratulations in bringing out such a nice compendium on Mysticism. It has filled a wide gap which remained unbridged for such a long time.

A very well written book on Mysticism by a specialist in the field who has done great work on Mysticism. Every Library should have this book to provide basic background in Mysticism and other allied disciplines. It is really more creditable for a western scholar to put Mysticism on the scientific foundations, in such a nice way.

Suresh Chandra: *Philosophical Discussions*, pp. 208, Prakash Book Depot, Bara Bazar, Bareilly-243 001, (1979) Price Rs. 50/—

Dr. Suresh Chandra the author of this book is teaching philosophy at the Central University of Hyderabad. This book is based on his notes on philosophical issues on which he has pondered over from time to time and projects his thinking acumen on the topics discussed by him. Prof. Ram Chandra Gandhi regards his work a philosohical autobiography in the sense that it reflects his reactions to various philosophical themes and controversies for about twenty years.

Dr. Suresh Chandra has divided his book in seven sections, besides Introduction, Bibliography and Index. I Philosophical Scepticism and discusses Scepticism, Wittgensteinian Technique and the Certesian Doubt and lastly Prof. Ayer on the Possibility of Error; Section II Verification and Basic Statements : under this section he has discussed: Weak verification: The Paradox of Strong Verification and Incorrigibility, and Can a state of affairs make a statement true? and doubting and verifying a Confirmation. Under Section II Anayl-tic synthetic Four Definitions of Analyticity and Ayer on Analytic and Synthetic A Priori Propositions; Under Section IV Analysis of Experiences : Decision to have a pain Private Language and Sense Statements, Knowing what others Feel; Can Psi be demonstrated ? The Verb 'To see'. Section V Analysis of the Self : Ayer, Hume and Hobbes on Self, Hick, Olding and Resurrection Persons, : Section VI Discernibility, Entailment. Sense-data and Predication: Identity of Indescernibles, Does Knowing Entail Believing;/Chisholm's Treatment of Sense—Data, and Strawson on M-Predicates; In the last Section Philosophy and Metaphysics : Mathrani on Philosophical statements, Descriptive Metaphysics and The Nature of Being have been dealt with.

Dr. Suresh Chandra has very ably discussed the main philosophical topics on the basis of earlier studies and also given his thoughts on these problems. It is an interesting and thought provoking book on epistemology and metaphysics. The style of the author and the language and the manner in which he has discussed the main philosophical issues are really nice.

Dr. Suresh Chandra and the Prakash Book Depot deserve our thanks for bringing out such an exhaustive book based on Western views followed by the discussions of Dr. Suresh Chandra. Students of Philosophy should take advantage of Dr. Suresh Chandra's scholarship.

S. S. Rama Rao Pappu and R. Puligandla : *Indian Philosophy: Past and Future*, pp. 434, Motilal Bararasidass, 41-U.A. Bungalow Road, Delhi 110007 (1982) Price Rs. 125.00.

The Editors of this volume are: S. S. Rama Rao Pappu, An Associate Professor of Philosophy, Miami University, Oxford, Ohio, U.S.A. and R. Puligandla Professor of Philosophy at the University of Toledo, Ohio, U.S.A. Both these Professors have to their credit many books and several research papers published in American and Indian Philosophical Journals.

The Editors in their Preface have outlined the plans of this book and invited contributors who are well known in the field of Philosophy in India and divided the problems into four categories: (1) What is Indian about Indian Philosophy (II) What is the goal of Indian Philosophy ? (III) What is the responsibility of the Indian philosopher ?, and (IV) What is the future of Indian philosophy ? Under these different categories different issues were raised and the contributors were requested to contribute their articles on the specific issues raised by the editors. This is really a good approach on which the thinking of writers is centered. The various Issues posed are as follows: Under I category What is Indian about Indian Philosophy ?: What do you consider to be the unique and distinguishing features of Indian philosophy ? Is there a 'spirit' of Indian Philosophy ? Do you consider Vedanta or some form of transcendentalism to be the true spirit of Indian philosophy ? Is the expression 'Indian philosophy' a contradiction, because true philosophy is neither Indian nor Western ? Does Indian philosophy mean nothing more than the geographical reference to the Kind of activity that took place (or is taking place) in the Indian sub continent ?

Under II Category What is the goal of Indian Philosophy ? Several such questions were posed : As an Indian philosopher, what do you consider to be the goal(s) of Indian philosophy ? Do you consider moksa be the legitimate summum bonum of Indian philosophy ? To What kinds of questions and what kinds of concerns are you most compelling drawn ? How do you identify your concerns as Indian and not Western ? What is the role of Indian philosophical tradition as represented by the "schools in the contemporary context ? Do these schools of Indian philosophy have merely a historical interest or do they have relevance to the present-day philosophy ? To what extent, if any, do you consider your conception of Indian Philosophy and your philosophical thinking in general, are affected by Western philosophy and Western modes of thought ?

Under category III What is the responsibility of the Indian philosopher ? What do you consider to be the responsibility of the Indian philosopher ? Do you agree with the traditional conception of Indian philosopher as a 'realised' Individual ? Is the Indian philosopher in possession of a 'higher knowledge' which is denied to others ? What, if anything, should be his social concerns. ?

Under Category IV What is the Future of Indian Philosophy ? the questions raised were : How do you conceive of the future of Indian philosophy ? Does the Indian philosophical scene in the past one hundred years give you the impression that we are making 'progress' or regress' ? What should be the role of Indian philosophy in the context of global philosophy — i.e., Indian philosophy vis-a-vis Western philosophy, Chinese philosophy, Latin American philosophy, etc. Should Indian philosophy imitate the styles of contemporary Western philosophy ? Or should progress in Indian philosophy be native to the soil ? What should be the relation between traditional Indian philosophy and the 'progress' of Indian Philosophy. Can Indian philosophy break its connections with traditional schools and still remain Indian."

All the above mentioned questions were put to the contributors who were invited to contribute to this volume. The whole book has been divided into three parts as follows :

Part I : *The Tradition of Indian Philosophy* consisting of 7 articles : 1. What is Indian about Indian Philosophy ? Pratima Bowes, Reader in Religious Studies, University of Sussex, England. 2. In search of Indian Philosophy—Saraswati Chennakesavan, Retired Professor of Philosophy Shri Venkateshwar University, Triupati (India) 3. The Western and the Indian Philosophical Traditions — P. T. Raju, Professor Emeritus, College of Wooster, Wooster, Ohio (U. S. A.) 4. The Question of Indianness of Indian Philosophy — K. B. Ramakrishna Rao, Professor of Indian Philosophy and Head of the Department of Philosophy, University of Mysore, Mysore; 5. The Quest for an Ontology of Human Self — Ramakant Sinari-Professor of Philosophy and Head of the Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay; 6. Some Reflections on the Indian View of Philosophy — K. N. Upadhyaya, Professor and Chairman of the Department of Philosophy, University of Hawaii, U.S.A.; 7. Towards a Better Understanding of Indian Ethics — Dipankar Chatterjee—Assistant Professer of Philosophy, University of Utah, U.S.A.

Part II : *Tradition and Modernity* : consists of 7 contributions as follows : 1. Traditional Indian Philoophy as a Modern Indian Thinker views it. — Kalidas Bhattacharya, Retd. Professor of Philosophy, Visvabharati University, Santiniketan (India); 2. A New Approach to Indian Philosophy—Ram Shankar Bhattacharya, traditional Indian Scholar who lives in Varanasi; 3. Indian Philosophy Between Tradition and Modernity — J. N. Mohanty, George Lynn Cross Professor of Philosophy, University of Oklahoma, U. S. A. 4. Indian Philosophy : Is there a Problem Today ? Bimal Krishna Matilal-Spalding Professor of Eastern Religions and Ethics, Oxford University, England. 5. Indian Philosophy at the Crossroads — J. S. R. L. Narayana Moorty, teaches Philosophy at Monterey Peninsula College. Monterey, California (U.S.A.) 6. Indian Philosophy at the Crossroads of Self-Understanding—Debabrata Sinha—Professor of Philosophy, Brock University, Canada. 7. Tradition, Freedom and Philosophical Creativity — Rajendra Prasad—Professor of Philosophy, Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur (India).

Part III *The Future of Indian Philosophy* consists of six contributions as follows : 1. Whither Indian Philosophy : A Search for Direction and Suggestions for Reconstruction — Dinesh C. Mathur —Professor of Philosophy, State University of New York at Brockport.; 2. The Responsibilities of Modern Indian Philosophers — N. K. Devaraja U. G. C. Research Scholar, Lucknow University, Lucknow and has also been Professor of Philosophy at the Banaras Hindu University. 3. Futurism and Indian Philosophy —V. Narayan Karan Reddy—Professor and Head Department of Philosophy, Osmania University, Hyderabad Dn. (India); 4. The Future of Indian Philosophy — N. S S. Raman, Professor of Philosophy, Banaras Hindu University; 5. On Teaching Indian Philosophy — S.S. Rama Rao Pappu, Associate Professor of Philosophy, Miami University, Oxford, Ohio, U.S.A ; and 6. The Relevance of Indian Thought to the Evolution of World Philosophy — Ashok K. Gangadean, Associate Professor of Philosophy, Haverford College, Pennyslvania, U.S.A.

This collection of essays will provide a vision of the future for Indian Philosophy. Indeed a very thoughtful book on Indian Philosophy. Every teacher of Philosophy should take advantage of these views in forming their opinion about Indian Philosophy. The Editors deserve our thanks for bringing out such a thoughtful book on Indian Philosophy.

H. N. Randle : *Fragments From Diṅnāga*, pp. 93, Motilal Banarasidas 41 U. A. Bungalow Road, New Delhi-110 007. Originally published by the Royal Asiatic Society, London 1926. The first Indian Reprint 1981. Price Rs. 40/—

The treatise was originally written as part of a study of Indian Logic in the Early Schools undertaken for the Doctorate of Philosophy of the University of Oxford. This book contains seventeen fragments attributed to Dinnaga by Vachaspati Mishra. This is also confirmed by the Tibetan version of the Pramana-Samuccaya, the authorship of which is also attributed to Dinnaga.

The fragments constitute the Sanskrit text transliterated in Roman script, translated and annotated in English. The text deals with the various topics of logic, etc. The book is divided into 22 sections. Section I is introductory. Section 2 deals with Pramana Samuccaya. Sections 3 to 22 contain seventeen fragments which deal with different topics of Indian Logic such as Definition of Perception, Vasubandhu's definition, manas as an organ of sense, Contact in vision. Criticism of the Vaiseshika doctrine of the perceptibility of substance. Testimony not a seperate source of knowledge, The probandum in an inference, The three fold cannon of syllogism, A septenary of types of syllogism, Vasubandhu as a critic of the Nyaya, Definitions (i) Inference for another, and (ii) proof the Nine types of syllogism, All middle terms are paksa Dharma, criticism of the definition of hetu, Definition of a probans or valid middle term (the concept of Vyapti), Analogy not a seperate source of knowledge, The object of inference merely ideal, Definition of vada and Criticism of the Vaisesika doctrine of the real universal. In the end two Appendices are given : I. Dinnaga and Prasastapada II. Summary of the Buddhist Logical doctrines.

The book is very well documented with Preface, Bibliography, Abbreviations and index. It is still one of the best books on Indian Logic and deserves to be thoroughly mastered by the students of Indian Logic for better understanding of Indian Logic.

V. M. Bedekar & G. B. Palsule : *Paul Deussen* : *Sixty Upanisads of the Veda*, Two Volumes pp. 996 Price Rs. 150/— First Edition 1980.

Paul Deussen is one of the foremost Western scholars who has been attracted to Indian Wisdom and the Study of Sanskrit and has devoted his life to the understanding and the interpreting the philosophy of the Upanisads. He firmly believed that the Upanisadic thinkers had obtained the most intimate and immediate light upon the last secret of existence and that the Upanisads contained philosophical conceptions unequalled in India or any where else. The original work of Paul Deussen was in German and has recently been translated into English by late Professor V. M. Bedekar and Dr. G. B. Palsule. One of the translators Prof. Bedekar was Professor of Philosophy. He translated several good German works into English and has been well versed in Ancient Indian Philosophy as well as Western Philosophy. The other translator Prof. G. B. Palsule has been Professor of Sanskrit and Research Fellow at the Bhandarkar Oriental institute and also an eminent scholar of Sanskrit and author of four Sanskrit Dramas and many books in Sanskrit.

Both the translators have taken great care to translate Paul Deussens *Sixty Upanisads of the Veda* from German to English faithfully. Prof. Bedekar translated more than half of the work and suddenly died on the 3rd January 1978. The later portion is translated by Dr. G. B. Palsule who completed this book for getting it published M/s Motilal Banarasidass have done a splendid service to the cause of Indian culture in publishing this great work *"Sixty Upanisada of the Vedas"* in two valumes of Dr. Paul Deussen.

The whole book is divided into two Volumes : The First Part consists of A. The Upanisads of the Rgveda under which comes 1. The Aitareya Upanisad 2. The Kausitaki Upanisad; B. The Upanisads of the Samaveda: consists of 3. The Chandogya Upanisad and 4 The Kena Upanisad: C. The Upanisads of the Black Yajurveda : 5. The Taittiriya Upanisad, 6. The Mahanarayana Upanisad 7 The Kathaka Upanisada 8. The Svetasvatara Upanisad, 9. The Maitrayana Upanisad; D. The Upanisads of the White Yajurveda : 10 The Brhadaranyakaopanisad. Part II. consists of 11. The Isa Upanisad; E. The Upanisads of the Atharvaveda have been divided as follows : (a) Pure Vedantic Upanisads : 12. The Mundaka Upanisad, 13. The Prasna Upanisad, 14. The Mandukya Upanisad with the Gaudapadakarika, 15. The Garbha Upanisad, 16. The Pranagnihotra Upanisad, 17. The Pinda Upanisad, 18. The Atma Upanisad, 19. The Sarva Upanisat-Sara, 20. The Garuda Upanisad; (b) Yoga Upanisads : 21. The Brahmavidya Upanisad 22. The Ksurika Upanisad, 23. The Chulika Upanisad, 24. The Nadabindu Upanisad, 25. The Brahma-Bindu Upanisad, 26. The Amrtabindu Upanisad, 27. The Tejobindu Upanisad, 28. Dhyanabindu Upanisad, 29. The Yoga—Sikha Upanisad, 30 The Yogatattva Upanisad, 31. The Hamsa Upanisad. Under C *The Samnyasaa Upanisads* 32. The Brahma Upanisad, 33. The Samnyasa Upanisad, 34. The Aruneya Upanisad, 35. The Kantha Sruti Upanisad, 36. The Paramhamsa Upanisad, 37. The Jabala Upanisad, 38. The Asrama Upanisad. Under D Siva Upanisads; 39. The Atharvasira Upanisad, 40. The Atharva-Sikha Upanisad, 41. The Nilarudra Upanisad, 42. he TKalagnirudra Upanisad and 43. The Kaivalya Upanisad. (E) Visnu Upanisads: 44. The Maha Upanisad, 45. The Narayana Upanisad, 46. The Atmabodha Upanisad, 47. The Nrsimhapurvatapaniya Upanisad, 48. The Nrsimhottra-Tapaniya Upanisad, 49. The Ramapurvatapaniya Upanisad, 50 The Ramottaratapaniya Upanisad. F. Supplement : 51. Barkhe Soukt, 52. Tadiw, 53. Schiw Sankalp, 54. Baschkl (Baskala Upanisad), 55. Tschhali (Chagaleya Upanisad), 56. Pankl (Paingala Upanisad), 57. Mrat Lankoul (Mrtyu langala Upanisad), 58. Arkhi (Arseya Upanisad), 59. Pranou (Pranava Upanisad) and Schavank (Saunak Upanisad).

The contents have been divided throughly and give a complete picture of the book.

This is an excellent book on the Upanisads of the Veda in two volumes by an eminent German scholar who has been famous for his Indological Studies.

The book has been very ably compiled by the great scholar and should be in every Library. The book clearly indicates the richness of vast literature of Upanisads available in India. It is one of best-classics on Upanishads which may be regarded as the source book of Indian Philosophy.

We admire the scholarship and learning of the great scholar who devoted his life time in understanding the teaching and philosophy of the Upanishads.

A. L. Basham : *History and Doctrines of the Ajivikas*, pp. 316, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, Patna and Varanasi, First Edition London 1951 and Indian Reprint Delhi 1981, Price Rs. 75/-

This book by A. L. Basham is a scholarly contribution regarding the history and the doctrines of the Ajivikas who formed a third heretical sect besides the sect of Gautama Buddha, the founder of Buddhism and that of Mahavira Vardhaman, the twentyfourth Tirthankara of the Jainas.

The cult of Ajivikas was founded by Makkhali Gosal, the contemporary of Mahavira Vardhamana on the basis of strict determinism with a belief in the all embracing rule of Niyati (principle or order). According to Gosal, it is niyati which ultimately governed our action, controlled phenomena and left no room for human volition.

The book has been divided into two Parts. Part I History of the Ajivikas which is divided into ten chapters : I. Introduction, II. The Six Heretics, III. Makkhali Gosala and his Predecessors, IV. The Last Days of Makkhali Gosala, V. Purana and Pakudah, VI. The Early Ajivika Community (I), VII. The early Ajivika Community (II), VIII. Ajivikas in the Nanda and Maurya periods. IX. Ajivikas in Later Times, and X. The Southern Ajivikas. The Part II has been divided into five chapters : Ajivika Scriptures, Niyati, Ajivika Cosmology, Other Doctrines of the Ajivikas and Conclusion.

The book concludes with the examination of Barua's three questions and the influence of the Ajivikas and their place in Indian history. The book contains an illuminating foreword by Dr. L. D. Barnett, eight illustrations, two maps, Bibliography and Index.

It is an interesting and very informative book on Ajivikas cult and the publishers have done great service in getting it reprinted in India and in reviving the old cult of Ajivikas.

I

Cosmic Existentialism

M. Lietaert Peerbolte

Introduction

The meaning of the term Cosmic Existentialism is an interpretation of human existence that is to be regarded as a crystallization, or manifestation of a moulded form expressing cosmic qualities. In a certain respect the purpose of this book is to introduce one to a philosophical energism, the successor of philosophical materialism.

Since in clouds of gass and dust in our galaxy, in which our earth occupies a very small part, not only minerals seem to occur but also amino acids, it is clear that materials for building up our bodies are not only to be found on our planet, but also in the universe. The same is the case with electrons: they are present in the universe as well as the human body.

Here, we would like to suggest that the same applies with regard to our psyche: our psyche is not a product of bodily or physical functions, but is also present in the cosmos.

The differentiation we apply with reference with the terms universe and cosmos is based on the assumption that energies in the universe are measurable and that there are also energies in the cosmos that are not measurable, although cosmos and universe form a unity.

The new viewpoint in this cosmic existentialism regards the human psyche. Already in my book "Psychic energy in prenatal dynamics, parapsychology and peak-experiences" (Servire, 1975) I have demonstrated by dreammaterials concerning prenatal disturbances, psychoanalytical approach of telepathic phenomena and so-called peak-experiences, that the usual opinion about psychic energy as being only a product of the human brain (including the senses) and of activities of internal glands cannot be maintained. This conclusion was supported by certain viewpoints which the neurologist

Eccles describes in his book "The neurophysical basis of mind" (as to his later book, together with Popper "The Self and its brain" I disagree with them regarding the hypothesis that the brain would be the "store-house" of memory). According to Eccles in his book, first mentioned, the transfer of sensorial stimuli in the cerebral synapses has a quantum-mechanical character and as such the brain can only be an important intermedium between "mind" and the electromagnetic system of our nervous system: brain cannot be the producer of our psyche, or mind.

Another support may be found in the work of the late prof. O. L. Reiser, published in his two books "The Integration of human knowledge" and "Cosmic Humanism". In an extensive correspondence with him he drew my attention to Redgrove's Study "A mathematical theory of spirit" in which Redgrove proposed to interpret "spirit" by the imaginary number i, the root of minus 1. Reiser's commentary was that this interpretation by means of i implies other dimensions. Besides his theory of a "cyclic-creative cosmology" Reiser developed a theory in which he accepted a fifth till an eighth dimension of energy with kinds of energy without demonstrable rest-mass. So a universe of energies can be conceived in which 4 dimensions (including the 4th time-space dimension) of the manifest world and 4 dimensions of non-manifest energies exist. On the interface between these two worlds of energy Reiser thought the velocity of light. The non-manifest world of energy would be characterized by the imaginary number i. Moreover, it seems that by mathematical calculations energies of the imaginary dimensions can have velocities which can be considered as practically infinite velocities by the lack of rest-mass. So, Reiser's viewpoint about the creative moment in his cosmology, or the transition of non-manifest to manifest, is caused by a ratardation of originally infinite velocities.

I mention this cosmology of Reiser to make it clear that provisionally I call the energies of the non-manifest world of energies "psychic energies".

One must realize oneself that the electromagnetic activities of the brain are demonstrable and measurable, but that thoughts, emotions and in general the psychic qualities, related to our brain-activities, are not demonstrable or measureable. What man thinks cannot be caught by our instruments; that man thinks is demonstrable. So, we are forced to the conclusion that man himself is the only instrument which records and de-codes psychic energy.

Whereas the retardation of imaginary velocities, mentioned above, is not yet completely clear (it is a pity that Reiser died, but in my correspondence with him he thought of interferencies causing this retardation), regarding this present study it is important to discuss some notions, derived from physics. First, two forms of presentation of e.g. an electron can be mentioned: the aspect of a particle and of a wave-movement. Bohr has called these two forms together the principle of complementarity as they are never simultaneously observable, but they are each other's complement. In a paraphysical parallel in my book "Psychic energy" I have indicated that a similar kind of complementarity exists in psychic energy: interpreting emotion as a wave-movement and consciousness as a particle aspect. Here, the notion of "paraphysical" is used in the sense of "imaginary", non-manifest dimensions of energy.

Secondly, energy in the 4 manifest dimensions has an electromagnetic character: with regard to paraphysical dimensions I use the term "psi-electrical" and "psi-magnetic" as parallels.

A very important notion is formed by the so-called resonance-absorption which also plays a role in psychic energy. In physics this notion means that when in atom A the potential is higher than in atom B and that when these two atoms are mutually in resonance, a quantum of energy from the atom A can be emitted which can be absorbed by the atom B. By the absorption of this quantum the potential in atom B becomes higher.

The paraphysical parallel of this resonance-absorption is to be found in the information-theory. If someone sees e.g. a book the title of which draws the attention, there exists already a resonance between this person and this book. When this person starts to read this book, he absorbs the data mentioned in it. In many ways this same principle is present in human life: one is struck by something, i.e. one is in resonance with it, and one tries psychically to assimilate it, i.e. one absorbs it, and by this one reaches a higher level of psychic energy, e.g. by more knowledge, or by emotional enrichment (e.g. by seeing a beautiful landscape, or by an artistical expression).

Apart from these physical and paraphysical notions concerning energy another aspect is very important regarding cosmic existence, which can be called cosmic consciousness. This psychological notion is already discussed in "Psychic energy" as the "orgastical experience of space". There are three aspects characterizing it: 1. the disappearance of the ego-limitations caused by the ties with the body and the sensory perception; 2. feelings of unity with the partner, or with nature, or with the cosmos; 3. awareness of unlimited space and timelessness. This trias of characteristics can be found in all peak-experiences and "altered states of consciousness", as Tart has called it and in experiences of cosmic consciousness.

In connection with this the fact can be mentioned that Maslow, after a heart attack and not so long before his death, said that he also could experience a ' plateau-experience". He meant that this experience continues much longer than a peak-experience. He used the notion of unitive consciousness, in connection with this plateau-experience, to indicate that during this experience, and so simultaneously with it, also a normal state of consciousness could exist that was still concerned with everyday life: the two states of consciousness were "unitive".

I. Cosmic consciousness

Introduction :

The term "cosmic consciousness" was introduced by the late Canadian psychiatrist Bucke in his book "Cosmic Consciousness," a study in the evolution of human mind (1901-1923). In the extensive collection of descriptions of persons who, according to Bucke knew the experience of cosmic consciousness, it is a remarkable fact that this cosmic consciousness is related to a mental-religious attitude. "Religious" is not meant in the sense of some churchical institution, but as an inner contact with the cosmos, sometimes represented by a notion of God, sometimes expressed in another way.

Already in the introduction of his book Bucke accentuated his point of view that the evolution of human mind, or spirit, will be in that way that after a time of socialism a social community will come into existence in which cosmic consciousness will be developed in man. In part IV of his book he mentioned, moreover, something which is very remarkable from a modern psychoanalytical point of view including prenatal and conceptional psychodynamics such as conception-shock. He said, namely, that for the coming into existence of cosmic consciousness the necessity is that the union of the parents has to be a complete one so that these parents's qualities are mixed in a complete way in the child which will become a cosmically conscious man. Although from a more recent point of view. about 60 years later, this opinion is expressed in a somewhat primitive way, in those days this psychiatrist knew already that the conceptional process is very important for the development of the human mind in the direction of cosmic consciousness.

1. Extrasensory perception

The starting point of a psychodynamical approach of cosmic consciousness can be formed by extrasensory recording. It is well-known that this form of recording plays an important role a.o. in telepathic phenomena and what in modern para-psychologic literature is termed Extra Sensory Perception: ESP.

In my book "Psychic Energy" some studies are included to demonstrate that in telepathic information between two persons much importance is attached to the psychological relation between these two persons. The conclusion is that the telepathic contact can be established by means of psychic energy, or libido. More over, a study is included which requires a correction of the meaning of psychic energy. This study regards a dream in which the analysand dreams in the beginning of Oct., 1956 about a Russian invasion in Hungary. This dream fitted very well in his own psychic conditions of inner states of panic by the conscious re-working of his psychotrauma. However, the analysand as well as the analyst were very amazed when in Nov. 1956, i.e. one month later, the Russian invasion became matter of fact, in order to suppress a Hungarian revolution. So, it appeared that this dream had two different interpretations: 1. an intrapsychical one and 2. a precognitive effect. As to the paranormal phenomenon it was remarkable that this analysand had no relation at all with Hungary, nor with any person from there. There did not exist any source of telepathic information. So, there was no other possibility for an interpretation of this precognitive effect than that the intrapsychical condition of the analysand, with his panical experience, would be in resonance with a collective panical condition in Hungary, as such a revolutionary outburst is surely preceded by a collective state of panic. Via this resonance in the analysand's psyche the final outburst of revolution and the Russian invasion would be absorbed by the analysand.

As to the question how this extrasensory information could be transported from the Hungarian panic to the analysand's panic, the hypothesis of a psi-layer is helpful as a transport channel of such information. The acceptance, however, of such a psi-layer would define some characteristics of this psi-layer in this case. Analogous to the air-vibrations transporting a word and to the electromagnetic vibrations in the telephone for transport of information, this psi-layer as a transport channel of psychic qualities must consist of psychic vibrations.

The conclusion should be considered a turning point. If, namely, the psi-layer has the same psychic qualities as the intrapsychical energy, or libido, than it is impossible to maintain that "psychic" would be a product of the brain and of activities of internal glands. On the contrary, it is much more probable that human libido, or psychic energy, is a form of energy bound to man which, however, also exists outside man in the cosmos, just like electrons are bound to man and also existing in the universe.

In such a way the telepathic phenomena between two persons, each of which on another side of the earth, can also be interpreted via an extra human psychic energy as a transport channel. The way in which these two persons are mutually in a psychic resonance so that quanta of psychic energy can be absorbed in this psi-layer and thereafter absorbed by the other person, is based on a mutual psychic condition. So, it is well-known that in some cases twins can be in a telepathic cantact with each other, independent of the distance separating them. In such cases the telepathic phenomena refer to a psychic resonance.

There is another problem. When in 1954 I published the first edition of "Prenatal Dynamics" (in 1975 reprinted in "Psychic energy"), it is striking that in dreams concerning conceptional conditions in this or that way something indicated a form of experiencing infinity. A few examples can illustrate it. The first example refers to a dream during a conception-analysis: the dreamer stands near a railway. On her one hand she sees a signal box on her other hand a signal pole. In front of her the rails and above her the electric wires for the train. Two planes come as it were out of infinity. They follow the electric wire, fly around the signal Pole and the first plane is preparing to land in the signal box. The dreamer awakes in a state of panic as "landing in the box will cause an explosion".

In this dream the signal box symbolizes the ovum: the plane represents the sperm and the fear of explosion points to conception—shock.

In a second example, in another conception-analysis, the ovum is symbolized by a mill which at the same time is a ball. The sperm is represented by a cigar. In the dream it is said that little people from another planet know more about things than mankind on earth The ball makes sucking movements in the direction of the cigar.

These two examples indicate that a recording already existed before the biological process of fertilization had taken place and in both dreams something about infinity is mentioned.

In 1954 already the question arose how this experience of infinity had to be interpreted. Influenced by the interpretation of telepathic phenomena, as mentioned above, by a psi-layer of extra human psychic energy, the following working hypothesis seems to be the most possible interpretation of this experience of infinity: 1. a field of attraction exists between the two germs before the biological process of fertilization; 2. this field of attraction, or of energy, would be in resonance with the extra human psychic energy so that quanta, emitted by the extra human psychic energy, are absorbed by the pre-conceptional field of attraction. By this absorption of quanta, or "psychons", a primal Ur-consciousness about infinity would arise in this field of attraction.

This interpretation of an Ur-consciousness, or Ur-engram, is also based on the consideration that consciousness in any stage of psychical development always arises by confrontation; in this case by the confrontation of the energetic field of attraction and the extra—human, or free psychic energy in the cosmos. Every confrontation which causes consciousness can be interpreted, from a psychodynamical point of view, as causing a higher level of energy, or potential. This confrontation can be caused by tendencies or wishes which are in collision with reality; it can be caused by absorption of psychons.

In a way this working hypothesis runs parallel with the interpretation of the mechanism of telepathic phenomena where quanta from the one person are absorbed by the free psychic energy and then again absorbed by the other person who is in resonance about the contents of these quanta which are deooded by the receiver, maybe via a dream, maybe in full awakend consciousness.

2. The experience of infinity

The two examples of experience, or awareness about infinity, mentioned above, are derived from the analysis of conceptional disturbances. In order to get a clear insight in this experience of infinity another example can be useful. A person drives a car on a long and straight main road, whereas there is nearly no other traffic. Although one is conscious that one is driving the car, one is relaxed to a certain extent and one's eyes are at rest, i.e. they are focussing infinity. If in the distance another car becomes visible, then first of all the awareness arises that the eyes are no more at rest, focussing infinity; that this state of rest is disturbed. There after one sees the other car. In short, this means that all seeing is an interruption of vision, i.e. focussing infinity. It is essentially this difference between this "seeing" and this "vision" that causes the transcendence of the ego as the centre of consciousness, whereas the condition of vision, or at-rest, factually means a removal of the ego insofar it is bound to the sensory perception, with, on the other hand, an indication of the experience of timelessness and unlimited space. One is consciously driving the car which means an ego bound to sensory perception, but this consciousness is on the background whereas the timeless experience of space is in the fore.

In a same way one can observe this transcendence in other mental states of altered consciousness: the ego transcends from sensorially bound to experiencing spacial timelessness.

After some discussions with Romain Roland about mental states of relaxation Freud accepted some "oceanic feelings". He thought that such feelings might be based on the fetal state of weightlessness by floating in the amniotic water. It appears, however, by continued analysis of prenatal and conceptional disturbances, that this oceanic experience is already present in man when coming into existence. This fact indicates that the oceanic experience is a very first libidinal experience. If one replaces the driving a car on a road by the sexual attraction of the two germs, then the primal experience is an oceanic one which can be disturbed at conception e.g. by conception-shock. Replacing the eye focussing infinity by the contact between the energetic field of attraction and the free psychic energy in the cosmos, this Ur-consciousness is at-one with this oceanic experience. And it is maintained during the whole fetal period unless more or less important disturbances take place.

Here, three notes, have to be made. First, the extra human psychic energy is thought to be a free psychic energy. This is meant as a "paraphysical" analogy of what is known in physics as bound and free energy; in a simple form it refers to a free electron and an electron bound in an atom. In physics a relation exists between the amount of free and bound energy and the notion of entropy.

Secondly, the extrasensory recording of disturbances in prenatal psychodynamics is based on the oceanic facet of libido. The fetus experiences lust by the oceanic experience and a disturbance of this lustful experiencing causes an unlustful engram: it becomes angraved in the fetal psyche. As to the quantum-mechanical interpretation of the arising of an engram, this is extensively discussed in my book "Psychic energy"; here, the state of oceanic experiencing can be compared to a photographic film whereas the engrams come into existence in an analogous way as a photographic picture on such a film (a.o. by a change in the spin-direction). Thirdly, by the prenatal psychoanalysis the notion of libido, as lust, cannot only be interpreted as erotic and sexual, but as a bi-polar psychic energy. On the one side the erotic pole strives first after the fertilizing union, then after the building up of the fetal body (in co-operation with the electromagnetic forces) and finally, postnatally, after lust-satisfaction by means of the own body and thereafter by means of other objects. The erotic pole is always bound to time and space (e. g. sperm-ovum, etc). On the other side, specially in the prenatal stage, the oceanic pole shows an "as-if" static character of experiencing infinity. After a more serious disturbance in the fetal as well as in the postnatal life the oceanic shows its dynamic character by a regressive tendency towards the primal oceanic experience. One could call this regressive, oceanic tendency a form of cosmotropy.

The timeless character of the oceanic pole can be illustrated by dreammaterials which indicate prenatal disturbances. In dreams engrams of such disturbances are expressed by symbols derived from postnatal sensory perception, demonstrating a form of synchronicity. In the two examples about conceptional conditionings, already mentioned, the symbols give a good illustration of it: rails as a symbol of unifying, a planet as a symbol of experiencing infinity, But also further disturbances of the prenatal stage are expressed in dreams in a same manner. A very illustrative example is the dream in which the dreamer is an air-ship. She sees full moon, but one sector of it is darker, whereas this dark color also flows out in the sky. The dreamer becomes panical and thinks that the moon is angry In this dream the moon represents the placenta and a small placental rupture causes a bleeding, expressed by the dark color. It appeared that the mother of this dreamer had a collision with a motor during her pregnancy so that she had to lay in bed for some time because of a threat of abortion. Besides possessing a timeless character the oceanic pole is also objectless in relation to the experience of infinity as an all-world. The only one existing in this all world is the fetus himself. So, every disturbance of this all-world is experienced as an occurrence caused by the fetus himself. The consequence is a kind of feeling of guilt which objectively is completely illogical, but nonetheless subjectively present with far reaching consequence. There are adults who have a feeling not to be wanted in this life. Within the frame of a classical analytical orientation one would look for a mother-image which has not been loving enough during the early and earliest postnatal stages. It is, however, also possible that this person as a child asked for extra attention from the mother as a compensation for a prenatal disturbance, so that this child felt unwanted even before it was born. After birth this child tries to get proof after proof that the mother does want him. In such cases essentially the feeling of being unwanted is not related to some object, a.o. the mother, but is the expression of a very deep injury of the primary narcissistic, prenatal state with the inner conclusion "finally I am not allowed to live". In postnatal life such structures suggest a masochistic tendency.

On purpose here, the Freudian notion of primary narcissism is used as, indeed, the fetal, oceanic all world corresponds with this notion, although Freud used this term to indicate a first mental state after birth. The interpretation, however, makes this primary narcissism more open for psychotherapy to overcome this "as-if" masochistic attitude in life.

3. Oceanos and Freud's thanatos.

From a classical-analytical point of view one does not proceed much further in such cases than stating that a masochistic structure exists, eventually in a sadistic projection, if one does not recognize the prenatal and also the conceptional character of such structures. As Freud himself excluded a psychonalytical research of prenatal psychodynamics, it is not amazing that in his later life, round his 60st year, Freud accepted a destructive drive in which the sadomasochism forms the centre, besides the libidinal strivings (eros). Freud called this destructive drive thanatos, or death-drive.

Several psychoanalysts have not accepted this thanatos as a primal drive. However, the psychoanalytical researches of prenatal and conceptional conditionings made it possible to trace the deeper causes of this destructive drive. Thanatos and thanatotic reactions find their deeper causes in disturbances of prenatal and of conceptional oceanic experiences. Manifestations of prenatal thanatotic reactions are a fetal tantrum, more or less comparable to the tantrums of a baby in its craddle; the difference is that the fetus cannot cry.

There is a great difference between thanatotic reactions in postnatal life, caused by erotic frustrations and those caused by disturbances of the oceanic experiencing in prenatal life. As erotic tendencies are directed on an object, also the thanatotic reactions, after frustration of erotic wishes, e.g. an angry reaction, remain directed on objects. This discrimination between the own ego and any object does not exist in the fetal oceanic experience. There, an experience of a primary narcissistic all-world exists. If this all-world is disturbed a thanatotic reaction is also objectless: a furious all-world which corresponds with the tantrum of a crying baby. The baby is also furious, but this fury is not directed against any object. One could call this oceanic fury a "blind" rage.

Most often, in postnatal life a mixture of these two forms of thanatotic reactions is present. However, the more the oceanic rage is accentuated, the stronger also the oceanic destructive drive forms the core, a destructive ego which prenatally is associated with anxiety and panic "not to be allowed to live", feelings of being an outcast.

Here, social-psychological perspectives are present in such a way that from a social-psychological point of view it is very important that man can develop the oceanic pole of libido and that the satisfaction of erotic tendencies by "bread and games" is not so predominant, although this facet cannot be neglected. By a too far carrying through of erotic satisfaction, the danger exists that the oceanic tendencies are neglected with as result a social alienation. These aspects will be discussed in chapter II. Here, it is emphasized that the development of the conscious experience of oceanos is necessary just as well as the avoidance of too heavy frustrations on the erotic side, in order to keep the thanatotic reactions within social limits.

From an energetic viewpoint there exists a parallel between the thanatotic reactions and what in physics is known as the mirror-effect. If one takes a particle, as example, with electrical charge (e.g. an electron) and one places a mirror to it, then there are three differences between the original and the mirror-picture: 1. the spin-direction of the original particle is a reversed one in the mirror-image; 2 the direction of the north pole of the magnetic field belonging to this particle is also reversed (instead of the right hand rule, the left hand one); 3. there is a time-reversal. In physics this mirror-image could be called, positron, or anti-matter. But in psychic energy these three differences are remarkable: 1. the change of the spin direction could be called anti reality; the change of the magnetic field and its north pole could be called the change of love into hate (if emotion can be called psi-magnetism); the change of time could be translated as regression: backwards in the time. These three aspects are very important for the analysis of borderline-cases where just on the conceptional level disturbance of the oceanic experience is preponderant: regression towards the mother-image; destructive hate instead of love; anti reality are characteristics of such borderline-cases. The psychotic actions of such cases are understandable if one interpret them as mirror-effects on the basis of quantum-mechanics. Also fallacies and hallucinations can be interpreted as mirror-effects. For the therapy this interpretation is very important.

4. Development of oceanic experiences

Today rather often the opinion is expressed that in order to realize social changes the use of violence is not obsolete. When a certain degree of social alienation is reached, surely an oceanic thanatotic reaction can manifest itself by social violence. However, this is something else but the nowadays advice: do use violence. Perhaps violence can remove erotic frustrations, but it never can remove social alienation as, on the contrary, it will reinforce this alienation. For the moment a plead for conscious development of the oceanic experience is still an ambiguity. On the one side, some classical psychoanalysts think that all those who are searching for cosmic consciousness are only suppressing their aggressions and thanatotic reactions. On the other side, many people think that the "unlust" in culture can be eliminated when the erotic frustrations are removed as much as possible. However, one must not forget that the expectation of a more or less paradisiacal community has always played an important role in the background of social revolutions. This expectation is a projection of the fetal experience of an oceanic all-world on a postnatal community and specially on its material aims. From this point of view it is understandable that after a period of strivings after material welfare a period comes with an emphasize on a kind of mental welfare. The projection of prenatal oceanic conditions on the postnatal circumstances will never be realized if the aim concerns material situations. On the other hand, Bucke was right in his opinion that by the development of cosmic consciousness without doubt also social circumstances will change. Then, it concerns a "new Man" who consistently re-orientates the community: a new human community.

Although it is a fact that every new insight evokes resistances, it is, nonetheless, good to mention how within a Western culture the oceanic aspects can be developed. First, the maithuna has to be mentioned which forms an important part of tantric rites. The female partner sits vis-a-vis on the lap of the male partner. By mutual swinging movements both partners can experience an orgasm in which any form of sadomasochism is excluded. Thereby the orgastic experience is not only a physical one, but is carried through into a mental experience of cosmic consciousness. It is also possible to drop the swinging movements, only practizing a form of carezza in this attitude of maithuna. In case of orgasm the mental experience is a "peak-experience", in case of carezza the final experience could be called a "valley"-one. A good maithuna is dependent on the inner readiness and openess for this oceanic experience. So, it is not suitable for haphazard sexual contacts.

Secondly, since the prenatal and conceptional psychodynamics became clear, it is possible to integrate a meditative element in the Western cultural pattern in that way that meditation means a reminding oneself of the prenatal and conceptional world of experiencing. From a psychoanalytical point of view Alexander and Graber have already suggested that the Buddhistic Jnana-stages correspond with prenatal psychodynamics.

Essentially three facets can be discerned of this fetal oceanic experiencing: 1. an energetic one; 2. a connecting one and 3. a noetic facet. Together these 3 facets form the oceanic all-world with its characteristic of infinity. The energetic facet can be described as an infinite vitality; the connecting one as an infinite all-embracing one (which can be called an objectless feeling of love) and the noetic facet as an infinite all-world. Together they form the timeless experience of unlimited space which corresponds with Freud's Id.

For meditative purposes the best starting point is formed by the connecting facet of objectless feelings of love. In the beginning it will be difficult to get rid of love which is directed onto an object. This difficulty means that one has to get rid of any wish which is directed to any object: the objectless feeling of love is, namely without any wish.

Freud thought that the Id. apart of its contents of suppressed wishes, would be a state in which every wish would be fulfilled at the same moment. This interpretation of the Id needs a revision insofar as in the primary narcissistic experience of all-world (oceanos) wishes do not exist. The fetus only experiences an "I am all". When reminding oneself of the feeling of objectless love one has also to get rid of any wish regarding any object.

Here, for the Western man a moment of fear can arise: "if I get rid of my loving wishes towards one or more fellow people, I shall become a complete egotist". This fear may be necessary as a stage of transition, but in egotism and egocentricity in postnatal life just the infinite feeling of objectless love is lacking which is the characteristic of the fetal experience. In egocentricity, namely, is already hidden an aggressive element regarding the outer world and this does not exist in an undisturbed fetal experiencing. Therefore this fear is without a real reason and is only a stage of transition.

On the other hand, it is sure that those who can remind themselves this feeling of objectless love are much more free with regard to love an object and can contact much easier the inner kernel of a fellow-man and, moreover, they have a larger capacity of delaying functions in connection with the fulfillment of their own wishes; so, they can also develop more love directed onto objects. Perhaps, it is possible that re-experiencing the infinite vitality of the energetic facet can procure an interpretation of some so-called miraculous healing in that sense that the infinite vitality in the ill person is reactivated by the healer. The noetic facet, and its experiencing can open perspectives related to paragnostic faculties.

Bucke was completely right in the expectation that by the development of cosmic consciousness another mankind and another social order will arise.

When continuing the meditative process of reminding oneself, with the starting point of the feeling of objectless love, one will observe that in the long run also the two other facets become conscious. Finally the concentration of Ur-consciousness: the relation with the free psychic energy in the cosmos.

Here, a warning must be made. If, namely, one has undergone severe disturbances in the fetal stage, and one would practise the process of reminding oneself without a guidance of an expert in prenatal psychodynamics, the possibility exists that without recognizing these disturbances one would be caught by a negative oceanic objectless tantrum related to this prenatal disturbance, or that one would be unable to reach the unlimited special and timeless experience.

5 Psychic energy as energy

Emphasis is laid on the fact that psychic energy is an energy which cannot be measured or demonstrated by instruments today in use in physics, and that therefore it is an imaginary energy of other dimensions. It is understandable that physicists make objections against such a hypothesis of imaginary (i) energy. Perhaps these objections can be decreased if psychic energy is defined as the capacity to perform psychic labor, whereas psychic labor can be defined as the product of psychic concentration (in which the emotional intensity is included) and the amount of engrams which partake in this process of psychic labor. These two definitions are correlated to each other and are, on an imaginary level, parallel with the definitions of energy and labor as used in physics. However, not only physicists but also other people can have objections in this sense that on first view it is difficult to see, e.g. energy as love, or as fury. Eventually one can agree that human life of wishes is called a psychic energy and perhaps one can also accept an energetic interpretation of fury and agression. But it can become difficult to interpret the notion "love" as a form of energy.

On the other hand, it is also difficult to interpret the mutual attraction between a sperm and an ovum as the prototype of love, even if one acknowledges the difference between the attraction between an electron and a proton and the attraction between the two germs, bearers of a life-principle. On purpose this example of the force of attraction is taken to illustrate that our notion "love" is, as a matter of fact, so limited. It is a notion that is learned in our postnatal life as a means to verbalize certain emotions. If for instance one of the three facets of fetal oceanic experiencing can be verbalized as a feeling of objectless love, this notion is only a conscious indication of a very distinct emotional state that is related to an emotion of all-embracingness. When trying to interpret this all-embracingness as an energy, one can imagine this energy to be capable of infinite velocity (because this energy has no rest mass). By such a velocity all what exists is embraced. It is not amazing if many people will think that such an energetic velocity is identical with the notion "God". Here, however, one must realize that Eckhart has already said "that God is called God, is done by mankind". This saying is also applicable to emotions such as love. It is the well-known difference between the word and the emotion itself, a difference which Anna Freud has discussed in "The ego and the mechanisms of defense" (New York, 1946). One can verbalize the feeling of objectless love (in itself an energetic quality) as a unity with the psychic energy in the cosmos. The fact that postnatal feelings of love are a limited derivation of this prenatal experience does not cause difficulties for a conscious insight. Moreover, many people know by experience that love is a force, so: a paraphysical, imaginary energy.

Another aspect of psychic energy, consciousness, has already been mentioned in connection with the paraphysical analogy with the notion "complementarity" in physics. This complementarity regards two forms of manifestation of electrical energy: the particle- and the wave-aspect, which run parallel with an ego and an emotional aspect of psychic energy. This ego forms the centre of consciousness. A second energetic aspect of consciousness regards the fact that consciousness always exists by confrontation which causes a higher level of energy. This confrontation plays an important role in the arising of the pre-conceptional Ur consciousness. First a confrontation takes place between a sperm and an ovum and between their mutual radiations. The question arises whether this confrontation as such might be sufficient for interpreting the arising of the Ur-consciousness. The difficulty, however, is that this confrontation does not seem enough for interpreting the contents of the Ur-consciousness. In that case, namely, these two cells ought already to be bearers of a psychic energy with the character of infinity. It seems much more plausible that this confrontation in itself remains on the instinctive level, on a paraphysical base comparable with an ion (the sperm) moving along the psi-magnetic lines of force, radiating from the ovum, it seems more likely that the contents of the Ur-consciousness, the experience of infinity, is caused by a psychic resonance-absorption between the free psychic energy and the pre-conceptional field of attraction by which the energetic level becomes increased and as a conscious experience of infinity becomes established. The relative increase of potential by the psychons causes consciousness as something which is psychically perceptible. This interpretation by means of a psychic resonance absorption is essentially similar to the interpretation of the arising of a telepathic contact as described above.

In this psychodynamical working hypothesis in order to interpret consciousness the philosophical speculation about consciousness as some metaphysical datum is replaced by a paraphysical, psycho-energetic principle. On the one hand the advantage is that several phenomena are better understandable; as well as the experience of cosmic consciousness, as generally the existence of consciousness as such, as well as the telepathic phenomena are comprised in this hypothesis.

On the other hand, this working hypothesis offers points of contact with modern philosophical points of view, such as e.g. Reiser has described in his "Cosmic Humanism", where he proposes dimensions of energy which belong to the non-manifest world. Also the suggestion of Eccles, based on quantum-mechanical considerations, fits in this present working hypothesis (as to Eccles' opinion about memory, described in "The self and its brain", I don't agree with it and hope to expatiate on it in another study). Eccles' conclusion that the intra cerebral transport of sensory stimuli needs a quantum-mechanical explanation, finds support in Smythies' researches about serotonine and its molecule compared with those of marihuana. The molecular structure of both is nearly the same. But the molecules of serotonine have the capacity to attract a cloud of electrons (quanta) whereas the marihuana molecules lack this capacity. By this capacity serotonine can transport electric stimuli as electrons from the one end of a nerve, in the synaps, to the other nerve, whereas marihuana, on the contrary, blocks the synapses. The quantum-mechanical transport of stimuli in the synapses is established by these researches.

Another question is whether in the long run a connection can be found with the interpretation of gravitation as a.o. prof Kooy thinks about gravitons which are round the celestial bodies in the universe. These gravitons would have a velocity equal to 10^6 times that of light and would cause a.o an all sided pressure on the earth.

As to such supraluminous velocities one can imagine them as fields in which a.o celestial bodies are material holes. At any rate these gravitons and their supraluminous velocity seems to belong to the non manifest world of energy, just as psychons, or psychic energy.

Here, it is the place to put forward the opinion of the philosopher Bergson. He thought that the original human consciousness would be much wider, but secondarily inhibited for the sake of daily existence. This opinion corresponds with the difference between the fetal oceanic consciousness and the postnatal erotic one, the latter bound to time and space, whereas, on the contrary, the oceanic consciousness is timeless and unlimited spacial.

Further, it seems possible to interpret Freud's lust principle as a parallel with the law of Hamilton regarding tendencies toward the less action: till a certain degree the oceanic consciousness is more static than the erotic one, which always strives after lust satisfaction, or relaxation: i.e. after oceanic experiencing. It seems not impossible that man, when he could completely live in the cosmic consciousness, would also experience the all embracing unity with nature without discerning the objects: a consciousness expansion. Would here lay the root of the primitive animistic way of experiencing ?

6. Man and cosmic consciousness

One can ask oneself why it would be so important to emphasize cosmic consciousness and its development, the more so when taking into consideration all the existing problems which today threaten human existence.

On the contrary, these threats might be a direct consequence of today's further and further suppression of the oceanic experience. This suppression evokes the counterpart of cosmic consciousness (its mirror-image) : infinite fury, as a destructive tendency Although this social aspect will be discussed in chapter II, here, as an example, the inflation can be mentioned as a practically unseizable negative oceanic symptom, maintained for the sake of erotic satisfaction. Moreover, it is surely not right to try to change social problems by force as force always causes the further suppression of positive oceanic experiences. Social changes which are not preceded by changes of mentality can change sceneries, but without the essential changes which are wanted and are so important. For instance, one can call for a social notion as often as possible, as without this notion no politic "ism" can attain a real change. But the development of such a social notion does not come to the fore when using force, as the social motion is only "born" by a changed mentality.

Such considerations justify the emphasis to be laid on the development of cosmic consciousness as an adult form of this experience corresponds with the prenatal oceanic experience.

Besides the psychodynamical aspect, here discussed, also a cultural-philosophical aspect is of importance. The original and undisturbed image of man means a man who knows himself as bearer of erotic strivings after lust-satisfaction as well as of oceanic, cosmic states of psychic rest and relaxation. This original image of man is not bearer of an inborn destructive drive. The original image of man, on the contrary, knows unitive consciousness as Maslow has called it; simulataneously being "high" and realistic regarding daily life.

For every man the real experience of happiness is formed by the unitive consciousness as an expression of one's own Self, which can be imagined in this way that the bi-polar libido is a straight vertical line, whereas the ego in its active and its receptive aspect is represented by a horizontal line perpendicularly on the vertical one. Where both lines cross each other, the Self can be placed as a junction between eros and oceanos as well as between the two aspects of the actual ego.

II

The Architecture of Reality : A Footnote to Republic, 509d-511e

Derek A. Kelly

The direction and argument of this paper may require a relocation of the perspective from which we may generally formulate and proceed to solve problems in philosophy. The problem of the paper is intelligible as a complex of "demands" on the metaphysical attention, demands which require conceptual formulation and resolution. One such demand on attention is the awareness that some pervasive trait or character of reality may intrude itself into the human process in such degree that the world and its realities come to be unmistakably identified and organized as a world in terms of the requirements of that form of reality. The philosophical principles which make such organizations of the world intelligible are in each case specifically different from kindred cases. There appear to be several logically distinct forms of reasoning operative in fundamental inquiries.[1] These forms of reasoning appropriate and circumscribe the world differently: the logical and ontological constructions that they offer differ in degree and in kind from each other. Peirce, Weiss, Popper and others have turned our attention to the basic constructions and schemata which seem to underlie the basic categorical taxonomies in different philosophical systems, or in metaphysics.[2] The paper is directed upon a critique of various schematic constructions that have been used in certain paradigmatic metaphysics, and is also an attempt to outline a schema which can both help to differentiate these paradigms as well as to locate them in a coordinated framework, thus articulating them as mutually intelligible and necessary.

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[1] This statement is the major claim in a number of articles : See "Varieties of Philosophical Reason," *Philosophical Studies* (Ireland), XXIV, 1976, 26-38; "Conditions for a Philosophic Future," *Theoria to Theory*, 1976; and "Reason and Political Authority," *Journal of Value Inquiry*, 7, No. 4, Winter, 1973. 261-273. The idea that there are some fundamental alternative ways of reasoning about the world has been defended *inter alia* by C. S. Lewis in "Alternative Systems of Logic," *The Monist*, XLII (1932), No. 4. 481 507; and by Jan Lukasiewicz in numerous essays collected in L. Borkowski, Editor, *Jan Lukasiewicz: Selected Works*, Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co., 1970.

I. Introduction

While architecture may be defined provisionally as the art of human association, systematic philosophy may be defined, also provisionally, as the art of the coordination of the fundamental ontological and epistemological emphases awareness may bring to bear on reality—to articulate, criticize and locate these emphases. In the initial stages of an inquiry, it is useful to focus the speculative intent through the use of a ruminating instrument, that is, some known and intersubjective presence to attention and scrutiny.[3] Architecture has been used to serve as a paradigm for philosophy here because the traits which collectively and distributively characterize architecture, when approached in a certain way, are similar to the traits which are characteristic of the philosophic process.[4] Both architecture and philosophy embrace a variety of the fundamental powers human beings may bring to bear on any subject matter. They both involve the logical, intuitive, aesthetic and practical powers. Both focus on criticism or on construction in a disciplined way by attention to structural (connective, inferentiable, etc.) components: design is central to the architectural process just as logic is central to philosophy. The intuitive power is found in philosophy in the activity of following the connections (by using deductive, inductive, and dialectical methods) which arise as consequences from supposed designs or structural divisions of a subject-matter; in architecture we find this power working to make determinations of the 'place' of an architectural product within the contours (legal, structural, physical) of its suggested environment. Further, the product of both disciplines is a complex *presentation—representation* of a subject-matter. The architectural product makes a "statement", pre-vocal, perhaps, unless the product is a startlingly intruding presence in its new environment, but capable of conceptual articulation; the philosophical product is largely conceptual articulation, yet it may also resonate in other areas of interest: it may be *felt* as Kant felt the moral law within, it may give shape to the pattern of a life by helping one to coordinate one's focus of habitualities as is visible in the differences between a character formed according to Kantian ethics and one formed by more naturalistic ethical habitualities. Both are ways of organizing various processes and orders of realities into a coordinated framework, and thus may be regarded as ways whereby a "world" is either produced or enhanced.

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[2] The examination of categorical frameworks is of course central to all fundamental inquiries. Pivotal works by philosophers of different philosophical persuasions often center at least in part on categorical frameworks: for example, works like *Individuals* by P. F. Strawson *Objective Knowledge* (Oxford, 1972) by Karl Popper. *Ideas* by E. Husserl (Macmillan, 1931), and W V. Quine's *The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays* (N. Y. : Random, 1966), are inquiries into categorical frameworks. C. S. Peirce, widely regarded as America's greatest philosopher, has had an important influence on a number of thinkers who have developed systematic philosophies including Justus Buchler, J. K. Feibleman, Charles Hartshorne, Paul Weiss, and others. See Paul Weiss and C. Hartshorne, Eds., *The Collected Works of Charles Sanders Pierce*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 1929ff.

[3] A ruminating instrument may take many forms : simultaneously or successively, collectively or partially, such instruments may be mathematical proofs, as symphony, a special science (e. g. biology or linguistics), a game, a style of living, and certainly physical objects of all forms and natures. Plato, Aristotle, Rousseau and Kant, among others, argued in their educational theories that the use of diagrams and maps was a crucial step in the development and disciplining of the imaginative and conceptual powers of human beings. Systematic inquiries seems to be more successfully carried out when these faculties are regularized by one or more systems of intercoordination of elements (e. g. the use of the matrix method in sentential logic). Ruminating instruments may naturally be modified or replaced as an inquiry proceeds.

[4] Cf. "Architecture as a Philosophical Paradigm," *Metaphilosophy*, Vol. 7, No. 3-4 (July/Oct. 1976), 173-190.

Within the processes which constitute architecture and philosophy, we may differentiate a small variety of junctions which help us to determine the components of the processes. In both disciplines we find the use of an initial vision-brief which may be considered as the indefinite set of *aporia* which evoke inquiry in the one, and designs in the other. In philosophy the vision brief may be a pre-articulated awareness of an orientation to the world that one has engaged and which can be given a conceptual rendition. A second stage in the processes of architecture and philosophy is one where we have the conscious application of innovative or traditional schematic forms as indeces, as suggestions and models of where and how to differentiate and organize a subject-matter. Ever since C. S. Peirce, following Kant, raised the issue over the kinds of logical constructs that may be used in this stage of inquiry, the issue has received considerable attention from contemporary systematic philosophers.[5] The variety of schemata that are taken by philosophers as "fundamental" cry out for some resolution of their status and of their claims to priority in metaphysical inquiries. Hegel's claim to the priority and exclusivity of his trichotomous dialectic needs to be examined as a claim which contravenes convictions which result from an awareness with Plato that no one schema may or can be taken as the "form" of reality itself for there cannot be any non-ambiguous criteria for a "good account" of conceptually generic subject-matter.[6] Where Plato's fundamental principles of division extend from dichotomous ones in general ontology to polyadic ones in ontology of man, for instance, Peirce defeneded a trichotomous fundamental division of categories, as does Hartshorne, but Weiss defends a tetradic principle of division, while Feibleman is equally emphatic that ontology is dyadic in fundamental structure.[7] Dyadic, triadic, tetradic, and polyadic schema are abstract representations of possible strategies for inquiring into any subject—matter. A schema suggests the points at which a distinction may be made, the relations which one represents entail specific and specifiable demarcations within the substance of subject matter. Why a W.H.Sheldon should find the touchstone of reality in polarities, while a Hegel should find his answer in syntheses is a puzzle for any intra- and inter-philosophical inquiry such as metaphysics.[8]

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[5] See for example, Charles Hartshorne, *Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method*. La Salle, Ill. : Open Court, 1970. Paul Weiss and Arthur Burks, ‘Peirce's Sixty-Six Signs,’’ *Journal of Philosophy*, XLII, 1945, 383-388; Paul Weiss, *Philosophy in Process*, Carbondale : Southern Illinois, 1968, V.

Just as the mode of emphasis involved in the vision-brief orientation of inquiry may be differentiated from the schematic designs used in categorical inquiries, so we may distinguish the emphasis on construction from that on evaluation. The first two stages of inquiry may be classed as presentational or exhibitive tasks. They anticipate, shape and also actually intrude into the process of construction and defense by argument of a set of final determinations in an inquiry. In the constructive emphasis some specific model or schema is advanced and explained, illustrated and rendered intelligible in terms of the materials for communication available for use in that domain of inquiry. Paul Weiss was aware of Plato's views, but he settled nonetheless on a division into four irreducible and exhaustive modes of being.[9] That schema bore the burden of Weiss' prolific use of that schema to differentiate modes of being, the rhythms of life, the kinds of logic, and so forth. A final emphasis in inquiry may be on the evaluation of the results of inquiry, an attempt to generalize the possible practical consequences of the set of final determinations which form the product of inquiry.[10]

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[6] This is why the attempt to reconstruct a (the) Platonic "system" is a risky undertaking, and if certain statements in the Seventh Letter are accepted, then Plato himself may be taken as supporting the view of Plato presented here.

[7] Cf. J.K. Feibleman, "History of Dyadic Ontology", *Review of Metaphysics*, VI, No. 3 (March, 1953), 351-368.

[8] Hegel's position is well-known. See W. H. Sheldon, *God and Polarity: A Synthesis of Philosophies*, New Haven: Yale, 1954.

[9] Paul Weiss, *Modes of Being*, Carbondale: Southern Illinois, 1968, p. 514.

This division of the process of philosophic inquiry may by the use of a different principle of division be reduced to two basic species of philosophic inquiry both of which interplay in the actual process of any individual philosophic inquiry: these are schematic and argumentative species. The schematic emphasis in inquiry involves the coordination of the vision-briefs which are the extra-systematic bases of an inquiry with the schematic designs which are used to give the approximate layout of the subject matter. These schematic designs may be augmented in explanatory power when they are fleshed out in terms intelligible to the people of the age in question. This latter task is a phase within the argumentative emphasis in inquiry, however. The schematic-designs mediate the actual constructions (the set of final determinations) which represent the *intellectus*. as distinct from both the vision-brief emphasis and the evaluative emphasis in inquiry both of which are among the *rei* whose adequacy with intellect we seek.[11] The activity of coordinating the vision-briefs with the schematic designs goes something like this. Human beings appropriate and organize their worlds in different ways:[12] as adventurers and contemplators, as imaginative and philosophic, as pragmatists and idealists, as visionary and as mundane. Worlds shaped in these ways are not only specifically but primarily generically variegated. We face the world as mystics, as knowers. lovers, technicians. It is a contingent fact that human beings engage the world in any one or another of these and other ways. It is a necessary truth that these ways are compossibilities. Many systematic philosophies which have been presented as definitive and adequate appear from within the strategy of the present paper as superb articulations of the perspective of one or another of the fundamental emphases: different forms of awareness, or different noematic objects[13], may be taken as prototypical of reality exhaustively. The fundamental emphases, the prototypical contours of reality, may initially be articulated as vision briefs which will be called those of Identity, contrast, mediation, and friendship or parity. These vision-briefs often appear to be linked to a particular schematic design. In all reflective disciplines, we seek to give conceptual shape to our awareness of the world. Any conceptual articulation requires idealizations, and schematic designs are among the most abstract of these idealizations. Quine refers to the use of what we call schematic designs and interprets their servicability in inquiry in terms of the principle of simplicity. Simplicity considerations, Quine holds, play a role in recognition, in minimizing the multiplicity of objects, in survival, in enhancing the scope of a theory, in engendering the conditions for creativity.[14] Popper interprets simplicity as highest in generality, and thus make generic concepts and their fundemental principles of division into a central focus in inquiry.[15] It is these generic concepts and their fundamental principles of division, and consequently their schematic designs, that we may use in an attempt to gain an entrance into the problem of logical and categorical constructions which lie at the base of systems. Using C. S. Peirce's designations for the fundamental complexes, we can differentiate monadic, dyadic, triadic, and tetradic schematic designs from each other. We will shortly explain the natures of these various tools.

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[10] "Architecture...", No. 4 *supra* develops some details of this claim.

[11] Heidegger has mistakenly argued in e.g. "The Essence of Truth," that his strategy of actualizing "adequatus" (by interpreting truth as *aletheia*) is in fact not a "correspondence" theory of truth. This involves a reduction of principle (of truth) to method.

[12] While there are philosophers, for instance Irwin C. Lieb, in *The Four Faces of Man*, philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1971, who willingly explore the plurality of ontological foci human beings may bring to bear on the world, there is a need for a thorough conceptual examination of the possible bearing that modal ontological foci may have on our social, political, legal, educational, and other cultural institutions. Our laws, for instance, may be un-reflectively prejudicial to some modal foci which are neither threats to the stability of a society, nor outrageous to the moral consciousness.

The argumentative task of philosophy involves an attempt to give a "good account" in discoursive terms of the way things are, and this task involves both inferential (logical) tools to help assure the consistency and coherence (e.g. sequences) of the articulation as well as the activity of generalizing an account to cover and help interpret any subject-matter whatsoever, but perhaps focussed centrally on the subject-matter of an individual person's directionality in life. Here only the first three main activities of philosophy will be considered. The intention is to focus on several vision-briefs and articulate them in connection with their own peculiar schematic designs.

Several postulates of method guide the constructive efforts below.

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[13] This is Husserl's term. See *Op. cit.*, chs. 9-10. I use "noematic" so as to avoid the question begging existential assumptions which form a sediment on the term "object".

[14] Cf. W. V. O. Quine, *Word and Object*, Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1960, 19-21.

[15] Cf. Karl Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*, N. Y.: Harper. 1965. Ch. VII.

One postulate is that we must distinguish simplicity taken as economy which is a pragmatical or a psychological necessary condition for an adequate schematic design, from simplicity taken as parsimony which is claimed on behalf of certain allegedly necessary logical and ontological conditions of an adequate schematic design. Hegel, for example, insisted that his triadic schema was both pragmatically and logically, psychologically and ontologically *necessary* (and sufficient) for philosophic understanding. While equally insistent on the need for a triadic schema in metaphysics, Karl Popper makes his schema only necessary and not sufficient for philosophic understanding.[16] A related postulate is that an adequate schematic design must not violate the principle of anti-typicality, this is by whatever principle we divide and differentiate a subject-matter, that principle must not be one that reduces the relations and coordinations of differentiated integrities to relations of a single type: Hegel's logic is one which construes the design of any subject-matter whatsoever, generic or specific, as triadic, with initial, subsequent and terminal divisions all being triadic in structure, ad infinitum. Weiss in his *Modes of Being* referred to earlier, advances an ontology based on the fundamental axiom that "Being is diversely and exhaustively exhibited in four interlocked, irreducible modes."[17] Each of the four modes has a triply differentiated relation to every other: Weiss' fundamental schematic design in his *Modes of Being* is the square of opposition suitably reinterpreted. Where Weiss' schema is a tetradic one and his modes of inter-modal relation triadic in structure, Brumbaugh's schema is a tetrad of types with a dyadic inter-typal structure.[18]

To say that an adequate initial schematic design must not be a mono-typical one, is not to say that it must somehow "synthesize" a wide variety of existing schemata. That would be eclectic and that method has not allowed its user to achieve anything but problematic, and rarely if ever assertoric modal propositions. Victor Cousin's *History* is a paradigm case of an eclectic schema.[19] While eclectic methods are useful in the early stages of inquiry, they are best superceded by more rigorous standards of order. The pivot of all metaphysical systems is to be found in the interpretation offered of the principle which is to define the nature and kinds of the principles of division which may be brought to bear on different subject-matter. The resolution of the issue over principles of division and schematization is a necessary phase in a metaphysical inquiry, and a necessary condition for being able to engage in actual construction.

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[16] Cf. "Popper's Ontology: An Exposition and Critique," *Southern Journal of Philosophy*, 13, No. 1, Spring, 1975, 71-82.

[17] Weiss, *Modes*, p. 16.

[18] Cf. R. S. Brumbaugh, "Cosmography: The Problem of Modern Systems", *Review of Metaphysics*, XXVI, No. 3, March, 1973, 511-521.

[19] Victor Cousin, *Introduction a l'histoire General de la Philosophie.*

II. Monadic Determinations and the domain of Identity

Apart from a number of philosophers, some already mentioned, who have been concerned with the problem of fundamental ordering schemata, there are also inquiries from other domains of inquiry which are relevant to the second stage of the present inquiry. Using numerical—complexes as fundamental models of orderly schemata, the issue over principles of division may be framed as follows : To what extent may number-complexes help us to formulate the fundamental principles that may operate in the fundamental divisions we make in subject-matter ? We have already noted that there are some philosophers today who would find such a question intelligible; in addition, there are extra-philosophical sources which suggest that the problem is not simply of philosophic interest, but is fairly extensive. In Psychology, Kohler was one of these interested in the tendency of people to perceive events in terms of numerically differentiated or differentiable terms: and Jung and Von Franz are convinced that there is a connection between the structure of the psyche and numerical patterns of order.[20] In anthropology, Hartley Burr Alexander, Alan Dundes, Mary Douglas, Levi-Strauss and others have sparked the controversy over the possible relation between a "culture" and the tendency to perceive and conceive of things in the world in one model or another.[21] In mathematics, Weyl, Poincare, Bernays, and others have examined the case for numerical patterns, and in the case of Weyl came very close to attributing individual "personalities" to various numerical patterns of order.[22] In sociology and the history of religions, we find Durkheim and Levy-Bruhl at the center of a controversy over the way to demarcate the so-called pre-logical from the logical mentality, while in history of religions we find Mircea Eliade, following Durkheim in his inquiries concerning modes of classification found in different cultures as distinguished from the alien method of categorization which may be brought to bear on the processes of different cultures.[23]

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[20] Cf. Marie-Louise von Franz, *Number and Time*, Evanston : Northwestern, 1974.

[21] Cf. H B. Alexander, *The World's Rim*, Lincoln : U. of Nebraska, 1953; Alan Dundes, "The Number Three in American Culture," in Dundes, Ed., *Every Man his Way*, Prentice-Hall, 1968, 401-423; Mary Douglas, *Natural Symbols*, N. Y. Random, 1970; Claude Levi Strauss, *The Raw and the Cooked*, N.Y.: Harper, 1969.

[22] Cf. Von Franz *Op Cit.*

[23] Cf Mircea Eliade, *Myths, Dreams, and Mysteries*, N.Y.: Harper, 1960.

One culture may have a pivotal model of organization, another culture a different model [24]

We have already noted that human beings respond to and appropriate the world in different ways. Some trait of reality, or some form of awareness, may intrude one way or another into the other to such a degree that "reality" and its knowability may come to be unmistakably and incorrigibly identified and organized in those terms. One such vision is that of *Identity*. : the basic character of this form of awareness is that there is no "ontological difference", that all discriminable realities are intelligible in terms of one basic principle, share location in one and only one fundamental order. The vision of contrast or dimensionality is based on an awareness of a fundamental *fault* in reality, that dichotomy is irreducibly ultimate. The vision of mediation or contexturation combines these first two visions into one and refuses to defend either the ultimate disjunction of realities even while it also refuses to accept the total univocity of realities. Finally, the vision of parity or friendship is one which insists on the fundamental idea of a plenitude of realities irreducible to each other and unintelligible except in terms of a multi-valued system of coordination.[25] Each one of these "visions" may achieve its definitive conceptual rendition in terms of one or another of the four design-forms we have mentioned, and may be taken as the name or definition of a specific mode of being, or ontological type.

The vision of identity is given its definitive form of methodic control by a monadic determination. Basic to this vision of reality is that there is no ultimate and irreducible difference between realities which we may discriminate, and that whatever else we may choose to say about reality, reality is One.

The One which is the final word of a monadic vision-brief is a supra-generic principle. One of the constants of our metaphysical tradition has been the tendency to conceive reality as a graded or hierarchical series of levels of modes of being at the apex of which is the "one", the supreme genus, regarded as the "highest" reality or the "really real". Such a doctrine is invariably the result either of a failure to realize the nature of monadic determinations, or else a refusal to accept the fact that there may be kind of a reality which is not discoursively and thus not determinably differentiable. A monadic rendition of the vision of Identity, as we shall articulate it, insists on accepting reality in at least one of the forms in which it may become perspicuous as being undifferentiable, and will thus hold that the "One" can be accepted as being beyond the apex.

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[24] Cf "Jung and the Medicine-wheel," *Philosophy Today*, 20, No. 2, Summer, 107-113.

[25] For criticisms of standard two-valued logics, see Lewis and Lukasiewicz, note No. 1. Also Arthur Prior, *Past, Present and Future*, Oxford, 1967.

Consider the product of a monadic determination. A monadic determination is one which "grasps" reality not as some "other" standing over against a first, but as something *sui generis* : reality appears as an absolute, non relative, thing-in-itself. It is not relative because it has no parts, and thus no divisions, no joints which are real. Since a monadic determination grasps reality as "One", reality appears as beyond difference, beyond determination: it can thus be grasped only through identification. The monadic determination of reality yields a "One" which is neither a part nor a whole, for each of these presupposes each other and thus a dyadic determination of reality The monad is not a kind, nor a genus, nor a whole, nor a quantity. It is, rather, the unnameable. If we grasp the product of a monadic determination, we will see that reality must appear as something that cannot be spoken, or identified, or characterized: it is the precondition for otherness while admitting no otherness within itself. To attempt to characterize (and to differentiate, e.g. by species-difference) reality grasped as "One" is to fall prey to the fallacy of attribution. For only the One is: there is thus no independence, no plurality. What is being portrayed here is the awareness of an infinitely inexhaustible and indivisible One, a totally de-differentiated reality.

The vision of Identity when formulated monadically presents us with the most general and least specific determination we can make of reality. Its discoursive product, "One is" is perhaps an empty truth in the sense of lacking informative content, but is a truth nonetheless. Sometimes called God, sometimes Being, sometimes the "really real", this monadic determination and its ontological deliverance is central to ontological inquiry. We need a category of Identity: that is, a category so general that it holds for all henceforth discriminated realities, yet so specific that it holds for every discriminable reality. This is the ultimate "It is". All that one can convey about reality in this mode is that it is unattributable: "Neti, neti", "Not this, not that." The One is thus neither spirit nor matter, neither permanent nor changing. "One" may be what we could call an infrangible term because it is applicable without restriction anywhere. To be able to say of whatever may be discriminated that it IS is to have a way of preventing the confusion of the problem of reality with the problem of modes of being. While all realities, no matter how they become perspicuous "are", modes of being may be assigned to "higher" and "lower" levels of a system of reality.

In views of Eastern philosophies, and in occluded portions of our own intellectual history, the monadic determination has played a role. It is the first hypothesis in Plato's *Permenides*, it is perhaps the guiding vision behind Plotinus' attempt to characterize the hypostacies, it is perhaps the transcendental unity of apperception that Kant holds to be the objectless condition for the appearance of phenomena, or Husserl's Transcendental Ego which is the inarticulable condition for all our determinations of reality. This appears to be the fundamental determination of reality in the non-dualist Vedantic system: it is perhaps basic to Karl Jaspers' "Encompassing". I think it may be the central insight of Wittgenstein's mysticism, perhaps of Heidegger's Being beyond being, and central to a great many other fundamental determinations of reality.

Taken as the One beside which there is no other, reality must here be appropriated as an incomparable, uncoordinated mystery. And where the monadic determination is accepted as a legitimate way of making determinations concerning reality, there we can see the so-called ontological proof of the existence of God as the most rigorous attempt to give conceptual form to the Monad which is beyond conceptual form: it is the most rigorous attempt to bridge the abyss between discourse and the silence which both precedes and also comes after speech.

In the present context, the monadic vision of Identity plays a central role. It is a limit-concept which sets the boundaries for the domain of the discoursive portrayal of reality. It is a view which helps to establish the inexhaustibility of reality by any conceptual articulation whatsoever. Had Bergson not dubbed intuition as the mode of access to *Duree*, *Duree* could be taken as an analogue to the One. Purged of all priority, *Duree* is a mode of experienced oneness, without subject or object, an everflowing stream ever ready to be transposed into determinate form, a persistent everreadiness for division and determination.

III. Dyadic Determinations and the Vision of Contrast

From Plato to Merleau-Ponty, philosophers are agreed that the minimum necessary structure for the consciousness of anything whatsoever is that which is expressed by the law of contrast: Awareness is actualized in its primary form by contrast. Awareness requires either that some datum is encountered as something standing over against a subject, or that some datum disengages itself from an undifferentiated background and intrudes itself into some subject's awareness. Plato signalized this notion in his claim that knowing awareness requires twoness;[26] Merleau-Ponty, following Husserl, makes the foreground background duality central to his articulation of nascent awareness.[27]

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[26] *Republic*, 511e.

[27] Maurice Merleau Ponty, *The Phenomenology of Perception*, N.Y.: Macmillan, 1962.

There are people for whom not Identity, but contrast, duality, division, polarity, dichotomy form the necessary condition for intelligibility and for any determination of reality whatsoever. This vision brief and its dyadic schema of intelligibility is the foundation for much of Western as distinct from Eastern philosophy. For many philosophers, reality becomes perspicuous not as some all-pervading Identity, but as a broken unity: many of the so-called "problems" of philosophy require and presuppose a dyadic matrix: conceptual-existential, change-permanence, freedom-determinism, one-many, and a host of other dualities form the initial and often the terminal datum for philosophical reflection.

A dyadic determination of reality obtains wherever it is claimed that reality is intelligible as and is ontologically grounded in duality. W. H. Sheldon, for instance, claims that polarity is the "*fons et erigo*" of reality.[28] Sartre claims that reality, experienced reality, is intelligible in terms of two generically irreducible terms: *Being and Nothingness*. Parmenides, the first philosophical ontologist, makes his fundamental principle of division a dichotomy of Being and non-being. We have to consider first the nature of a dyadic matrix, and then the vision of reality which it may be used to articulate.

A dyadic matrix, first of all, determines reality as fundamentally dichotomous, and issues forth in categorical systems whose fundamental categories are bipartite. We know, for instance, that a system of logic is but a collection of concepts such as truth, falsity, negation, implication, consistency, etc. which are taken as basic, together with principles to which they give rise. We know today that there are alternative systems of logic which reject the logic of Aristotle or of Russell and Whitehead which are based on the fundamental dichotomy of the true and the false, and which hold that the "law" of excluded-middle is archetypal for all reasoning.[29] And even though it may be true that multi-valued or modal logics may be found in the early stages of Western thought, as in Diodorus Cronus, for instance, we also know that the systematic development of logics which reject the law of excluded-middle had to wait until the early years of this century for their development and articulation by thinkers such as Lukasiewicz, Tarski, and others. So great has been the hold of the dichotomous law of excluded middle on the logical consciousness, that systems such as that of Hegel are even today regarded as fundamentally deviant and "illogical" since they reject the law of excluded-middle. *Principia Mathematica* continues this tradition by categorically excluding modal qualifications of propositions and by basing itself on the law of excluded-middle. And those who have either been influenced by or accept dichotomy as ultimate present metaphysical systems which match their logics : Russell dichotomized the world into Universals and Particulars and never managed to make sense of anything: Feibleman set out to relate reality to the categories of a dyadic ontology.[30]

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[28] Cf. W. H. Sheldon, *The Strife of Systems and Productive Duality*. Cambridge, 1918.

[29] Again, see Lewis and Lukasiewicz, *suprà*, No. 1.

In contrast to a monad, the dyad is incapable of determining any absolute reality, and can only articulate the structure of reality in terms of relative terms and categories. A dyadic matrix presupposes and can only be applied where reality is engaged as a duality. The dyad itself represents a complex. differentiable and divisible aspect of reality. The dyad is thus a tool for the investigation of reality insofar as it is partitioned, insofar as it reveals a "fault" at the heart of being—in Paul Ricoeur's pregnant phrase.[31] The move from a monadic to a dyadic tool for the investigation of reality is akin to the move from Hypothesis I to Hypothesis II in Plato's *Parmenides*, for it involves a move away from a whole which is beyond discourse, to the 'whole' conceived as "all," as a sum of parts. In a dyadic determination, it seems that the highest categories must reflect either a dynamic antithesis between continuity and permanence or discreteness and change, or a static antithesis of unity and plurality.

Dyadic thought is generally indefinite since the relation that obtains between the two highest categories may be defined in different ways. Basically, the relations may be contractive or expansive. On the basis of this distinction we may distinguish, inter alia, four fundamental forms of dyadic ontologizing.

A dyadic ontology is coincidental when the pair of terms which are said to be the most fundamental categorical terms of a system are held to be "ultimately" contractive and coincidental. The best example of such a view is to be found in Nicolas Cusanus' view of the ineffable coincidence of opposites. Cusanus' is not a triadic view; he does not hold that there is some "third" term that mediates and reconciles opposites, but that opposites remain opposites even while sharing coincidence, a coincidence which Cusanus never explains but accepts on faith. A dyadic ontology is complementary when it is claimed that reality invariably manifests itself in terms of pairs, and that neither term has any priority over the other. Here I would locate Feibleman's dyadic ontology of the irreducibility of fact and essence.[32] A polaristic dyad obtains where reality is appropriated as a duality but where it is claimed that the terms constituting the duality have different weights in the determination of any specific domain of reality. For example, Schelling claimed in one of his early systems that reality may be understood in terms of the polarity of subjectivity and objectivity. The specific domain of reality which we call "Nature" Schelling holds as being intelligible in terms of the formula, $N=O+,S$: that is, in Nature Objectivity is predominant over subjectivity. On the other hand, Spirit is intelligible as, $S=S+, O$: that is, Subjectivity predominates over objectivity.[33] W. H. Sheldon and M. R. Cohen are two other examples of thinkers who hold that polarities explain the nature of reality.[34] Finally a dyadic ontology is antagonistic wherever two terms are held to exhaust reality's dimensions, and where the terms in question are held to be not only opposites, but also as having no covering genus whatsover. Sartre's ontology of being and nothingness is one example of this type, while Wittgenstein's view expressed in the *Tractatus* that facts and objects are the mutally exclusive and irreducible aspects of reality is another example.[35]

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[30] Cf. J. K. Feibleman, "The Range of Dyadic Ontology," *Journal of Philosophy* LI, No. 4, Feb. 18, 1954, 117-124.

[31] Cf. Paul Ricoeur, *Freedom and Nature*, Trans. E. V. Kohak, Evanston: Northwestern, 1966.

[32] Cf. Huntington Cairns, Ed., *The Two Story World*, N. Y.: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966, p. 6, 83.

In my own attempts to construct a system, I have tried to combine a dynamic dyad with a static dyad by advancing two notions whose explication would yield the relations advanced here. I distinguish the nisus of Deliquescence from the nidus of Dedifferentiation. Deliquescence refers to the self differentiating activity of some realities, while dedifferentiation refers to the self-integrating process of realities. In my view, when reality is approached dyadically, it must be approached as simultaneously a self-integrating and a self-differentiating complex. To put this in terms intelligible to the tradition of philosophy, I would claim that we cannot intelligibly speak of "the" One or the many, but of the "One becoming many and the many becoming one". We cannot speak intelligibly of permanence or change, but of the permanent passing into change and change passing into permanence.

A dyadic determination of reality is a necessary ingredient in any systematic inquiry: not only may reality be approached as a broken unity, but some realities can be approached in no other terms. At the same time, dyads are not sufficient for systematic inquiry: reality is not exhaustible by a dyadic analysis.

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[33] Harald Hoffding, *A History of Modern Philosophy*, Vol. II, N. Y. Dover, 1955, p. 164-168.

[34] Cf. D. J. Bronstein, "The Principle of Polarity in Cohen's Philosophy," in S. W. Baron and E. Nagel, and K. S. Pinson, Eds., *Freedom and Reason*, 1951.

[35] Cf. C. B. Daniels and J. Davison, "Ontology and Method in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*," *Nous*, VII, No. 3, Sept. 1973, 233-246. And, of course, Sartre's *Being and Nothingness*.

IV. Triadic Determinations and the Vision of Analogy

Both logically and ontologically, there are thinkers who have rejected the archetypal status of the "law" of excluded-middle that states that *tertium non datur* and have argued instead that *in medio veritas*. For those who engage reality in terms of a triadic matrix, the basic aim is to break the hold of dichotomy as ontologically ultimate and to advance the notion that mediation, synthesis, balance is ultimate or fundamental. Triadic determinations seem to function in thinkers who wish to reconcile a monadic determination with a dyadic determination: while reality may *appear* as a broken unity, that unity is repaired in *reality*. The triadist thus seems to seek to avoid both the apparent pitfalls of a solely monadic determination which yields the vision of an Identity which is beyond all difference, as well as to avoid the vision of a reality irrepairably broken into two.

Depending on what principle of division is used, the genus of triadic matrices may be found to have anywhere from three to several thousand species. Relying on a principle that I have considered elsewhere,[36] we can distinguish three fundamental species and an illustration of each. One type of triadic matrix is a simple triplicity where reality is engaged as a "whole" of three items numerically and accidentally but not essentially differentiated. Coordinated together but reducible neither to a fourth term nor to any one of the three constituting terms, this triadic matrix seems to be the basis for Popper's doctrine of the three worlds.[37] Another type of triadic matrix is two-tiered. Three disparate items are unified by holding either that one of the three terms is a synthesis and thus takes either ontological priority or ontological inferiority to the other two terms. For example, Hegel claims that being-in-and-for-itself (Spirit) is of greater reality than either being in or being-for-itself. Here Spirit has ontological priority to the other two terms. On the other hand, Feibleman's view is that although Fact and Essence are ultimate and irreducible, nevertheless their combination and interaction in forming the world of "destiny" yields a third realm that is, however, of lesser reality than fact or essence.[38] Finally, a genuine triad obtains where it is held that reality is intelligible in terms of a triple set of terms each referring to a fundamental mode of being, irreducible to each other, and excluding any reconciliation in terms of one or another of the terms. The positions of Cassirer or of Peirce are intelligible in terms of this matrix.[39]

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[36] *Supra*, note No. 16.

[37] In addition to Note No. 16, see "The Categorical Structure of Popper's Metaphysics," in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*. XXXVIII, No. 1, Sept., 1977, 82-99.

[38] Cf. notes on Feibleman, *supra*, notes No. 32, 30.

[39] Cf. Ernest Cassirer, *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*, New Haven: Yale, 1953-57, Vol. III, xv.

Whatever type of triadic matrix is used, reality appears within such a matrix as a system of interweaving modes of being. Reality is revealed, in a different formulation, as a *contexturation* of individualities. In the contextural (triadic) schema, individuals deliver to awareness *not* their individualities, but specific traits and these traits form the basis for contextural acts. Thus to treat reality contexturally rather than in some other fashion is to treat reality not in terms of individualities but as the foci of distinctions and qualities. In such a schema, reality is appropriated and is explained in terms of convenant, ordinant and analogical contexturations; or as feeling, imagination and myth when we are speaking of the human world specifically. A convenant contexturation obtains where the similarity between individuals is grasped in terms of associative criteria and with little regard to the "real" qualities of individuals. Thus when any object X is linked to any other object Y in virtue of surface qualities, we have convenance. This is frequently how poets and "magical" people deal with the world. Ordinant contexturations obtain wherever specific traits of real individuals are conjoined with specific and general traits of other individuals. And analogical contexturations obtain where both surface and deep traits of individuals are conjoined together. Let us consider some examples. Imagination is the function of treating individuals as the foci of qualities, and of using whatever qualities "fit" together no matter how out of character they may seem. "Love" and a "red, red rose" are convenant and do not share deep characters. On the other hand, feeling is directed not upon individuals qua individuals, but on individuals qua bearers of specific traits which are attractive or repulsive. Feeling is not as indiscriminate a contexturation as is imagination. When subject to imagination, physical and other individuals become malleable, and images generally are impressions which are sustained and detached from the flux of sensations which may found them. Finally, myth functions to combine convenant and ordinant conexturations, and this may help to clarify the fascinating orders we find in myth, and the fantastic associations of both deep and surface qualities that are integral to the mythical consciousness.[40]

It seems to me that precisely because a triadic matrix does not divide the world exhaustively into two dichotomous terms it is more suitable for dealing with the world of experienced reality than is a dyadic matrix. Wherever change, continuity, dynamism seem to be pervasive traits of reality, there armatrix which does not presuppose strict and stark divisions is a more suitable tool of thought.[41]

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[40] Cf. articles in *supra*, note 24.

[41] This is also Jan Lukasiewicz's view, See *Op. Cit.*

V. Tetradic Determinations and the Affirmation of Parity

From the very beginning of philosophical thinking, philosophers have apparently all felt compelled to remove themselves as quickly as possible from the ambit of mundane, spatial, existence and to grasp the universal, the general. Gottfried Martin, one of the outstanding German metaphysicians today has argued precisely that the "general" is the gateway to metaphysics.[42] In this regard, he follows Plato. The order of sensational and physical being is troublesome to both thinkers. Plato regarded this domain as base, disconnected, lacking in unity, and thus unworthy of philosophic attention—it is represented by *Eikasia*, the lowest level of the line, a world of shadows and reflections only. On the other hand, there have been a few philosophers who have felt that the spatial domain of multiplicity, of manyness, should not be derogated but understood, not rejected but accepted, not opposed but engaged in terms of friendship. There is a sense in which the most crucial problem facing any systematic philosophy is that of once again, or maybe for the first time, integrating the physical and spatial world into the domain of philosophy. The prolific individuality of spatial realities may not be amenable to scientific treatment, but it cannot be disregarded by philosophy. Where science cannot deal with individuality, cannot deal with the specific, the non-general, philosophy must step in and bridge the gap between the general and the individual, and it must do so not by reducing the individual to the general nor the general to the individual, nor both to some third, but by accepting the realm and domain of physical manyness as an integral order of reality. Socrates' insistence that the "unexamined life is not worth living" has exercised an inordinate influence on philosophers who have forgotten or ignored the fact that even while Socrates and subsequent philosophers may be right in insisting on the examination of life, it is equally true that the "unlived life" may not be worth examining, or may result in an examination that is deficient. Even Husserl who made "to the things themselves" the battle cry of a new philosophy was led to interpret the "things" as essences and not as individual facts which he regarded as unintelligible in themselves.[43]

According to Aristotle's report on Plato, Plato held that there are four fundamental dimensions of being and that these become perspicuous in terms of four forms of mind: intuition, knowledge, opinion and sensation.[44] The domain of sensation becomes intelligible only in terms of a tetradic schema: physical things require four points as coordinates if they are to be grasped as individual unities. This is something Pythagoras, Plato and Euclid, as is well-known, believed. Those who approach the world neither in terms of identity, nor contrast, nor analogy, present as their basic vision-brief the principle of parity or friendship—these are the despised naive realists, sensationalists, lovers of multiplicity and disconnection. This is the domain accepted by lovers of the individual, the particular; it is the domain which is pre-logical in the sense that the fundamental principle of logical inference, namely transivity and continuity, has no compelling power. Yet it is precisely this pre-logical, pre-inferential domain of "gross" physical individuality that needs to be included within the province of philosophy. Reality has many varied goods to offer, and we cannot except out of sheer conceit limit, the real to some narrow province in which we feel secure, or to which the dominant ontology of millenia has paid homage,

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[42] Gottfried Martin, *General Metaphysics*, N. Y. Humanities, 1968.

[43] Cf. Edmund Husserl, "The Crisis of European Man," and "Philosophy as Rigorous Science," in Q. Lauer, Ed., *Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy*, N. Y.: Harper, 1965.

[44] Cf. J. N. Findlay, *Plato: The Written and Unwritten Doctrines*, Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974.

Whether we face the world, reality, as a mystic (monadic), as a knower (dyadic). as a peacemaker (triadic), or as a friend poses the same problem for all of us: how are we to understand. Our common need is to find some way of organizing the world, some way of finding or projecting some order so that we may orient ourselves. If we are to understand the nature and origin of the principle which establishes order in chaos, it is orientation in space and to spatial things that seems to provide us with our initial datum. As physical beings we confront the world initially as physical presences with an upright posture. This posture helps us to establish certain minimal points of reference and orientation which may later be abstracted out to form the basic concepts of a categorical framework. But initially, pre-logically, it is the individual person, and the individual thing per se, that is the zero-point of all orientation and arrangement.[45] Phenomenological investigations have shown that each individual person is the center of a life-world. Each individual is the inexhautible center from which all orientation radiates. For an ontology of the human world it is precisely this individual center that must be approached in quest of a philosophic understanding of individuality; in general ontology, it is the individual spatial thing that must be used as a center of reference for all explanation. It seems to me that a tetradic matrix provides us with a tool for being able to approach the world of physical individualities as individuals. For the tetrad invites us to accept the physical items we experience sensationally for what they are and as they are, and to treat them as all being on a par: different, yet equal, and thus friends.

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[45] Cf. "Home as a Philosophical Problem," *The Modern Schoolman*, 52, No. 2, January, 1975, 151-158.

While we need a vision-brief which accepts an appropriation of reality in terms of identity, and while we do in fact engage the world frequently as a dichotomy or as a synthesis, we need as a fundamental touchstone of reality a tetradic matrix which yields up not identity, nor duality nor synthesis, but which yields individuality in irreducible integrity. Individual integrities remain opaque to conceptual systematization, and thus act both as the motives for philosophic reflection, as well as the inevitable refutations of any and all systematic schemes. Our philosophic humility finds its home in the domain of irreducible manyness.

VI. Conclusions

We began this inquiry with the observation that the formulation of specific propositions together with the laws that are to govern inference constitutes the terminus ad quem of the inquiry, while the terminus a quo is a ruminating instrument rich in exhibitive power which we use as a heuristic in formulating our fundamental principles of division, and in helping us to formulate the rules of inference which render consistent and mutually intelligible the several statements which constitute the linguistic termini of inquiry. In this case, the processes of architecture were taken as a main ruminating instrument. As inquiry begins, the linguistic formulations that we then utter are quite different from the judgements which might terminate an inquiry. In philosophy, as in any other systematic discipline, inquiry is carried out over a period of *time*, and the modal status of asserted propositions and statements may change over time from, for instance, merely contingent or problematic assertions which may mark the beginning of inquiry to assertoric and necessary propositions that may mark the terminus of inquiry. One traditional mark of philosophy has been its search for necessary propositions and statements, and its rejection of purely contingent statements as having no philosophic or scientific interest. Yet it is these contingent statements that constitute the core although not the whole of the domain best describable by a tetradic instrument. Inquiry requires time and time is the ground of true assertions: it is time that eventually assigns to assertions their modal status. One inference that may be drawn from this claim is that any logic that systematically excludes temporal and modal propositions from the domain of philosophically relevant propositions cannot be a suitable logic for philosophical inquiry.[46] Clarity and distinctness may thus be a directive aim in inquiry, but it cannot be the criterion for the entire course of inquiry.

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[46] Cf. Nicholas Rescher, *Studies in Modality*, *American Philosophical Quarterly* Monograph Series, No. 8, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974, for an example of contemporary work in modal logic.

The foundation of systematic philosophy is in logic. The question of what any metaphysical assertion implies is a question for logic, for logic is concerned with principles of inference. Whoever denies a principle of logic, such as the "law" of excluded middle, or denies a rule of inference, for instance the *modus ponens* in the logic of material implication, may consistently argue in terms of different fundamental principles of inference. There are different ways of reasoning about reality, and different ways of grounding and defining inference. Part of my aim here has been to suggest that there are a few fundamental axioms that may ground systems of inference and that these axioms form the heart of some fundamental alternative systems of philosophy.

> *And, along with me, take these four affections arising in the soul in relation to the four segments: intellection in relation to the highest one, and thought in relation to the second; to the third assign trust, and to the last imagination. Arrange them in a proportion, and believe that as the segments to which they correspond participate in truth, so they participate in clarity.*
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> *I understand, he said, And I agree and arrange them as you say.*[47]

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[47] *The Republic of Plato*, trans. Allan Bloom, N. Y.: Basic Books, 1948, p. 192, 511, d e.

III

Traditional Sources of Education for Grasping Social Complexities

Henry Winthrop

1. The Social Education That America Receives

On all sides today we note recognition of the fact that the social complexity of American civilization is becoming increasingly unmanageable. Not only are the effects of the institutional interdependencies of American civilization ill understood but practical measures that are being devised to deal with some of the problems these institutional interdependencies generate are, themselves, both difficult to understand and difficult to implement. The mouth-filling language that I have just used is the vocabulary by which we pay our respects to scholarship. "Social complexity," "institutional interdependencies," "practical measures" — are not all such phrases, fluff? In ordinary, garden-variety of language what are we saying. We are saying that in God's country what goes on in one guy's back yard is affecting what goes on in another guy's back yard. The noise is terrific and all hell's a poppin. We are griping because the fences we have built have proved to be of no help and everything we are doing to make them bigger and more soundproof isn't working out at all. The kids are still punching holes in the fences, the backyard high flies they have hit while playing are still coming over, the cats on the fences yowl more than over at night disturbing our sleep, new debris that we have never seen before is accumulating in our yards, etc. Man, have we got troubles! You name it. We've got it and the fancy vocabulary of scholarship isn't worth a plugged nickel.

This writer in 1973 had one unsurprising but amusing piece of evidence of the public recognition of the complexity of proposed solutions for our social difficulties, brought to his attention during a

TV news broadcast. A TV commentator was discussing a plan that has been devised to deal with the interrelations of population growth, proposed new real estate developments, established sources of water supply, etc., in a certain area of the country. In commenting on the plan he referred to an operating, mathematical formula it contained. This formula, he complained, approached Einstein's theory of relativity in its complexity. The commentator's description need not, of course, be taken literally but the metaphor directing attention to the great difficulty to be faced in trying to comprehend the plan is probably both legitimate and accurate. Be that as it may, the point with which I should like to deal in this section is the tragic contrast between the level of popular explanation of the difficulties of the social problems America faces and the level of explanation which is required to deal with them both realistically and adequately.

The prevailing level of analysis and source of influence in this country—at least to the extent that we are concerned with mass public education—is that of TV. This medium often has a captive audience of at least 30 million viewers, for national, news broadcasts, talk shows, panels and interviews. The level of analysis of the issues treated in these forms of presentation run from the depressing, superficial, unenlightened and zigzagging chatter of the talk show to the all-too-brief, oversimplified and highly selected, out of-context features of the panel discussion or the personal interview. Often the person interviewed is highly knowledgeable on a given problem but is prevented from providing his listeners with a well-organized presentation of his topic. The obstruction is created by the disjointed questioning of the broadcasting company's interlocutor who usually does not know enough to squeeze maximum, intellectual efficiency out of the half hour or entire hour's questioning of the interviewee. One can almost hear Truman Capote saying impatiently to the interlocutor, after 15 minutes of pointless jabbering "Aw, shut up!" Superficiality in interrogation and disorganization in intellectual approach is the essence of this type of public education — a super-ficiality and disorganization that is shored up by a cult of personality. The interlocutor is expected to have an attractive personality, be one of the "beautiful people" and be well groomed. He or she is expected to demonstrate a sense of humor, not take the subject at hand too seriously, exhibit a measure of flippancy on occasion and know how to control deftly the course of the interview, keeping the mind the educational, cultural and intellectual background of the "typical viewer." The questioning is supposed to leave the viewer with a false sense of having comprehended the issue and of having seen it brought down to earth.

The communication process is bastardized with the unexpressed assumption that in a democracy anyone is able to understand the social issues faced by the American community. All that the interlocutor must do is to succeed in winnowing away from the replies of the interviewee, his pedantry and stifle any tendency he may have to lose himself in technicalities. The ignorance and superficiality of the questioner and the lack of preparedness of the interviewer to ask the right questions, to make the right connections, to understand the relative importance of different bits of information supplied and to connect up the issue is question with other issues facing the nation—all these considerations remain unquestioned.

If the charge I am making concerning the intellectual deficiencies of the popular interview, seems to be somewhat harsh, we can justify it somewhat indirectly by bringing to the reader's attention a volume which not only admits to this superficiality and treats it as a virtue but which is written as a handbook on how to appear intelligent even when ignorant. I am referring to the volume, *How to talk with practically anybody about practically anything*, by Barbara Walters.[1] The volume might have more appropriately been entitled, *How To Sling Baloney And Get Away With it*. Writ clear throughout this volume are some slick and standard formulas given by Mrs. Guber (Barbara Walters) for effecting successful interviews. They all add up to getting people to talk about themselves. Clearly, the life, habits, enthusiasms, convictions, achievements, worries, past difficulties, etc. of the interviewee can, by no stretch of the imagination, be equated with his or her ideas. Unfortunately, most members of the viewing audience fail to make this necessary distinction.

It is important to avoid any misunderstanding at this point. I do not know Barbara Walters. Given a free hand in real life she may be a person of deep knowledge and a powerful analyst. For all I know she may even have received a *summa cum laude* in some field or other from Harvard or Radcliffe or some other worthy institution. All I am saying here is that the standard operating procedure to which she is constrained by the network for which she works and which, I presume, is felt to be most appropriate for the millions of her viewers and listeners cannot do justice to any social problem or issue that she attempts to deal with via interview over the air. I might also point out here that I am probably leaning over backward to be fair, considering the flabbergasting attitude of Stuart Schulberg the executive producer of the "Today" show on which Mrs Walters performs Mr. Schulberg's conception and inflated evaluation of the intellectual quality of his TV programs was given recently in his own words. Commenting on interviewees who appear on the "Today" show, Schulberg[2] had this to say.

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[1] Barbara Walters. How to talk with practically anybody about practically anything. New York: Dell, 1971. 241 pp. Barbara Walters, along with Frank McGee, the effervescent and moustached Gene Shalit and Frank Blair are the central characters of NBC's "Today" show. Stuart Schulberg is the executive producer.

"They know its impact. They know that the audience they're talking to is *exactly the kind that is interested in serious ideas*, is interested in politics and also locally are opinion leaders, generally speaking." (Italics mine)

I have already remarked that the prevailing level of analysis of our social issues (and, of course, of ideas) is that provided by TV. Let us note that so distinguished a TV personality as Paul Harvey, commented sometime in October 1973, in one of his TV appearances, on the superficiality of the treatment of important social issues and ideas by the theatrical personalities that appear on talk shows. He spoke of the restlessness and concern of dedicated scholars, professors, and thoughtful writers over the mangled treatment that social issues and ideas receive at the hands of vain and ignorant actors and actresses and theatrical producers and directors. The mass media, of course, are the main source — and certainly the most potent one — for public education. By and large the service they provide is *miseducation* and this they create by virtue of the low level of analysis and information they encourage.

Some of the features of this low level of analysis and information—constructing our profile primarily from talk shows, panels and interviews and secondarily from newscasts—can be summed up as follows: 1. incompleteness of information and often downright ignorance; 2. oversimplification of issues and homogenization of the basic factors which generate them; 3. superficiality in treatment that frequently misses the controversial aspects of the proposed solutions for our problems and fails to emphasize the areas of still unresolved ambiguity they exhibit; 4. childlike proliferation of assumptions and all-too-frequent failure to distinguish assumption from fact; 5. the frequent tendency to wander from the main point or issue by concentrating on some marginal consideration or on an ancelary point made by an opposition speaker; 6. the failure to embed an issue in the social matrix out of which it has arisen; 7. the failure to deal with the relationship of a given issue to other serious issues that are the concern of the moment; 8. the puerility of allotting anywhere from 15 minutes to an hour for the treatment of a problem that cannot be properly understood unless months are devoted to its study; 9. the obvious guidline of insisting on treating an issue all too often as a means of entertainment and distraction rather than as a matter for serious study, thereby substituting the ideals of the theatre for the ideals of the classroom; 10. the utter indifference on many an occasion—particularly when an issue is discussed heatedly—to the demands of logic; 11. the marked muddle-headedness in the use of language so that protagonists are often guilty of many of the semantic pitfalls against which the general semanticists warn their readers; 12. the substitution of fiat commentary for analysis in the examination of issues; 13. the discouragement of originality in ideas within the framework in which a given issue is to be treated; 14. the tendency to place a premium upon flippancy in the treatment of an issue, often precisely to avoid the required intellectual discipline; 15. the toleration of intellectual zigzagging. particularly on talk shows, to the point where it is actually treated as an asset; and 16. the assumption that all speakers are equally privileged "to put their two cents in," regardless of whether or not they have done their homework. All these faults constitute a sample only of the educational and intellectual deficiences in the presentation of social issues and ideas in general by the mass media, most particularly, of course, TV.

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[2] Jay Sharbult. " 'Today' Staff Rises Early." *TV Marquee. The Tampa Tribune & Tampa Times.* October 28 November 3, 1973. p. 37 and p. 41.

Some of the consequences of communication in this genre are beginning to become apparent. Many a university instructor today finds that his classes consist almost/chiefly of members of the TV generation—of students whose notion of communication and the treatment of ideas is derived almost wholly from TV and radio. One finds that they exhibit the shock effects of the type of "intellectual" stimulation provided by TV. They have difficulty in dealing with abstractions and the cognitive content of ideas They assume that communication consists of a smattering of information, "gut reactions" to expressed attitudes and values, and the inspection of competing climates of opinion. The tendency of some of them to make use of the ever-present "you know" after about every band of 8-12 words — a "you know" that not only conceals a lack of thought and a paucity of ideas but also accompanies a logorrhea uncontaminated by any tendency towards analysis — betrays the fact that they have never acquired much capacity for intellectual probling of any kind.

These are students who feel that they have been subjected to a "putdown" when they are corrected for the unwarranted assumptions they make, corrected for the mistaken information they employ, or corrected for their non-sequiturs in conversation. Under the TV dispensation of encouraging communication whether or not the communicant is informed, they fequently refuse to read, study or do any intellectual homework at all. Their notion of democracy in a communication context is that one man's opinion or comment is as good as another's. On those occasions when they do dimly perceive that they are failing in the mechanics of communication or one lacking the preparation for discussion by virtue of the limited information at their disposal, they simply retreat into a dead silence, refusing to continue discussion at all. If questioned, they employ a studied evasiveness.

Phenomena of this sort point to the fact that we are producing a large fraction of our citizenry, that is ill-prepared to comprehend the pressing social issues and problems of our time. This same fraction is likewise lacking in the minimum amount of knowledge that is needed to even begin to grapple with these issues and problems. The latter consideration, even more than the former, converts the lack of social, political and economic enlightenment on the part of many Americans into a *basic problem of American civilization.* Stated simply that problem is this. Where can we find the printed sources of information and social analysis that will improve the general level of understanding of the basic issues now confronting the American community? Furthermore, can we differeniate different levels of social sophistication and education for social understanding that different types of intellectual offerings can provide? Finally, how can we make use of the mass media so as to inculcate some of the intellectual and educational virtues they now so sadly lack? The section that follows constitutes an attempt to answer the first two of these questions.

2. Sources Of Education On Social Issues Apart From The Mass Media

A vital question at this point would be to ask ourselves just what are the different levels of analysis on which social issues or ideas could be — or, ideally, should be — discussed. Let me provide *one possible taxonomy* for the differentiation of levels of analysis that can be and have been provided, in dealing with many of the major issues currently confronting American civilization. This taxonomy is provided in Tables 1, 2 and 3.[3]

The taxonomy provided is admittedly arbitrary and is only one of many schemas that could be constructed to show the increasingly difficult and penetratively different levels of social analysis. But the point to be focused upon is that generally we achieve increased depth of understanding of a social problem or a social issue as we go up the ladder of social sophistication. Increasing sophistication tends to be accompanied by a richer and a more detailed range of appropriate information. Increasing sophistication also requires intellectually more demanding forms of analysis.

We have already highlighted some of the deficiencies of TV as a basis for education with respect to the social issues of our time. Let us now turn to level 2 of Table 1, namely, contemporary literature as a source of education on the social problems and issues of our time. Some understanding of a number of our social problems and issues is provided, for instance, by the *political novel,* I am using this phrase in the sense employed by Howe.[4] I quote him directly.

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[3] The three tables reflect an increasing level of sophistication and intellectual demand as we go from Table 1 through Table 3.

> "... By a political novel I mean a novel in which political ideas play a dominant role or in which the political milieu is the dominant setting—though again a qualification is necessary, since the word "dominant" is more than a little questionable. Perhaps it would be better to say : a novel in which *we take to be dominant* political ideas or the political milieu, a novel which permits this assumption without thereby suffering any radical distortion and, it follows, with the possibility of some analytical profit." (p. 17)

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4 Irving Howe. *Politics and the Novel*. Cleveland and New York: The World Publishing Company, 1957. 251 pp.

Table 1. Some Arbitrary, Popular Sources For Education On The Social Issues Currently Facing The American Community Classified By Increasing Levels Of Sophistication.

Level Of Sophistication[1]	Examples Of Educational Approach
1. Mass media, especially TV	news broadcasts, talk shows, panels, interviews,[2] radio, editorial pages of tablid newspapers.
2. Contemporary literature	the political and social novel or play: e. g , *The Last Hurrah* by Edwin O'Connor and *The 480* by Eugene L. Burdick.
3. Science fiction, the utopian novel and the anti-utopian novel	*The Troika Incident* (science fiction) by James Cooke Browne,[3] *A Modren Utopia* (a utopian novel) by H. G. Wells; and *Nineteen Eighty Four* (an anti-utopian novel) by George Orwell
4. Popularizing non fiction	*Now Is The Time* by Senator Fred R. Harris; *Citizen Power*. A People's Platform by Senator Mike Gravel; *America, Inc.* Who Owns and Operates the United States by Morton Mintz & Jerry S. Cohen; and *A Populist Manifesto*. The Making of a New Majority by Jack Newfield and Jeff Greenfield.

1 The level of sophistication—and possibly even influence—increases from top to bottom of the table.

2 It should be noted that many TV documentaries are conspicuous exceptions to the superficial level of educational approach of the examples given in the table. Thus the TV program, *The Advocates*, is often pitched at a level equal to that of numbers 2 and 3 of Table 2.

An example of what I have in mind is the debate entitled "Should Your State Government Adopt The Constitutional Amendment To Limit State Spending." shown on TV on November 1, 1973.

[3] James Cooke Brown earned his Ph.D in Sociology, Philosophy and Mathematical Statistics with a doctoral dissertation on co-operative communities. He has devoted himself to teaching and research and is the creator of "Loglan," an artificial language constructed to test the theory that the structure of language determines the boundaries of human thought.

Table 2. Some Arbitrary, Selective Sources For The General Reader And Intended For His Education On The Social Issues Currently Facing The American Community, Classified By Increasing Levels Of Sophistication.[1]

Level Of Sophistication[2]	Examples Of Educational Approach
1. The standard textbook for the student and general reader	*Contemporary Social Problems*. An Introduction to the Sociology of Deviant Behavior and Social Disorganization by Robert K. Merton and Robert A. Nisbet (eds.) and *Social Problems: A Modern Approach* by Howard S. Becker (ed,).
2. The broad and synoptic essay by non-specialists	*Crisis In Our Cities* by Lewis Herbert *Future Shock* by Alvin Toffler; and *The Rape Of The Taxpayer* by Philip M. Stern.
3 The broad and synoptic essay by specialists.	*The New Industrial State* by John Kenneth Galbraith and *The Coming Of Post Industrial Society*. A Venture In Social Forecasting by Daniel Bell.
4 Compressed treatment of our major problems with the emphasis on policy formation and priorities.	*Goals for Americans*. The Report of the President's Commission on National Goals (1960); *Prospect For America*. The Rockefeller Panel Reports (1961); *Agenda For The Nation*. Papers on domestic and foreign policy issues (1968 and 1969) by Kermit Gordon (ed.); *Setting National Priorities. The 1972 Budget* by Schultze, Fried, Rivlin and Teeters (eds...); & *Setting National Priorities. The 1973 Budget* by Schultze, Fried, Rivlin & Teeters (eds.).

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[1] The level of sophistication—and possibly even influence—increases from top to bottom of the table.

2 The renumbering in Table 2 reflects the fact that the sources given in the table are all still intended for the general reader but reflect materials that, by and large, assume a high level of knowledge and sophistication on the reader's part. This assumption is completely absent for the materials shown in Table 1. If we had one continuous table the numbers 1,2,3 and 4 of Table 2 would become numbers 5,6,7 and 8, respectively.

Table 3. Some Arbitrary, Specialized Sources For Education On The Social Issues Facing The American Community, Classified By Increasing Levels Of Sophistication.[1]

Level Of Sophistication	Examples Of Educational Approach
1. The treatment of a broad problem for one's own professional colleagues.	*Sociology And The Field Of Public Health* by Edward Suchman.[2]
2. The problem-oriented, highly specialized work for other highly specialized professionals.	*Afro-Americans In Pittsburgh.* The Residential Segregation of a People by Joe T. Darden.
3. A combination of number 2 above and an interdisciplinary, general grasp of the relationship of any given problem to other problems facing the American community, with special emphasis on technology assessment.	1. Technical Information For Congress;[3] 2. *Technology And Public Policy. The Process of Technology Assessment in the Federal Government* by Vary T. Coates. 2 Vols. and a Summary Report;[4] and 3. *Technology Assessment.* Understanding The Social Consequences of Technological Applications, edited by Raphael G Kasper.[5]
4. Evaluation of social policy, itself, where experimentation cannot be employed.	*Quasi-Experimental Approaches. Testing Theory and Evaluating Policy* by James A. Caporaso and Leslie L. Roos, Jr. (eds.)
5. Activity devoted to seeing the interconnectedness of various social phenomena and of many of our specialized social problems: the systems approach.[6]	*Sociology And Modern System Theory* by Walter Buckley; *Decision And Control* by Stafford Beer; *Systems Analysis: A Diagnostic Approach* by Van Court Hare, Jr.

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1 The level of sophistication—and possibly even influence increases from top to bottom of the table.

2 This volume was prepared for the American Sociological Association in 1963 and was published by The Russell Sage Foundation.

3 This volume is the Report to the Subcommittee On Science, Research And Development of the Committee On Science And Astronautics. U.S. House Of Representatives. Ninety-Second Congress. First Session.

4 These volumes were prepared under NSP Research Grants. They are part of the *Program Of Policy Studies In Science And Technology* of The George Washington University, Washington, D. C. July 1972.

5 This volume, which appeared in 1972, was published in cooperation with the Program of Policy Studies in Science and Technology, George Washington University.

6 The volumes mentioned as examples under column (2) are primarily devoted to *explication* of the systems approach with some examples from the social or the management sciences. There are, of course, many publications that reflect *direct application* of the systems approach to one or more social problems, to policy issues, and to planning objectives.

Certainly in the political novel the reader is made aware of a problem and obtains a very sketchy idea of its outlines. But that is about all. A good, political novel would be one that prompted him to read further on the issue — but, of course, in the area of non-fiction. In addition, a good, political novel should leave the reader with a permanent sense of moral outrage, civic concern and some legitimate humanitarian fears. Or, to put the matter in terms expressed most succinctly, we once again quote Howe.

> "The criteria for evaluating a political novel must finally be the same as those for any other novel: how much of our life does it illuminate ? how ample a moral vision does it suggest ?—but these questions occur to us in a special context, in that atmosphere of political struggle which dominates modern life. For both the writer and the reader, the political novel provides a particularly severe test: politics rakes our passions as nothing else, and whatever we may consent to overlook in reading a novel, we react with an almost demonic rapidity to a detested political opinion. For the writer the great test is, how much truth can be force through the sieve of his opinions ? For the reader the great test is, how much of that truth can he accept though it jostle *his* opinions ?
>
> In the political novel, then, writer and reader enter an uneasy compact: to expose their opinions to a furious action, and as these melt into the movement of the novel, to find some common recognition, some supervening human bond above and beyond ideas. It is not surprising that the political novelist, even as he remains fascinated by politics, urges his claim for a moral order beyond ideology; nor that the receptive reader, even as he perseveres in his own commitment, assents to the novelist's ultimate order." (p. 24)

Although I have chosen to speak of the political novel, similar comments could legitimately be made of the novel that deals with social themes, such as, for example Thomas Mann's *The Magic Mountain* or Alexandar I. Solzhenitsyn's *The First Circle.* I regard the latter as a social novel in spite of the strong, political overtones that flow from its portrayal of the tragic sense of life in a totalitarian context.

The inadequacies of contemporary literature as a somewhat higher level of sophistication lie precisely in the fact that it does not pretend to provide a real understanding of a social problem or a political one. Rather it seeks to dramatize the social forms in which that problem receives expression. *The 480* by Eugene L. Burdick dramatizes some of the ways in which vicious propaganda, brain washing, image-making and the manipulation of the masses take place and brings into focus some of their consequences, both actual and potential, It does not attempt a social analysis of the genesis of these phenomena, the mechanisms, means and methods used to produce them, or the psychological roots of human fallibility and suggestibility. Above all it does not deal with the scientifically researched, educational, social, psychological, intellectual and cultural means by which most forms of social fiction, fantasy and falsehood may be resisted by the individual. The political or the social novel, then, caters to concern rather than to understanding.

In Table 1, I have placed science fiction, the utopian and the anti-utopian novel a notch above the contemporary novel or play because it often provides a measure of social analysis for a variety of problems. Thus, some of the problems of rampant urbanism are treated in Isaac Asimov's *The Caves of Steel.* The deadly effects of social conformity and collective, social pathology are vividly described for us in Robert Sheckley's *The Status Civilization* The dangers of social elitism and class exploitation are described and analyzed in a general way in Michael Young's *The Rise Of The Meritocracy, 1970-2033.*

One of the more ambitious attempts at social education is provided by James Cooke Brown in *The Troika Incident.* Here we see science fiction at its best, insofar as social analysis is concerned, in which almost all the major problems of our time are dealt with as well as a variety of possibly viable solutions to them. Nevertheless, certian attributes that can be provided by objective studies of one kind or another are missing. Among such missing attributes I would include the following: (1) a direct, objective or scientific treatment of our current social issues; (2) a direct posture of immediate, practical concern with our problems as they press upon us now; (3) the provision of the statistical detail to enable us to see particular, social difficulties in structural and outline form, and (4) the treatment of proposed solutions from the viewpoint of conflicting, current interests as well as the legislative difficulties that lie in the path of amelioration. All these are attributes that generally are missing from the imaginatively created contexts of the projected, social pathologies of most science fiction that is concerned with our social education. It would be possible to read a dozen volumes like *The Troika Incident* and yet have no real grasp of any of the major, social problems that plague modern society or that fuel the popular pressure for relief action that congressman must face daily. For the down-to-earth approach to our unresolved social difficulties — executed in the fashion required by a *generalist* approach — we have to turn to educational material in a different genre, such as that shown on level 4 of Table 1, under the category of "popularizing non-fiction."

This *generalist* approach to which I have just referred is realized when the general reader is given a *broad* introduction to several of our social problems but, at the same time, a very brief and untechnical treatment of each. The type of volume that does this for the general reader provides the central details on our current problems but seeks to avoid burying him in them. The presentation is openly *partisan* rather than *scientifically disinterested.* It represents an effort to deal honestly with selfish and/or partisan interests that are responsible for creating or maintaining the problem and it pins the solutions proposed on some combination of moral considerations, some notion of social justice and equity, and the advancement of the public interest. Often a volume in this genre exhibits a muck-raking spirit here and there, revealing facts that have not yet become a matter of public disclosure. Books in this vein are almost invariably interested in explicitly redressing glaring inequities that have been tolerated on a country-wide scale all too long — inequities that bring unhappiness, frustration and difficulties to vast numbers of Americans.

The problems that books of this type deal with are major problems that exist on a national scale. They include among many others the following problems: ending poverty; establishment of better, public health and medical insurance; abolition of unemployment; control of inflation; the reform of voting procedures and the improvement of the political representation of the citizen; the reform of the conduct of political campaign and the laws governing campaign expenditures; the need to assure income maintenance and the establishment of humane and reasonable floors to income: reform in the making of foreign policy and the need to reduce secrecy surrounding its formation; the need to enlist all Americans in the establishment of national priorities; an honest effort to end racism in American life: greater efforts to end war and to enlist all Americans in the decision making surrounding war and peace by making them aware of the contingencies relevant to policy governing our relationships with other countries; a more extended attack on our environmental problems and a better balance between the need for national, economic growth and our need for a clean environment; the need to bring about a reduction in crime; a clearer and more humane control of the American economy and one that can stop the increasing tendencies towards monopoly and the destruction of free enterprise; a greater effort to cushion the potentially undesirable, social impacts of new science and technology; the establishment of a progressive rather than a regressive, national tax structure; a more enlightened and less wasteful policy with respect to our energy and power sources and their utilization; a reform of our educational practices and the establishment of better educational facilities for all; a more intelligent, more humane and collectively healthier approach to the conditions surrounding our rampaging urbanism; a more honest attach on our national problems of food and nutrition; the solution of our growing and oppressive problems of transportation; etc.

The material on level 4 — as I have stressed — is intended for the *general reader*. For this reason, although some detail is provided on the problems and issues that the nation faces, the amount of such detail is limited. To appreciate the controversy surrounding proposed solutions to a given problem and to appreciate its full complexity, a greater wealth of relevant detail is needed. Treatment of this type is provided by more highly selective sources although these still try to provide materials for the *general reader*. Some of these sources are shown in Table 2.

This second level of sophistication can be brought about by familiarity with the content of a standard textbook on social problems. This level of sophistication is category 1 of Table 2. A text on social problems is, of course, supposed to be free of partisanship. Its value lies in the presentation of either the relevant facts or descriptions of competing points of view, or both. Although the textbook on social problems is clearly intended for the student, the general reader can clearly improve his grasp of our social problems by reading this type of material. Readers of such a text, however, will often find themselves provided with a description of several solutions to any given problem. In seeking to make a choice from among these, they will often have to work up their own point of view for doing so. They will also have to decide what differences in weight to attach to the mass of facts that are presented to them. They will generally not be given a set of criteria for determining the relative importance of different facts nor will they be provided with any range of priorities with respect to the relative seriousness of the problems with which the text familiarizes them. Where controversy surrounds the different proposals for solving a problem, they will frequently not be furnished data on the methods by which partisan interests disseminate their point of view or lobby for it in the halls of congress. Nor will they be provided with a critical assessment of the facts in the text, so that they can relate the voluminous data they are supplied to the public interest. For such assessments they have to go to certain newspapers and periodicals[5] or to books and articles on the level of sophistication that I have christened "popularizing non-fiction" in Table 1. Quite obviously, then, the standard text, together with the type of expose material that one can find in *America, Inc.* and a *Populist Manifesto*, would constitute a preferable combination for the understanding of social issues.

The next, most insightful level of sophistication with respect to the understanding of our pressing social problems and national issues is one which—although still intended for the general reader—will not only provide as much detailed information on a given problem as the standard text but sometimes even more information than can be provided by such a text. I have called this level of sophistication, "the broad and synoptic essay," and in Table 2 this type of essay is covered by categories 2 and 3. The factual solidity provided by these two categories will, however, not be the main characteristic of this level of sophistication. Instead, the main features of the broad essay will be those I have just described as the attributes that are missing from the presentations of our national problems, provided by the standard text. Put positively the broad essay will usually provide—in addition to the necessary wealth of detail that is needed by the general reader—the following characteristics : (1) a well worked-out professional viewpoint by means of which the wealth of detail is intellectually organized; (2) a broad recommendation of one or more policies or programs for the solution of each of the problems in question; (3) a conspicuous tendency to look at the way the problem in question is related to other problems of national importance; (4) a tendency to weight in various ways the variety of factual considerations that are part of the problem or germane to it; (5) the advantage of a *point of view* with respect to the writer's concern with obtaining social justice and rectifying the social inequities that are part of the problem or have been created by it; (6) where a nest of problems are simultaneously examined by the author, the reader will often be provided with an implicit but rough spectrum of priorities for both the importance and the solution of these problems; (7) the expose of political partisanship (and the expression of political corruption, if present) underlying the advocacy of one or more solutions out of a large number vying for legislative or public attention; and (8) a dominating concern with the public interest and often the presentation of a public philosophy showing a strong tendency, implicit or explicit, to assess the social costs of unresolved problems and to examine proposed solutions in terms of the "quality of life" they are likely to impose.

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[5] A sample of the types of publication that will relate social detail to the public interest are the following: *The Christian Science Monitor*, *The Nation*, *The New Republic*, *The Progressive* and *The Public Interest*. There are, of course, other publications than those I have just mentioned that can also fill the bill.

The main differences between categories 2 and 3 of Table 2 will be these. In category 2 the broad and synoptic essay is the work of a *non-specialist* who has made himself highly knowledgeable with respect to the problems or problems under consideration. In category 3 the essay will be part of the creative, professional endeavors of a specialist. But the most crucial difference between the two levels of treatment of a social problem by means of the broad essay is substantive. The specialist is likely to provide a more richly informed essay by virtue of his background. This richer background often leads to a wider panorama of concern that can be provided by the non-specialist.

The next. most demanding level of sophistication in the understanding of our complex social problems and social issues is one that will deepen considerably the reader's understanding of them. This is achieved by changing somewhat the emphasis of levels 2 and 3 of Table 2. The type of treatment involved will still seek to provide genuine intellectual understanding of the problem or problems dealt with. But the grasp of the problems will now be achieved through compression of a great deal of detail rather than through the highlighting procedure of the broad essay. This compression in question results from the fact that the data furnished are highly selective. The selectiveness, itself, has for its purpose the clarification for the reader of policy problems and the presentation of the options in policy that are available. Occasionally planning difficulties will also be highlighted although all explicit talk of "planning" may be eschewed and subordinated within the framework of policy analysis. Because of the selectiveness and resultant compression involved, the sheer volume of the data printed will be less than the volume of data that is to be found in the broad essay. The fewer facts given are, however, the most significant facts. Clearly they are aimed at reinforcing the justification of one or more of the policies being examined or the national goals being recommended.

The volumes produced at this level of sophistication will usually be authored by groups of specialists who may have spent a considerable amount of time discussing the *interconnections* of the problems and the policies with which they deal. Some of the volume on this level of sophistication take as their main purpose the establishment of priorities in connection with the magnitude of the expectations to be allocated in dealing with the problems being treated, in terms of the policy choices available to the nation. The choices dealt with are viewed from the standpoint of three criteria : (1) how much emphasis should be put on one national objective as against another; (2) which of various possible means to achieve a given objective should be chosen; and (3) when objectives conflict with each other, as they often do, which of the feasible compromises among them is most desirable. Occasionally, the material of volumes on this level of sophistication will make extensive use of professional background papers written by a variety of experts. The material will still be intended for the general reader as well as a professional one but the level of enlightenment and sophistication of such readers will be assumed to be quite high.

One can obtain a deeper insight into the nature of printed material on this level and the motivational dynamics that have led to their production, by quoting from the Foreword of one of them, authored by Schultze, Fried, Rivlin and Teeters.[6] The following excerpt will what I mean.

> "Although the mandate is couched in narrower language, President is, in effect, required by law to present annually to the Congress his assessment of the nation's problems and his proposals for dealing with them. The federal budget, which is the main vehicle for communicating the details of the President's assessment and recommendations, is thus the chief instrument for focing and recording executive branch decisions about national priorities—about the objectives the federal government should seek, the share of the nation's resources that should be devoted to each, and and about who should bear the costs. The annual review necessitated by the preparation of the budget also gives the President and the Congress an opportunity to weigh the effectiveness of federal programs in achieving their purposes and to consider how they might be improved.
>
> Because the federal budget is, unavoidably, a complex and abstruse financial plan, its significance as a comprehensive priority-setting document has in the past been obscured in a welter of technicalities. To deepen public understanding and stimulate informed discussion, the Brookings Institution in 1970 undertook to prepare an annual analysis that would highlight the priority-setting content of the budget and explain both the President's policy proposals and alternative strategies for dealing with national issues. The present volume is the third in this annual series. A substantial part of the book is concerned with the problems that dominate current discussion of national priorities and whose resolution will shape national policy this year and influence it for years to come." (p. vii)

An even greater insight into what may justifiably be called the *basic problems of American civilization* can be obtained by noting the problems that the authors of these volumes regard as of maximum importance and that press for national solution. Among these we might mention — and these are taken from *Agenda For The Nation*[7] — are the following: (1) budget alternatives after Vietnam, a subject that is explored by Charles L. Schultze; (2) jobs, training, and welfare for the underclass; (3) raising the incomes of the poor; (4) the negro and the urban crisis; (5) moving toward realistic housing goals; (6) crime and law enforcement; (7) investing in better schools; (8) new challenges to the college and university; (9) unemployment, inflation, and economic stability, a theme that is dealt with in this volume by Herbert Stein: and (10) managing the federal government. All these were problems concerned with domestic policy.

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[6] Charles L. Schultze, Edward R. Fried, Alice M. Rivlin and Nancy H. Teeters. *Setting National Priorities. The 1973 Budget.* Washington, D. C. : The Brookings Institution, 1972. 468 pp.

With respect to foreign policy, the following were the problems taken up in *Agenda For The Nation*: (1) the politics of alliance; the United States and Western Europe; (2) relations with the Soviet Union; (3) transpacific relations; (4) the Middle East; (5) the dollar and the world economy; (6) the United States and low income countries; (7) military strategy, military forces, and arms control; and (8) central issues of American foreign policy. This latter topic, incidentally, was authored by Henry A. Kissinger.

A further extension of one's insight into the basic problems of American civilization can be gained from the chapter headings of *Setting National Priorities. The 1973 Budget*. The material in this volume deals in some cases with — detailed *aspects* of some of our basic problems — aspects that would be regarded as ancillary to certain major problems whose dimensions should be moral rather than budgetary. An example of what I mean is the problem of *war and peace*. Thus the problems of Part 1 of this volume, because of its budgetary emphasis, really deal with detailed portions of defense planning. Nevertheless, until mankind can eliminate war, the realism of a man like Senator Jackson is appropriate here. Recognizing that the posture of the USSR does not permit us at this time to frame a "peace budget" and to formulate the various options that would fall under such a budget, we are left with the only other alternative — a "defense" or "military preparation" budget — and the tasks of dealing with several problems that are subordinate to defense.

In this sense, Part 1 of this volume deals with problems that some social thinkers might not choose to regard as "social problems" but rather as problems in the implementation of a defense budget. But inasmuch as preparation for defense is the reality with which we are faced, a depth-understanding of the various aspects of defense, together with the concomitant budgetary difficulties, becomes, than, the kind of information needed at this time to understand the problem of war and peace as a *basic problem of American civilization*.

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[7] Kermit Gordon (ed.). *Agenda For The Nation*. New York: Doubleday, 1969. 620 pp.

There is no implication in this point of view, that the economical, psychological, sociological and political factors are *not* more germane to understanding the problem of war and peace. Such factors are unquestionably more basic. But the contemporary form of this problem that is thrust upon us is, unfortunately, the question of how to make ourselves militarily ready should the hostile posture of the USSR result in that country initiating war. For reasons such as these, the aspects of Part I of are proper themes for understanding some of our basic problems.

Part One, then, devoted to foreign policy and nation security, contains chapters on the following: (1) overview; (2) what shapes the defense budget; (3) changes and trends in the defense budget; (4) special defense issues, and (5) major national security options. Part Two, devoted to domestic problems and programs, contains chapters on the following: (1) income support; (2) health insurance; (3) child care; (4) fiscal problems of cities; (5) financing elementary and secondary education, and (6) the environment. Part Three, devoted to a long-run view of priorities, contains chapters on the following: (1) what happened to the fiscal dividend; (2) revenue and expenditure projections: 1973 77; (3) alternative sources of federal revenue; and (4) a new approach to priorities.

The important point to remember, in connection with level 4 of Table 2 is that the essential structure of our problems, the essential picture of their most viable solutions and the essential nature of the policy alternatives involved, are brought to the attention of the reader in a somewhat finished form of intellectual organisation. The work of accumulating essential information and the arduous tasks of intellectual organization and depth analysis have already been done for the reader. One important result of this is that any further effort on his part to achieve increased intellectual sophistication on the social issues involved will carry him into *professional* work on these problems — work intended for other specialists — rather than into work and thought intended for the *intelligent layman* as well as for professionals.

Work by professionals for other professionals will certainly result in increased sophistication with respect to some of the basic, social problems of American civilization. Such work, however, need be no part of that type of intellectual equipment for the intelligent citizen that would be quite appropriate for voting behavior, understanding of new legislation, grasp of controversial issues to the point where major differences could be clearly explained to adult audiences, citizen representation on commissions appointed to study various national issues and concerns, citizen advisory bodies to the President of the US, to governors, mayors, professional organizations, etc. Knowledgeability through level 4 of Table 2 will be more than adequate for intelligent, lay purposes. But because it is still true that effort beyond the call of civic duty will deepen still further one's understanding of our basic problems, it will be of some value to classify and differentiate levels of sophistication even within the framework of specialized, professional effort. Some of the relevant types of such *professional differentiation, itself*, are therefore shown in Table 3.

In Table 3 levels 1 and 2 are, I believe, self-explanatory. Problems on these levels will be attacked, of course, in terms of professional standards. In such cases it is understood that the outcomes of research and study are intended for other professional readers and are to be evaluated by them in terms of ongoing and conventional, professional standards. The basic difference between levels 1 and 2 of the table is that the problems on level 1 are broad, national concern while the problems on level 2 are limited in scope and application and familiarity with them will be confined to a subgroup of professional readers.

Categories 3, 4 and 5 of Table 2 provide the highest flights of technical involvement with some of the social issues and problems that are among the basic imbalances of American civilization. These categories exist at levels of difficulty that are frequently beyond the training and expertise of most professionals in the social and behavioral sciences. One major emphasis in these categories is that of methodology—even where the work done is primarily substantive in nature—it is this emphasis which creates high-level difficulties in the treatment of the social problems involved. The differentiation in difficulty that I have suggested exists among the last three levels of Table 3 is somewhat arbitrary. A definitive differentiation among the three categories listed, with respect to how intellectually demanding they really are, would require the services of one or more experts in these areas. The expert skills and knowledge to mark such definitive judgments are beyond my competence My own impressions derive solely from a cursory examination of some of the materials in these areas. But the real points at issue here are these : (1) a very profound and a more complete grasp of the basic problems of American civilization seem, to accompany the exercise of these approaches when analyzing the social issues facing the American community today, (2) these methodological approaches are, by and large, the tools of high powered specialists and should therefore not be expected in the armamentarium of the intelligent and socially concerned layman and (3) a sophistication associated with some or all of the levels of Table 2 is more than adequate for civic, social and political understanding of most of the social problems now pressing upon the American community.

Our survey, then, of sources for the understanding of those basic, social problems that are now of national urgency—a survey reflected by the content of Tables 1, 2 and 3—is, I think, fairly accurate. But inasmuch as the great bulk of Americans continue to rely on the mass media for their education along these lines, let us turn to a discussion of some of the ways in which mass media programing and content can be improved with respect to the exercise of their educational functions, when dealing with our current, complex, social issues.

to be continued

IV

Exploring Sociobiology

Michele D. Martin-Charlton

The Beginnings : Evolution

To begin to understand sociobiology, we must first look at the basics of evolution and adaptation. Once this process is understood the next step is to look at the various ways that the science of biology and that of sociology have historically used evolution to explain and predict behavior. Finally, an attempt to interrelate these two fields through the use of evolution and adaptation will be explored.

Most theories of evolutions seem to stem from Darwin's work describing the mechanism by which evolution operates. Far from being merely "the survival of the fittest" which comes to mind for most people, this theory explains natural selection; the mechanism and the key to the evolutionary process (Barash, 1977). Fitness does not refer solely to the strongest, most aggressive species. The 'fittest" is not necessarily the one who wins all the battles, nor do there have to be any battles. Rather fitness refers to the frequency with which a gene from one generation is passed to the next generation.

To regress a bit, Darwin's work on evolution centers on reproduction. All animals reproduce offspring, usually resulting in more during their lifetime than the two offspring needed to replace the two parents. Logically the population of any given species should then continue to increase until chaos results. Instead we find that there appears to be a regulatory device at work which limits the offspring that survive, the reproduction rate of the adults; in short that limits the population in some way. In explaining this regulatory mechanism, Darwin's explanation can be summarized as follows :

(1) Variation is a characteristic of every group of plants and animals. The natural selection of inherited variations, caused by

mutations, has an effect on the character of successive generations of a population.

(2) More of each kind of organism is produced than can survive due to the lack of space, food, etc. Yet the population of each organism remains fairly constant. Therefore it must be assumed that most of the offspring die in each generation.

(3) Since a larger number of individuals are produced than can survive there is competition for food, space; for survival. This might be an actual active conflict or a slow struggle against an unfavorable environment,

(4) Those variations better equipped to survive in a given environment will be favored over those less well adapted. This is the "survival of the fittest"-

(5) The surviving individuals will give rise to the next generation and in this way "successful" variations are transmitted to the next generation and to the succeeding ones.

This "evolution" occurs over many generations; many individuals are born and die but the population as a whole continues. The variations are passed on to the population through the gene pool or deme; each individual is genetically unique. However, by counting the specific characteristics, we can have an idea of the representation of that characteristic for the whole. This characteristic represented in the total population, may increase or decrease over generations depending on mutations, introduction of genes from some outside population. or by natural selection. Evolution by natural selection implies that individuals with certain traits have more surviving offspring in the next generation, therefore they have contributed more genes to the gene pool than others with different traits; the representation of that specific trait is thus greater (Darwin, 1859, 1950).

Alternatives To Darwin

This basically is Darwin's theory of evolution. In the field of biology, however logical this theory may seem, various people have found problems with it and have proposed their own variations.

One of the major problems with "survival of the fittest" is the idea of "altruism"; a term used to describe any giving behavior that helps another individual and involves sacrifice or risk for the donor. If each individual is supposed to be striving for its own traits, i. e. its own offspring, such actions seem out of character.

The first major solution to the question of altruism was proposed by Wynne-Edwards (1963). He stated that "group selection" is at work in altruistic behaviors. By this he meant that the individuals in groups would voluntarily refrain from having many offspring for the good of the group. He cited examples of courting ritua nd the fact that often the subordinate members of a domin-ance rarchy do not reproduce, stating that these are some of the volu ry, "altruistic" measures used by the individuals for the be-nefi the group. This theory is rejected however, by the majority of the sociologists because it does not logically follow Darwin's principles. This solution would suppress the number of individuals passing on altruistic behaviors and traits, while favoring the individuals who were selfish. Those with restraint (altruistic) behaviors would have fewer offspring while those with no restraint would have more. Thus the population would probably increase over time rather than decrease or remain stable and the representation of the altruistic trait would decrease.

In 1964, Hamilton introduced the theory of Kin Selection to explain altruistic behavior. This theory, also called Inclusive Fitness Theory of Selection, takes into account the ways in which individuals further thier own selfish genetic interest via the reproduction of their genetic kin. Very complex ratios and calculations can be used to illustrate whether a relationship is beneficial to the individual. However for the sake of brevity, these can all be simplified into the following :

INCLUSIVE FITNESS OF AN ORGANISM = Number of Offspring produced by the Organism = Number of Offspring Equivalents* produced by Genetic Kin due to the Behavior of the Organism

*Where Offspring Equivalents = Sum, for all Genetic Kin ((Effect of Organism's Behavior on the Number of Offspring Produced by a Particular Genetic Relative) | Proportion of Organism's Genes carried by that Particular Genetic Relative ||)

Note: The number of times a particular genetic relative reproduces successfully or doesn't reproduce as the result of the behavior of the organism must be devalued by multiplying it times the proportion of the organism's genes that are identical by descent with those of that particular genetic relative. (Bajema, 1978)

Other theories have been proposed since Hamilton but they are essentially the same as the Inclusive Fitness Theory or are modifications of it. These modifications can be used, along with Darwin's original theory of natural selection to explain evolution including factors like reciprocity (Trivers, 1971) see Model A), the units of selection (Lewontin, 1970) and parental care. influence of relatives and game theory (Maynard-Smith 1964, 1978).

Instinct vs. Learning

One other debate that has occurred along this line involves the "instinct vs. learning", "nature vs. nurture" problem. As Barash has noted, this debate has been one of the least productive ones in the development of sociobiology. Instead of an "either-or" question scientists are beginning to realize that both the environment and genetically determined factors are essential in explaining behavior. You cannot examine the environment without including the organism, nor can you study behavior while completely discounting environmental influences; Thus the "new" approach can be summed up in the following model :



(Barash, 1977)

Once the evolutionary theories are understood, we can turn to the development of sociobiology from this background. According to the model just presented "behaviors are subject to evolution by natural selection just as any other phenotype might be" (Barash, 1977, pg. 48). The object of sociobiology as the study of these behaviors, would then be to look at behaviors with historical perspective, an evaluative approach and/or a predictive approach (Barash, 1977). In this manner we begin to use sociobiology much as we would any other science.

The Historical Approach

The historical approach deals with the identification of behaviors and a reconstruction of the evolutionary history of the behavior in question. The evaluative approach attempts to evaluate the adaptive significance of observed behavior patterns. The predictive approach seems to rely on the principle that when any behavior under study reflects some component of genotype, the individual should behave so as to maximize their inclusive fitness (Barash, 1977). Thus there is a model to follow starting with evolutionary biology and continuing to and through animal and human behaviors.

In the field of biology there are numerous studies beginning with the premise of evolution by natural selection, adding sociological paradigms like socialization, to result in sociobiological research. For example in his article on "Socialization, Social Structure, and Ecology of Two Sympatric Species of Lemur". Sussman (1977) discusses the implications the body proportions of two different species may have on the socialization of the infants. In one species the baby's body axis is parallel to the mother's; in the other species the infant's body axis is perpendicular to the mother's. The babies in the former species seem to develop faster than those in the latter;

due partly to the habitat of the lemurs and partly due to the biological proximity of the infant's head to that of the mother (the carrying position having evolved over time).

A few of the other studies using biological characteristics as influential agents of socialization are: Washburn and Hamburg's studies (1965). which state that group life is the sociological response to the primate biological adaptation of prolonged activity; Parker's (1977) work on Macaques shows that the development of social behavior is inextricably tied to central nervous system maturation involving the ontogengy of sensory and motor patterns; and Poirier and Smith (1974), who feel that gender plays an important role in primate socialization, stating that there is a direct relation between the socialization and learning processes of infant males and females and their subsequent adult roles. These studies are only concerned with socialization and primates; other studies concerning a variety of sociological concepts and as wide a variety of animals are vast enough to fill volume after volume. The basic underpinnings of sociobiology are then widely used in biology (although they may not always be labeled as such).

Sociology and Biology

Sociology, especially modern sociology, on the other hand seems more reluctant to admit the use of sociobiological concepts. Herbert Spencer seems to be one of the few classic theorists that consciously and consistently uses evolution and animal/human comparisons in developing a theory of sociology. He begins by discussing the fact that to "know" or understand something you must do more than describe its concrete form. "An entire history of anything must include its appearance out of the imperceptible and its disappearance into the imperceptible" (Spencer, 1958, pg 281). Things have no meaning if you do not know where they are coming from or where they are probably going.

In looking at the background of organic matter, Spencer finds that evolution seems to consist of the effect change of one thing has on another; an "integration of matter and dissipation of Motion". As the environment changes, the organisms must change to accomodate their new surroundings. The change, in turn affects other organisms, resulting in a chain reaction. The primary, or starting step in this process is the "Persistence of Force"; that which underlies the principle of activity. Without going into a detailed discussion of motion, gravity and philosophy, this theory of force can be summarized as; that which makes the universe move, the foundation of all action and life; something that is there but truly cannot be measured. Spencer seems to leave much of the definition of Force in the realm of metaphysics (Spencer 1958, pg 129, 196 200, 276).

To continue, this changing results in a move from a less coherent form (one less capable of adapting) to a more coherent form (Spencer, 1958, pg 307). This can also be described as an advance from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous; from an organism that is not specialized enough to cope with its environment to one that is. Spencer cites various examples in the realm of biology, such as the homogeneous beginnings all animal life seems to have had in the waters of prehistoric earth and the embryonic similarities found in many birds and animals. He then goes on to discuss the development of men. "It is true that, during the period in which the Earth has been peopled, the human organism has grown more heterogeneous among the civilized divisions of the species..." (Spencer, 1958, pg 340). Various "underdeveloped" races show more resemblance to primates while more "civilized" peoples have developed such things as longer limbs, greater cranial capacity. (pg 341)

After reading Darwin's *The Origin of the Species*, Spencer changed some of his terms so that his vocabulary would concur with Darwin's. He spoke more of natural selection and less of the geological and metaphysical forces at work in evolution. He seemed to feel that the use of natural selection as the basis evolutionary change was more valid than the "direct effect of function of structure theory" proposed by Lamarck. The theory states that an organism changes consequent to the effects of use or disuse by the environment. Examining the problems that arise with this theory, Spencer stated :

> "Plants which are rendered uneatable by the thick woolly coatings of their leaves, cannot have had these coatings produced by any process of reaction against the action of enemies; for there is no imaginable reason why, if one part of a plant is eaten, the rest should thereafter begin to develop the hairs on its surface." (1907, Vol. 1, pg 391).

In contrast, he believed that Darwin's theory ended the deadlock concerning evolution; it explained adaptation through natural selection. While discussing and interpreting Darwin's theory, Spencer also re-examined his earlier works on evolution. For example, in the Principles of Biology, the described the decrease of the size of the jaws in the civilized races of mankind. He compared this work with the natural selection process evident in the decrease of the size of dog's jaws as they became domesticated. However, he seemed to feel that there may be more than one kind of selection process, labeling the second "the selection by inheritance due to negative factors" (the jaws diminished in size because of diminished use. not because a smaller size allowed the being to function better). (1907, Vol. 1, pg 400)

In this manner, Spencer continued to basically agree with Darwin, while also modifying his theory slightly for his own use, much as the biologists already mentioned had done. He also noted the problems attached to the study of natural selection and evolution. To ascertain whether a "fortuitous variation" is inheritable, one needs merely to select individuals and observe their offspring. While to ascertain whether there is inheritance of a "functionally-produced modification", "...it is difficult in many cases to find such arrangements, troublesome to maintain them even for one generation, and still more through successive generations". (1907, Vol. 1, pg 414). His constant referrals to natural selection, however, seem to imply that he still felt that the basic theory was worthwhile in the study of humans and societies. His comments on vaccinations has many allusions to evolutionary changes. He stated that the illnesses, the diseases have remained the same, it is the ability to withstand them that has changed over time (Spencer, 1902).

In his discussion of Personal Beauty, he again discussed changes in the facial bones and muscles, this time explaining that our concepts of beauty have evolved along with the physical functional attributes. Projecting jaws, cheek bones that jut out, etc. while necessary to the mastication of primitive humans, are characteristics attributed to "lower races of men" and also thought of as "detractions to beauty". (Spencer, 1907, Vol. II, pg. 390 391).

These are but a few of his many references to the evolutionary concept prevalent in mankind and society. In addition to his use of the basic concept of evolution and natural selection (altered now and then to better fit his needs) Spencer also carried evolution one step farther. He enlarged the concept of evolution by coining the phrase "Super-Organic Evolution". This variation of natural selection sounds much like the Kin Selection theory of the biologists. Spencer stated that organic evolution is the actions and reactions going on between organisms that are related; for example the rearing of offspring. Going beyond the combined efforts of the parents, we come to Super-Organic Evolution. This includes all those processes and products which imply the co-ordinated actions of many individuals (Spencer, 1901, Vol., I, pg. 6). True forms of this type of evolution are found only in the higher vertebrate, and it is this form of evolution which "human societies exhibit in their growths, structures, functions, products". (pg 7)

Cultural Determinism

So it appears that sociology was progressing along much the same lines of thought as biology would decades later, but evolutionary theory became out-moded as cultural determinism came into vogue. Although sociology was seen to have roots in biology and natural sciences (Comte, 1975) the idea that sociology was a study of something that involved more than the other sciences (the hierarchy of sciences) enabled sociologists to separate sociology from the realm of purely physiological facts. Social facts were caused by something more than nonsocial explanations. As Durkheim (1938) explained social facts are "...facts with very distinctive characteristics: (they) consist of ways of acting, thinking, and feeling, external to the individual, and endowed with a power of coercion, by reason of which they control him". (pg 3) He goes on to state that thses facts should not be confused with biological phenomena; they are actions and representations not biological functions.

From this apparently innocent deviation, sociology turned from an area open to comparisons to one that was totally inclusive. "Homo Sapiens, we were told, was a uniquely culture bearing animal whose behavior was almost entirely learned and socially transmitted..." (Van Den Berghe, 1978, pg 25) According to Van Den Berghe this feeling of cultural determinism became firmly entrenched in sociological thought when social scientists tried to atone for "racist" theories that were popular early in the twentieth centruy. These theories reported that "different 'races' of man represented different stages of evolution", holding whites to be the most nearly perfect form and blacks the least developed, for example this theme runs through some of the works of Comte and Saint Simone. When these theories were shown to be "rationalizations for slavery and colonial exploitation" embarrassed sociologists flew to the other extreme by denouncing evolutionary influences and by dwelling on cultural determinants (1978, pg. 25). In the nature vs. nurture argument, at this point in the growth of sociology, surely nurture was winning.

The Rise of Sociobiology

But all the problems in societies were not being solved (not that they ever can be) and work was being done in the biological fields that seemed to show parallels between animal behavior and that of humans. (For a lengthy listing of such problems—the frustrations of some sociologists and the work being done by biologists and behaviorists. see Ellis, 1977, Barash, 1977, Wilson, 1975, Chevalier-Skolnikoff and Poirier, 1977, to mention a few of the many authors detailing the rise of sociobiology.) (See also the articles mentioned in the biology section of this paper.) Books were appearing that raised new, or rather old ideas that had been shelved. Questions were presented in the works of Robert Ardrey (1966, 1970), Konrad Lorenz (1952, 1966), M. Montague (1968), Desmond Morris (1967, 1969). These authors were handling such revolutionary topics as : the idea of dominance and ranking must be present not only in animals but in any higher vertebrate that establishes a social order (Lorenz, 1966); humans as well as animals have an instinct to "protect" their territory, be it actual land ownership or merely personal space (Ardrey, 1966); and mankind is composed of beings that have evolved or are evolving from the primates and as such are subject to many of the same influences (Morris, 1967, 1969).

The nature v.s nurture, biology vs. sociology feud simmered for years. Scientists continued to be split in their approach to research; some in each field basing all findings on evolutionary or "natural" causes, others seeing environment as the only influence. For example, the study of sex roles has long been split down the nature vs. nurture lines. Are women less aggressive because something in their genetic makeup influences them (many studies point at the overall greater movement of newborn males as proof of this), or do they learn that this is what is expected of them (as the learned helplessness theory presented by Bernard, 1976 and others suggests)?

The pseudo-clash could have gone on for decades more in 1975 Edward O. Wilson published a textbook entitled *Sociology: The New Synthesis.* Wilson attempted to incorporate as much of the literature on social behavior of animals as possible. In effect, he formally created a new field of "sociobiology". Being a biologist, his emphsis was on the determining factor of genetically transmitted agents. However, he also included a chapter on the social behavior of humans. It was this chapter that brought the debate to a head. The "invention" of this new area was in effect the culmination of years of unrest in both parent fields. Now people began to rally behind the new banner of sociobiology, or biosociology if they were sociologists. Writers began to admit that it is ludicrous to try to separate environmental and genetic influences. (Again the "new" writings in sociology concerning the advantages of sociobiology seem to be merely rephrasing those of biology.) For example, in his book *Sociobiology and Behavior*, Barash (1977) discusses the predictive and evaluative values of sociobiology (pg. 277).

Of course not all saw sociobiology as the solution to understanding humans and animals. Some biologist believe that sociobiology is an exciting, needed new field, however, they are concerned with only the evolutionary theories of biology. In three years or so, they feel that "sociology, psychology and those other fields" can be incorporated into sociobiology. John Kunkel, in his reply to Lee Ellis' article on the "Decline and Fall of Sociology" in *The American Sociologist*, (1977) feels that sociobiology is not for sociologists for it "centers on biology", rather the field of biosociology may be in the future of sociology. He recalls research done by biologists and sociologists, stating that they were in effect studying different things, for example. he challenges the very idea of altruism. Wynne-Edwards (1962) and Wilson (1975) speak of altruistic genes and hereditary behaviors but Kundel believes that "...altruism is to be found mainly in the eyes of the beholder rather than in the genes..." (1977, pg. 70).

He goes on to write that "...biochemical and genetic factors set the stage, (for behaviors)...but that culture and history provide the script for social life." (pg. 71) Biosociology then, if it is to develop, will have "an appropriate emphasis on sociology rather than on the relatively constant biological basis of individuals' physical existence." (pg. 71).

The debate goes on and on, and sources from each side could be cited endlessly. Instead, I would like to conclude this paper on an optimistic note, by speculating on the positive future uses of sociobiology. Professional evaluations can be found in many books and articles already mentioned. The following then will be my own interpretation.

Incorporating biological evolution into sociological theories opens exciting avenues for future research. Explaining behavior (human and animal) using only one field always leaves many unexplained factors. Combining them may help us find answers. If a link between various animals (especially types of primates) and humans can be established, imagine the possibilities. Primates who mature sooner and have shorter life spans than humans, can be put into different environments to determine what influences a specific behavior. Perhaps this information could then be used to alter human's environments. For example, biologists have known for years that overcrowding causes rats and other animals to fight, destroy their young, have more spontaneous abortions, etc. until the population declines. Is it possible that the same types of things are happening to humans in large cities ?

Other examples are the "astounding" facts that sex-role researchers are reporting. When females and males talk, for instance, the female often turns her head to the side instead of looking straight into the man's face. Biologists long ago observed that animals, like wolves and baboons, in a hierarchy respond in similar ways. The subordinate animal display the most vulnerable part of their body, their belly or their throat. to th dominant animal as a peace promoting tactic This display shows that the subordinants know their place; they know that the dominant animal could kill them and by surrendering before the fight, they prevent the fight altogether. Is this what women are doing ? Are they showing signs of deference to keep the masters from feeling challenged ?

Again, in sex roles, have men and women "evolved" into their respective roles as a way of coping with their environment. Is that why various cultures look at male and female roles differently ? Will the current "women's movement" result in genetic changes in females ? Will women of the future become larger, stronger, etc. to cope with their new found freedom ?

The possibilities in this field are endless. To turn things around, sociological concepts can be applied to animals to help us better understand them and perhaps keep us from exterminating them all, through our carelessness We are finding out that many animals, like whales, have very complex social interactions and interfering with these interactions can harm more than the one animal that is killed.

There are so many questions and so much to learn. And the answers would seem to be much more valid when we can understand as many aspects as possible.

SELECTION FOR RECIPROCITY WITH RESPECT TO HELPING BEHAVIOR

Predicting Whether Selection Favors Selfish or Helping ("Altruistic") Behavior When the Actor and the Recipient of the Act Are Not Genetically Related

Reproductive Benefit To Actor Of Reciprocity By Recipient Of "Altruistic" Act	Reproductive Cost To Actor For Performing "Altruistic" Act	Reproductive Benefit To Actor Of Reciprocity By Recipient Of "Altruistic" Act

Helping ("Altruistic") behavior is selected for whenever ecological interactions meet these genetic conditions

$$\underline{B_A <} \, \overline{\underline{C_A}} \, \overline{< B_A}$$

Selfish behavior is selected for whenever ecological interactions meet these genetic conditions

Note : Many of the acts that are described as "altruistic" appear to be so only as long as they are studied in isolation from acts of reciprocity. Reciprocal altruism is, by definition, a misnomer.

Based on Trivers, R. L 1971. The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism. *The Quarterly Review of Biology* 46 : 35-57.

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V

Disembodied Existence—
What it means ?

P. K. Mohapatra

A familiar tradition in Philosophy of Mind treats persons as essentially nonphysical in nature and defines personal identity solely in terms of psychological continuity. According to this tradition, memory and character continuity is not only the primary criterion but also the sole criterion of personal identity. The importance of memory, in preference to bodily continuity, is almost taken for granted. Even while trying to offer a proof—the like of which is the favourite of the memory theorists—for the primacy of the psychological criterion, the authors of this tradition do not appear to be open-minded at all. Thus Locke, for example; "Should the soul of a prince, carrying with it the consciousness of his past, enter and inform the body of a cobbler......everyone will know him to be the same person as the prince".[1] Such cases of alleged change-of-body, instead of being tendentiously described as such, could as well be described as cases of memory-and-character exchange, or at least as cases where we would not know what to say. In this tradition, characterized by a rather dogmatic adherence to the psychological criterion of personal identity, the belief in disembodied existence and reincarnation etc. (I shall refer to this as, simply, 'survival' and describe the proponents of this belief as the 'survivalists') follows equally dogmatically.

I shall show that such beliefs are ill-founded and can be said to be unintelligible, since their supposed basis, namely memory, can at best be a criterion of personal identity only in a secondary sense—

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[1] John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. Book II ch 27 sec 16. See also A. M. Quinton, "The Soul" in *Journal of Philosophy*, 1962.

depending as it is on the bodily continuity criterion. To this purpose, let us consider the status of memory as a criterion of personal identity.

If there is said to be a logical connection between memory and personal identity, it is because it lies in the meaning of "remember" that if one remembers having done X then it follows that one is the person who did X. But memory in this sense (call it the strong sense) *implies* personal identity and cannot, therefore, be a criterion of personal identity.[2] However, people do not always remember in the strong sense; there are often cases of misremembering or delusive memory. Thus, when someone says he remembers doing such and such he makes a memory *claim* which may or may not be memory in the strong sense, and which thus does not *imply* personal identity (let us call it memory in the weak sense). And if memory is taken to a criterion of personal identity at all. it is because we take memory claims to be (probable) cases or real remembering which, in turn, suggests personal identity. But, let us ask, how do we know cases of real remembering as distinct from delusive memories etc ? How, indeed, do we learn and are taught the meaning of "memory" (in the strong sense) so as to be able to tell genuine memories from wrong ones ? Certainly, by being told (or shown cases) that the person himself *did* what he now says he remembers[3], i.e. the person making the memory claim now is the same person as the earlier person who did what is being remembered; and, if we are not to beg the question. the last can be explained by telling (or it being shown) that the rememberer and the doer of the action are physically continuous. But for this, we would not only fail to tell delusive memories from real ones, we could not be having (or introduced to) the concept of memory in the first place. If this is so, it follows that identity in terms of bodily continuity is the primary concept of personal identity and that any other idea of personal identity (e.g., in terms of memory and/or other psychological continuities) can *make sense* only by depending on this primary sense, but not conversely. Thus, if the 'survival' theories make sense at all, and some to be plausible cases of personal identity despite the absence of bodily continuity, it is because (and that's a conceptual 'because') there is this primary sense of personal identity. This conceptual dependence can be explained by the fact that if there were not persons who were bodily continuous with other noncontemporaneous persons, we would not be able to apply the concept of 'same person' in the first place and the survival thesis, which makes use of the notion of 'some person' only in a secondary sense derived from the primary sense in the bodily context, would not be an intelligible thesis at all. This is due to the fact there will be what I call the secondary use of 'same person' only if there is the primary use there of, and not conversely. "My doll is in pain" makes sense only if "the girl is in pain" is meaningful;[4] had there been no meaningful employment of the concept of pain in the human context, no possible sense could be attached to its use in the context of inanimate objects. The secondary use of a concept is, thus, an extended use, derived from and dependent on its primary use. Disembodied survival and reincarnation etc will be cases of personal identity only in this sense and memory in all such cases of survival will only be the criterion of identity in an equally secondary sense. It is this inevitable conceptual fact which constrained Strawson to admit that the disembodied persons (whom he more often preferred to qualify as *former* persons) can enjoy only a "logically secondary existence".[5] His not saying this, though, would have been upto his liking since his concept of a person requires the applicability to it of both the M— and P—predicates and a disembodied person could not have M-predicates applied to itself — not at least most of them which are essentially body-specific.

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[2] See Bishop Butler, "Of Personal Identity" in his *The Analogy of Religion* (George Bell & Sons. London, 1902).

[3] It should be noted that memory, as related to personal identity, is that form of memory which is known as personal memory as distinct from other forms thereof. For more on this, see Norman Malcolm, "Three Lectures on Memory" in his *Knowledge and Certainty* (Prentice Hall, Inc. Englewood Cliffs, N. J , 1963) and also Don Locke, *Memory* (Macmillan, London 1971).

Further, my analysis of the status of memory, as a (usable) criterion of personal identity, coupled with my theory of secondary use of concepts, implies a much stronger consequence. For if this analysis holds, then memory is seen not only as a criterion in the secondary sense in the described context, but also as secondary criterion *simpliciter*, dependent as it is, for its meaning as well as applicability as a criterion of identity, on the bodily continuity criterion. If this is so, then memory cannot be even the primary criterion in *any* case, and its appearing as such in the case of the alleged disembodied survival is not only deceptive but also illogical.

The described dependence of memory on the bodily criterion does not demand that every time a memory claim is made it has to be checked against the background of bodily continuity. Quite to the contrary, there are very good reasons to believe that people's sincere and confident memory claims are generally true and are hence can be relied upon. Indeed, this can be taken even to be a necessary truth Shoemaker, who made this claim explicitly, reasoned that this is one of those "general facts of nature" which must be assumed in order for our concepts to have significance.[6] In particular, if it were not a general fact of nature that sincere and confident memory claims are generally true, no one could possibly make and none could be understood to make memory statements at all. Now, given this "general fact", a sincere memory claim of any particular person is not to be doubted except where there was reasonable ground for such doubt and consequent check. But certainly this is no reason for saying that the sincere and confident memory claims of his supposed past life by an alleged disembodied person or an embodied survivor is not to be doubted and not to be checked. For firstly, we must remember that the truth to the sincere and confident memory claims is a "general" fact of nature and, secondly, that this general fact is compatible with there being *reasonable* grounds for doubting any *particular* memory claim. And it will hardly be denied that the case of the survivor recounting events and actions of "his" past life is not a general fact of nature. How, then, can a general fact explain or account for a phenomenon that is not so general after all? Further, I believe that the "general facts of nature", which Wittgenstein[7] refers to and which Shoemaker subsequently appeals to, are closely connected with what may be called a 'semantic feature' of language. This can be explained by saying that, for example, in order that certain statements be made and understood *as* memory-statements, certain semantic conditions must be satisfied, viz, that the words "I remember......" must be uttered by persons and that the utterance of these words must be correlated with certain happenings in *their* pasts and so on. And what is perhaps equally important is the fact that these correlations must be *known* to hold in most cases, for otherwise not only the use of memory-language could not be taught and learned, but the general reliability of memory claims can never be guaranted. Now, in case of the alleged survivors what are the 'semantic conditions' that might give content to their "remembering" their earlier lives ? In the absence *ex hypothesis* of bodily continuity none of the "remembered" actions of a previous life done by any previous person in that life (if such could be known) could be reasonably said to be happenings in *their* pasts — much less, known to be so. It follows, therefore, that not only are the alleged cases of survival *not* general facts of nature, they also supply *a reasonable* ground for doubting the memory claims in those cases and call for the need to check at least some of these claims.. Besides, this reasonable ground becomes a *strong* ground in view of the fact that such cases are not only few but also certainly abnormal.

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[4] Cf Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (Basil Blackwell, 19 Part I sec 282.

[5] P Strawson, *Individuals*, ch 3 p 115.

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[6] S. Shoemaker, *Self-Knowledge and Self Identity* (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1963), pp 239-41. Also cf. Wittgenstein, *Ibid*, Part II p 56 (last line).

[7] See Wittgenstein, *Ibid*, Part II p 56.

As Wittgenstein had said, "It is only in normal cases that the use of a word is clearly prescribed; we know, we are in doubt, what to say in this or that case. The more abnormal the case the more doubtful it becomes what we are to say."[8] It follows, therefore, that in the case in question checking of memory claims is necessary and that the normal rule of general reliability will not apply to the memory claims of the alleged disembodied persons or even the bodied survivors. But since, in the absence of bodily continuity, there is no *possibility* of such checks, there would, in such cases, be no ground for saying that a person is really remembering things and events in his past rather than showing an excellent feat of retrocognitive clairvoyance Penelhum has argued that it would be a matter of option as to what to say in these cases and that the identification simply on the basis of these memory-like claims *does not have to be made*,[9] to which I add that it will be unreasonable to make such identification. Incidentally, what a supposed survivor claimed to remember may be found to be true; but what is required is not simply this but (since this is a case of personal memory) that it is *he* who had done what he now "remembers" to have done. In the unavailability of bodily continuity (and so of independent check), all necessity for saying this is lost and no justification for saying this is forthcoming.

It might still be maintained that saying without justification is not saying without sense. But my secondary-sense-argument has shown that the appearance of sense our talk of disembodied existence has is due to the fact that such talks are *like* our talk of same person etc in the normal, bodily context. This is what makes the idea of disembodied existence intelligible only in a secondary sense. And the Cartesian idea of pure non-embodied existence — the idea that persons are essentially nonphysical or bodiless — is devoid of any intelligibility whatsoever. For to attach any sense to this idea is to elevate a concept which has an inevitably secondary sense to the status of primacy. Besides. for reasons adduced earlier, such a concept can never be learned and so can never be taught: hence it would be totally unintelligible.

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[8] *Ibid*, Part I sec 142.

[9] Terence Penelhum, *Survival and Disembodied Existence* (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London), chs 9 and 10 and esp p 97.

VI

The Gita as Vinoba Sees it

Vishwanath Tandon

The Gita has been a great source of inspiration to a large number of saints and philosophers of India. Shankaracharya, Jnaneshwar and Gandhi the three who influenced Vinoba most, acknowledged their debts to the Gita by writing commentaries on it, and Vinoba describes his close relationship with it in these words: "The bond between the Gita and me transcends reason. My heart and mind have received more nourishment from the Gita than my body has from my mother's milk. ... I live and move in the atmosphere of the Gita."[1] He finds in it almost every idea needed for the flowering of a full life.[2]

Vinoba's study of the Gita is very deep. It was an awareness of this fact combined with the knowledge that he had translated the Gita in parallel Marathi verses 'with the haunting music of the original', that had impelled Jamnalal Bajaj to request him to deliver talks on the Gita while they were prisoners in the Dhulia Jail of Maharashtra. Vinoba acceeded to it and so followed the eighteen Sunday Discourses on the Gita, beginning on 22 February and ending on 19 June 1932. These discourses originally delivered in Marathi and called *Gita-Pravachan* are now available in twenty-two languages including English, German and Danish. They are titled in English as *Talks on the Gita*. Some 1.6 million copies of the various versions have been sold so far, testifying to its popularity among the general public and importance to the learned.

But they have not been the only discourses on the Gita delivered by him. While in Seoni Jail in 1940 he delivered a second series of discourses on the last eighteen verses of the second chapter of the Gita, and another series on the various aspects of the Gita in Vellore Jail in 1943-44. The Seoni talks are available under the title of *The Steadfast Wisdom*, but the Vellore talks have appeared in small parts only now and then. Besides these, there are also some isolated talks which throw some light on his views. However, *Talks on the Gita* occupies the foremost position for any comprehensive idea of his views.

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[1] Vinoba, *Talks on the Gita* (Sarva Seva Sangh Prakashan, Varanasi, Feb. 1959), p. 1.

[2] ibid, p. 3.

The General Approach

The view that the Gita presents the essence of the Upanishads goes back to a hoary past, but some present-day scholars go beyond it and find in the Gita a synthesis of not only the Upanishads but also of other ancient Hindu philosophies. Dr. S. Radhakrishnan wrote ; "The different elements which, at the period of the composition of the Gita, were competing with each other within the Hindu system, are brought together and integrated into a comprehensive synthesis, free and large, subtle and profound. The teacher refines and reconciles the different currents of thoughts, the Vedic cult of sacrifice, the Upanishad teachings of the transcendent Brahma, the Bhagawat theism and tender piety, the Sankhya dualism and the Yoga meditations. He draws all these living elements of Hindu life and thought into an organic unity."[3] Vinoba accepts this fact of synthesis but thinks of it in his own way. He says : "The Gita synthesizes in various ways. There is, first, a synthesis of various metaphysical ideas without which there can be no basis for life. Secondly, it resolves the conflict found between the individual and society, without which neither of them can make any progress. Thirdly, it resolves the problem of duality between the soul and the physical body that lies within a man himself. All these three syntheses dominate the Gita and they are urgently needed."[4]

This has been the foremost approach of Vinoba. But before dealing with it in some details some other aspects of his approach may be mentioned. First, he has come to the conclusion from a study of the ideas, language, vocabulary and grammer that the Gita is as old as the Upanishads, probably prior to the *Manduk*[5]. Secondly, he does not agree with the view that it was meant to remove Arjuna's scruples based on nonviolence and to make him fight. He argues that Arjuna's attitude had nothing to do with nonviolence.

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3 S. Radhakrishnan, *The Bhagawadgita* (Allen and Unwin, London, 1949), pp. 13 14.

4 *Vinoba-Chintan*, Nov.-Dec., 1966, p. 37. *Vinoba-Chintan* was a monthly publication of the Sarva Seva Sangh Prakashan, Varanasi, from Feb. 1966 to Jan. 1971.

5 ibid, p. 6.

He believed in fighting, but, on that particular occasion, he wanted to evade that duty because of *moha*, attachment. However, it does not imply that the Gita does not teach truth and nonviolence. The twenty-four desirable qualities placed in between the two great virtues of fearlessness and humility in the sixteenth chapter, viz. compassion, tenderness, forgiveness, serenity, patience etc., are, for the most part, synonyms of *ahimsa*.[6] Thirdly, the question of the historicity and unhistoricity of the Gita is of no significance to him. For, "Krishna shines in the heart of each of us, the Inner ruler". Kurukshetra is both inside and outside. There is little difference between the two battles, though the real one is inside.[7] Fourthly he agree with B. G. Tilak that the message of the Gita is for ordinary men, living their daily lives in the world, and that it is for the whole world, since all spiritual practices are for all.[8] Lastly, the Gita does not teach rennuciation of actions, but of their fruits. He is critical of the notion that on becoming spiritual, there is no need for a man to do any work.[9]

The Synthesis

As indicated above, the first synthesis pointed out by Vinoba in the Gita is of the metaphysical ideas. But it is difficult to spot out particular places in his *Talks of the Gita* as examples of this synthesis. The reasons for it are probably two. First, the nature and the level of the audience in Dhulia Jail precluded Vinoba from going into the minutiae of it. Secondly, the Gita is so much imbued with it that it is not possible to isolate it. However, the very fact that it is full of the use of such words as *sankhya buddhi*, *yoga*, *purush*, *prakriti*, *guna*, *chitta-nirodh*, *abhyasa*, *vairagya*, *avatara*, *yajna*, etc., words special to the different schools of Hindu thought, testify to it. It synthetises by interpreting them in its own ways. In the words of Vinoba, "The Gita has a way of using old philosophical terms in new senses. The evolution takes place by the nonviolent process of grafting new meanings on to old words."[10] And that is also what the various commentators themselves, including Vinoba, have been doing with the Gita itself.

However, the synthesis between the three paths of self-realization, namely, those of *Jnana* (Knowledge), *bhakti* (devotion) and *karma* (action), has been laid bare by him. He says that the three paths can neither be isolated from each other and nor they are separate. They together make for one entity. It is all like a sugar cake whose sweetness, shape and weight are not things apart. In every particle of it are found its form, its weight and its sweetness. Similarly, every part of life should be brimming with action, devotion and knowledge.[11]

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[6] *Talks on the Gita*, pp. 6-7 and 233-234.
[7] ibid, pp. 10 and 232-233.
[8] ibid, p. 67.
[9] ibid, pp. 265 and 38.
[10] ibid, p. 12.

But *jnana* or true knowledge does not merely mean an intellectual understanding. To be real, it must pervade through one's life and flow through one's heart. It should find expression through hands, feet and other parts of the body. However, his personal experience has taught him that even such a knowledge is insufficient. While it does reduce grosser impurities, it is not able to destroy the subtler impurities of the heart. This needs the aid of devotion.[12]

The twelfth chapter of the Gita deals, in particular, with it and Vinoba says of it, "This is a small chapter with only twenty *slokas*; nevertheless it is a stream of nectar."[13] In his discourse on it, he deals both with *saguna* (with form or attributes) and *nirguna* (without form or attributes) devotions, and finds that both have their strong and weak points. However, they are complementary to each other. In the Ramayan Bharat is an example of the latter while Lakshaman is of the former. Still he says that the *saguna* devotion must find its perfection in the *nirguna*, and in favour of this view he cites the example of the three dedications found in Buddhism, which is first to an individual (the Buddha), then to an institution (Sangha) and finally to a principle (Dharma).[14]

It may also be mentioned in this context that Vinoba does not disapprove of idol worship. He says: "Foreigners, and even thinkers of our own country, have found fault with it. But the more think of it, the more I realize its beauty. What is the meaning of it? Image worship is the *vidya*, the art, of experiencing the whole universe in a little object... This is not mere imagination, it is a matter of direct experience. What there is in the cosmic form, all of it is contained in a little image, in a graig of sand."[15]

With regard to the third path of action or *karma*, it has already been pointed out that the Gita does not stand for the renunciation of actions. It preaches the performance of *svadharma*, one's own duty, in the best possible manner, without any desire to enjoy its fruits. According to Vinoba's interpretation, *karma-yoga*, the path of action, and *sannyasa*, renunciation, are the two aspects of *akarma* (inaction in action).[16] When the Gita talks of action, it means the discharge of *svadharma* and *akarma* means an action which is natural and easy. The emphasis on the discharge of *svadharma* is there because the motive behind it would be that of the discharge of one's own duty only. Any other motive or temptation would ill agree with desirelessness, which is an attitude of mind. To have this attitude, one needs a purification of mind and heart, and actions conducive to it have been termed *vikarmas* by the Gita.[17] This meaning given to *vikarma* is Vinoba's own, and he includes in it the various kinds of spiritual efforts like devotion: meditation, enquiry and analysis (*jnana vijnana*), development of personality (*guna-vikasa*) and discrimination between self and non self (*atma-anatma-viveka*).[18]

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[11] ibid, pp. 216-17 and 230-231.
[12] ibid, p. 164.
[13] ibid, p. 158.
[14] ibid, pp. 162-171.
[15] ibid, p. 151.
[16] ibid, Chapter V.

Vinoba has adduced several arguments in favour of the path of action. As compared to *sannyasa*, it has a greater practical value. In the words of Vinoba, "The art of acting and not clinging to it is preferable to action through inaction. because it is easier. ... Through *karma-yoga* one can learn to control the senses and, little by little, detach the mind from all activity."[19] Secondly, it is both the way and the goal, while *sannyasa* is only the goal. Thus from the point of view of a *sadhaka*, seeker, *karma-yoga* is preferable.[20] Thirdly, it provides an opportunity for self-examination, a must for cleansing the mind of its dirt. Lastly, it sets up a healthy ideal before society and rids it of hypocrisy and deceit. That is why all the saints, even after reaching the heights, have with good reasons held on the means, the apronstrings of action, and have gone on performing their *karma* till death.[21]

The second synthesis in the Gita, found by Vinoba, is that of the individual and society. According to him, the Gita stands for a programme of harmonious living.[22] We are born into three orders — the human body that wraps us, the vast universe that surrounds us, and the society into which we are born and this includes our family members and neighbours. We make use of these orders every day and wear them out. The Gita desires that we should try to replenish what is lost through us through *yajna* (sacrifice), *dana*, (the rite of giving) and *tapas* (penence). *Yajna* stands for service meant to discharge the debt owed to the universe; *dana* signifies service to society to pay our debt to it, and *tapas* aims to remove the defects and distortions that arise in the body. They may all be called *yajna* in a comprehensive sense, and then it can also be said that the Gita stands for a life of *yajna*.[23]

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[17] ibid, pp. 41 and 51.
[18] ibid, pp. 69-70.
[19] ibid, p. 65.
[20] ibid, p. 64.
[21] ibid, p. 37.
[22] ibid, p. 255.

The prevailing idea of conflict between the individual and society is due to the absence of a life lived as *yajna*. Really speaking, it is impossible to separate the two. Vinoba says : "If a curtain is hung in the middle of a room to divide it into two and it is blown about by wind, sometimes one part appears larger and sometimes the other. The size of the compartment is not fixed and permanent; it depends on the wind. The Gita transcends these quarrels. These quarrels are imaginary."[24] He also finds the Gita teaching how one and the same action destroys the difference between *svartha* and *paramartha*, the good of oneself and the good of the Self. Between the air of the room and the unbounded atmosphere without, there is neither difference nor conflict. To imagine the conflict and shut the doors and windows can only result in death by suffocation.[25]

The third synthesis in the Gita relates to the Self and the non-Self or the physical body. It is indisputable that the Gita has declared the soul to be immortal and the physical body, a temporary phenomenon. However it has not overlooked the importance of the latter as a means and has advocated a scientific disciplined life. Vinoba observes : "The body is a tool, and we should certainly do all that is necessary to keep it fit. A machine should be made to work, it must be well used. But can one identify oneself with the machine ? And should we not think in the same way of the machine, the body ?" And he adds, "The truth is that the body is not an end, but a means."[26]

The Gita, naturally, does not have any fear of death. To it, death is only a long sleep, a view with which Vinoba concurs. He also argues that memories of the past increase our evil dispositions. Hence there must be some way of forgetting the sins and virtues of the past, and that way is death.[27] To the Lord Krishna's assurance in the sixth chapter of the Gita that one treading the path of righteousness never comes to grief, Vinoba's explanation is, ' Like sleep, death too is necessary, Just as we wake up from sleep and resume our work, our former *sadhana* (spiritual efforts) will avail us even after death."[28]

This, in bare outline, is the synthesis which Vinoba find in the Gita. But no account of his understanding of the Gita will be complete without some mention of his concepts of *svadharma* and of the ideal man of the Gita.

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[23] ibid, pp. 247-250.

[24] ibid, p. 257.

[25] ibid, p. 258.

[26] Chapter VI of the Gita, verses 16-17. *Talks on the Gita*, p. 184.

[27] *Talks on the Gita*, p. 154.

[28] ibid, p. 82.

Svadharma

All commentators are agreed that the Gita attaches great importance to the discharge of *svadharma* in the context of the *varna* system which is often confused with the existing caste system. But according to Vinoba, the *svadharma* of the Gita is so comprehensive as to be applicable to all, irrespective of sect, society and times. If the Gita refers to the *varna* system, it is only because that system was in vogue then and it uses it as an illustration.[29]

Several arguments have been advanced by Vinoba in support of the Gita's emphasis on *svadharma*. He compares it to one's mother in whose selection one has no hand. He says, "I have to discharge it. It does not imply any narrow-mindedness. It is not a matter for comparison."[30] To clarify it further, he gives another illustration and says that only a shirt which fits one, can be comfortable for him, even if the cloth be coarse. Likewise, the usefulness of one's *svadharma* does not depend on it being the best in the world. It is the best for one simply because it is meant for him.[31] Milk would not do for a fish. In every individual there is something distinctively his own, and another's *svadharma* cannot lead to his growth. The value of a service is not dependent on the area served but upon its depth.[32]

However, his concept of *svadharma* has a flexibility about it. He divides it into two parts, unchangeable and changeable. In the second category may be kept many of the duties pertaining to one's community, country and times. They vary as the three undergo changes. And not only that, an individual himself may also change from time to time necessitating changes in his *svadharma*. To cite Vinoba; "I am not today what I was yestsrday, nor shall I be tomorrow what I am today. I am forever changing. The *svadharma* of childhood is just to grow. In youth, I am full of the power of action and should use it in the service of society. In maturity, others will get the benefit of my wisdom."[33]

He also tries to answer the question how to determine it. He says that it is born into the world with us. "The service of the parents to whom I was born, the service of the neighbours among whom I find myself, these duties come to me naturally. Then, my other obligations are matters of everyday experience. I feel hungry, I feel thirsty. So, to give food to the hungry and drink to the thirsty becomes my duty by nature. Hence it is not necessary to go in search of *svadharma*, of some form of service or compassion."[34]

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[29] Unpublished Vellore Talks dated 22. 11. 1943. Somewhat similar ideas find expression in S. Radhakrishnan: *Op. Cit.*, p. 364 and Aurobindo, *Essays on the Gita, Second Series* (Calcutta, 1949), pp. 316-317.

[30] ibid.

[31] ibid.

[32] ibid, *Talk on the Gita*, pp. 7-8 and

[33] *Talks on the Gita*, p. 274. Also pp. 7-8.

It may also be mentioned here that Vinoba does not disapprove of the *varna* system and advocates that the calling of the ancestors be continued if it does not militate against morality, because both naturalness and *dharma* are found in it. At the same time, he admits the decay of the system and the difficulty in upholding it. He, however, would be happy if it could be reformed and revived. He also says that even in countries where this system does not obtain, everyone has his *svadharma*, since all of us are born into the stream bringing with us our own special circumstances with its *svadharma*.[35]

In short, a study of Vinoba's relevant statements on the subject, including his ideas on *yajna*, *dana* and *tapas*, show that the service of the family members, neighbours and the larger society, keeping oneself fit, participation in productive labour, etc., constitute one's *svadharma*.

The Ideal Man

According to Vinoba, the Gita's ideal is that of the *sthitaprajna*, the man of steadfast wisdom, described in the last eighteen verses of its second chapter. His reasons for this view are two. First, the word is Gita's own. Secondly, though in other chapters it talks of the *jivana-mukta* (the liberated soul), the *bhakta* (the devotee), the *gunātita* (one who has transcended differences) and the *jnana nishtha*, (one steadfast in *jnana*) the picture of the *sthitaprajna* is most detailed and revealing. In the words of Vinoba, "Here, side by side with the marks of the *siddha*, the perfect one. we are also told of the qualities of the *sadhak*, the seeker after perfection."[36]

While the *sthitaprajna* combines the essential elements of all other ideals, his distinctive trait, according to Vinoba, lies in his capacity to take correct decisions because of his complete objectivity. In this respect, he differs from a good man who sees good only and fails to understand the world in its reality.[37]

His another peculiar trait is that he is ever in a state of *samadhi*, a state of inner equilibrium and tranquility of mind. Vinoba thinks

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34 ibid, 205-206, and 13-14.

35 ibid, p. 206. The *varna* system has supporters in the west also, see Garald Heard, *Man the Master* (London, 1948), pp. 132-133.

36 ibid, p. 26.

37 Unpublished Vellore Talks, dated 29.11 1943.

that the Gita's concept of *samadhi* is not the popular concept which stands for a state in which there is no awareness of the outside world. He says that it is not necessary that one capable of such a *samadhi* be a realized soul. The Gita's ideal is higher. The *samadhi* of a *sthitaprajna* is such that he is fully aware of his environment and yet he continues to maintain the state of inner equilibrium and tranquility of mind.[38]

Such a person is always one with the Brahma. He seems to be so engrossed in the *atma* that he is, in a way, not aware of the world. Just as our breathing does not interfere with other activities, the same is with his engrossment with the Brahma. However, while breathing is an activity, the realization of the Brahma is not. His chores of life indicate his physical existence, but they relate to his physical body and not to his Self. He has no desires, no attachment. Every moment of his life is for service. He has no self-interest left. He lives for others.[39]

Such is, in brief, the ideal man of the Gita as conceived by Vinoba. In this as in other, matters, he exhibits both an originality of mind and a readiness to take the present needs of society into account. And as already indicated, his ideas on the Gita reflect his actual philosophy of life, both in the ideal and the efforts towards it.

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[38] ibid, talks of 30.11.1243. 1.12.1943 and 2.12.1943.
[39] ibid, talk of 2.12.1943.
* *Paper Contributed on the Gita Pravachan Golden Jubilee.*

Book-Reviews

Sandra A. Wawrytko : *The Undercurrent of Feminine Philosophy in Eastern and Western Thought*, pp. 358, University Press of America, Inc., P.O. Box 19101. Washington, D.C. 200 36 (U.S.A.) (1981).

The Undercurrent of Feminen Philosophy in Eastern and Western thought was originally a doctoral dissertation submitted to the Philosophy Department of the Washington University. This is a unique contribution to philosophy in which the author has not dealt in the usual manner of classifications, such as empiricist versus rationalist, Idealist/Materialist, nominalist/realist, etc., The author has tried to look into the spirit of Feminine philosophy in two important philosophies—The Yin Philosophy of Tao Te Ching and Spinozism as a Femine philosophy. The author has very ably and critically examined the Femine undercurrent in the above mentioned two philosophies — the aspect which was hitherto neglected.

The Book has been divided into Four Chapters: 1. The Feminine /Masculine Polarity which has been further divided and subdivided into three : A. Establishing the Dichotomy of Perspectives which has been further subdivided into: 1. Yin and Yang, and 2. Contemporary Approaches to Polarity: which is divided into a. The Biological Approach, b. The Cultural Approach and the c. Symbolic Approach; B. An Exploration of the Feminine Principle : 1. Manifestations of the Feminine Principle subdivided further into a. The Elementary character and b. The Transformative character. 2. Modes of Being under the Feminine Principle a. Inwardness/all-is-one ness. b. Receptivity/non-assertion. c. The Link with Nature/materiality.; C. Implications of the Feminine Principle for Socio-Political Organization — Summary. Under Chapter II. The Yin Philosophy of the Tao Te Ching is divided into A. The manifestations of Tao-Theoretical Foundation which is further subdivided into 1. Metaphysical Manifestations: The Structure of the Universe, 2. The Dual characters of Tao — a. Nameless Tao-the Elemantary character; b. The Ten Thousand Things named — Tao — the Transformative character; and 3. Epistemology: The Process of Enlightenment; B. Modes of Being Through Tao: 1. Ethics: The Individual's Enlightenment Path which is further subdivided into: a. inwardness — the Tao of humanity, b. Receptivity — the sage ideal c. Materiality — the link with Nature ; 2. Socio-political Implications : The Enlightened Taoist State: a. The communal sense — all-is-oneness, b. The non-assertion of the sage ruler, c. Harmony with Nature and Tao; Chapter III. Spinozism as a Feminine Philosophy divided into A. The Manifestations of Substance: Theoretical Foundations is further subdivided into : 1. The Metaphysics of the one: The structure of the universe, 2. the Dual characteristic of Substance has been further subdivided into : a. Natura Naturans — the Elementary character and b. Natura Naturata—The Transformative character.'3. Epistemology: The Dynamics of Blessedness; B. Modes of Being: Philosophy as *Praxis* has been divided into. 1. Ethics: Relating to the Universe which is further subdivided into: a. Inwardness — the perfection of human virtue/power, b. Receptivity — the philosopher ideal c. Materiality — the link Nature. 2. Socio-Political Implications: The Enlightenment Commonwealth is subdivided into: All is-oneness — The single mind of the commonwealth b. Non assertion—the balance of citizen and soverign, and c. The commonwealth in harmony with Nature, and Chapter IV: Conclusions Concerning Feminine: Appendices, I Standard Interpretations of the Spinozistic System and III Individual Responsibility in a Deterministic Universe.

In the end Notes, Glossary, List of Works consulted and Index have been given.

The author in his introduction tries to defend considering Spinoza, a prime product of the feminine perspective, has been chosen to introduce us to the realm of feminine philosophies, illustrating the feminine perspective and principle of being by means of a coherent and encompassing system. Spinoza's is a philosophy pervaded by feminine values, one which carries those values to that culmination in various areas—metaphysics, epistemology, ethics and political theory.

As confirmation of Spinoza's philosophic femininity, the marked parallels between the thought and the self-acclaimed feminine or Yin philosophy of the Tao Te Ching have been taken into account in this study. The discussion of Taoist thought serves as a bridge linking the initial outline of the feminine principle of being to the systematic philosophy of Spinoza. Motivations and metaphysics, ethics and social proposals, overlap considerably in the two philosophies, a fact ultimately explicable by reference to a shared perspective on the universe, despite certain discrepancies in the matter of culturally influenced details.

A very well written book and includes supporting views from many well known philosophers from the history of philosophy in support of his study. He has made references to the works of Aristotle, Hegel, Jung, Margaret Mead, Erich Neumann, Freud, Kurtz, Karen Horney, Eva Firkel, Harding, Erich Fromm, Schopenhauer, Helen Deutsch which support his view point.

It is indeed a great work on the Feminine Philosophies of two great philosophers. Spinoza and of Tao Te Ching. This aspect has never been studied so thoroughly as in this dissertation of

Dr. Sandra A. Wawrytko. The author has very ably discussed the various aspects of these two philosophies which represent West and East from a particular standpoint which he has considered so thoroughly. The publishers also deserve our thanks along with the author for bringing out such an authoritative book on undercurrent of Feminine Philosophy in Eastern and Western thought.

Mohan Lal Sandal (Translator) : *Mimasa Sutras of Jamini*, Two Volumes pp. 1022. Price Rs. 200/— (Reprint 1980) Motilal Banarasidass, Delhi, Patna and Varanasi.

The first edition of this book appeared in 1923-25 and now after about 60 years the book has again come into print. This books was originally published as Volume XXVIII of the Sacred books of the Hindus, Edited by Major B. D. Basu from Allahabad (1923).

Pt. Mohan Lal Sandal has made an attempt to translate the main text of the Sutras in a simple but lucid language highlighting the exact import of the system. He had the advantage of getting help of Dr. Kunte, an eminent Indologist who had translated the same upto chapter VI independently. He has provided an elaborate introduction detailing the importance of the principles of Mimamsa in solving problems of interpretation.

Purva Mimamsa, theistic from the outset is one of the six systems of Indian Philosophy. Based on the Vedas and Brahmanas, it represents the practical side of Vedic Religion. This school was founded by Jamini which discusses the sacred rites and the rewards accruing from their performance. Holding the authority of the Veda as absolute and eternal, the system emphasizes that articulate sounds are eternal, and that the connection of a word with its sense is inherent in the word or the sentence itself, but is not affected by usage and thus paves the way for correct interpretation of the word or sentence even in the daily routine of human affairs.

Pt. Mohan Lal Sandal has done a great service to the cause of Indian Philosophy by reviving the age old Mimamsa Sutras of Jaimini by translating the book into English for the benefit on English knowing world. The translation has been very ably done making the meaning of the sutras clear. Pandit Ji has done commendable work by translating this ancient book of the East. Both the translator and the publisher deserve praise for bringing out this book after about sixty years.

Sri Swami Sivananda : *Brahma Sutras*, pp. 686 published by Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, Patna, Varanasi (Second Revised Edition 1977) Price Rs. 125/— cloth Bound and Rs. 100 Paperback.

Sri Swami Sivananda, a very renowned saint of Rishikesh founder of the Swami Sivananda Ashram and Divine Life Society and founder of the great religious and spiritual centre which attracts followers from all over the world.

Swami Sivananda Ji in a very clear and easy exposition and in his own inimitable way explains the Brahmasutras to all lovers of truth dispelling all ignorance and doubts. He has given useful information which may not be found elsewhere. Swamiji has given an elaborate introduction to this great work in the beginning, along with a short introduction and summary of the Dr. Herent Addhikaranas preceding each pada. Each sutra contains a word by word and a running translation. The text of the Brahma Sutras is included to enable the readers to do svadhyaya and get them to heart for purposes of meditation.

The whole book is divided into four chapters : I. Samanvaya Adhyaya consisting of Sutras 1-134, Chapter II. Avirodha Adhyaya Sutras 135-291; Chapter III. Sadhana Adhyaya Sutras 292-477 and Chapter IV. Phala Adhyaya Sutras 478 to 555. All these four chapters have further been subdivided into different subheadings and under each subheading Introduction and synopsis has been provided. In the end Index has been provided to important topics discussed.

It is a very scholarly book with original sutras and interpretation and explanation of them. The language, style and presentation is interesting, simple and attractive. It is one of the best compendium for grasping the reality and meaning of Brahma Sutras, one of the source books of Vedanta Philosophy.

The Sadhaka as well scholars who are interested in the study of Vedanta should go through this book which is an exhaustive but simple. Swami Ji has made this philosophical work very simple by his spiritual insight and knowledge. Motilai Banarasidass have done a great service to the cause of Indian Philosophy. Every one interested in the study of Brahma Sutras must go through this book.

V. P. Verma : *Philosophical Humanism and Contemporary India*, pp. 204, Motilal Banarsidass, Publishers, Delhi, Patna & Varanasi, Price Rs. 50/— (1979).

Dr. V. P. Verma, the author of this book is an eminent Prof. of Political Science, Patna University. He has to his credit a large number of books in the fields of Indian Political Thought and Politics, Comparative Political Philosophy, Empirical Politics and Public Administration, Vedic and Buddhistic Studies and Indian Philosophy and Education. Dr. Verma has distinguished himself as an original political thinker.

The substance of the contents of this book is based on the Deendayal Memorial Lectures on "Integral Humanism and Modern Indian Thought, which was the first in the series of the lecture.

In this book an attempt has been made to reconstruct idealist human philosophy on the basis of Eastern and Western metaphysics and the natural sciences. It supports the basic principle of ethical absolutism and analyses the fundamental principles of humanist political thought with reference to sovereignty, obligation and rights. It also lays a detailed manifesto for the reform of the Indian political, administrative, social and economic systems The manifesto provides an alternative to communism and capitalism and wants to reform Gandhism in a more radical direction. The basic theme of man as a moral and spiritual subject has been re-asserted in the light of newer advancements in knowledge.

The contents of the book have been divided into Eight chapters: I. The Theoretical Foundations of Spiritual Humanism which has discussed Humanism in different aspects and relationship, such as Meaning of Humanism, Ontology, The Epistemological Problems of Humanism, Monotheism and Spiritual Humanism, Humanism and Religion, Humanism, Science and history; Evolution and Humanism; Humanism and Dialectic, Humanism and Existentialism, Humanism and the Behavioural Sciences, Humanism as a Philosophy of life, Humanism as Ontopolitics: Man as a Moral and Spiritual Subject. II. Ethical Absolutism and Humanist Values: The Scientific Methodology and Ethical Absolutism, Sources of Idealist Humanist Ethics, Humanism and Values, Humanism and Non-violence; III. The Methodology and Concepts of Idealist Humanism: The Multidimensional Man and the Multi-disciplinary Approach to Political Philosophy, Ontopolitics and Empirical Political Analysis, Ontopolitics and Historical Materialism, Spiritual Humanism, Justice, Theory of Punishment, Humanism and Conservatism, Humanism and Internationalism. IV. Humanism and the Indian Political System; V. Idealist Humanism and Public Administration; VI. The Social Philosophy of Idealist Humanism; VII. The Economics of Philosophical Humanism — The Capitalist Model of Development. The Marxist Model of Development. A Revision of Gandhian Economics, A Manifesto for Indian Economic Development and VIII. Generalized Conclusions, Reflections and Suggestions.

The author has very ably discussed and examined the various aspects of Humanism both Indian and Western in relation to Contemporary India. Really an interesting and exhaustive book which can help policy makers and planners in the developing countries in finding out an integral world-view and an exposition of concrete technics to meet the challenges of the hour. Dr. Verma deserves our congratulations for producing such a nice practical book which may prove of an immense value to the developing countries and particularly to India.

I

The two modes of religious experiencing : a psychodynamical approach

M. Lietaert Peerbolte

1. A religious experience

There are several ways of defining a religious experience. In primitive cultures the veneration of ancestors might be called such an experience; in higher forms of culture, the veneration of some more or less abstract ideals forms the core of religious experiencing, such as Brahman (India), or God (Christian religions). At any rate the different forms of religious experience seem all to be based on a relation of man with an unmanifest world. The notion "unmanifest" indicates that man supposes a world as a religious domain which cannot be perceived by his sense-organs.

It is true that specially the Freudian psychoanalysis is thought that such a supposed "unmanifest world" as a religious domain would be based on experiences in early youth, such as dependency on parents, anxiety and fear of being punished by them, or of being repelled. The essence of the "unmanifest world" would be the fact that the little child cannot understand the world of the adults, nor can participate in that world. The result would be, on the one hand, fear, and on the other hand, the wish to be sheltered and consoled. Freud was right when he called this kind of religion an "illusion".

The only question is whether this psychoanalytical interpretation is applicable to all forms of religious experiencing. One has to realize that Freud's observations were related to religious experiences as they existed in the Western world with its Christian basis. This means that a central point in Christian religions is to be found in feelings of guilt and in the "nullity" of man with regard to God. Human powerlessness and divine omnipotence form a crucial point in several kinds of Christian religions; in so-called Christian conversions the abdication of one's own will and the surrender to the divine will form the core. The question can be put whether Freud was also right when he interpreted this divine will as a derivation of parental "images", as they are incorporated in the super-ego. It seems that here Freud's interpretation is inadequate as in these religious conversions the most typifying characteristics are quite the same as in any kind of the so-called orgastical experience of space: the disappearance of the ego-consciousness which is related to the sense-organs; the experience of unity with a partner, or with nature, or with divinity; the experience of timelessness and unlimited space. There three fundamental characteristics, together with an intense feeling of love, belong to the experiences of conversion as described by W. Jemes in his book "The Religious Experience".

Indeed, James is right that the final aim of any religious experience can be called "peaceful happiness".

From a psychodynamical point of view the fact that Freud failed regarding the religious experience is caused by his definition of lust as essentially a sexual satisfaction. Sure enough, the orgastical experience of space, as a basic feeling of happiness, can also be evoked by sexual intercourse and as such it also can have a "religious", or cosmic character. This aspect, however, of lust satisfaction is not evaluated by Freudian psychoanalysis.

The psychodynamical origin of this orgastical experience of space, as the deepest source of "cosmic happiness" is to be found at the level of conception, i.e. at the level where a new human being starts its existence on earth. In this respect Freud only thought of a "sublimation", as de-sexualization, whereas as a matter of fact it refers to a kind of transcendence. The original fetal world of experiencing is an oceanic one, i.e. a timeless experience of unlimited space together with a feeling of objectless love. This "objectless love" means that the fetal consciousness of unlimited space does not discern between the own ego and any object: emotionally it is all one "all-world" (c.f. my study "Eupsychia, Darshana International, Volume XXI No. 2, April 1981).

It must be agreed that these researches also had a philosophical implication in so far as the relationship between sensorial perception and consciousness in the academic viewpoint had to be changed, as is done in "A philosophical Energism" (Darshana International, Volume XXI No. 1, January 1981) whereby the original fetal experience might be called a psychical time/space continuum, as the psychic energies are not produced by our brain, but these energies are present in the cosmos as well as bound to man and his brain. Already the naming "psychic energy" is a name made by man whereas these energies in a free state in the cosmos are supraluminous velocities, or tachions. By our sensorial apparatus and specially by our brain they are "de-coded" as "psychical".

2. The ego-drives

Returning to the religious experiencing which Freud became acquainted with and studied, the relationship of human powerlessness and cosmic omnipotence can be interpreted as a sadomasochistic attitude, which, moreover, often is accentuated not only by feelings of guilt, but also by the necessity to suffer in this earthly life, and, not to forget, by the so-called "original sin". To accomplish the sadomasochsitic whirlpool, this original sin is mostly interpreted as the sexual lust-principle. In the Roman Catholic Christianity this interpretation has as a consequence that the mother of Christ, Mary, received her divine child without any experience of sexual lust.

Here, the sadomasochistic characteristics show their relation with the suppression of all what can be called the orgastical experience of space which I also have called the oceanic facet of psychic energy.

The result of this kind of religious experiencing is a strong emphasis on the ego-drives of which the sadomasochism forms a component. In a pattern of culture which is at the nearest connected with this kind of religious experiencing, on the one hand, one can find so-called saints who via a form of conversion (e.g. Augustine) have found a way of meeting with the divinity, at the cost, however, of a complete abdication of sexual lust ("the flesh"). On the other hand, however, such a cultural pattern shows the sadomasochistic principle of dominance and submission in every interhuman relation with wars as exacerbations.

3. The original sin.

It is already mentioned that the so-called "original sin" is thought to be associated with the sexual lust-principle. And as no child will be born without, at its beginning, the parental sexual lust, every child would be poisoned by this original sin. From this point of view Freud's researches and his conclusions show a great courage amidst of such a pattern of culture. He saw the suppression of the lust-principle as the important source of all kinds of neuroses; in other words, he attacked the whole basic point of view of the repudiation of the lust-principle.

To-day, over more than 1/2 an age later, the cultural pattern has gone to the other extreme of free sex without any tabu. And the Christian churches can protest against it, warning that just by the fear of this so-called free-sex they have emphasized that the lust-principle would be the great source of sin in its religious meaning. It is, indeed, said that such a free sex is anti-cultural and that to establish a culture a kind of sexual restriction is necessary. Here, Freud introduced the notion "sublimation", or de-sexualized lust.

4. The other point of view

Freud restricted his researches to the psychodynamics of postnatal life. The next step to get an insight in the essence of the lust-principle came from the psychodynamical researches of prenatal life. It appears, namely, that the original experience of lust is exactly identical with the oceanic "orgastical experience of space". The consequence has to be that the lust-principle in itself cannot be a sin as the ultimate experience of lust means a consciousness about infinity (timelessness and unlimited space). Moreover, by researches in psychopathology, when they are based on prenatal or conceptional disturbances, it appears that anorgasmy, (so, the suppression of the sexual experience of lust), causes such disturbances, specially in conceptional events. In such cases a "conception-shock" arises as the root of sadomasochistic reactions.

These findings contradict the Western interpretation of the "original sin". This "sin" is not dependent on the lust-principle as such, but on roots of sadomasochism arisen by conception-shock which is caused by the suppression of this lust-principle. If one likes to accept an "original sin" this "sin" is related to the sadomasochistic traits and not to the sexual experience of lust. This conclusion is very strange when looked at from a Western religious point of view. And in a way this conclusion is a complaint against this Western religious point of view. By advocating the lust principle as the "original sin", this standpoint augments the sadomasochistic traits generation after generation, with a continual re-inforcing of the ego-drives.

From this point of view the Eastern religious cults seem to be more realistic. Specially in tantric practices the aim is just to come to the experience of oceanos which is also called "mind-as-such" (Guenther) But also in other religious philosophy this same principle as to be found, e.g. in the notion "atma" which is as well in the heart of every human being as in the cosmos. In some symbolism of Western mystics this atma, or spirit, is depicted as a dove in the centre of the sun. But then also this sun is not depicting a realistic sun, but it contains several layers: cosmic hierarchy. Very clearly one can meet this symbolism in van Eijk's famous "Adoration of the Lamb", at Belgian Ghent (1 th century). But churchical belief in the Western culture has always rejected such opinions as the "original sin" would be the experience of lust.

Nowadays such points of view which formerly were the domain of mysticism are no longer to be called "mystic" as they are based on the prenatal and conceptional psychodynamics.

It may be true that in a pattern of culture in which the lust principle is called the "original sin", some "saints" have been able to reach toward a form of cosmic consciousness. But on the other hand, the increase of sadomasochism, perverting the cultural pattern as a whole, is also a consequence of this religious opinion. It may be true that the background of this opinion is formed by the fear of a sexual unlawlessness. This fear, however, cannot justify the consequence of increasing sadomasochism generation after generation. This sexual unlawlessness exists even so much as it is a consequence of the suppression of the real experience of lust, i.e. the oceanic orgastical experience of space. By this suppression the sexual orgastical experience remains within the framework of the ego-drives: a sexual performance as proof of one's potency. In that way no human being can experience the "atma" in the heart.

It is to be hoped that mankind returns to the humbleness that the atma in the heart is more important than the re-inforcement of the ego-drives. If one wants to use the term "original sin", this does not refer to the basis of the lust-principle with the oceanic-religious experiencing, but to the sadomasochistic roots at the conceptional level, caused by suppression of this lust-principle.

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II

Innovations in the Treatment of Education for an Intelligent Functional Democracy

Henry Winthrop

1. Possible Innovations For Public Instruction Via the Mass Media

Americans are accustomed to having VIP's take them into their confidence, treat them as equals, and discuss public issues with them. Although this takes place chiefly by means of TV and radio, it is likewise true that newspapers, public appearances and whistle-stops during political campaigns are other means that often reflect th.. type of civic cordiality. In almost all instances, however, particularly on TV, the matters discussed are "ersatz" concoctions. "Issues" in the sense in which we have tried to highlight this term throughout this paper are rarely discussed at all. They are skirted or usually touched upon in the most superficial of terms. What is called discussion is generally a well packaged mixture of politics and personalities. There is no intrinsic reason, however, why the public broadcasting system cannot introduce a mature and authentic level of talks and public instruction on the issues of the day, accompanied by the same spirit of cordiality that I have already mentioned. FDR introduced the "fireside chat" and there is no reason why the cordial atmosphere of the fireside chat could not accompany adequate treatment of our national, social issues, using highly competent scholars and specialists, talking also or in terms of small teams, or, perhaps, making use of the panel techniques on particularly complex problems in which audio-visual devices must frequently be employed.

Such lectures can clearly be pitched to different levels of sophistication, thereby soliciting different types of audiences. When these lectures are local rather than national, a question period can be set aside for questions from the audience, phoned in, thus ensuring two-way communication. Some of the most successful courses at modern universities — even courses in modern mathematics — have been conducted in this fashion. Where, of course, we are dealing with political and social issues, we would want a non-partisan, group of experts to certify in advance that the lecture to be given is not only free from bias but presents alternative views on the issue in question. The content of an instructional, fireside chat can be determined by national or local committees of educators, specialists, members of the public, and business and congressional representatives. Thus this type of program will possess the following virtues: (1) those who speak will really be people who know what they are talking about, (2) the presentations given will be such that they treat members of the audience as individual who wish to know and understand and not as subjects who wish to be distracted, (3) the content of such talks will be certified as to adequacy — that is, will be officially designated as germane to the issue under discussion, (4) the temptation to exploit sensationalism through some recent notoriety, success or splash made by some individual will never or rarely become possible and (5) the corollary temptation to capture immature minds through an adolescent passion for viewing "beautiful people," regardless of the value of what they have to say, will simply not occur at all, so that the talk show disease will be conquered.

Where the consequences of new scientific or technological discoveries are serious enough to warrant public concern, Americans will be fully apprised of considerations that must be borne in mind before public decisions are made. Similar considerations will be made clear for important, new legislation or important, social or institutional inventions. Thus, the bare beginnings of both senses of the phrase, "technological assessment," will become part of the civic and social consciousness of the citizenry. Problems of content selection and focus and problems of content interest and clarification will become a matter of professional concern. Sophistication with respect to matters affecting the public interest and the importance of developing a public philosophy will become a permanent part of the national, political life-style. The moral dimensions of public decision making will be burned into national consciousness. Finally the ability to distinguish an objective, social analysis from that prompted by special interests, philosophical partisanship or self-effacing but biased lobbying will become a national habit.

There is a variety of fireside chat that could develop into an even *more intimate* program than the discussion by experts would allow. I am referring to the fireside chat that makes use of laymen interested in a pressing social problem or national issue, who have done considerable homework and made themselves "lay experts" on some given problem. These will be citizens who have already complied with Congressman McCloskey's[1] notion of "tithing". This term refers to an educational procedure for developing a nature level of social and civic consciousness—a level for the citizen viewers in which they are to function in the same way as experts on some given but important issue. Let me make clear what Congressman McClosky means by "tithing" in his own words.

> "The greatest duty inherent in citizenship may be to devote a specific and continuing portion of our time to the process of government. I would suggest the adoption of a new national ethic, that of the tithe—10 percent of one's time, energies, resources and effort directed to the achievement of excellence in government. Each citizen might choose an issue, a party or a candidate to which he will devote 10 percent of his free time during the year and 10 percent of such cash resources as remain after he has fed, clothed and educated his family. The pledge might be to devote 10 percent of one's time, assuming a forty-hour week. This effort would amount to less than one hour per day on the part of most working American citizens and perhaps slightly more than one hour per day for the housewife with children in school. In each expenditure, it could amount to only a few cents per month for wage earners at the lower end of the scale and hundreds of dollars per month for the affluent.
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> There are many ways in which this time and financial contribution can be allocated. First, to education of oneself and one's friends through reading, analysis and discussion of issues. Second, to the ascertainment and distribution of information on the abilities, qualifications and viewpoints of candica es or the merits of public issues. Third, to the organization and leadership of groups participating in political effort and turning out to vote on election day. I suggest that the present disillusionment with American politics, compounded by the lack of candor and truth on the part of government, represents a crisis of major proportions. The citizen who remaims uninvolved in times of peril can raise no complaint when his government is mediocre or unresponsive." (pp. 248-9).

The value of tithing is that the prospective drawback that an instructional program by experts' may convey, namely, an undesirable sense of a teacher-pupil relationship to the listener-viewer is clearly avoided. Each member of the audience can say "There but for the lack of time, go I."

Finally, where the fireside chat on pressing social issues is local, we have the possibility of two-way participation between listener-viewer citizens and the lecturer, team of lecturers or panel members. The resulting question and answer period is heavily directed towards a currently needed type of mature, participatory democracy. It is mature because those who participate are not asked to vote yea or nay on the basis of an uninformed outlook, a shallow one or an outlook which is essentially a disguised type of gut-reaction. This is the currently, bastardized version participatory democracy — one that veers dangerously close to mobocracy, albeit disguising the latter in populist rhetoric. Instead, the question period following a sophisticated and adequate lecture or panel discussion on a major, social problem becomes a highly enlightened mode of public participation in which one's subsequent vote or influence is trustworthy precisely because it is to the point. And one must certainly be to the point when dealing with the complex issues of a complex society like ours.

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[1] Paul N McCloskey, Jr. *Truth And Untruth*. Political Deceit in America. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972. 264 pp.

There are a number of TV experiments today being conducted at different locations throughout the world, in which the fireside chat is being employed or a question and answer period following the lecture or panel is provided, or both. In Heidelberg, Germany, a systems research group, using an educational TV channel, set up the appropriate linkage between viewers in their homes and the broadcasting studio, with a computer in circuit. The type of feedback and registration of that feedback process that this makes possible — following adequate lectures on social issues — is not only an example of mature, participatory democracy but is also one that can give us a record of an authentic version of the democratic process. In this way one can set up a collection of case histories of enlightened democracy in action — cases that can later be analyzed for a variety of questions related to adult learning with respect to the pressing social issues of our time. Such cases can also be analyzed in order to effect subsequent improvements on the learning process via participatory democracy, when what has to be achieved is an adequate understanding of our basic social problems and the controversial positions that result from proposed solutions to them.

Congressman McCloskey has also provided us with an excellent outline of some of the *major issues* now before Congress and the country on which adequate knowledge and thought is needed by the citizenry. I cannot avoid the temptation to provide the reader with his outline. It reads as follows :

"1. How do we *simplify* government, reducing the overlapping jurisdiction of local, county, regional, state and federal government ?

2. How do we restructure our tax laws ? Do we really need property taxes, lotteries, liquor and cigarette taxes *and* income taxes for federal, state and local governments ?

3. Are we not finally face to face with the necessity of recognizing that property taxes and zoning have combined to deny equal opportunity to the children of the poor ? (And thus some minorities ?)

4. How do we build incentives into our free-enterprise system to stimulate ending pollution as well as making a profit ?
5. How do we balance environmental protection against development and progress ? Clean water against industrial prosperity ?
6. How do we provide equal medical care, teeth straightening and nutrition for *every* child in a nation where our natural affluence is more than adequate to do so ?
7. How do we construct a national health care program which provides good care in the urban ghetto and rural areas—which provides a personal doctor-patient relationship at reasonable cost, yet does not encourage overutilization and excessive charges ?
8. How do we protect our remaining open space ? What should be our national land-use policy ? How do we reorient and redirect the population concentration in already crowded cities ?
9. How do we revitalize our cities—their housing, transportation and environment ?
10. How do we achieve a growing body of world law, strategic-arms limitation, disarmament and dismantling of the missile systems which can destroy us all ?
11. How do we provide for the unwanted child ? Or the prevention of the unwanted child ?
12. How do we reform our prison systems ? Our procedures of criminal justice ? The backlog in our courts ?
13. How do we respond to the question as to whether we should not slow down our continuing increase in the consumption of resources and energy—the mad pursuit of more gadgets and conveniences ?
14. Can't we recycle water, newsprint, junked automobiles, feed lot wastes, bottles and cans ?
15. Can't we build bicycle paths, railroad underpasses and rapid-transit systems instead of more dams and highways ?
16. Should we not go back to the concept of home or condominium ownership for every American family ? Should we not heed Daniel Webster's admonition in 1820 that property ownership carries with it a respect for the law which protects that property?" (pp. 246-8).

Let me now turn to other reforms that are needed for our mass media.

A socially complex society like our own, with a large and increasing population of college-educated people, needs new types of newspapers and periodicals. These should be devoted to *adequate* discussions of the various, social issues and problems facing the American community today and should be handled, hopefully, by scholar-journalists of the Walter Lippman type. The traditional type of journalistic approach will no longer suffice for a good understanding of the issues before us. There are several reasons for this.

1. The *typical* journalist is not trained in the skills required to deal with the mass of information and the quality of scholarly and objective analysis that is needed for a proper treatment of the basic problems of American civilization. 2. The *typical* journalist is professionally over sold on the doctrine of simplification and engages in the superficial treatment of issues under the umbrella of a set of simplistic assumptions that call for "reaching the reader." He mistakes readability for adequacy. He tends to cater to the intellectual laziness of the reader as well as to his political apathy and alienation. He is more interested in capturing the reader's interest than in capturing the nature and the structure of the problem being treated. 3. The typical journalist suffers from "Unawareness of complexity." This tends to result in lame accounts of some of the most difficult issues of our time. As a result of deficiencies like these, journalistic traditions are not fashioned for the task of adequate treatment of a complex, social issue or problem.

I am aware that a number of journalists, given the task of dealing with a complex, social issue, will rise to the occasion and do an excellent job via a lengthy, Sunday supplement article, a special, midweek feature story or a series of articles over a period of time. The collection of articles that appear in the New York Times Books, published by Quadrangle Books, reflect a notable exception to the usual journalistic fare on serious issues, but then we have to remember that most of the authors of these articles are serious scholars, writers or intellectuals. They are therefore not representative of journalists at all. The *New York Times Magazine* in which the articles in these books originally appeared, points the way to the kind of newspaper that I am plumping for here. Where the format of a *daily* newspaper would consist entirely of articles of the type that have been selected for the New Times Books, we would have the sort of newspaper I am calling for. The term, "newspaper," would then, of course, be a misnomer. Another generic name would have to be developed for dailies of this type. The BBC publication, *The Listener* is of the same vintage so far as adequacy of treatment of complex issues and complex subject matter is the virtue sought. The traditional newspaper would, of course, continue to flourish. But it would make no pretense at providing a knowledgeable and thoughtful analysis of everyday social issues. It would simply provide the news as completely and as accurately as possible, but without interpretation either from the editorial page, the syndicated columnist, the feature writer or the flippant journalist. I have faith the eventually a public taste for dailies of this sort could be developed. This would be all to the good, socially. It may even prove advantageous if the daily newspaper of the future contained three sections: one devoted to straight news reporting, one combining all the other features of the daily newspaper as we now know it—sports section, business section, financial section, woman's page. metropolitan news, etc. — and one containing a section devoted to the scholarly, intelligent, factual and analytical presentation of social problems and issues and the examination in the same vein of the various options that are proposed for dealing with these problems and issues.

2. Some Requirements for the Public Treatment of Complex Social Problems

The task of presenting complex. social issues and problems via the printed word is not an easy ore because of the fact that one must be accurate, complete and sound analytically and yet (1) achieve such results within the framework of the average man's vocabulary, (2) employ a relatively simple vocabulary level and (3) maintain reader interest. This task, however, is not so difficult as it may seem at first glance. That it can be done is, perhaps, indicated by the following passage from W. Somerset Maugham's *The Summing Up*, quoted by Gunning.[2]

> "I have never had much patience with the writers who claim from the reader and effort to *understand* their meaning. You have only to go to the great *philosophers* to see that it is *possible* to express with *lucidity* the most subtle *reflections*. You may find it *difficult* to *understand* the thought of Hume, and if you have no *philosophical* training its *implications* will doubtless escape you; but no one with any *education* at all can fail to *understand exactly* what the meaning of each sentence is. Few people have written English with more grace than Berkeley. There are two sorts of *obscurity* you will find in writers. One is due to *negligence* and the other to *wilfulness*." (p. 37, Gunning).

Gunning points out that the most successful writing in this century has exhibited a *Fog Index* (one of the current measures of readability) ranging anywhere from 7 through 10. Prose with a Fog Index (FI) beyond 12—the readability level of a high-school senior—is likely to become heavy going for a reader and risks the danger of being ignored or understood. The FI is a direct measure of grade reading level. The Fog Indexes of novels by John Steinbeck, Ernest Hemingway, Somerset Maugham and Sinclair Lewis are at 7 or 8. *A Tree Grows In Brooklyn* and *See Here, Private Hargrove* yield a FI of 7. John Gunther's *Inside USA* yields a FI of 10. *Uncle Tom's Gabin, Ben Hur, Gone With The Wind* and *How To Win Friends And Influence People* have FI's of 8 or less. *Ivanhoe* has a FI of 10.

The point, then, is this. The dailies that are to provide the discussions of our complex, social issues and problems will have to achieve prose styles with a FI somewhere between 7 and 10 and—

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[2] Robert Gunning. *The Technique of Clear Writing*. New York: McCraw-Hill, 1952. 289 pp.

most probably—a FI of 10, but certainly not above 12. There is, of course, a vast literature on how to achieve the three objectives in writing that I have mentioned three paragraphs earlier. Quite obviously either scholars will have to acquire the requisite writing skills or writers for the public will have to learn enough about a scholarly article with a FI above 12 that they are trying to cast into an equivalent article with a FI at or below 12, so that even the scholar will declare that what he has had to say has in no way been mutilated.

I recognize, of course, that there are limits and dangers in a populist approach to ideas. Clearly some of the complexities of mathematical economics or of intricate, international, financial procedures or of complex, psychological theories will not be translatable into a FI below 12 for the simple reason that some of the quantitative relationships and highly abstract concepts in such areas intrinsically do not lend themselves to being understood in the vocabulary that creates readability for the average man. Any effort, for instance, to deal with high-level abstractions in Basic English can become so circumlocutory as to lose the reader's attention. What is to be emphasized when talking about the presentation of complex, social issues and problems, in terms that make the themes under discussion comprehensible to the reader, is something else. What is to be emphasized is that a *great many* of our social issues and problems *can, in fact, be presented in expository writing with a FI between 7-12, without any loss of the three virtues we mentioned earlier.* The neglect to do so by those who deal with these issues and problems is precisely what constitutes Original Sin in the area of public communication.

What I have said about dailies that will deal with our social issues and problems will, of course, have to be equally true for any popular magazines that should be wholly devoted to such concerns. *Reader's Digest* already has a FI of 9; *Time*, 10; *Harper's*, 11; and the *Atlantic Monthly*, 12. *Look* initially had a FI of 10 and later managed to reduce it to 8. *Life* was below 12. Inasmuch as all of these magazines have discussed social issues and problems, it is clear that such matters can be handled with a FI somewhere between 7-12. The readability quality *is not* the area in which our popular magazines fail when dealing with social problems and issues. Instead, their deficiencies lie *in the failure to achieve accuracy, completeness and analytic soundness.*

Similar considerations will likewise have to go for *books* on subject matter concerned with our complex, social issues and problems. Here, however, we have had a greater and an earlier recognition of the need for readability. An old but excellent example of this achievement can be found in the volumes that compose *The*

Thinker's Library, an old but famous British series that was published by the British firm of Watts & Co. from the 30's on. It is one of the few projects that has the distinction of having enlisted some of the world's outstanding scholars — although making use predominantly of British scholars — and of having achieved a readability that is extraordinary. Although I know of no measures that have been made of the FI of the volumes in this series, my having read several of them convinces me that, in most cases, the FI would probably range somewhere between 9 and 12.

The writing and presentation of science and of scientific themes has likewise in recent years made use of the recognition of levels of difficulty and readability. Three special catalogues make this abundantly clear. Thus Deason, Barrett and Fisher[3] in the Foreword to their volume make clear their interest in both the differentiation of difficulty level and the maintenance of interest in the following words.

> "The Traveling Elementary School Science Library consists of 160 books, respresenting the major scientific disciplines, including mathematics, and have been classified as to difficulty at three levels without suggesting either chronological age of the reader or school grade level. The designations are: "P", primary or very simple; "I," intermediate; "A," advanced. In general, the total collection should appeal to academically-talented students in the first to sixth grades, and to average students in the first to eighth grades. In using the collection, the prospective student reader should be permitted to attempt to read any books in which he displays an interest, irrespective of his age, grade in school, or the classification of the book.
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> ... Many of the books, particularly those marked "I" and "A," have been tested for interest and appeal over the past three years by selected child readers ..." (pp. 2 3).

Deason and Lynn[4] also recognize the need to discriminate among levels of difficulty in their catalogue, *An Inexpensive Science Library*, in the following fashion.

> "Books marked (1) are comparatively simple and can be read by students in the upper elementary grades and junior high school. Books marked (2) are suitable for the senior high school student. Titles bearing the designation (3) will appeal to the gifted senior high school student or to the college un-

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[3] Hilary J. Deason, Nancy C. Barrett and Stephen W. Fisher. *The Traveling Elementary School Science Library* Washington, D.C.: American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1959. 47 pp.

[4] Hilary J. Deason and Robert W. Lynn. *An Inexpensive Science Library*. A Selected List Of Paperbound Science Books. Washington, D.C. : American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1960 70 pp.

> dergraduate. The most difficult books are marked (4) and are primarily suited for the professional specialist. Any or all of the books will appeal to the non-specialist adult reader in accordance with his interests and general educational background. We have specifically excluded certain very difficult works that would have very limited appeal." (p. 1)

There may, of course, be similar catalogues for materials in the social and behavioral sciences. I am not sure, however, that there are similar catalogues for the variety of social ills and social issues with which America is beset today. But if we do not now have such libraries and such selections, with respect to our social ills and our heated social issues, we should.

In general, the non-technical exposition of our social ills and controversial social issues for public understanding will probably have to be funded by money from private, public and professional sources. I suspect little difficulty will be encountered here. The difficulties will eventually prove to be substantive rather than financial.

3. The Neglect of Super-complexity

When all is said and done and the layman has acquired an *adequate* grasp of one or more of our social problems — assuming that is possible — and the scholar or professional has acquired an expert grasp that is almost complete, are we then "right on" ? Can we then expect the layman to vote intelligently on issues and make an appropriate choice from among the stands competing candidates take on these same issues ? Can we assume that if policy and planning are then put into the hands of honest and well-intentioned professionals and experts, we can repose confidence in them and assume that they will come up with appropriate solutions for our problems ? I am afraid that the answers to these questions will have to be in the negative. Many, perhaps most, of our problems are substantially interlinked. These interlinkages are what we referred to in section 1 as our institutional interdependencies and we have alluded to them here and there in this paper.

Our current energy shortage — as we learned to our sorrow in 1973 during the Arab-Israeli War — is an example of a clear-cut interlinkage of some problems. It is an interlinkage that reflects the convergence of such problems as the following: 1. the problem of persuading oil-rich Arab countries not to exploit American, European and Japanese oil needs by *quid pro quo* diplomacy in which needed oil imports will be supplied only if these countries frame their foreign policies to meet Arab needs, demands and expectations; 2. the problem of meeting increased demand for oil that results from an ever-rising standard of living in technologically advanced countries; 3. the problem of meeting increases in the demand for oil that results from population increase, together with the problems of slowing population growth; 4. the problem of preventing any one country, particalarly Russia, from gaining geopolitical control of so important a heartland area as the Middle East; and 5. the problem of persuading consumers in technologically advanced Western countries to control their appetites for power consuming gadgets that are not at all indispensible to the good life.

In addition there are some other problems: 6. the problem of learning how to find a balance — if, indeed, one can be found — between the need to preserve natural ecological relationships and life-cycles in nature that are necessary to human survival and the need to exploit new resources that can meet fossil-fuel needs — resources such as Alaskan oil or shale oil deposits in Colorado, Utah and Wyoming; 7. the problem of meeting the need for transportation like metropolitan rapid transit developments, as a substitute for the passenger car or even passenger car pools; 8. the enormous problems of oilspill and the world wide ecological and economic threats they pose; 9. the problem of presuading Americans to stagger work schedules over three different, daily shifts but on a much vaster scale than we have three-shift companies and industries at present; 10. the problem of developing new modes of transportation that will not depend on fossil fuels but rather on other types of materials; 11. the problem of achieveing the practical development of new sources of energy, particularly solar energy and thermonuclear fusion; and many other problems too numerous to mention here. Some of these are explained most adequately for the intelligent citizen-voter in such recent volumes as those by Holdren and Herrera[5] and by Marx.[6]

This example of the interconnectedness of the problem of our energy crisis with other problems of great social importance is only one example of a linkage system. But the point to be stressed is that the study and understanding of the *interlinkages* of *almost any* social problem with several other social problems, are not the sorts of function that specialists can, or are supposed to, provide. This point has been driven home in the past, with respect to many social problems. Let me mention three such examples.

Thus, when a Ford Foundation team of agricultural experts sought to help India with her food production problems, the available expertises were rendered impotent. No simple solution could be found for India's food production problems because the team discovered that there were more than 70 variables with highly complex interrelationships that were contributory to these problems,

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5 John Holdren and Philip Herrera. *Energy*. A Crisis In Power. San Francisco : The Sierra Club, 1973. Second printing. 252 pp.

6 Wesley Marx. *Oilspill*. San Francisco : The Sierra Club, 1971. 139 pp.

many of them being important social factors. A number of these social variables are discussed by Vogt[7] in his book on population. Hasan Obzekhan, active with *The Club of Rome*, has pointed out that there is a complex of world-wide, interlocked problems that are called "the maze of continuous critical problems" (CCP's). No one of these can be adequately solved without simultaneously solving the other problems in the complex. Among the component problems in this complex, we find the following :

> "hunger and malnutrition; large-scale underdevelopment; large-scale peverty; uncontrolled population growth and size; unbalanced population distribution; inadequate education; insufficient medical care; obsolete welfare practices; growing environmental pollution; spoilage of nature; wastage of natural resources; generalized underemployment; obsolete system of world trade; urban sprawl; decay of inner cities; inadequate transportation and communication; inadequate shelter; inadequate law enforcement; inadequate crime control; obsolete correctional practices; inadequate recreational facilities; discrimination vs. minorities; discrimination vs. the aged; increasing social discontent; crystalizing of youth alienation; growing participation crisis; growing administrative illegitimacy; inadequate conception of world order; insufficient authority of international agencies; polarization of military power, continued nuclear escalation and inadequate understanding of CCP's.

Finally, Ritchie Calder,[8] discussing the failure of Great Britain, after World War II to solve her problem of fat shortages by means of the famous Groundnut Scheme in Tanganyika, has described the many interlocked variables that were involved. The Groundnut Scheme (pea-nuts in American terminology) failed due to (1) ignorance of the many variables involved, (2) ignorance of the manner in which these variables were interlocked and (3) ignorance of the necessity to produce policies and plans that would have coordinated the expertise of all the specialists that were involved—or should have been involved—in the Groundnut Scheme.

In the light, then, of the considerations that I have just emphasized, we have to recognize that even the expert on a social problem is bound to face the difficulties that stem from the relations of his problem to other problems. This is not meant to be discouraging. Rather it is meant to emphasize the interdisciplinary nature of our social problems and the importance of coordinating the work of teams of specialists when dealing with them. Obviously there is a level of super complexity to our problems — a level that exists because of the linkages among them. In this sense, since the expert must modestly recognize his limitations, how much more must the newscaster, the panelist and the average citizen who wishes to do the "tithing" recommended by Congressman McCloskey, recognize their limitations. All those who wish to educate us on our social problems must clearly avoid simplistic approaches to them.

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[7] William Vogt. *People!* New York: Hillman/Macfadden Books, 1971. 207 pp.

[8] Ritchie Calder. *After The Seventh Day.* The World Man Created. New York Simon and Schuster, 1961. 448 pp.

But lack of recognition of the interconnectedness of our social problems is not the only stumbling block either to an adequate understanding of them or to the acquisition of the wherewithal to judge the appropriateness of different solutions that have been proposed for dealing with them. There is another consideration, emphasized by Beer[9], that cripples both the understanding of our social problems and the quality of our policy formation and decision-making with respect to them, so that the solutions we propose for dealing with them are almost bound to be wide of the mark. Beer has pointed out that we really do not understand our problems. Rather we understand the models we make of our social world and it is these surrogates for reality that we assume faithfully reflect that reality. We therefore think that we are managing the social world when, in fact. we are revamping only our surrogate notions of that world.

Employing some general systems schemas Beer has shown the inadequacy of our models to reflect that world. Derivatively, Beer stresses the maladaptiveness of the reactions we take towards disturbances in the real world, because those reactions *may be* appropriate only for our surrogate models. As a result public policy all too often winds up in failure. To make matters worse, the social conditions of the real world keep changing over time, so that the surrogate models we retain increasingly reflect that real world more and more poorly and render increasingly irrelevant the policies we pursue. Beer comes to the conclusion that no one today really understands the social issues of our time and—as he puts it—"They are not going to learn about it through the media." What, then, can we do to create an understanding of our world that will eventually produce viable, social policy ?

Beer calls for a total education system that could be promulgated independently of all surrogate systems of education. It comes in two parts, each with five units. Let me state what he has in mind, in his own words.

> "Part the First contains a basic knowledge of the systemic universe. Its first unit deals with the concept of system. The next three units expound, respectively, a contemporary

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[9] Stafford Beer. "The World We Manage." *Behavioral Science.* Vol. 18, No. 3 May 1973 198-209.

understanding of the physical, biological, and social aspects of the world. These divisions are some concession to the way people have — erroneously — been taught to think. This makes necessary the fifth unit, which integrates the first four.

Part the Second would begin with a restatement *ab ovo* of mathematics adequate to deal with these concepts. It would be close to Spencer Brown's Laws of Form. The second unit would encompass the systems approach to management, at every level (by a logical recursion) from the community to the world entire. Thirdly, we should tackle asthetics, design, and the quality of life. This unit would invent new systems for living, including a new kind of house and a new kind of city. The fourth unit would consider man's heritage, history, and the classics, not with a nostalgic scholarship that clearly has a surrogate existence within the ages under discussion, but with a forward orientation that projects us onward. The fifth and final unit would put together a new philosophy, comprehensible only to students of this total work.

You will note that these ten units are not referred to as books, as TV programmes, nor as anything else. They would be packages using the appropriate medium for the job. Part of the work would be to design those packages so that they were effective instruments of communication, given the technology that we already have. Another part of the work would be to devise a means of promulgating the package economically, so that anyone—irrespective of age, learning, or income — could gain access to a Systems perspective on the systemic world. ...

Meanwhile, we shall part.[10] All of us leave here to return to our work, whatever it may be, in a real world, containing real people as we ourselves are real. This world is crashing, and its institutions are failing. It is run through a surrogate, by surrogate men. We have new solutions, which cannot even be expressed in the surrogate language. This is the problem.

I tell you that the problem cannot be solved as most people, most parties, most governments appear to believe, by adopting any one of the solutions that each of them canvasses for these solutions, different from each other as they claim to be, have one striking feature in common. All of them are known not to work." (p. 209)

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[10] The tone of the last two paragraphs of the material quoted is due to the fact that Beer's paper was the Presidential Address to the Society for General Systems Research at the Annual Meeting of the AAAS in Philadelphia, December 29, 1971.

The pessimism exhibited by Beer is, to be sure, unpleasant. It is probably used for its "shock value." Its most cogent lesson is to drive home the theme of this paper, that we have been abiding all too long with overly simplistic notions of our social ills and conspicuously unviable solutions for them. Our models — the pictures in our heads, as it were —are false to social reality in different degrees. This same point has been emphasized in recent years by Forrester,[11] But if we take the educational jeremiads of men like Beer and Forrester seriously, then one central conclusion is clear. Current communication and methods for educating the populace with respect to our social ills and with respect to the actions we must take to dissipate these ills, is extremely inefficient. Our educational approaches must be drastically overhauled. In the meantime, we should be aware of built-in tendencies, encouraged by our culture, to oversimplify the nature of our social problems. The task of eliminating this propensity to oversimplify is surely one of the *basic problems of American civilization.*

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[11] Jay W. Forrester. "Counterintuitive Behavior of Social Systems." 16 pp. Reprinted from *Technology Review*, Vol. 73, No. 3, January, 1971.

III

Refutation of Indian Materialism by Indian Idealists

T. N. Ganapathy

For purposes of this paper I confine the term 'Indian materialist' to Carvaka Darsana and omit any references to the heretical and materialistic attitudes of the *ajivikas*.[1] The Carvaka Darsana is known by different names such as *Bārahaspatya*, *Nāstika-mata* and *Lokāyata* and a Carvaka is nicknamed as a *Vitanda-vadin* and a *Vedavirodhi*. To faciliate the refutation of this school, a bird's eye view of the main doctrines of Carvaka in terms of epistemology, ontology, cosmology and axiology, would provide a backdrop.

In *epistemology*, Carvaka accepts perception only as a valid *pramana*. According to him whatever is arrived at by means of direct perception alone exists. That which is not perceptible is non-existent for the very reason that it is not perceived. All knowledge is immediately obtained from the senses and must depnd only on the senses. Since inference depends on universal and necessary concomittance, Carvaka denies inference. His arguments against inference may briefly be summed up.

Inference, according to Carvaka, involves an uncertain leap from the known to the unknown, and a reference to something which cannot but be out side the bounds of perception. Knowledge of an invariable relation (*Vyapti*, without which there can be no inference on the basis of universal principle) cannot be established. *Vyapti* cannot be the cognition of a relation between two universals, for the universal itself cannot be demonstrated. According to Carvaka, universals are inadmissibe because their existence is never perceived. What is given in perception are particular cases of smoke and fire and not fireness and smokeness. For the same reason (indemonstrability of universals) Carvaka says that *Vyapti* cannot hold between a universal and a particular. Causal or necessary connection is also denied because we can at no stage be certain as to the absence of all conditions or *upadhis*. The possibility of some conditions lying somewhere hidden and escaping our observation cannot be altogether ruled out. Thus there is nothing necessary to justify inference. The other objections against the possibility of inference made by Carvaka are: (a) Inference has to depend on perception and it is not an independent source of knowledge. (b) Impressions made by inferential knowledge are vague and dim as contrasted with those produced by direct perception. Perception alone gives vivid knowledge. (c) Inferential cognition is not concrete, because it is not produced by objects directly. (d) Inference is often found contradicted. (e) There is no proof which may establish the law that every case of the presence of the *hetu* (smoke) is also a case of that of the *sadhya* (fire).

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[1] This term is applied to Makkhali Gosala and his followers. According to tradition, Gosala was a contemporary of Mahavira and the Buddha. The main doctrines of Gosala were (a) disbelief in the efficacy of *Karma*; (b) belief in complete determinism (*niyati*); (c) antinomian ethics; and (d) a belief in atomism. Besides Gosala, there were five other *ajivikas*. For a detailed study refer: A. L. Basham, *History and Doctrines of the Ajivikas*: *A Vanished Indian Religion* (London: Luzac and co., 1951).

All these objections against inference have been answered by different schools of Indian thought. (a) Inference in the first place does not always depend on perception and even if it does it does nothing more than what perception itself must do. Inference makes proper use of its materials. These materials are supplied to it in perception. But perception also make use of these materials. There can be no real perception without sensation; for that reason we do not regard perception to be invalid. (b) Vividness has never been accepted as a definition of *pramana*. Many perceptions can be vivid and yet not true. (c) Inference, like perception, is also produced from objects and it is wrong to argue that while the one is concrete the other is not. (d) What is contradicted is false inference and not valid inference. (e) Lastly *Vyapti* is quite justifiable. If a Carvaka were asked why we should admit perception and not reject it as a valid source of knowledge what would he do? *Either* he must remain silent without resorting to any argument in which case he tacitly confesses that he cannot maintain his point *or* say that perception is valid because it is not misleading. In the second alternative he actually gives a reason as to why he is himself taking up a position; in other words, he draws help from inference to show that inference is not valid. Any source of knowledge must be accepted so long as it does not prove misleading. Again what does the Carvaka do when he denies the existence of objects that are not perceptible? He cannot say that his position is exclusively supported by perception because actually he infers the non-existence of the objects from the fact of their non-perception. In this connection it may be pointed out that sympathisers of the Carvaka school[2] hold the view that Carvaka did not reject inference in the absolute sense. Since Carvakas are referred to as *Vitanda Vadins* by *Buddhaghosa* as *haituk s* (the propounders of *hetusastra*, i.e. logic) and since *Arthasastra* also maintains *lokayata* as the science of logic (*anvikṣki*), we cannot attribute to Carvaka a purely negative or destructive attitude to the validity of reasoning as such. In support of this contention they refer to one *Purandara*, a lokayata thinker, who admits of inference 'in determining the nature of worldly things, where perceptual experience is available. Purandara says that inference should not be used for establishing any dogma pertaining to the transcendental world, life after death, the law of karma, etc. On this view, inference should be from the perceptible to the perceptible and never from the perceptible to the imperceptibie and vice versa; even in matters where inference is admitted, not certainty, but only practical possibility can be established through it. In this connection mention may be made of a Carvaka work by the name *Tattvopapalavasimha* by Jayarāsi Bhatta, where the author denies the validity of *all pramanas*, including perception. Carvaka rejects *sabda* (verbal testimony) as an independent pramana since it relates to the unverifiable, and depends on perception, even though he admits ordinary testimony (which is verifiable) as useful in the conduct of practical life.

The ontology of Carvaka contains a positive and a negative side. On the positive side Carvaka maintains the reality and existence of the world which is reducible to four elements, air, water, fire and earth. These four elements, on Carvaka view, cannot be reduced further to any single substance. On the negative side, Carvaka denied the existence of ether (*akasa*) because it is imperceptible and denied the existence of all that is super sensible i.e., God, soul and the other world. Soul does not survive bodily death, since it is also a product of the combination of the four elements. Regarding their views on soul the Carvakas may be classified as follows:

CARVAKAS

Dhūrta Carvakas
(Who deny the existence of soul altogether)

Susikṣita Carvakas
(Who admit soul only so long as the bodily organs lasted

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[2] Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya, *Lokāyata, A study in Ancient Indian Materialism*, New Delhi: People's Publishing House, 3rd Edn. 1973.

Dehatmavadins	*Suksma Dehatmavadins*	*Antahkaranatmavadins*
(Who say that the soul is not distinct from the gross body)	(Who say that the soul is not distinct from the subtle body (Suksma Sarira)	(Who say that the soul is not distinct from the causal body or *antahkarana*)

Indriyatmavadins	*Pranatmavadins*	*Manoatmavadins*
(Who say that the soul is not distinct from the senses)	(Who say that the soul is not distinct the Vital breath (Prana)	(Who say that the soul is not distinct from the mind)

The cosmology of the Carvakas is negative in the sense that they do not believe in the doctrine of creation, and reject any explanation of the universe in terms of the agency of God as the cause. They deny 'purpose' in the universe and reject any explanation in terms of *adrsta* (unseen cause) *karma* (action), *niyati* (fate), kāla (time) and *yaddrccha* (chance). According to the Carvakas the universe can be explained satisfactorily with reference to its own nature (*svabhava*). *Svabhavavada* rejects both teleology and deterministic mechanical causation. According to the sympathisers of the Carvaka cosmology, the Nyaya-Vaisesika criticism of *Svabhavavada* Carvaka is based on the misinterpretation of this doctrine as *ākasmikavada* or *animittavada* (chance theory) and Madhavacarya's view of Carvaka cosmology[3] as a mixture of *svabhava* and *yaddrcchavada* (accidentalism) is also an unsympathetic reduction of *Svabhavavada* to *Yaddrcchavada*. Svabhavavada is the explanation of the universe in terms of its own nature (*svabhava*) and not in terms of any transcendent principle such as purpose, chance (*yaddrccha* cause, fate, (*niyati*), unseen power (*adrsta*), time (*kāla*), etc.

Of the four *purusarthas*, *dharma*, *artha*, *kāma* and *moksa*, Carvaka axiology admits of only two values — *Kāma* (happiness) and *artha* (wealth).

The basic tenets of Carvaka in the words of Brihaspati, as given by Madhavacarya are :

> There is no heaven, no final liberation, nor any soul in another world,
>
> Nor do the actions of the four castes, orders etc., produce any real effect.
>
> The Agnihotra, the three Vedas, the ascetic's three staves, and smearing one's self with ashes,

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[3] Madhavacarya, *Sarva Darsana Samgraha*, Trans. by Cowel and Gough London, Kegan Paul, 3rd Edn., 1908.

Were made by Nature as the livelihood of those destitute of knowledge and manliness.
If a beast slain in the Jyotishoma rite will itself go to heaven,
Why then does not the sacrificer forthwith offer his own father?
If the Sraddha produces gratification to beings who are dead,
Then here, too, in the case of travellers when they start, it is needless to give provisions for the journey.
If beings in heaven are gratified by our offering the Sraddha here,
Then why not give the food down below to those who are standing on the housetop?
While life remains let a man live happily, let him feed on ghee even though he runs in debt;
When once the body becomes ashes, how can it ever return again?
If he who departs from the body goes to another world,
How is it that he comes not back again, restless for love of his kindred?
Hence it is only as a means of livelihood that Brahmans have established here.
All these ceremonies for the dead,—there is no other fruit anywhere.
The three authors of Vedas were buffoons, knaves, and demons.
All the well-known formulae of the pandits, jarphari, turphari etc.
And all the obscene rites for the queen commanded in the Aswamedha,
These were invented by buffoons, and so all the various kind of presents to the priests,
While the eating of flesh was similarly commanded by night-prowling demons.[4]

Giuseppe Tucci has summarised the views held by the Carvaka as follows:

1. Sacred literature should be disregarded as being false.
2. There is no deity or supernatural.
3. There is no immortal soul; nothing exists after death of the body.
4. Karma is inoperative; it is an illusion.
5. All is derived from material elements (*mahabhuta*).
6. Material elements have an immanent force (*Svabhava*).
7. Intelligence is derived from these elements.
8. Only direct perception gives true knowledge (*pratyakasa*).
9. Religious injunctions and the sacerdotal class are useless.
10. The aim of life is to get the maximum of pleasure.[5]

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[4] Ibid., pp. 10-11.

[5] Quoted by D. Ripe, *The Naturalistic Tradition in Indian Thought*, Delhi, Varanasi & Patna; Motilal Banarsidass, 1964, p. 58.

In this paper we shall take up for discussion the doctrine of *bhūta-caitanya vada* or *dehatmavada*.

According to Carvaka the physical body constitutes the self or atman and apart from the body there is no self as admitted by the other schools of Indian Philosophy. Let us see some of the main reasons adduced by the Carvaka in support of his position. (a) When people say 'aham' or 'I' they invariably refer to the body. No one says that 'I' is outside the body. 'I' does not refer to anything external to the body. It does not refer to 'you' (tvam) or 'he' (sah) or any other object in the external world. 'I' or 'aham' refers only to the body of the individual who uses that expression. This 'I' denotes the self or soul. Therefore the soul is nothing other than what is referred to by the term 'I', that is, *deha* or body. In the same way, the term 'I' does not refer to anything *inside* the body. For example, when you ask: "Where is the curd ?", the answer is given in the form that it is *in* the pot. But when you ask "Where is the I ?", people do not say that it is inside the body. Every one shows or indicates the body as the 'I'. Thus 'I' is neither outside the body nor inside the body. *It is body itself.* Thus body and soul are not distinct.

When I say 'I am fat' or 'I am fair' what is fat or fair is body. This shows that 'I' refers to the body. Take the statement 'I know this'. This 'Knowledge' or 'caitanya' also belongs to the body. If you expand the statement 'I know this' it would be 'I, who am fair, know this' or 'I, who am fat, know this'. 'Fairness' and 'fatness' have been accepted as *Dehadharama* (attributes of the body). In the same way *caitanya* or knowledge also must belong to the body. Just as there is a coordinate relation (in terms of substance and attributes — *Guna-Gunin samanadhi karanya*) between the 'I' and 'fairness' or 'fatness', there is a coordinate relation between 'I' and '*caitanya*' or 'knowledge' also. Just as you accept fairness as *dehadharma*, you have to accept *caitanya* or knowledge also as *dehadharma*. Here the term 'I', as already shown, refers to the body and there is a coordinate relation between body and caitanya. Therefore body and soul (=caitanya) are not distinct.

(b) The other reason adduced by the Carvaka to show that the body itself is both sentience and soul, is given by Sankara as follows :

> They adduce this reason: 'its existence being dependent on the existence of the body'. Anything whose existence depends on the existence of another, and which ceases to be when that other thing is not there, is ascertained to be an attribute of the latter, as for instance, heat and light are attributes of fire. As regards such attributes as the activities of the vital force, sentience, memory, etc., which are held to belong to the soul according to the believers in the soul, they too are perceived within the body and not outside; and hence *so long as any*

> *substance other than the body cannot be proved* they must be the attributes of the body itself. Hence the soul is not distinct from the body[6] (Italics mine).

(c) If the Carvaka were questioned how can consciousness arise in a body which is a combination of non-intelligent (non-sentient) elements, he has a ready answer. According to him, consciousness arises in the body from the combination of non intelligent elements in the same way in which red colour is produced from the combination of betel leaves, arecanut and lime. Toddy is taken as another illustration. Intoxing drinks such as toddy, are made through the process of mixing some ingredients. Each ingredient by itself is not intoxicating. The inebriating power of toddy comes from a mixture of ingredients. Similarly though, the earth, fire, air and water individually have no consciousness in them, a specific *proportion* of these in a particular form gives rise to a consciousness. This consciousness is the soul or *atman* and it lives only as long as the body lives. Thus the soul is completely a this-world phenomenon, and does not have a distinct existence from the body. In short, consciousness or soul is a proportionate grouping of the four elements. On this view of Carvaka, a pot (though a combination of the four elements) does not have consciousness because it lacks the specific proportionate combination of the four elements.

(d) Whenever there is knowledge, there is the body; and whenever there is no body, there is no knowledge. This shows that knowledge and body are not distinct. It is like this. If you put the question : 'Is the pot different from the clay?', 'No' is the answer. This means that clay and pot are not different. In the same way if you ask the question : 'Is consciousness (knowledge) different from the body?', 'no' should be the answer, for no one has knowledge without the body. Just as you say 'clay is the pot' *caitanya* or knowledge is the body.

(e) When I say 'I am a man', the term 'man' here refers to the body. There are different types of bodies such as the bodies of monkeys, ants, elephants, trees, etc. 'Man' is one form of such bodies. Here the term referred to by 'man' is not distinct from the body. Therefore 'I am a man' means 'I am a body'. This 'I' stands for the soul and this means that the soul is the body. If it is argued against this position that the coordinate relation that exists between 'I' and 'man' is like that which exists between 'the crystal' and 'red colour' (i.e. coordinate relation due to error—*doskrta samanadhikaranya*) in the statement 'the crystal is red'. Carvaka has a ready answer. When the crystal is in the presence of a red flower we say that the crystal is red. But later on we come to know that the crystal is not red, when the flower is removed away from the crystal. Is there any such occasion for us to say or show that 'I am not a man?' No. The Carvaka makes a caustic remark by saying that even 'the educated' will not say that he is not a man. Hence the coordinate relation that exists between 'I' and 'man' is inseparable. That is the 'soul' is not different from the body.

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[6] *Brahma Sutra Bhasya* of Sankaracaraya, Trans. by Swami Gambhirananda, Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 3rd Edn., 1977, p. 741 (3. 3. 54).

(f) The Carvaka ridicules those who say that the body is not *atman* as people who do not accept as valid what is given directly in perception, and who accept as valid that which is not given directly in perception. (*Dṛṣṭa hāni, adṛṣta kalpana*). People who say that the soul is distinct from the body are prepared to accept, not what is given in perception, but what is given in their imagination.

Since all the arguments, adduced by Carvaka, to show that the soul is not distinct from the body, are based on logical arguments, several schools have made attempts to refute them on logical grounds. In this paper I intend to confine my attention to the Advaita refutation of the Carvaka view. In this connection I would like to make an observation here that though Advaita Vedanta is popularly known as an idealistic system, it is a misnomer in the strict sense, for advaita admits of realistic and empirical elements in the *Vyavaharika satta* (emprical level of reality). To be precise advaita is a plenary experience of non dualism.

The refutation of Carvaka doctrine is as follows :[7]

(a) The view that the body constitutes the self lacks correspondence in the case of a dead body where body exists, but consciousness or self does not exist. This necessarily leads to the acceptance of a self existing apart from the body. Advaitananda in his *Brahma vidyabharana*, a commentary on Sankara's *Sutra Bhasya*, explains this point a little further. If caitanya or self is also a *dehadharma* just as 'fairness' or fatness' is, it should be present in the dead body also. If it is present in the dead body also then the term 'dead body' itself is a contradiction in terms. Since *Caitanya* is absent when the dead body is present, it cannot be the *dehadharma*. That is, caitanya is not there in the body at death. Therefore Caitanya is not the body and distinct from it. Further, 'fairness' of the body is given to perception by the senses. If *caitanya* is also a *dehadharma* it must be given to sense-perception. Since it is not given to sense-perception, it is something other than *dehadharma*. Hence *deha* and self are not identical, but distinct. In th words of Sankara :

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[7] The Main thrust of the Carvaka refutation in this paper is based on an advaita work by name *Svārājya-Siddhi* of Gangādharendra sarasvati (18th century) with a commentary called *Kaivalya-Kalpadruma* In this work in chapter I, *Adhyaropa prakarana* verses 29 to 32 deal with the criticism of *dehatmavada* while verses 33 to 36 deal with the criticisms of *Indriyatmavada*, *Pranatmavada*, *manoatmavada* and *Antahkaranatmavada* respectively.

> ... it (soul) must be distinct from the body, 'since consciousness does not exist even when the body is there.' If from the fact that the attributes of the soul exist when the body exists, you infer that those attributes belong to the body, then why should it not be inferred that they are not the attributes, of the body owing to their non-existence even when the body is present, they being different from the characteristics of the body? For attributes like form (or colour) etc. which belong to the body, may very well last as long as the body persists; but such characteristics as the activities of the vital force does not occur after death even though the body exists. And such attributes of the body as form (or colour) etc.. are perceived by others (outside the body), but not so are such characteristics of the soul as consciousness, memory, etc.[8]

(b) The existence of consciousness, memory, etc can be determined when the body continues during a man's life. But their non-existence cannot be so determined from the non-existence of the body. "For even when this body has fallen, perchance these attributes of the soul may well persist by transferring themselves to some other body. Even (if this be a doubtful theory) that doubt can well demolish the opposite point of view,"[9] that the *aham* is the *deha.*

(c) Consciousness cannot be the attribute of the elements because *a thing cannot act on itself* If body (which is made of elements) is not distinct from consciousness, then body or consciousness becomes the *karta* or *agent*. and as such consciousness cannot perceive its elements, for what is the subject of knowledge cannot be an object of knowledge. To quote Sankaracarya :

> For fire, though possessing heat, does not burn itself, nor does an actor (or acrobat) trained though he may be, ride on his own shoulder. And it cannot be that consciousness which is an attribute of the elements and their derivations (and is hence one with them). will perceive those elements, etc. For neither one's own form nor of anybody else is perceived by forms, etc , where as external elements and their derivations are perceived by consciousness. Hence just as the existence of this perception of the elements and their derivatives is admitted, so also must its separateness from them be admitted.[10]

(d) Consciousness is not an attribute of body. To illustrate, perception takes place when light and other accessories are present; it does not take place when they are absent. From this we do not argue that perception is an attribute of light, etc. In the same say in the argument that when consciousness occurs body is present and it does not occur when the body is absent, the body is only an auxiliary like light, etc. and it does not follow from this that consciousness is an attribute of the body. Further the body is not an absolutely contributory factor in perception, since even when the body lies inactive in dream, many types of perception seem to take place. Hence consciousness and body are distinct.

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[8] *Brahma Sutra Bhasya*, Ibid., p. 742.

[9] Ibid., p. 742.

[10] Ibid., pp. 742-743.

(e) Moreover, if the body were the self, how could we explain continued happiness in respect of one and continued misery in respect of another ? The Carvaka cannot give a satisfactory explanation to this phenomenon. We can explain this only with reference to merits and demerits. This explanation presupposes the existence of a self which serves the *substratum* of merit and demerit. Further the initial action (first movement) of a newly born child, suggests the existence of latent impressions which could not have been possible without prior experience. This prior experience necessarily presupposes a self existing before the rise of the present body. At least here the self is not the same as the present body.

To this the Carvaka would argue that happiness, misery, etc., pertain to created bodies by chance, just as pots, which are created by a single potter and come into contact with milk, honey, etc. by chance. The relation between milk and pot is a chance relation. In the same way the relation between happiness and bodies is a chance one. Therefore it is unnecessary to point to continuity of self and thereby justify the so-called *purva janma*. The Advaitin, Gangadharendra Saraswati, meets this objection as follows. Although the practical efficiency of the effects is not different when the material cause is the same, like a lamp which is lit from another lamp and has got the same practical efficiency or like the seeds of a particul tree which have the same practical efficiency, yet, on the basis of these examples we cannot admit that the relation of milk, honey, etc to pots created by a single potter, occurs by a mere chance.

(f) The pivot of Carvaka theory that body and soul are not distinct rests on its epistemology of perception. If perception is the only proof, then the *dehatmavada* is a self contradictory theory for the following reasons.

(i) If 'any other proof apart from perception is invalid', then, this same statement is invalid, for it happens to be only a mere statement and not a perception.

(ii) The Carvaka says that body is atman. One need not say this to a man who knows this. If you say this to a man who does not know this, your statement is the only pramana for him. Here at least your statement 'perception is the only proof' becomes impossible. Further what special reasons do you have to say that your statement is the pramana ? In the words of *Haritasmrti* "The Vedas are valid; smriti texts based upon them are valid; ithihasas and puranas, etc., are valid; 'but one says these are not valid'; *WHAT IS THE PROOF* for the validity of his statement ?"

(iii) If it is held that perception is the only pramana, there occurs a contingency of inactivity because of non-belief in anumana.

For example, you cannot engage yourself in the activity of cooking because, this activity, on your part, involves a prior knowledge that cooking is a means to a desired end and such a knowledge could be had only through inference or *sabda*. That is, what is not given to in perception may be obtained through inference or verbal testimony. There are truths which are not given in perception, one such truth is that the soul and body are distinct.

(iv) It may be argued that knowledge got by *sabda*, that the soul and body are different, must not be taken as valid because of the fact that some cases of verbal testimony are not certain. That is, one concedes that verbal testimony can give only probability and not certainty; if the principle in this argument is extended, then perception also would become probable and not certain for there are cases of illusory perception. Hence *dehatmavada* is only a probability, not a certainty.

(v) Further, perception, viz., perceptual knowledge arises from sense-organs which are not perceived but only inferred. It follows from this that the rise of perceptual knowledge itself suggests *aunumana* as a valid means of knowledge.

(g) The *dehatmavada* of Carvaka is a futile argument, because according to him the cognition of the soul in body is well known in ordinary experience. The *Carvaka sastra* conveying this is only a restatement and hence futile. In other words, since every one knows that *deha* is *atman*, your *sastra* is not necessary, because it becomes supperflous. Further your *sastra* ceases to be one because a sastra must tell what is not known hither to. That which is not known hither to is that body and soul are different. That which says this is a *sastra*. What you say is known to everyone and hence yours is not a *sastra*.

(h) If one accepts the view that sense organs constitute the self (*Indriyatmavada*) or the each one of them is the self, then the destruction of the body would occur due to the defect of the plurality of selves. If it is held that the *aggregate* only constitutes the self, then, it would mean that the blind and dumb do not have a self; hence they are as good as dead. Moreover the testimony of one who has seen or heard becomes inappropriate. Again the aggregate of sense-organs cannot be explained. There will not be even a seer for the dream state. And there will be fear of sleep even, due to the non-differentiation between sleep and death. If the sense organs were to be the self then there would be no witnessing principle of the states of dream and sleep, because the sense-organs merge, therein.

(i) Some flowers of Carvaka adopt the *pranatmavada*, i.e. the view that the vital airs constitute the self. They say when the vital airs exist in the body, there is the usage that one is alive and when they depart from the body there is the usage that one is dead. Gangadharendrasaraswati refutes this view on the basis of reasoning established by the scriptures. The *Brahadaranyaka Upanisad* says that the vital airs are insentient. One is said to be alive or dead not because of the existence or absence of vital airs in the body, but because of the presence or absence of the self associated with the subtle body. According to the *Katha Upanisad* one lives not because of the vital airs but by something else wherein these two exist. Hence there is something else other than *prana*, which is the self.

(j) The view that mind constitutes the self (*Manoatmavada*) is also rejected. Mind, like the sense of sight, etc., is an instrument of cognition, i.e., of the self Hence mind cannot be the self.

(k) The view that intellect constitutes the self (*antahkaranatmavada*) also cannot stand examination. According to Advita, intellect is the effect of the five unquintuplicated elements, which is also of the nature of the five fundamental elements. If intellect, which is of the nature the five elements were to be the self, then, the sense-organs, physical body, etc , which are also of the nature of fundamental elements, would constitute the self as well. The result of this would be the plurality of selves in the body.

Gangadharendra Saraswati speaks of the difficulty that arises to an aspirant because of divergent views among the different philosophical schools about the nature of self. He refers to ten different views about the self.[11] The Carvaka considers (i) *body to be the self*, some of their followers consider that (ii) *sense organs constitute the self*; some others among them speak of the (iii) *vital airs to be the self* and yet some among them call (iv) *the mind to be the self*. According to Vijnanavada school of Buddhism (v) *soul is momentary consciousness* (vijnana); for the followers of the Bhaskara school, (vi) *intellect referred to as a sheath* (*vijnanamaya-kosa*) *which is permanent, is the self*. To *Samkhya and Yoga*, (vii) *enduring consciousness which is devoid of bliss is the self*. According to the *Bhatta* school (viii) *the self is both sentient and insentient*. However, the Prabhakara and the Naiyayika schools consider that (ix) *the self is insentient*, but through the relation of inherence it becomes the substratum of knowledge. Against all these views Advaita holds that (x) *the self is unsublatable and of the nature of non dual consciousness and bliss*. After listing all these views the authour of *Svārājya-siddhi* asks; of these, which is the conclusive view for the aspirant ?

The question is: how are we to justify that there is a principle or entity called self and which is different from the body ? Briefly the argument runs as follows. It is admitted by one and all that there are objects, outside us, such as tables, chairs, etc. If these are the objects of knowledge, then, there must be a subject of knowledge, different from them. This subject is the seer or self Whatever is an object of knowledge is not-self; anything that is perceived or cognized is not-self The body is perceived; therefore, it is not-self. The same argument applies to the senses and the mind. How do we show that the sense organs are objects of knowledge? We know that there are sense organs through inference (and not by perception). For example, from the perception of colour I infer that I have the visual sense. That is, we have knowledge of a particular sense organ from the perception of the appropriate object as the case may be. Thus every sense organ is an object of knowledge. Whatever is apprehended or cognized or perceived must be not-self. Hence it follows that the sense-organs are not the self.

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[11] Svārājya Siddhi — Chap. I, Verse 12.

How do we prove that mind also is an object of knowledge? Mind, like the sense organs, is an object of knowledge for it is known through inference. The mind must also function along with the sense organs so that we may have knowledge of the external world. The mind is known through inference as an instrument for knowledge of the external world. Since the mind is known through inference it is an object of knowledge. Further, in the absence of the functioning of the mind even though the sense organs function we do not get the knowledge of the object. Therefore we know that there is such a thing as mind whose functioning is necessary for knowledge of external objects. Thus the mind is inferred, and known; and whatever is known or cognized is an object of knowledge and hence not-self.

Now the question is: how does one say that there is the self? Is it known or not-known? Our first point is that *the self is not known as an object of knowledge*, because it is the subject. Let us assume for the sake of argument that the self is an object of knowledge. Then a question arises: What is it that knows the self? There are three possible alternatives to this question which one can think of. They are (a) Is the self known through the not-self? (b) Is it known through another self? and (c) Does it know itself? (a) That the self is known through the not self is an untenable position because not-self is incapable of knowledge. (b) Nor can the self be known through another self. For to say that one self knows or is known by another self assumes the existence of the plurality of selves, which in itself stands in need of justification. Even granting that there is a plurality of selves, a self can know only a body, etc. and not another self. The existence of the other self is only an object of inference. That is, to the question how is the self known the answer is by another self. How is this other self known? Naturally only by yet another self. How is this third self known? by the fourth, etc, *ad infinitum*. Any position which leads to infinite regress is not satisfactory as a piece of reasoning. Therefore a self is not known by another self. (c) Can it be said that the self known itself ? Even this alternative is untenable for it is impossible for one and the same entity to be a subject as well as an object at the same time in one and the same act of cognition. Cant it be said that one part of the self is the knower and the other known ? No; because this question assumes that the self is divisible. Why not grant this assumption ? If It is divisible, then it must be a composite entity and as such it must be perishable. This will lead to the impermanence of the self. If self is impermanent, then, one cannot satisfactorily account for memory, recognition, etc. Thus the self cannot be known by not-self; it cannot be known by another self; not can it know itself. Hence *the self is not an object of knowledge.*

Though it is not an object of knowledge, *it is not unknown.* It is known (in a special sense, not in the sense of an object of knowledge) when everything is known. Since it is the basis of every piece of knowledge that we have, *the self is not unknown.* We can go beyond this and say that self is known even when there is no object of knowledge. How ? For example, the self is known in *susupti*, deep sleep, where there is no knowledge of any object external or internal. Thus the self is known when every thing is known, as for example, in states of waking and dream. The self is known even when there is no knowledge of objects, for example as in the *susupti* state. Just as the self is the witness to the objects of the waking and the dream states, it is also a witness to the absence of things in *susupti*. In this sense it is self-luminous. The self is said to be self-luminous in the sense that while it reveals everything else. it is itself not revealed by anything else. Therefore there is the self; it is known; but this does not mean that it is an object of knowledge like a pot or a pan. It is self luminous. This is the position of Advaita Vedanta.

As one preceptor of Advaita Vedanta has said we must thank the Carvaka for his contribution to philosophy in general and to the doctrine of *atman* in particular, in the fact that he has not shown *atman* as something existing outside the body. By asserting that soul is not distinct from the body the Carvaka has given a new direction to materialism from external nature to interanl nature namely, body. As we have seen already the *Dhurta Carvaka* has denied the existence of soul altogether. But the *susiksita carvak*a admits of a soul, but says that it is not distinct from the body. The distinction between *dhurt*a (crude) and *susiksit*a (refined) Carvakas, shows that one who accepts the existence of the soul as against one who denies it, is designated as '*refined*'. No only this The refinement becomes finer and finer if one is an *indriyatmavadin*, instead of a *dehatmavadin*, a *pramatmavadin* instead of an *indriyatmavadin*, a *manoatmavadin* instead of a *pranatmavadin*, instead an *antahkaranatmavadin* instead of a *manoatmavadin*. If the refinement of Carvaka is pushed to its logical conclusion we may find him in the Vedanta camp and we welcome him to our fold with open arms.

IV

The Impact of Religious Faith And the Attitudes of Self Transcendence on Death Anxiety In the Orthodox Muslims

Moazziz Ali Beg & Abu Sufyan Zilli

The ideas leading into this investigation stem forth from certain major points of Islamic philosophy contained in the Holy Quran. The subjects of this study were therefore avowed Muslims i.e., those who were regular in praying five times and observing fast throughout the month of Ramazan. Death and dying are not abhorred by Muslims especially because the prophet of Islam had encouraged remembering death as a check on engrossment in wordly pleasures.

The authentic faith, according to Islam, leads into seeking the will of God, and sets in as the ultimate goal of life. The mundane life, as it is explicitly given in the verses of the Holy Quran, is only a preparatory stage for the abiding existence where the true believers would attain eternal bliss in consequence the actions commended by Allah. These ideas are not necessarily restricted to Islam; they are also found in the Jewish, Christian, Hindu and Jainist religions (Smart, 1968).

The Muslim mystics hold love of God as the most advanced stage of spiritual development and self-transcendence. The most illustrious Muslim mystic-philosopher Al-Ghazzali has given a systematic exposition of this developed state of human consciousness which involves a kind of psychic transmutation (Al-Ghazzal 1962). The renowned mystic poet Rumi, who seems to strike a synthesis between the positions of Plato and Spinoza, anticipated Maslow through his concept of self-transcendence. Transcending beyond involvements in life and death enables an individual to attain the most developed stage of spiritual sublimation which, according to Rumi, is the goal of the biological future of man. (Rumi 1934),

The concept of self-transcendence which has been employed in this investigation is derived, however, from Frankl as it is quantitatively exhibited in the P. I. L. Test. In the absence of a test exhibiting the Islamic concept the investigators had no other alternative. It was taken for granted that those who strive for higher ends of life generally tend to transcend fear of death and disengage themselves from blind involvements in life.

Another assumption underlying the study pertains to the observation that the older generation of Muslims takes to religious practices very seriously. Through an intensive involvement in these practices they make preparations for the after-life or the AKHIRAT (as it is described in the Holy Quran). The variable carrying the age differentials could not therefore be neglected in the light of these considerations.

The significance of this investigation is derived from the fact that death anxiety has been studied in a cultural background where attitudes toward death drastically differ from those that have their roots in the modern western civilization which is governed by the scientific outlook. People in the west are, by and large, allergic to the ideas surrounding the fact of death. Death brings their mind into confrontation with a frightening meaningless void because to them the end of life means the end of existence as well. On the contrary death has a deep meaning and significance for the Indian mind to which the Muslims are no exception. Professor Toynbee (p. 130) has aptly remarked "A present day Christian monk's stalwart Christian faith makes death, for him a comparatively unimportant incident as it is for a Budhist who believes the possibility of obtaining Nirvana, or for a Hindu who believes that the "dweller in the innermost" of a human being's spirit is identical with the Ultimate Spiritual Reality that lies behind a universe that is "illusory". So it is with a Muslim who firmly believes that death is a gateway to the life which is real and abiding: *WAL AKHIRATO KHAIR UM WA ABQA* (Holy Quran). In the light of these assumptions a 2x2x2 factorial design was used to study the effects of age, religious faith and self transcendence on death anxiety. All the three independent variables were split up as 1. (a) Older subjects b) Younger subjects; 2. (a) High and (b) Low religious faith; and 3. (a) High degree of self transcendence and (b) Low degree of self transcendence. This design yielded eight groups of subjects. *A*. Younger having high religious faith and high degree of purposiveness in life; *B*. Younger having high religious faith and low degree of purposiveness in life; *C*. Younger having low religious faith and high degree of purposiveness in life; *D*. Younger having low religious faith and low degree of purposiveness in life. The same scheme repeated with the older subjects and denoted E, F, G, H, respectively. A sample of three hundred drawn from the educated population of Muslims consisted a graduate and post-graduate students, research scholars, teachers and persons from the non-teaching or the administrative staff of the Aligarh Muslim University. The age range of the younger group ran from 18 to about 30 years, and that of the older group from 40 to about 60 years. The original forms* of Putney and Middleton' (1961) Religious Ideology Scale and Crumbaugh and Maholick's (1969) Purpose In Life Test were given to both younger and older groups of subjects in order to sort out individuals having high and low religious faith and having high and low purposiveness in life from each group. The eight groups of subjects thus obtained consisted of 15 subjects each. Templer's (1970) Death Anxiety Scale (DAS) was administered on each group, and the scores were subjected to t-test and the analysis of variance with the view to obtaining the significance of differences in the means and for locating the interaction among the three independent variables. The F-ratio for the age variation turned out 4.71 (insignificant) suggesting an absence of difference with regard to death anxiety. The F-ratio for variation in PIL was 29.67 (significant at .01). These values tend to suggest that subjects having high degree of purposiveness in life are more afraid of death than their counterparts, with their mean of means at 9.03 and 5 24 respectively. F-ratio for religious faith variation was found to be 1.73 (insignificant) marking a clear absence of difference with respect to death anxiety. F-ratio for interaction between age and purpose in life was 77.19 (significant at .01), indicating an interactional effect of age and purpose in life on death anxiety. The insignificant values of F ratios for 1. interaction between age and religious faith, 2. between purpose in life and religious faith, and 3. among age, purpose in life and religious faith were 3.44, 3.83 and .005 respectively. Hence no interaction exists among these variables so far as death anxiety is concerned. The t-tests yielded a very strange finding Older and younger persons with high purposiveness in life tend to have a higher mean on the DAS. These findings run contrary to certain assumptions, and lead into very intriguing questions. Death anxiety is fairly prominent among those who may be said to have an orientation towards self-transcendence. Whereas it is true that the PIL measure of self-transcendence does not include the Islamic religious and mystic notions it does not at the same time fall inconsistent with the main thrust of Islamic religious and mystic philosophy which encourage self-transcendence. Nevertheless, the questions which pose themselves for an answer seem to be concerned more with the death perspective itself. What is more specific about death from the point of view of the religion of Islam are its consequences, both remote and immediate. The immediate consequences of death arise out one's fate in the grave about which definite beliefs are common among the Muslims. These beliefs generally surround the notion of punishment in the grave or *AZAB E QABR*. The remote consequences are believed to follow when one's destiny is unveiled, whether heaven or hell — at the day of judgement. These beliefs are part of the faith and any skeptic who dares to question them ceases to be a Muslim. This investigation however leaves these aspects of death perspective unexplored but they doubtlessly stimulate for a deeper probing.

It appears from a thoughtful handling of these findings that death being the antithesis of life-confined goals and purposeful strivings of a self-transcendent nature poses a threat to meaningfulness with which these goals and strivings are identified. This might be an underlying reason for the lurking fear of death in the minds of the respondents. This idea draws some reinforcement from the fact that the scores of the respondents who are not deeply involved in any purposeful orientation in life were low on the DAS.

These speculations on the part of investigators have led to the conclusion that death perspectives are to be re-examined in terms of their specific aspects and dimensions within the context of a particular philosophy, and death anxiety remains a diffused concept unless it is tied up with a specific dimension around which it really becomes effective. There may be an other-wordly dimension of death anxiety related to the firm faith of an individual that his fate in the other world lies entirely and exclusively in the hands of a Supreme Power who is absolutely just but who, at the same time is doubtlessly Merciful and Compassionate.

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V

"Plato's Republic and Hutter's New Jerusalem"

Stefan C. Christopher

For some time I have had a close knowledge, both personal and through the written word, of a little known group of communal Christians called the Hitterian Brethren. As I learned more about them, the likenesses between their social system and Plato's Republic (a utopian conception) forced themselves on my awareness. As I began to list likenesses and differences it soon became clear that there was a very strong parallelism. As far as I know, no one has seen this before, or, if they have seen it, they have not told it to the world at large.

Plato (427-347 B.C.) is a man well known in learned circles. Not so Jakob Hutter. Yet both men, by themselves, at different times and places, came up with quite like versions of what life ought to be like. The ideas of both men ought to be studied carefully and with respect. Jakob Hutter was born in the Puster Valley, South Tyrol, in about 1500, the son of a village hatmaker. He took up this trade himself, spending time as a journeyman in Klagenfurt, Carinthia. As a young man he was turned to Anabaptian, quite likely by Georg Blaurock, of Switzerland, one of the founders and early missionaries of this branch of Christianity. He lived through the Peasants Revolt in the Tyrol (1525) which was rather communistic, or at least socialistic, in programme. In 1529 he went to Moravia to look into rumors that the "New Jerusalem" had been founded there. Liking what he found, he joined a community of communistic Anabaptist which had been founded the year before under Jakob wiedemann. He was chosen as Bishop in 1533, and burned at the stake in 1536. During his three years as Bishop. he organized the community along rather Platonic lines, as this paper will show. The movement, still alive, now calls itself, after him, the *Hutterian Brethren*. The Brethren live in about 200 communes in Canada, the U.S A., the Phillipines and Japan.

From what little we know about the early life and training of Plato of Athens, and Jakob of Moos; it is clear that the weightiest factors in the growth of their thought lives were the life and teachings of Socrates, in the case of the former, and Christ, in the case of the latter. The strong, Socratic personality left its indelible mark upon the thought-life of Plato; popular late medieval German Christianity was likewise formative of Hutter's thinking. As young men, both doubtless became greatly interested in the social and civic life of their times. Plato was perhaps 23 years of age when the "thirty tyrants" came into control of Athens. During Hutter's teens, the official religion of the pious Tyrolese was changed seven times. Both, thus, lived through tyranny, which made for a feeling of disgust in their minds. The ruthless way in which the authorities put down any show of resistance aroused the bitter antagonism of both men reward those who worked with the government by serving as its functionaries. Both lived during their formative years at a time when the common people were being scandalized by corruption in high places.[1] Hutter turned to the realms of the "spiritual" to find a just society, Plato to the "Ideal". As an outcome of their close touch with everyday practical life, they thought through in th minds ideal ways of life which could be neared in real life.

The Platonic principle that knowledge is virtue was also taught by Hutter with a religious twist: virtue is knowledge of God, or faith. By this thinking, learning (for Hutter, religious learning) is of the greatest importance. Upon this belief more than any other, Plato's influence on Western civilization, and Hutter's influence in the *Hutterian Brethren* thrive.[2]

What is learning ? Hutter and Plato give their different but parallel answers in their epistemologies, The *will of God* (Hutter) or *Ideas* (Plato) are the ruling forces in life. Over against the uncertain changing senseworld, Hutter set up th. unending changeless *will of God*; Plato the realm of unending, changeless *Ideas*. We are but blurred images of God, to Hutter; of the Ideal Man, to Plato. Both taught an unchangeable reality. One found it in God, the other in Ideas. For Hutter, God's will alone stays forever and is worthwhile; for Plato, Ideas alone stay forever and are worthwhile.

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1 See Bogardus, Emory S., *The Development of Social Thought*, David McKay & Co., New York, 1968. p. 114. Hutterian writings of the period, dicussed below, Fairly reek with indignation as to the immorality of the ruling classes.

2 See *Organon*, Winter, 1971, "The Hutterian Brethren of Washington".

It is God's will alone which man must seek to know and understand, for Hutter; it is Ideas, for Plato.

Because of his religious outlook and of his early disgust with the politics of his day, Hutter turned away in his social philosophy from empirical observations in the Socratic or Aristotelian manner to a search for a just way of life through studying the will of God. Plato's aristocratic outlook played a like role, making him also at bottom a social philosopher, albeit a most dogmatic one. Plato's thinking finds expression chiefly in the *Republic*, written in Plato's middle age. Hutter's thinking finds expression chiefly in the *Rechenschaft* (Account of Our Faith) written by one of his followers, Peter Rideman, a few years after Hutter's death. In his old age, Plato wrote about these idealistic thoughts in the *Laws* and *Politics*. A few years after the Rechenschaft came out, the Hutterites gave forth *Das Gross Artikel Buch* (*The Great Article Book*).[3] These Platonic and Hutterian works, taken together, may be called works in social philosophy.

Both Plato's and Hutter's ideas of the beginnings of group life are interesting, though simple. Plato begins with man; Hutter with God. For Hutter, God made woman to meets man's needs, and thus began the first human group. Plato sets forth a social-contract origin of society. But instead of seeing why man should live together, man, to both Plato and Hutter, chose to follow his own selfish will. Plato and Hutter both see man as to begin with in paradise, and having fallen.

To Hutter, Christ redeemed man, so he can now get back to his original state, or regain paradise, if he but follow the New Testament Plan. Plato implies at least a relative restitution is possible if man but use his powers of reason.

Both Hutter and Plato see the ideal man as one who is temperate and self-controlled. They see man as having a free will, and do not hesitate to make value judgements. There are two sets of forces vieing for the mastary of the soul, a better and a worse principle. One leads to mastery of self; the other to self-slavery and opportunism.

Utopia

Inasmuch as Plato and Hutter had turned away from worldly careers to private lives of religious thought, the instruction of disciples, writing and public speeches, their communities assumed characteristics that were far from this-worldly. Hutter did found his New Order, and was burned at the stake for doing so. Plato lived to a ripe old age, like as not because he did not try to set up his Ideal State. Both Plato and Hutter predicated their utopias upon the assumption that they be small enough so that everybody could know everybody else. Plato limited his to 5 040 citizens, and no Hutterian community ever had more than 2 000 members. It is therefore, impossible to apply their social ideas rightly to a modern city of 100,000 people, or to a nation-state of 200 000 000; both thinkers had in mind *small communities, not large societies. Gemeinschaft*, not *Gesellschaft*, is their aim.

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[3] This book written in the manner of medieval theological disputations, consists of six "articles, or basic questions of faith, each defended by arguments listed "punktweis", or point by point.

In both the Republic and the New Jerusalem there is a hierachy of statue, which takes in three divisions of people. In Plato's Republic, there are the guerillas, the soldiers, and the artisans. In Hutter's New Jerusalem[4] these are the elders, cousin brothers, and sisters. Children and other dependents might be seen as a fourth division, but theoretically they are not an integral part of either community as such. Thus in introducing the ideal community both men use grown men and women. Out of the needs and through the doings of fully grown persons (in the New Jerusalem they are committed to unconditional compliance with the word of God) they build their ideal commonwealths.

Social Inequality

In both the Republic and the New Jerusalem, no man is an island unto himself. Each can do something best; by joining together all will be better off. There are not only the three divisions, but there is specialization within them. Part of the charter of a just community is that each shall find his place in the special order and shall fullfil his special role. The New Jerusalem and the Republic both see the need for putting the right man on the right job.

Most people are artisans and farmers.[5] Higher learning is as a rule not open to them. They get the common education, including plenty of exercise, and singing (Plato also adds musical instruments). It is useless to try to give a higher education to that large part of the people who are mentally incapable of getting any good out of it, particularly if the group has little need for it. To this both Hutter and Plato agree.

The baptized men (New Jerusalem) or soldiers (Republic) keep order at home. Stand for the community in dealing with the outside, and help the rulers in this and other work. They defend their way of life by word and deed, but in the New Jerusalem never with the sword. In both ways of life the citizens will never get away, however, either from war or other evils, and community life will thus always be a utopia in theory and cross in practice.

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[4] A term taken from the Apocalypse, and uncerstood by Hutterians to mean a true Christian community.

[5] The reader may assume that both the New Jerusalem and the public are being simultaneously described unless otherwise noted.

Every member of the New Jerusalem is to be a metaphorical soldier for Christ. In both the Republic and the New Jerusalem the soldier is seen as needing years of training. The chief trait of your true "Soldier" is courage. In the New Jerusalem, the chief trait is, of course, spiritual courage. One outcome of this is that the members are always urging their leaders to expand (the Republic) or make converts (the New Jerusalem).[6] This raises up enemies and either makes or breaks the community. On the other hand, if the citizens lose their militancy, seeking only to lead a peaceful life and to go about their affairs quietly, they degenerate, by degrees; their children do so too; in time, they find themselves at the mercy of the world and utopia comes to an end. This has happened twice to the New Jerusalem, once in the 17th and again in the 19th century.

Among the members of the community there will be a few especially able persons, destined by nature and reinforced by training, to be good rulers. They are lovers of wisdom and religion. Weakness of character, drunkeness, selfishness, are unbecoming to them. Selfish living is out. The rulers are characterized, according to both Plato and Hutter, by the greatest eagerness to do *what is for the good of their community*. They show utter repugnance to anything that is against the best interests of the group.

The elders (New Jerusalem) or guardians (Republic) rule aristocratically. They do not seek the will of the commoners on every little thing, for the same reason that a teacher does not always ask the wishes of his pupils. They lead the way in showing an indifference to earthly or material things and always seek social righteousness. The three divisions develop an occupational or role psychology. Each develops occupationally conditioned feelings.

As stated above, all members of both communities get a basic education. At around twenty years of age they must pass a general education test (religious, in the New Jerusalem) in order that they may become candidates for guardianship of the Republic, or baptism in the New Jerusalem. They may then get practical training in leadership. During middle age, those who have shown fitness may be raised to the board of elders, or co-opted by the guardians, as the case may be. We may say they have passed a practical examination lasting several years. It is at this time that they become fully responsible for the practical life of the community by holding major offices. Only after reaching adulthood are they allowed to be exposed to serious temptations.

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[6] At the present time, Hutterian Communities divide, or "split" upon reaching a size of between 100 & 200 souls.

Prospective rulers are watched by the existing rulers for many years. This watching, or informal test, is three-fold. The first test is that of logic; they must be able to argue convincingly that it pays one to serve the group. The second test is that of fear; they are faced with dangers, physical or moral. The third test is that of pleasure; they must show they can resist all the pleasures which tempt the flesh.

In other words, they must show proof that the highest interest of the community is to be the ruling interest of their lives. Neither pain nor threats must affect their loyalty. The temptations which come from pleasures or the like must not disturb their self-control nor weaken their qualities as rulers. From this it will be seen that there is a long time of deep and broad training from the rulers. This thought is greatly different from the old theory of the divine right of kings and from the current practice of handing out political spoils to friends.

Though the spirit be willing, the flesh be weak. The rulers once chosen and put in office may become tyrannical. It is not always easy, after good rulers have been found, to keep them that way. To keep them good rulers and to take away the strong temptation to wink at greed, some safeguards are built into the plans of the New Jerusalem and Republic. The rulers, (and all the members, in the New Jerusalem) may own nothing beyond a few personal effects. They shall not live in their own houses, but shall dwell and eat together. They shall get from the community all that they need, but no more. They shall not buy and sell for gain, nor primp themselves with gold and silver. (In the New Jerusalem, these points hold for all, not the rulers only.) In the Republic, rulers shall be taught that they are made of gold. In the New Jerusalem, all shall be taught that the streets of their eternal city, i e. their way of life, are made of gold, i.e., is the way of truth. They therefore, in both cases, shall have no need of earthly tinsel They shall not be in touch with outsiders, except in the New Jerusalem, and there only as shall be needful to sell to or buy from them what the community cannot practically make for itself, to help the poor with aims, or to convert the unbelieving. If the rulers in either community should get any privileges in the way of lands, moneys, or homes of their own (in the New Jerusalem this of course applies to *all*) they could not give their single-minded attention to the community, and they would not become guardians of the welfare of the members, but tyrants, centers of intrigue. In zealous care that the rulers may not be distracted from guarding single mindedly the welfare of the community, the New Jerusalem has strict community of goods, with no difference made between the elder and the common brother; in the Republic it is enough that the guardians have community of goods, but they must go even further, and hold wives in common as well.

Socialization

The question may be asked : Will the people accept the division of the Population into hierarchal parts ? Hutter and Plato answer that the power of Public opinion be made use of, and that all those who live in the community be taught that they are brothers that is, children of their common Father, God (New Jerusalem) or Mother, Earth (Republic). This will keep them humble. Further, they are told that different talents have been given by God the Father or Earth the Mother to His or Her several children. Some have more talents, others less. Those persons who have more have the power to rule and may become rulers. Those who have less may become soldiers (the common brothers in the New Jerusalem). Others must be content with no special distinction at all (artisans, or women). But all are just as dear to Father God and Mother Earth and none have special rights not needed to do their jobs.

The objection may be raised by the disinterested observer that this is but an "opiate", one which a smart man will not be taken in by. The truth of the objection, namely that many will disbelieve, is admitted, and a solution of the problem is put forth. Teach the children when they are young, and when they are old they will not depart from the divine (Ideal) way. When they grow up, furthermore, they will tell their children, who in turn will teach it. This will go on and on. In the New Jerusalem, others, from the outside, will, from time to time, believe the message because of inspired preaching backed up by Godly lives. In this way Plato and Hutter founded their social philosophies upon propaganda. Any kind of ideology can be foisted upon a people through the use of the schools. A few bad rulers by controlling or neglecting the educational system, can ruin a community in a generation. In this both men agree.

Role Assignment

The rulers are told to test the children in order to find their talents. Plato and Hutter admit that talent is likely to found in the children of the common brethren as well as in the children of the elders, or, in the Republic, in any of the three divisions. If a talented child is found, he is to be encouraged and trained in line with that talent. If a child is not talented, a meaningful place should be made for him, too, and he should be helped to accept that place. Both men saw the fact that geniuses are born among all parts of society from the highest to the lowest. The community, therefore, should seek out smart children and give them the chance to grow in a socially acceptable way and not allow their gifts from God to be snuffed out.

Those well suited to the raising of children should be chosen, furthermore, and the children of the community should be raised by them, not necessarily their own natural parents. This ensures that children will be raised in a sympathetic, but objective way, and minimizes the likelihood that children will be spoiled by overindulgence, or brutalized by impatience.

The rulers are to oversee marriage. It is too bad that almost all persons choose their life-partners because of things which have little to do with the realities of their later married life. The marriage tie should not be firstly an individual thing, but should be ruled by the thought of the children not yet born and by due thought for the welfare of the family and community. The true purpose of marriage is not found in wealth or power or rank. but in the begetting of healthy-minded children. Marriage is highly sacred because it is a needful part of God's plan, for Hutter, or the Ideal, for Plato. Marriage between persons who are not alike is deplored in the New Jerusalem, but applauded in the Republic. Persons should marry who are temperamentally and in other ways alike in Hutter's utopia, or, in Plato's different. Marriage, in both, is sacred, and hence should be under strict safeguards, including eugenic ones. In the New Jerusalem, the purpose of eugenics is to prevent the unwanted effects of in breeding; in the Republic, it is to make the overall quality of the stock better. Both with respect to views on homogeneity and eugenics in mate selection, the New Jerusalem shows itself the more realistic by modern standards.

An Economic Golden Mean

The rulers shall keep the community from becoming either rich or poor. Poverty is the mother of meanness and cruelty, and wealth leads to pride and laziness. Both lead to discontent and both cause the breakdown of true religion. (Even the Humanist Plato was in favor of "true religion".) The poor group cannot properly equip itself or train itself; the rich community will grow careless and no longer work hard.

In the getting of wealth, the laws of imitation work powerfully. One person gets goods; others are right away moved to do likewise. In outcome, all may become lovers of money. But a money-loving leadership would be the downfall of the community. Hutter applies this to all the citizens.

The larger amount of wealth that one gets, the more he will want to get. The momentum of the wish for money-getting tears the group apart. The more one is taken in by wealth-getting. the less attention does he give to virtue. When the wish for goodness is in competition with the wish for riches, the former wanes as the latter waxes.

When the group becomes built up on a private property foundation, the rich have power and the poor do not. Usually, the rich care no more for the welfare of the poor than they do for goodness. On this and other grounds, private property has no place among the guardians of the Republic, or in the New Jarusalem at all.

When you see a group that has become poor, you may safely believe that somewhere thieves and other sinners are also there. The causes of pouperian are 1. lack of proper schooling, 2. ill training and 3. unjust ordinances or an unjust administration by the rulers.

The two big economic evils are wealth and poverty. As Plato said, "One is the parent of luxury and indolence, and the other of meanness and viciousness, and both of discontent." Therefore for Hutter and Plato, to be poor in spirit means to share worldly goods with the other citizens or brethren, not do without them, as a rule.

In both ways of thinking, there are two ways of hindering great wealth and poverty: legislation and education. Each guardian in the Republic, and each member in the New Jerusalem is to be guaranteed a set amount of goods, in the form of furniture, clothing, books, and the like. He may get more, but not so much that his life style differs apparently from the other guardians or brethren. The community should quite rightly insist that, beyond trivia, a guardian or brother, if moved by the right spirit. will willingly share what he gets from any source, with all the other guardians or brothers, unless he has gotten it from the community itself

The rulers shall be consors in both the Republic and the New Jerusalem. They shall consor incoming communications in order to protect the children from seeing and hearing evil. Works of fiction, particularly, shall be censored in order to keep the children from reading and taking over bad thoughts, Vice and intemperance shall not be shown in order that the young may not grow up in an atmosphere dirtied by pictures of filth, and in order that the children may grow up seeing fair sights and may get unhindered and unhampered the good in everything. Thus in both the Republic and the New Jerusalem, children are to be raised in a clean and controlled environment.

The rulers shall guard the mores. Since the plans of both the New Jerusalem and the Republic are held to be faultless, any change would mean going backwards. Hence, the rulers should carefully guard the folk ways, allowing nothing new which is not needful to stay alive in a changing world. If change were to take place in small things, there might be no stopping the spirit of change, and fundamentals might be lost sight of too.

The New Jerusalem and the Republic rest upon the education of wise leaders, and the selection and training of leaders who will act conservatively. Ordinances should be as few as can be, for they tend to be too rigid and inflexible. In view of the changeable character of human conditions, no final nor absolute ordinances can be laid down. The chief advantage of ordinances, however, is not that they make men honest, but that they make men act the same, and hence in a socially forseeable way. Ordinances are to be respected because they are the outcome of long experience, and because in the New Jerusalem, they give one a way of showing his yieldedness to the community and to God.

Punishment for disobedience is a part of the ordinances. Because custom is sacred and ordinances needful, obedience is a highly important virtue. The New Jerusalem and the Republic use punishment, not to get even but as a preventative and reformatory measure. Reformation is the true aim of punishment. It is, nevertheless, sometimes needful, for the good of the whole to be rigid and harsh. For example, in the New Jerusalem, he who will not work shall not eat. He may of course leave the community.

There is a division of labor between the sexes. In the Republic, the sexes are theoretically equal; in the New Jerusalem both enjoy the fulness of the priesthood of Jesus Christ. Men are stronger than women, and in the New Jerusalem, are held to be, both by training and nature, different in interests and temperament. Hence some occupations are more fitting for men, others for women There is nothing degrading in this for either sex; each sex is respected.

Child-bearing is highly valued and it is therefore fitting that woman devote much of their lives to the rearing of children. But all women, as well as men, should have the opportunities for the development of their potentialities, the first aim of all the members. In the New Jerusalem this means potential for sanctity. a narrowing of Platonic humanism. Those women who have special talent for this or that are free to develop it, consistent with their duties to family and community. This, of course, is true of men as well. Members of the New Jerusalem are conservative Christians, and that means they conserve the rights of women too, different though they be from the rights of men in some instances. In the Republic the rights of men and women are the same. In both the Republic and the New Jerusalem, it is held to be fitting for women to be knowledgable and well trained. Hence they receive the same opportunites for schooling as men,

Although both the Platonic and Hutterian philosophies place a negative value on change, both are for a dynamic type of education. This schooling, however, is to be definitely controlled by the rulers. It is also paternalistic. Common schooling is of two kinds: in the Republic, gymnastic and musical; in the New Jerusalem, vocational and religious. Gymastics and vocational training are "temporal"; music and religious training are "spiritual". The temporal without the spiritual produces a clever brute; the spiritual without the temporal brings poverty with its evils. The two together produce the moderate, practical man.

Learning is not a process of memorizing facts only, but of the development of the powers within the individual. In the New Jerusalem, this is understood in the narrow sense of powers of knowing God's will and making a living. Learning goes on throughout life, from birth to death. However, it slows up as one grows old. An aged man cannot learn much, any more then he can run much. But for the most part he need not learn much, for he has gotten a measure of wisdom, and he need not run much for there are younger men at hand to do such things. Learning in the early years of life is stressed. A child is taught early to respect his parents. Great care should be given to the first years of life. From three to six years of age the children in the New Jerusalem and the Republic come under the supervision of chosen women.

Anyone may take school courses but (above childhood in the New Jerusalem) they do not have to, if they do not want to. The laws of imitation are to be used; the teacher shall practice what he preaches.

A well-taught man or woman is the group writ small. Religion plays a basic role in both the New Jerusalem and the Republic. Belief in God takes over from teaching that might is right. Impiety undermines the strength of the Kingdom. In the New Jerusalem, God and the Community are one, for the community is the Body of Christ. God made man for himself. It therefore follows that God created the individual for the whole, but not the whole for the individual. Plato agrees with this conclusion, although he arrives at it differently. The worship of God is needful for a person in order to deep him from going back to beastiality and from making his humanitarian beliefs purely selfish. For Plato, religion is a means to an end, namely the Republic; for Hutter, the New Jerusalem is a means to religious sanctification.

Stability

Inasmuch as the New Jerusalem and the Republic are, in theory, perfect communities, without spot or wrinkle, any change would likely mean a change for the worse. But even members of utopia are not immune to the entry of destructive thoughts. The rulers are not proof against the temptations of power. To take away the stirrings of self-interest in the minds of the rulers, they are to share and share alike. In the New Jerusalem, of course, this is applied to the membership on the whole as well.

In spite of good safeguards the wisdom of the best elders will from time to time fail them. Sooner or later they will err. Communities will weaken and break up. But the Holy Spirit, in the Anabaptist view, or Human Reason, in the Platonic, will always come to the rescue and renew or refound. There will always be a remnant of the New Jerusalem somwhere until the end of the world. The parallel idea is that the ideals of the Republic will never disappear.

VI

Affect of a "Warm" or "Cold" Personality on Differences in Human Foreplay, Afterplay, and Communication in the Coital Relationship

Peter O. Peretti and Jennifer Gravitt

Erotic foreplay and afterplay during the coital relationship is essential to satisfaction in sexual intercourse (Rutgers, 1959) for human beings. Erotic love is the craving for complete fusion; for sexual union of one person with another. The foreplay and afterplay aid in creating a unity of two participating beings, in essence, as if they were saying to each other "we are all part of one; we are one" (Fromm, 1956). During the course of these activities, each partner attempts to increase excitement for the other; to bring about a pitch of fever and intensity which will prevail throughout the love-making and lead to complete fulfillment of the act (O'Conner, 1972). Moreover, these forms of love-play give a psychological basis for the total coital relationship in terms of total commitment of each partner to the other, total intimate acceptance, care, and affection. These partners seem to form a continuity of communion or sharing in the sequence of activities (Rutgers, 1959; Van de Velde, 1969).

Foreplay and afterplay can be considered from two viewpoints: physical activities, such as kissing, touching. hugging, caressing, and massaging (Long, 1967: McCary, 1967), and verbal communication or talking to one another (Long, 1967; Cox, 1968; Pierson and D'Antonio 1974). Masters and Johnson (1966) consider both activities significant in the total human sexual response pattern consisting of four phases: excitement, plateau, orgasm, and resolution. Consideration and tenderness of each other during this love-play demonstrates from one partner to the other the love and understanding present at the most intimate level. They also prepare each other (during foreplay) physically for the sexual union by executing preseminal flow in the male; pre coital secretion in the female.

Communicating between sexual partners both *before and after* the sexual union is part of the essence of the human loving relationship. Words spoken at these times reflect the language of intimacy (Allen and Martin, 1971). Outward expressions of mutual affection, endearment, and concern greatly enhance the mutual personal feelings, satisfactions, and bonds of love (Groves, Groves, and Groves, 1959). When each person has a genuine affection for the other, the honest expression of positive emotional feelings during the periods of foreplay and afterplay, when coupled with a mutual intensive desire for sexual intercourse can lead to an experience extraordinary in its richness — a pleasant, satisfying memory for all time !

Asch (1946), Mensh and Wishner (1947), Kelley (1950), and Veness and Brierley (1963) found personal "warmth" or "coldness" significant in interpersonal perception. Further, they found these cue traits of personality to be central to personality impressions of others by different groups of judges. Peretti (1969; 1971; 1974; 1975) through factor analysis and other statistical procedures found eight variables strongly associated with "warmth" in personality impressions, and eight associated with "coldness." A "warm" and "cold" scale were constructed on the bases of such variables, and a questionnaire was constructed to measure "warm" or "cold" personality features relative to it. These scales were used to measure the extent of "warmness" or "coldness" of personalities. Of note is the fact that these variables do include terms such as interest, concern, and understanding, which are important in love-play as well as in communication between partners in the coital relationship. Therefore, such expressions of communication, or active demonstration through the foreplay or afterplay can be said to be associated with "warmness" or "coldness" demonstrated in the sexual relationship.

The forthcoming study was conducted to determine the extent to which (1) "warm" or "cold" personalities of sexual partners affected foreplay, afterplay, and communication in the coital relationship, and (2) "warmness" or "coldness" was demonstrated through communication or love-play during the sequence of activities.

METHOD

Subjects : Sixty married couples were randomly selected from the marital files of a protestant church. These couples had been married from 3 to 5 years. and they ranged in age from 25 to 38 yrs. The mean for marital status was 4.2 yrs., while the mean for age was 34 males; 30 for females. Both the marital status yr. range and the age in yr. range were chosen in attempting to somewhat acquire a relatively stable response in the coital relationship. It was assumed that being married for less than 3 yrs., and/or being less than 25 yrs. in age might lead to an increased "warm" responsiveness in the activity which might not be present when the marriage and partners had "more maturity".

Materials : A "warm-cold" personality questionnaire consisting of items found associated with "warm" and "cold" personality variables (See Peretti, 1971; 1975). Responses to this instrument provided an index of "warmness" or "coldness" of the personality of each *S*.

A structured interview guide consisting of ten questions each for the variables of foreplay, pre-communication, afterplay, and post-communication. Each question could be answered with a "yes" or "no", although the interviewer might use probe questions for further clarification of responses.

The variables were operationalized on the interview guide as follows :

Foreplay and afterplay : Touching; kissing; caressing; hugging, and massaging.

Pre and post communication : words of affection; endearment; interest; concern, and understanding.

Questions were randomly mixed on the instrument to help avoid response or habit-set by the interviewees.

Hypotheses : Five hypotheses were tested in the study. They were stated in null form and included the following :

1. There will be no difference in foreplay, afterplay, pre and post-communication in the coital relationship between sexual partners with "warm" or "cold" personalities.

2. There will be no difference in the demonstration of acts of foreplay between sexual partners with "warm" or "cold" personalities.

3. There will be no difference in the demonstration of acts of afterplay between sexual partners with "warm" or "cold" personalities.

4. There will be no difference in the demonstration of pre-communication between sexual partners with "warm" "cold" personalities.

5. There will be no difference in the demonstration of post-communication between sexual partners with "warm" or "cold" personalities.

PROCEDURE

The selection of subjects took place by analyses of individual files in the marital collection at the church to select all possible couples listed who might fit the age and marital status desired for the study. Using a random sampling technique, sixty married couples were chosen from this population.

All of the subjects were contacted by members of the church office and told details of the study by church officials. At this time, they were also asked if they might like to volunteer as a participant. Of the initial sixty couples randomly chosen, there were seven that chose not to participate in the study. An additional sampling was taken from the files for their replacement.

Both the "warm-cold" personality questionnarie and the structured interview guide were administered to the *S*s in their homes during evening hours convenient for them. The people could take as much time as they wanted to think about their responses before giving them. Probe questions were used with the interview guide to provide a clearer understanding of the "yes" or "no" response required for each question. The *S*s were encouraged to speak as freely as possible to aid completeness of responses.

Completed questionnaires were processed to determine the "warm" or "cold" personality of each marital partner. The sixty couples were divided into 3 groups for further analyses in terms of their "warmness" or "coldness" as a group, i.e., where both partners were "warm", they were placed in a "warm" group; where both partners were "cold," they were placed in a "cold" group, and, when the partners were "mixed" (one "warm" and one "cold"), they were placed in a "mixed" group. Data collected from the interviews were compiled and treated by each individual group as well as by the total for all couples.

The questionnaire allowed the *S*s to be divided into one of three groups: "warm," "cold," or "mixed," while the interview allowed data to be gathered on the demonstration of acts of foreplay, afterplay, pre and post communication. Quantitative treatment of data and statistical techniques were accomplished by means of a computer analysis.

RESULTS

Data gathered from the *S*s are presented in Table 1.

Responses to the personality questionnaire were tallied with reference to the "warm," "mixed," or "cold" personality of the couples and to the related criterion measure. For the latter, the data were analyzed individually comparing responses for the three groups of *S*s. It can be noted in the Table that there were significant differences among the couples in each of the criterion. A contingency coefficient (C) was computed with the chi-square (X^2) to indicate the strength of association between the responses, and the strength of asso iation was strong.

	Subjects (N=120)							
	Warm (N=40)		Mixed (N=40)		Cold (N=40)			
	Responses							
Criteria	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	X^{2a}	C
Foreplay	968 (857.9)	232 (342.1)	813 (857.4)	387 (342.6)	791 (856.7)	409 (343.3)	75 22	.62
Pre-Communication	876 (770.1)	324 (429.9)	702 (769.4)	498 (430.6)	730 (768.5)	470 (431.5)	62.46	.59
Afterplay	802 (738.3)	398 (461.7)	726 (737.8)	474 (462.2)	684 (735.9)	516 (464.1)	28.63	.44
Post-Communication	722 (673.6)	428 (526.4)	633 (673.2)	567 (526.8)	615 (673.2)	585 (526.8)	49.60	.54

[a] $X^2_{.05}$ (df=2)=5.99; $X^2_{.01}$ (df=2)=9.21; $X^2_{.001}$ (df=2)=13.82

Regarding foreplay, "warm" couples had the greatest number of "yes" responses (968) and the least number of "no" responses (232) when compared with "mixed" and "cold" *S*s. There was a significant difference ($X^2=75.22$, df=2, $p<.000$) of acts of foreplay among couples from the different groups The calculated $C=.62$ indicated a very strong relationship between persons in each group and their foreplay responses. Of the four criteria being examined, foreplay was found to have the greatest difference in responses between couples in the three groups.

A significant difference ($X^2=62.46$, df=2, $p<.000$) was found in acts of pre-communication among the couples, with the most acts being performed by partners of the "warm" group (876) and the least by partners of the "mixed" (702). There was a strong relationship among the respondents ($C=.59$). In terms of acts of demonstration *BEFORE* the sex act, it can be noted that "warm" couples tend to perform the most foreplay and tend to communicate the most with each other, as compared to couples in the "mixed" and "cold" groups.

"Warm" couples engaged in the most afterplay (802), while those with "cold" personalities engaged in the least (684). There was a significant difference ($X^2=28.63$, df=2, $p<.000$) in performance with a strong relationship ($C=.44$). Although statistically significant differences were found, of the four criterion measures, discrepancies of performance were least among the *S*s in this category of response.

Post-communication was the most between "warm" couples (772) and least between "cold" (615) with a resulting significant difference ($X^2=49.60$, df=2, $p<.000$). The strength of association between the personality of the couples and the criterion measure was again found to be strong ($C=.54$).

In terms of acts of demonstration *AFTER* the sex act, it can be noted, in Table 1, that "warm" couples tend to perform the most afterplay and tend to communicate with each other the most, as compared to couples in the "mixed" or "cold" groups. Further, the Table indicates two trends in data, namely :

(1) As one goes across the Table from "warm" to "cold" responses, there is a general decrease in "yes" responses and an increase in "no" answers. This suggests a greater demonstration of acts of each criterion measure as the couples have personalities from both "warm" to both "cold." When either partner is different from the other (one "warm"; one "cold") then performance tends to be between that of couples from the other two groups.

(2) As one reads down the Table from foreplay to post-communication, there is a general decrease in "yes" responses under

each personality category with an increase in "no" answers. This suggests that, regardless of the personality of the couples, there tends to be a greater activity level *BEFORE* the sex act than *AFTER*. Holding personality constant, it can be noted that although activity does decrease, each criterion is comparatively more for the "warm" couples than it is for those in the "mixed" or "cold" group.

CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION

Personality factors of "warm" or "cold" by married couples do influence the coital relations, in particular, foreplay, afterplay and communication. The data indicated significant differences in the demonstration of such acts, therefore, the first null hypothesis was rejected. It might be concluded that the more "warm" each partner, the greater the frequency of occurrence of each of these criterion measures. Moreover, there will be a greater concern and interest in mutual pleasure, satisfaction, and happiness than when partners are either "cold" or "mixed."

Foreplay was found to be significantly greater in couples with a "warm" personality, therefore, the second null hypothesis was rejected. During probe questions in interview sessions, the *S*s in the "warm" group stressed the importance of this form of love-play more than any other group. It might be concluded that they considered as part of the coital relationship touches, manual caresses, and kisses of all types and in greater degrees than other *S*s. They had a sense of delight, pleasure, sexual stimulation in the mutual sharing of activities leading to the unity of the coital relationship.

Among the responses of "yes" to foreplay, couples of each group stressed the importance of propinquity or "nearness" in the relationship. Regardless of the display of acts of foreplay, the ideal situation was to be near each other. It seemed as if partners were very close in physical proximity, then they would emit a kind of "warmth" to each other To touch, tease, kiss, hug, and massage each other in this physical closeness tended to enhance delicate emotional, affectual feelings of love and desire. Increased foreplay by each mate, regardless of personality group, seemed to lead to highest peaks of excitement, tenderness, and outward expressions of mutual affection. Love not only begets love; it also begets greater sexual responsiveness and understanding.

Afterplay was significantly greater for the "warm" personalities leading the rejection of the third hypothesis. Compared with foreplay, there was a general decrease in this activity for partners in all personality groups. From the feminine viewpoint, this phase of love play might be considered the most significant ! Sexual responsiveness and sexual longing during the coital relationship are much longer for the woman, therefore, the man tends to display negligence, ignorance, or lack of concern when he does not continue to demonstrate acts of touching, kissing, caressing, and the like after completion of the sex act. It can be concluded from the responses of the female *S*s that they feel the need for afterplay tends to seal and confirm the intensification of love attained in the sexual communion. Further, they suggested that it allows them to feel that for their mate, the acts of love and tenderness were not over all at once with the ejaculatory release, but endured and echoed throughout their very nature with a strengthening of unity between the couples for all time !

The fourth hypothesis was rejected as pre-communication was significantly greater for the "warm" couples. In responses to the interview, they maintained that they talked more to each other, as compared to couples in the other groups. Communication included words of affection, endearment, and consideration. The most important subject matter centered on *love for each other*. During the course of the foreplay, the communication tends to aid in the finer stimulations of each partner, especially in psychic stimulations, and enhance the total intoxication of the partner in the total physical and emotional communion of the coital relationship. Tender words aid in the scene by increasing and enhancing emotional pleasure and arousing desire in the sexual partner.

Post communication was significantly greater for "warm" couples, hence, the fifth hypothesis was rejected. Data from the interviews suggested that affectionate words by each mate after the sex act tended to maintain and sustain the aura surrounding the complete relationship. For couples with a "warm" personality, it might be concluded that this aura is longer lasting and more stablized than it might be for "cold" or "mixed" personalities. Further, both male and female *S*s, in each group, stated that post-communication was essential for a display of consideration and understanding of the other partner. Neither partner is totally aware of the extent to which the other has reached his peak of satisfaction in the relationship, or the extent to which the desires and satisfactions of the act have subsided within the person. Increased post-communication aids in increasing and ensuring sexual satisfactions over an extended time period.

Collectively, whatever the criterion measure—foreplay, afterplay, pre and post-communication—there was greater demonstration of such acts by couples with a "warm" personality. It might have been assumed from the criteria of the "warm-cold" personality questionnaire leading to their categorization in this group. Expressions of interest, concern, and understanding, to mention a few, are associated with "warmth" more so than with "coldness" of personality. The "warm" personality is also concerned with the other person and reciprocity and mutualness in the relationship are stressed. The conjugal relationship must always be the outward expression of *mutual affection* if it is to yield its highest pleasures and satisfactions. For the wife, the sexual partner is called "compagnon" in French; "compagno" in Italian — the other half that makes a husband complete ! The unity extends in a loving adaptation of the bodies, minds, and souls of *both* parties to the coital relationship. It is a union, a unity of two souls but a single thought—two hearts that beat as one !

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VII

On My Knowledge of Other Minds

Archana Roy

I live in a world of things and beings, both inanimate and animate. My living in the world is a continuous adjustment with the environment, comprising of both persons and things. My actions and reactions depend to a considerable extent on things or persons I am dealing with. In my relation with objects, such as using, making or repairing them, I am hardly ever conscious of myself as an identical self. When conversing, arguing or communicating with persons I am more often unconscious than conscious of myself as a distinct entity yet such an awareness continues to be an underlying reality of myself. Self consciousness depends to a great extent on the situation in which I am, whether in a company of friends, or in that of an opposing group challenging my views or authority. The question of self knowledge vis-a-vis knowledge of other minds is, however, not an empirical question requiring illustration from actual situations to substantiate the truth of other minds. It is a highly abstract philosophical question demanding logical certainty of the nature of self knowledge.

If I know most certainly to have certain mental states of thinking, feeling, willing etc., can I know the mental states of others in the same way ? Further, in what radical way should my knowledge of other minds differ from a similar knowledge of physical objects ? Since both are 'other' than myself in the sense that they continue to maintain their distinctiveness in spite of my having socio-physical relations with them, philosophically speaking I cannot know them in the way I know myself. Such has indeed been the barrier between myself and others with the empiricist philosophers of 17th and 18th centuries as well as linguistic philosophers of recent times. The analogical argument provided by Berkeley continued to hold ground for long in our knowledge of other minds until it got rejected for some of its obvious weaknesses. The one strong reason against analogy is that it may lead to strongest of beliefs but never guarantee knowledge of any kind whatever.

Philosophical scepticism is generally characterised by its own method of doubt and question in the face of all empirical evidence. Descartes believed in doubting all that could possibly be doubted. Yet such doubts have a peculiarly philosophical character in the sense that it is initiated on grounds different from our own. Here the doubt is not evoked by possibilities of error or mistaken knowledge that one is capable of having with respect to objects of experience. Philosophers doubt not because they have to but because they like to and their scepticism is based on logical considerations of an entirely different kind. Such has been the nature of scepticism advocated by John Wisdom in a series of articles of knowledge of Other Minds as well as on The Concept of Mind (1950-51) published not as a criticism on Professor Ryle's the concept of Mind but as a continuation of it. Assuming the Sceptic's position Prof. Wisdom observes that Arabella can never be certain of what goes on in Bill's mind inspite of the fact that everytime she has claimed to know Bill's mental states, she has proved herself successful. But the sceptic insists that she can never have the ground nor the reason to know for certain what goes on in Bill's mind. The knowledge she claims for Bill's mind is not really that of Bill but Arabella herself which she mistakenly claims as if she were undergoing Bill's mental states and experience. The sceptic says, "Exactly so, when Arabella's statement becomes really one about herself she knows better than anyone else whether it is right, but while it is still about Bill she doesn't know it to be right like she would were it about herself, that is, like Bill does, G.N.A. Vesey's ed. *Body and Mind*, 1964, p. 372. Such sceptical statements about other minds leads Prof. Wisdom to observe, "It is tempting to infer that no one ever knows anything about the mind of another and even that no one over has any right to assert anything about the mind of another, since it is not true that on some other occasion he has been better placed and had then the reason, the ground, the data, the premiss he now lacks." Ibid, p. 372.

No empirical evidence of any kind can dissuade the sceptic from doubting consistently about the knowledge of other minds. Descartes' *Cogito ergo Sum* seems to be at the root of such scepticism. His 'I think, therefore, I am' is a self-evident proposition whose truth does not depend upon any collateral existence of other things and beings of the world. It seems as if it can stand alone by itself to know its thinking nature and thereby its own existence. If anyone should doubt Robinson Crusoe's credibility of identifying himself, left alone in a deserted island, his argument does not affect Descartes' *res cogitans.* His 'I think' is not an empirical subject standing in invariable relation with other beings of the world, but the logical subject which in the process of doubting realises the absurdity of infinite regress. Consequently he comes to the logically indubitable proposition that doubting itself provides the most certain existence of the doubter who thinks.

Going the Cartesian way we suppose that it is possible for *res cogitans to* apprehend itself in a wor'd of universal scepticism. It is like bracketting the world and suspending judgement on everything around which leads him to realise that his thinking implies his necessary existence. If the conception of such a self is a logical possibility, it certainly is not an empirical proposition holding true in the world of everyday experience. Referring to Descartes' I think, therefore, I am' Wittgenstein observed that the proposition indicates the limit of the world and not a part of it. A very significant emphasis indeed. Not being a constituent of the world, no relationship with worldly objects and persons can explain the nature of Descartes self which thinks and exists alone. It seems that his thinking self is an entity which being alone in the world could still maintain its meaningfulness. If anyone should doubt the truth of such a solipsistic proposition, he is raising the question empirically i.e. indicating the absurdity of the issue in a different perspective altogether. He is asking the relevance of a singly apprehended subjective proposition in a world in which there is no scope of apprehension of its meaningfulness. Propositions are meaningful or true when they are meaningful to the person who speaks and also to the person who hears. The whole discussion about its meaningfulness or truth falls through when A asserts his most certain existence without B or C understanding them. On the other hand A's assertion that he exists can be true only if B or C existing at the same time can know from A's assertion that he exists.

All philosophical thinking about the nature of minds need not follow the Cartesian way. We need not conceive self-against-the world as the first proposition of self consciousness. In fact we find enough evidence in the writings of both the linguistic and phenomenological thinkers like Wittgenstein, Gilbert Ryle, Brentano, Husserl, Martin Heidegger and others for whom the self is not conceived against the world. Rather the self is defined in co operation, and company with the world even to be primarily aware that he is or he is his identical self. It is a different approach altogether in the sense that the concept of the person as a unity of mind and body is the starting point, the basic datum of further philosophical investigations. The primacy of the human person is perhaps the stepping stone to all knowledge of mental characteristics, whether of the individual himself or those of others. The reason for thinking thus lies in the further fact of communication between person and person, in relations of 'I and You' as well as of 'he, she or they'. When Descartes' self-enclosed-self is left out of account, the importance of self-knowledge is not reduced to the minimum. Thus in criticising Descartes' notion of self we do not subscribe to Gilbert Ryle's concept of mind brought at par with knowledge of other minds. We do not assume any third person behavioural approach in dealing with either self knowledge or knowledge of other minds.

If we substitute Strawson's concept of persons for Descartes concept of mind we do so with the specific purpose of rejecting the Cartesian barrier between self-knowledge and knowledge of other minds. Perhaps as persons we can meet, whereas as minds we remain eternally apart. Only we would like to take a step forward to Strawson although accepting his primary concept of a person in the unique combination of P and M predicates.[1] Our tentative contention is that no individual recognises himself as a composite unit of two disparate characteristics. A person is a person, a unique being having physical characteristics and mental dispositions and abilities. He is not two in one but simply one, having both the characteristics. He may refer to his body or particular parts of the body, but never in the light of having or possessing them. For instance, he says, 'I am 55 Kg, and short statured ? If at times his identification is primarily with reference to his physical features, at other times he is totally oblivious that he has a body when absorbed in some arduous intellectual work. But he does not cease to be his body when preoccupied with mental operations, just as he does not cease to be a human being with specific mental attributes when he identifies himself with his physical features. The unity of the person is a unique fusion or amalgamation which accepting both the mental and physical characteristics rejects composition of the human person in terms of its elemental characteristics. The phenomenologist's account of the person unlike that of the linguistic philosopher is a dynamic unity which is disclosed in the immediate 'presencing' of the individual in the lived world of experience. As Frings observed, "True, each [illegible] has a body and mind, but the individuality of the person [illegible]t come about in such having a (qualitatively) different body [illegible] mind. Rather, a person's individuality must be sought in his [illegible] way of acting out his existence." (Manfred S. Frings, Tow[illegible] Constitution of the Unity of the Person, p. 72). The dy[illegible] of the human person disclosed in M. S. Frings' account of [illegible] one person" is sadly lacking in the metaphysical unity of th[illegible] person with P and M predicates. Since I have been con[illegible] mainly with finding out the possibility of our knowledge of other minds, I stop short at a point where one could give a full account of inter-personal relationships. But then we are only at the primary level of lived experience of persons in mutual relations to one another. And this level of experience is both a-logical and anti metaphysical. It constitutes the basis, the starting point of both the individual knowing himself and knowing others. If we fall back ultimately on the rock bottom of commonsense to explain the philosophical issue of other minds, it is because commonsense is our only source, perhaps the only criterion, we often resort to in knowing the truth of other minds, which for all purposes in the same as knowing other persons.

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[1] [illegible] wson, Persons (1958) in G. N. A. Vesey's, *Body and*
[illegible]

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VIII

Methodology Problems of Designing Systems for Management Scientific Research

Konstantin Hristov Kostov

The designing of system for management scientific research has a basic task to increase the effectiveness of research by eliminating operations which do not contribute to the solution of the scientific problem, labour and time consuming operations, as well as operations leading to erroneous solutions.

The model is the first stage in the construction of systems. In fact it represents the first stage in the construction of systems. The model offers only a most general idea about the basic components and their functions. It reveals the general and the specific in the object of modelling. Some authors are justified in considering it to be a conception and theory. The model presents diffuse outlines of each separate component, but precisely in this diffusivity the future structure and behaviour of the system take shape.

The design of system starts after the model. The design is a really functioning system, with the necessary software and hardware.

The Designing starts with a model and ends with a design, similar to the construction of some other systems. The distance between the model of research and the design of system is very great and it is necessary to seek for intermediate forms such as the design models.

The design model represents the pre-design stage, its task consists in facilitation of the construction of the design. It acts as a bridge between the model and the design. The design system for management scientific research reveals the basic components, the connection between them and their functions. It shortens the distance between theory and practice, thus increasing the possibility of creating real designs.

Without exaggeration, it may be claimed that the design model is a particularly effective form of linking the theoretical conceptions and views with concrete work, e.g, the engineering designs. The advantage of the design model consists in the fact that it casts more light on the diffuse theoretical models and structures and fills them with the real content.

The systems approach and the modelling theory will be attributed to the general scientific theory. The systems approach examines the object of modelling (the research process) as a system and the design model as an adequate system. The systems approach is considered to be the most solid foundation for the design of systems, including technical systems.

1. Principles for the Construction of a Design Model

The design model is constructed on the basis of definite principles and requirements, some of which are general and compulsory for all automated systems. There are other requirements which are raised only for automated systems in research, examines as a specific cognitive and creative activity. Adherence to these specific principles, which are valid only for the above cases, directs the construction of the design model and the design process to other ways, differing from the familiar ones. For the sake of greater clarity, we shall discuss first the requirements concerning the automated systems in research, and then the remaining requirements.

(a) The object of the model, the design model and the design should be the research process as a creative activity, while they should model the routine creative activity.

(b) The constructed model of the research process should describe adequately the object of modelling. On the one hand, it should comprise the general and the specific characteristics of the object, on the other hand, it should contain hypothetical elements having the highest degree of significance, or which are found experimentally and by means of theoretical analysis to reflect with highest probability the presence of characteristics in the object.

(c) The construction of the model should be performed consecutively and in stages, using experimentation and, above all, the theoretical experiment. The theoretical model reveals the details of the model and eliminates those parts which in the course of the experiment are found to be incompatible with the structure and functions of the real research process.

(d) Hierarchic principles in the construction of the design model. The synchronic and the diachronic approaches do not reveal the hierarchic connection between the components. This makes it necessary to apply here the hierarchic principle which explicates the complex interactions of some components of the model. Of particular importance are the target and resource parts, which are constructed on the hierarchic principle. It would be appropriate to use different types of hierarchic structures. The variety of hierarchic structures makes it possible to create a RAS design model describing a real research process with highest approximation.

In the literaure, the hierarchic principle in the construction of an engineering design for automated management system in the scientific-production unity is reflected through explication at two levels: higher and lower.[1] The higher level determines the strategy in the behaviuour of the system. On the basis of the strategy chosen at the higher level, the lower level receives signals, thus triggering lower (functional) management subsystems.

(e) Complexity in the construction of design models. The models are methodologically guaranteed on the basis of complex application of the systems approach, modelling theory, design theory, management theory etc.

(f) Principle of maximum efficiency in the functioning of the system. RAS functions with maximum efficiency when the result obtained is referred to the expenditures needed for its functioning and the ratio is smaller than or equal to; the accepted norm. The efficiency is the result of complex estimation. The scientific result is assessed first, then an estimation is made of expenditures and of the time used.

(g) Possibilities for development and improvement of the system. In the construction of the system it is necessary to introduce all prerequistes which guarantee the development of the system with respect to its increased possibilities to solve complex tasks, for reduction of the time needed for obtaining the scientific result, for decrease of expenditures, etc.

(h) Principle of stability of the basic structure. The development and the improvement of the system should take place without radical changes in its basic structure.

(i) Principle of introducing maximum information into the system. Information is the basic principle in the course of research, it is used as a basis for attaining the objectives of research. The information obtained may change the course and direction of research, the scope of the scientific work, it may impose corrections in the scientific hypotheses. Maximization of the amount of information and the establishment of data banks contribute to the increased effectiveness in the functioning of the system.

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[1] Automated Management System—Scientific-Production Unity, Moscow, 19 6 (in Russian).

(j) Principle of increasing the precision, reliability and significance of the research results. This principle requires the system to increase the precision and reliability of the results with respect to the accumulation of information, as well as the use of new methods and means.

(k) Principle of "psychological comfort" of the researcher. According to this principle, the experimental methods are independent of one another at any moment.[2]

2. Model Profile of Research

2.1. Global model of a generating structure

In order to fulfil its purpose, the global generating structure should contain the following subsystems .[3]

1. Forming;
2. Resource;
3. Transforming;
4. Integrating-differentiating;
5. Information;
6. Control;
7. Diagnostic-correcting.

Each subsystem performs a specicfic function in the system for generation of new scientific information (generating structure). We shall describe first the functions of the regular generating system. The basic function of the forming subsystem is to create a scientific problem, its final aim is to formulate the scientific problem.

The resource subsystem guarantees the system with suitable strategy, tactics and operator. This means that the generating structure should be able to select a methodology and a method for attaining the objective of the research.[4] The choice of strategy and tactics takes place after the stimulating effect of the forming subsystem more specifically after the formulation of the problem. The choice of tactics of research is based on the selected strategy, while the operator is chosen on the basis of the selected tactics. The anlysis and synthesis of the integrating-differentiating subsystem are performed taking into the strategy and tactics of research.

The main task of the transforming subsystem is to transform the object of research to a definite state—to desired target (the result which should be obtained at the output of the system). Transformation is performed by means of the operator chosen in the resource part. The realization of the transformation requires the availability of the initial state of the research object and the final state (the desired state, the target of the research, the scientific result). The influence of the operator and transmits them to the control subsystem. In fact, only recording of the intermediate state of the object is performed at this stage. The operator is chosen by the resource subsystem. The correctness of the choice operator is assessed by the control subsystem. The correctness of the choice of operator is assessed by the control subsystem.

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[2] V. M. Egipko. Organization and Design of Automated System for Scientific and Technical Experiments. Kiev, 1978 (in Russian),

[3] Cf. K. Kostov. Systems-Structural Approach in Research, Sofia, 1976 (in Bulgarian)

[4] W. Gasparski, Prakseological analyses of design—constructive developments, Moscow, 1978 (in Russian).

The integrating-differentiating subsystem performs analysis or synthesis of research on the basis of the tactics chosen. From an operational point of view, the difference between the transforming and the integrating-differentiating subsystems consists in the fact that the transformation is realized through the choice of operator, while the analysis and synthesis in the integrating-differentiating subsystem are realized through the chosen tactics. The different parts of the research object play the role of initial elements. The final scientific result is assessed by the control subsystem, while the choice of the tactics is made by resource subsystem.

The use of the tactics instead of the operator by the integrating-differentiating structure imposes greater detailization of the structure and specification of its functions. The two systems are not isolated, they interact. Their interaction consists in the fact that some parts of the scientific problem may be solved by the integrating-differentiating subsystem, others — by the transforming subsystem.

The control subsystem receives information from the transforming and integrating-differentiating subsystems, and assesses whether the results of the operations performed approach the target of the research, or not. When the results approach the target, the control subsystem sends a signal to the transforming, respectively to the integrating-differentiating subsystems, to continue the operative activity. When the operations have resulted in deviation from the research target, a signal is sent to the diagnostic-correcting subsystem. The control subsystem comprises a priori information about the final state of the research object and about the intermediate results.

The diagnostic-correcting subsystem is triggered only when the operations performed do not contribute to the achievement of the research target. The tasks of this subsystem may be divided in two groups: to perform analysis of the causes of the errors and to propose corrections (substitution of the old operator, change of tactics and strategy).

The main purpose of the information subsystem is to receive information from the input subsystem. to perform the necessary filtration in accordance with the targets of the research and, whenever necessary, to send it to the forming, resource and diagnostic-correcting subsystems. Its tasks are the following: information processing (filtration, systematization), distribution of the information for the internal needs of the system and supply of information from the input subsystem,

In view of better explication of the connection, it is necessary to introduce typologization in accordance with their purpose in the system. Three types of connections are distiguished: input (I), output (O) and intermediary (P). In their turn, the Intermediary connections (B) are subdivided into direct (P) and feedback (P) connections. Depending on their specific functions, they are subdivided into the following groups :

- stimulating (P_1),
- supporting (P_2),
- regulating (P_3),
- information (P_4),

The stimulating connections are realized between the subsystem for the formation of the scientific problem and the resource subsystem. They are only direct connections and they stimulate the choice of the scientific strategy, tactics and operator. The supporting connections guarantee the means for modification of the research object, for performance of analysis and synthesis. They are also only direct connections. The regulating connections are mainly characterized by the fact that the control and correction of the originally selected strategy and tactics of research are performed through them. They connect the resource subsystem with the control and correcting subsystems. Unlike the stimulating and supporting connections, the regulation connections are both direct and feedback. The information connection guarantee the subsystem for the formation of the problem, as well as the resource control and correcting subsystems. These connections are both direct and feedback.

3. Constructive model

The basic subsystems of the global model are subjected to decomposition resulting in expansion of the global model, which leads to the constructive model. A formal description will be presented of the entire procedure from the global to the constructive model. The following designations are adopted for the purpose :

A_0 ... — global model;

A_1, A_2, A_3, A_4...A — subsystems of the global model;

$A_{11}, A_{12}, A_{13}, ...; A_{21}, A_{22}, A_{23}...; A_{32}, A_{33}...$ — subsystems of the constructive model;

R_1, R_2, R_3, R_4 — characteristics of decomposition;

$=>$ — symbol of the decomposition.

The expansion of the global model is presented below, as well as the obtaining of the *constructive model* which consists of numerous sub-systems and subsystems.

$$\ldots A_0 \overset{R_1}{=} [A_1, A_2, A_3] \wedge A_1 \overset{R_2}{=} [A_{11}, A_{12}, A_{13}] \wedge A_2 \overset{R_3}{=}$$

$$\overset{R_3}{=} [A_{21}, A_{22}, A_{23}^0] \wedge A_3 \overset{R_4}{=} [A_{31}, A_{32}, A_{33}]$$

The symbolic expression means the following : the global model A_0 is decomposed into the subsystems A_1, A_2, A_3, then the subsystem A_1 is decompsed into the sub subsystems A_{11} and A_{12}; subsystem A_2 is decomposed into the sub-subsystems A_{21}, A_{22}, A_{23}; subsystem A_3 into the sub subsystems A_{31}, A_{32} ,A_{34} and A_{35}.

The result is a peculiar tree with the global model at the top and the terminal elements being : A_{11}, A_{12}, A_{21}, A_{22}, A_{23}, A_{31}, A_{32}, A_{33}, A_{34}, A_{35}. Unlike the tree of goals, where the hierarchic dependence is linear, i.e, the system at a higher level subordinates in some respect the systems in lower position, etc., the linear hierarchic structure explicates the dependence only along the vertical. The non-linear hierarchic structure reveals dependence along the horizontal. The presented structure of the constructive model indirectly explicates both the linear and the nonlinear dependences (along the vertical and along the horizontal).

4. Intermediate model

The decomposition of the global model may be performed in different ways so as to obtain variants of constructive models. The first constructive model is the *initial model*, followed by an *intermediate model* and finally by the design model. A series of models is obtained

$$\ldots \quad M_0, M_1 \ M_2 M_3 \ldots M_k ,$$

Where M_0 is the initial model, M_1, M_2, $M_3 \ldots M_{k-1}$ —intermediate model and M_k —design model.

The construction of intermediate models is necessary when they are experimented, corrected and optimized. Thus it may be considered that the design model is optimal with respect to the intermediate models. When no experimentation and study of the constructive models is required, then the initial constructive model merges with the design model.

$$M_o = M_k ,$$

where = designates the merging.

The elimination of the experimenting stage means that the initial constructive model is hypothetically accepted as optimal and that it is adopted as design model. The complexity of the object to be modelled of constructive models, i.e. intermediate models, and through them to seek experimentally the optimal model—the design model.

5. Simulation (Imitation) Programmes

Simulation of the research process comprises the elaboration of various programmes imitating its different aspects. The programmes may be classified in three main types: *global*, *complete* and *specialised* simulation programmes. It is necessary to apply the three types of simulation programmes in order to specify better the model of the generating structures, in order to complement it with new elements and to enrich it.

The specificity of the generating structure as the model of extremely complex activity (creative process) makes it necessary to examine not only the basic three types of simulation programmes—global, complete and specialized—but also the possible variants of each one of them.

The global simulation programme is realized in several variants: The first variant (V_1) simulates the consecutive application of the strategy, tactics and the operator. In this case they are assumed to be selected successfully in advence, and on the basis of their choice the object of research is transformed until it coincides with the ultimate target (the main target), if the formation of the target is performed according to the principles of the programme-target approach.

The second variant (V_2) comprises geneartion, assesment, choice of strategy, tactics and operators, and transformation of the object until it coincides with the ultimate target.

The third variant (V_3) simulates the same procedures as the second variant, the only difference being that the subsystem of additional information is used in the different stages of the research.

The complete simulation programme involves the action of all subsystems of the generating structure. The aim of the simulation is to show through the complete programme the place of each of them and the tasks for attaining the aim of the study. In the global simulation programmes the correction of the strategy, tactics and the operator is performed mainly on the basis of tests and errors, i.e. one of the generating operator respective tactic, and strategy if it is not effective. One takes the seconds, after that the third i.e. the complete simulation programme shows heurestic and diagnostic procedures.

Special simulation programme show aspects of complex scientific research action which is realization at solving complex task. Thanks to involving of diagnostic procedures is accomplished analysis receive results of action to operate actively in strategy. This situation give possibility to choice correct methods for attain aims inclusive the main aim.

IX

Some Reflections on the State of Relationship Between the Gross and Physical Body, Waking and Dreaming State and Living and Dying in the Brhadaranyaka Upanisad

Arvind Sharma

I

The Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad in discussing the different states of the Self, distinguishes between the waking, the dreaming and the deep sleep state.[1] This point is clearly developed in IV.3 wherein different states of the self are dealt with. Though the waking state is mentioned (IV.3.9), the emphasis is clearly on the dream state (IV.3.9-18) and ends with a recognition of the state of deep sleep (IV.3.19-34).

In this description one point is of particular interest. It is the description of the intermediate state. This is mentioned in IV.3.9 :

> 9. Verily, there are just two states of this person (the state of being in) this world and the state of being in the other world. There is an intermediate third state, that of being in sleep (dream). By standing in this intermediate state one sees both those states, of being in this world and of being in the other world. Now whatever they way is to the state of being in the

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[1] See S. Radhakrishnan, ed., *The Principal Upaniṣads* (London ; George Allen & Unwin, 1953), p. 256ff.

> other world, having obtained that way one sees both the evils (of this world) and the joys (of the other world). When he goes to sleep he takes along the material of this all-embracing world, himself tears it apart, himself builds it up; he sleeps (dreams) by his own brightness, by his own light. In that state the person becomes self illuminated.[2]

A similar intermediate state is also mentioned in IV.3.18.

> Even as a large fish moves along both banks of a river, the hither and the further, so also this person moves along both these states, the state of dream (or sleep) and the state of waking.[3]

In both these passages one should note that there is an ambiguity surrounding the word SVAPNA—which can mean both dream or sleep. One should further note that the activity of the gross body is related to the waking state and of the subtle body is related to the dreaming state by implication and these two—the gross and the subtle selves—are seen uniting in the heart.[4]

II

Let us next turn to the description of death in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad. This description basically involves the separation of the gross from the subtle body (IV.3.36) and the obtaining of a new gross body by the subtle (IV.3.8). It also involves a descent into the heart prior to death (IV.4.1-2).

> 1. When this self gets to weakness, gets to confusedness, as it were, then the breaths gather round him. He takes to himself those particles of light and descends into the heart. When the person in the eye turns away, then he becomes non-knowing of forms.
>
> 2. He is becoming one, he does not see, they say; he is becoming one, he does not smell, they say; he is becoming one, he does not taste, they say; he is becoming one, he does not speak, they say; he is becoming one, he does not hear, they say; he is becoming one, he does not think, they say; he is becoming one, he does not touch, they say; he is becoming one, he does not know, they say. The point of his heart becomes lighted up and by that light the self departs either through the eye or through the head or through other apertures of the body. And when he thus departs, life departs after him. And when life thus departs, all the vital breaths depart after it. He becomes one with intelligence. What has intelligence departs with him. His knowledge and his work take hold of him as also his past experience.[5]

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2 *Ibid*, p. 257.
3 *Ibid*, p. 261.
4 *Ibid.*, p. 262.
5 *Ibid*, pp. 269 270.

There are thus the following parallels between the states of consciousness in life and at death. In life the "self" moves freely between the waking and dreaming states through the intermediate state of "deep sleep." And in this sleep one's selves—the subtle and gross ones, are united in the heart. At the time of death one moves *through* the "intermediate state of death" *from* one gross self to another. In other words, death and rebirth are seen in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad as the extension of life. The vertical axis is converted into the horizontal.

Subtle Body
Intermediate State death new gross body
Gross Body

III

This discussion suggests some interesting conclusions :

(1) That death and rebirth are viewed very much in terms of "life" with the necessary adjustments in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad; and

(2) The "intermediate state" of deep sleep, which is equated with death, in later developments, gets placed on top of the subtle body and becomes associated with the causal body in later developments. This shift affects the neat picture of transfer from one life to another in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka adversely as the parallel between deep sleep and death has to be eliminated and the subtle and causal bodies collapsed into one for all practical purposes.

X

The Problem of Alienation in Emanuel Mounier's Philosophy

Marin Minkovski

E. Mounier (1905-1950) is one of the most eminent representatives of the French religious philosophy in the second quarter of our century. During autumn 1932 he started with the publication of the magazine "Esprit", propagating on its pages progressive ideas, that became popular not only in France, but also in a number of other countries in Europe and Latin America where catholicism had a strong influence. In esteeming his deed connected with the left-catholic movement, the well known Polish sociologist T. Jaroshevski writes, that "nearly all the roads of today's left catholics at least originate from Mounier if they do not lead to Mounier".[1]

The philosophy of the here contemplated author is known by the name "Personalism". Mounier himself contributed a lot to the popularisation of this term. In his last work he qualified his personalism as a "philosophy of tragic optimism". One of the central questions of this philosophy is the question of man's alienation.

Mounier distinguishes two forms of alienation, which he—using the Greek mythology—depicts figuratively as the alienation of Narcissus, and the alienation of Hercules. The first form of alienation is expressed in detaching of man from the world and the other people into an "egocentric isolation". In the same way as the mythic handsome Narcissus, who is internally tormented by the feeling of unsurpassed own beauty, becomes the victim of his self-amourousness, the contemporary man is endangered by his himself. Citing the author this is the "idealistic alienation". It is a sort of "progressive exsanguinating of the subjective life", a "tumoural development of the intellectual experience". The empty ideas, rendered fleshless, grow ever more fruitless and alien to the social committedness, the practical decidedness to change the existent social structures. Mounier points to the fact that the anarchists, existentialists and some representatives of the left forces have now fallen into the same situation. He notes with a feeling of regret that this form of alienation has seized also the contemporary Christianity, that, being led by the wrongly understood idea of purity and holyness, remained passive in the practical transformation of the world. In this connection Mounier states that Marxism, identifies not without reason this kind of alienation with the alienation of the religious man[2], Along with that he points out that the contemporary existentialists, as well as the positivists, do not succeed to rise up to the level of Marxist understanding of the "Narcissus" alienation. Pointing out that in this respect Marxism relates the strongly scientific thought with the effective transforming activity, the author advises the nowadays' generation to adopt the "realistic critical Marxist tradition".

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[1] T. Jaroshevski, Personality and Society, M. 1973, p. 457.

The second form of alienation exhibits itself in the interaction of man with his surroundings. Similarly to Hercules who was ruined by his own victories and conquests, the man of today stands under the threat to be defeated by the results of his practical activity. In connection with this form of alienation Mounier pays a special attention to the question of the role of techniques and technisation in the life of the man of today, adhering to a realistic position, opposite both to the existentialist and the positivist scientist view. The author declares himself against the technocratic ideas and moccs. against the attempts to transmute man into a simple instrument of technical mechanism. He strives for the building up of a "human economy", in which people will not more be ignored on account of production. "The great ordeal of the XXth century, Mounier writes in this connection, will be to avoid dictatorship of the technocrats on the left and on the right. who forget the man for the sake of organisation".[3] The author understands, that if techniques was allowed to develop as a blind force. this would hide the danger of depersonalisation, "so as the sudden blossoming up of the youth's body hides the danger to overturn his balance".[4] But taking into account the meanacing consequences of the technocratic trends, Mounier parallelly challenges also the "paranoic reactions" of the contemporary anti-technicism, of the groundless and apocalyptic fear from the development of techniques, which is characteristic of the contemporary existentialism. For the existentialist's the scientific discoveries and the technical achievements can not only improve man's life, but on the contrary they can also make man's being still more uncertain and alarming. Their philosophy treats the scientifico-technical development as a reason which independently from the social circumstances, always leads, also by itself, to regrettable consequences for the individual life of man. Outgoing from this viewpoint Jaspers, Sartre and others come to a negation of the progressive human development.

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[2] E. Mounier, Qu'est-ce que le personnalisme, Oeuvres, t.III, p. 211.
[3] E. Mounier, Le personnalisme, Oeuvres, t.III, p. 449.
[4] Ibid., p. 449.

Different from the pessimistic views of existentialism Mounier points out that the technical development inevitably leads, only in distinct cases and in fixed conditions and not always, to a depriving of individuality and alienation of personality. "The purely negative attitude towards technical development, the critisizer of the unfounded anti-technicism mentions, is dictated by the inadequate analysis or by the idealistic understanding of fate, which in fact we forge here on earth with our own forces".[5] Mounier is convinced that after man's fate dwells in his own hands the problems of technical development will not be solved to his detriment.

Distinguishing himself from these adherers of the "dramatic conceptions" that examine the crisis situation of the contemporary man abstractly, seeing most often its reason in the technical development itself, Mounier relates this question with the social structure of society and is in search of its roots in the established social relations. In this connection he puts the system of capitalism under sharp criticism, what can rarely be met with in western literature. The Soviet author V. Kuznetzov, the mentioned T. Jaroshevski, as well as some other marxists point out that criticism, which Mounier directs to the bourgeois civilisation and the social system of capitalism, has many points of contact with criticism contained in the "Economico-philosophical manuscripts" and "The Capital" by Marx, and in Lenin's works on imperialism as well.

Mounier estimates positively the existentialist descriptions of powers, through which man gets in rupture with the external world. But he considers that the existentialists come to the extreme, "putting personality in a state of incessant trouble and readiness to render an uninterrupted rebuff."[6] According to him the individuality, separatism and seclusion, by which the existentialists characterise the human being, are only moments of this being. For the being of personality the relation with its likes is of no less importance. The other people do not limit the world of personality, as some representatives of existentialism insist, just on the contrary — "they cooperate for its revival and growth. Personality exists only towards the other one, it realises and finds its self only in the other one".[7]

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5 E. Mounier, Qu'st-ce que le personnalism, Oeuvres, p. 213.
6 E. Mounier, Le personnalism, Oeuvres, t.III, p. 473.
7 Ibid., p. 453.

In Mounier's works a special attention is paid to the problem of the connection between man's alienation and the acquirement of material wealth. One of the first works — "From capitalist to all-people's ownership" — begins with the treatment of this problem. In this work of his he states that the question of ownership, before being a question of distribution of goods, is a question of the human situation, more a question of the owner than of the ownership itself. The relation between ownership and alienation is also treated in his ensuing works. The author states his view in a polemics with two opposite conceptions—of the blind moralism and of the philistine individualism.

Mounier declares that the adherers to the blind moralism, to the abstract moralising, are "helpless, because they do not understand the meaning of the biologic and economic conditions of the personality's life".[8] The moral idealism, the author writes in this connection, is often expressed in the requirement for a being that is uncommitted with anything: an antinatural requirement, which leads to ruin or inhumanity".[9] Using Gabriel Marcel's thought, Mounier stresses, that "it is not possible to be, without to have". Examining the question of dependence of the practical and spiritual activity of the people on the economic conditions, the author declares: Marxism is right when it gives some priority to the econmic factor. The underestimation of economy is done only by those who have ceased to torture their nerves with the question how to procure the daily bread. A tour in the surroundings of the town would be the best argument in the given case. At the initial historical stage, at which we live, the needs and the economic deficiency entirely predetermine the behaviour and the views of the people".[10]

It is clear that the position which Mounier defends in connection with the question of the role of material conditions in people's life is radically different in comparison to the century old implantation of the preaching, aiming to deviate man from the first rate worldly problems. His criticism against the "blind moralism" in fact refers to that part of Christianity that has put itself in service of social inequality. It is not superfluous to mention, that on this question another difference between Mounier and the representatives of American personalism is being outlined, whose views distinguish themselves from those of the criticised blind moralism.

Dwelling upon the philistine-individualistic ethics of possession Mounier remarks: "They extol the world's enrichment as if it liberates man by itself. The personalist dialectic of possession is more restrained... The blossoming of personality involves as an intrinsic condition self-depriving of ownership and material wealth, something that liberates us from egocentrism. Personality finds itself only in a process of self-depriving. Its riches is what remains for it when it is deprived of the whole property remaining at the hour of its death."[11]

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[8] *Ibid.*, p. 445.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 466.
[10] *Ibid.*, p. 466.

When he mentions the riches of personality Mounier has in mind its own value. This understanding is an alternative of the affirmed ethics in the bourgeois society that measures dignity of man in dependence on the riches which he owns. Again on this occasion Mounier writes : "From the viewpoint of individual poverty is in a certain degree the ideal statute of personality."[12] The author immediately clears up that poverty is not for him a certain constant ascetism, but a taste for simplicity, a state of benevolence and easiness, that excludes neither generosity, nor nobility, nor even a movement towards riches, if only this movement is not dictated by stingy passions.[13] But in spite of these reservations Mounier defends the view that self-deprivation of ownership and material wealth is the highest virtue. "For the personalist tradition (especially the Christian one) the upsurge up to deprivation of ownership is a central upswing in human life, the author declares".[14]

Without denying the human aspects of charity, we cannot agree with this conclusion, which seems to us exaggerated and unfounded. Examined on a socially-historical plan charity has fulfilled and is now still fulfilling the role of a factor that softens but does not abolish inequality and social injustice. Something more: in order to have sense and practical effect charity supposes the presence of inequality and injustice. But the great aim of the real, absolutely consequent humanism is to pull out the roots that feed these phenomena, to assure optimal conditions for the existence and the development of personality. That is why the supreme moral values must be looked for an esteemed in dependence on the real, practical contribution and effort for the realisation of the basic aims of humanism.

The supported and undisputably justified thesis of the author that the real riches of personality is to be found not outside of it but in it itself leads us also to this conclusion. But that from it follows that who, in the name of the good, sacrifices his freedom or his health, sacrifices something much more valuable in comparison with the other one, who deprives himself of ownership. For this reason his self-sacrifice merits a deeper appreciation on the side of society.

If we start, wording Mounier, from individual ethics, then it will not be difficult to note, that generosity contains in itself a dual dimension. If the man who manifests generosity can experience satisfaction from his deed, then this would be most often on account of the personal dignity and self-respect of that one, who accepts it or is compelled to look for it. Evidently the personalist ethics that pretends to be the most consecutive defender of personality should be also the reverse of the modal.

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[11] Ibid., p. 467.

[12] E. Mounier, Manifest au service du personnalism, Oeuvres, t. I, p. 593.

[13] Ibid., p. 594.

[14] E. Mounier, Le personnalism, Oeuvres, t. III, p. 454.

We shall touch still another moment of the author's concept about alienation, referring to the future fate of this social phenomenon. On this occasion Mounier remarks: "Marxism has the reason to think that the end of material misfortune is the end of an alienation in mankind's development. But it is not the end of the whole alienation even on a nature's level."[15] Searching "the root of the evil" Mounier comes to the conclusion that 'in presentdays' (capitalist — M M.) regime of distribution of wealth there exists only a temporary historical alienation. concemned to disappear together with the structures which favour its existence. In the centre of each human possession stands also the alienation of labour which springs up continuously. My possession, like the hand of King Midas, has the tendency to degrade the beings and the things, which I appropriate: it presents me to them as a conqueror, requiring a ruler who subjects, while at the same time I am hindering their freedom and mine."[16]

It is true that alienation is adherent not only to the capitalist social system and that with the abolishment of poverty the question of liquidation of alienation as a phenomenon will not be solved. Mounier comes to the right conclusion that in the roots of any alienation lies the alienation from work. But along with this he is apt to absolutise it, thinking that any possession of material wealth is an alienation and hinderance for the manifestation of freedom. In fact the accumulation of material wealth really leads to an alienation and depersonalisation, but only in the case when some fixed limits are overthrown. These are the limits beyond which man begins to serve more to the things than they do to him, this is the moment at which, as Mounier remarks in other cases, a man loses himself, sinks down and loses his individuality in them. In this connection the comparison with king Midas would be suitable if it was referred not to all cases of possession but only to these in which the aspiration towards acquisition of material wealth has hypertrophed and leads to moral degrading of personality. In the mythos for king Midas the creative fancy of the ancient Greeks has in an admirable way condemned not any striving after assurance of a well-being, but only avarice and money madness.

The exaggerated conclusion that any possession of material wealth is an alienation, is connected with the author's convincement that it emerges uncessantly in the process of labour. But as society will never be able to exist without labour, this means that alienation, if it is possible to put in this way, is a disease, of which mankind will never be able to get rid of. But this pessimistic conclusion is already not in favour of the pretensions of the philosophy of "tragic optimism".

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[15] Ibid., p. 442.

[16] Ibid., p. 467.

Book-Reviews

Gaurinath Sastri : *A Study in the Dialectics of Sphota*, pp. 106, Motilal Banarasidas, Publishers, Delhi, Varanasi, Patna (1980) Rs. 35/—

The author of this important book has been a great Sanskrit Scholar well known in the field of Sanskrit and Philosophy. He has been Professor of Sanskrit at the Banaras Hindu University. This work is a critical study of linguistic speculations on the nature of word and denotations found in the different systems of Indian Philosophy. The present work of the author is a detailed evaluation of the different theories propounded by such eminent writers as Kumarila Bhatta, Mandana Mishra, Vachaspati Mishra and Jayanta Bhatta. Dr. Gaurinath Sastri has done a great service to the cause of Indian Philosophy in bringing to light this great work which has inspired scholars both in India and in Western countries. He has dealt in this book a very important subject of Sanskrit grammar which will have a lasting value in the fields of Indian Philosophy and Sanskrit literature.

The whole book is an authoritative tratise and is divided into four chapters besides Preface. Detailed Notice of Contents, Abbreviations, Introduction, Notes and references. The four chapters being : I. Critique of Objections from the Nyaya and Mimamsa schools. II. Kumarila, Sabara and Jayanta on Sphota; III. Classification of Sphota and IV. Authority of Agama on Sphota which has been further subdivided into (1) Introduction (2) Some Sruti Texts on Sphota, and (3) Sabda Yoga.

The present work of the author is the revision of his previous work *Philosophy of Word and Meaning* published earlier in the Calcutta Sanskrit College series of Text and Studies has inspired present day writers to bring out a great number of books on the subject both in India and the West. In modern times science of philology is being studied with great earnestness. This book will prove of great importance for the philologists and linguists of all the countries of the world.

This book gives a penetrating insight on Philosophy of word and meaning in the vast Indian literature of great Indian thinkers. This book can give direction for a comparative outlook in further studies in the field of linguistics to other countries of the word.

This work provides direction for further work in this field. The author deserves praise for such a brilliant work.

M. M. Satisa Chandra Vidyabushana (Translator) Revised by Nandalal Sinha : *The Nyaya Sutras of Gotama*, pp. 366, Motilal Banarsidas, Publishers, Delhi, Varanasi, Patna, Reprinted 1981, Price Rs. 80/—

This book Nyaya Sutras of Gotama is a great philosophical work consisting of Nyaya Philosophy and it is like that of a Vaisheshika Method which consists in the enumeration, definition and examination of the categories. The book has been divided into five chapters and each chapter has been divided into two subchapters. Each sub-chapter has been divided into several sub-headings on the basis of sutras and their meanings which they express. A student of Nyaya can very easily find from the contents of the book original sutra pertaining to the desired object. The editor has very ably classified the headings which will prove of great importance to the students of Nyaya and Indian Philosophy. It is really a nice edited book on the Nyaya Sutras, with original Sanskrit text of each Sutra written in Devanagari script followed by Sanskrit vocabulary consisting of English Synonym of each and every word of the Sutra. English translation has been provided of each Sutra along with English exposition. The book will help the reader in clearly grasping the real meaning and exposition of each and every Sutra even without knowing Sanskrit. The book will prove of much benefit to the scholars who would like to go deep in the study of Nyaya Sutras of Gotama. It will prove a good text book for English knowing reader who is keen to study Nyaya Sutras.

The book has been provided with 6 Appendices: App. I Contains the Nyaya Suchi Nibandha of Vachaspati Misra in English translation. App. II adds Sutras omitted in the second edition; App. III is Vatsyayana's Commentary in summary form in English; App. IV is an alphabetical Index to the Sutras. App. V is word Index and App. VI is an index of words in English. These have added to the utility of the both.

It is one of the best books on the Nyaya System of Philosophy having original text along with English translation and exposition by a great scholar in the field of philosophy. It will attract a large number of readers, and even those who are not well versed in Sanskrit to grasp the real significance of the Nyaya System of Philosophy. If such books are published many non-sanskrit scholars will be attracted to Indian wisdom. The publishers, translator and Editor all deserve congratulations for doing a great service to the cause of Indian Philosophy, particularly bringing to the lime light work of Great scholar Gotama in a clear and critical manner.

Shoun Hino : *Suresvara's Vartika on Yajnavalkya-Maitreya Dialogue*, pp. 328, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, Varanasi, Patna (1982) Price Rs. 125/—

The author of the present work is a Japanese Scholar Shoun Hino who came to Poona under the Exchange Programme between the University of Poona and the University of Nagoya and completed this work under the supervision and guidance of Prof. K. P. Jog, Professor of Sanskrit, Deccan College Research Institute, Poona.

The present work is the outcome of Dr. Shoun Hino's research. The work is an analytical, critical and comprehensive study of the views of Suresvara on one of the most important topics in the Brahadaranayakopanishad. The Brahdaranyakopanishad has differently been explained by different authorities and Suresvara occupies an important place in its exposition and interpretation of this great work. His Vartika though occupies a very important place has not yet been translated or explained in Modern language. It is perhaps for the first time due to the efforts of Japanese scholar Shoun Hino this book has appeared in English.

The work consists of two parts. Part I. Introduction and Part II Translation and Annotation. The Part I consists of 10 chapters : Preliminary Remarks, Suresvara's work as a Vartika, Anandagiri in Relation to Sankara and Suresvara, On Abhasa in Suresvara's work under Reference, Suresvara on so-called Injunction in Vedanta, Jnana and Vijnana, The Method of anvayavyatireka as Means of Knowing, The Use of Illustration (drstanta) in Philosophical Writing, Suresvara's indebtedness to his Predecessors (Gaudapada in Particular) and Suresvara and the Samkhya. The Part II gives and English Translation of Brahdarnayakopanishad 2.4. and 4.5 with exhaustive notes. They are followed by Select Glossary, Bibliography and Verse Index. Preface, Abbreviations have been given in the beginning.

Dr. Shoun Hino, a great Japanese scholar of Buddhism, Sanskrit and Indian Philosophy, particularly Vedanta has very ably contributed has added this great work Suresvara's Vartika on Yajnavalkya Maitreyi Dialogue to the existing literature of ancient Indian Philosophy in English. This great work will find readers both in India and the West who wish to acquaint themselves with the true spirit of Brahdaranyaka Upanishad. The publishers deserve thanks for publishing this work, and Dr. Shoun Hino deserves our congratulations on such a nice and brilliant study.

Shantideva (Compiler) : *Siksa Samuccaya* A Compendium of Buddhist Doctrine (Translated from the Sanskrit by Cecil Bendall and W. H. D. Rouse, pp. 328, Reprint 1981 Price Rs. 60/—

This is the first Indian edition of the English Translation of Siksasamuccaya — A Mahayana Buddhist treatise edited by Dr. Bendall from a single Nepalese manuscript for the Russian Bibliotheca Buddhica. The first edition of the book appeared in London in 1922 and the second edition in 1971.

This book is a compendium of Buddhist doctrine preserved in the schools of the Great Vehicle — Mahayana. It presents, as its subject matter, the righteous code of conduct for the enlightenment of the aspirant. It embodies instructions for the accumulation of sixfold Perfection, viz., Liberality, Morality, Patience, Manliness, Meditation and Wisdom.

The book is divided into nineteen chapters. The first eight chapters : I Salutation to all Buddhas and Bodhisatvas ! II The Duty of Self Preservation, III Avoidance of Evil, IV Avoidance of Evil, V Avoidance of Evil, VI Preservation of the Person, VII Care of Enjoyments, VIII Purification from Sin, emphasise the avoidance of evil and Self-purification. Chapters IX The Perfection of Patience, X The Perfection of Strength, XI Praise of the Forest seclusion, XII Preparation of the Thought, XIII subjects of Intent Contemplation, XIV Self Purification, and XV Purity in Enjoyment and Religious Action deal with the Perfection of Patience, Strength, Contemplation and Religious Actions; And Chapters XVI The increase of Good conduct, XVII The Praise of Worship and XVIII Recollection of the Three Jewels and XIX Increase of Holiness read a lesson in the increase of Good Conduct, Holiness, Resurrection of three Jewels and the Praise of Worship.

The translation is authentic and authoritative. The book is interesting and instructive. In the end there is also an alphabetical index of quoted works and general index which has made the book more useful. This is an important contribution on the ethical aspects of Mahayana Buddhism. It is really nice it has been reprinted by Motilal Banarasidass once again.

Sisir Kumar Gupta : *Madhusudana Sarasvati on the Bhagvad Gita* Being an English translation of his Commentary Gudhartha Dipika pp. 344, Motilal Banarsidass, Publishers, Delhi, Varanasi. Patna, First Edition 1977, Price Rs. 100/— only.

The translator of this work Sisir Kumar Gupta is from the Ex-officer Bengal Civil Service and the Indian Administrative Service Cadre. The Bhagvadgita has attracted scholars from all over the world and its translation has appeared in almost all the languages of the world and its several commentaries have appeared from the pens of Indian and Western thinkers.

The present volume is commentary on the Bhagvadgita by Madhusudana Sarasvati a great commentator and his commentary is known as *Gudharthadipika*. This has been translated by Sisir Kumar Gupta. This is one of the best commentaries on the Bhagvadgita. The chief characteristics and special feautures of this commentary are : (i) It is remarkable for its catholicity, erudition and objective approach to the problem of existence. (ii) Presents a synthesis of Jnana (knowledge) and Bhakti (devotion) (iii) Accepts all the Vedic schools of Philosophy to the extent of their conformity to Monism and to the main theme of the great scripture, (iv) Provides notes on the import of every single word of the text. (v) Is invariably an invaluable guide to Indian Philosophy.

The book contains the text of the book in the Nagri script. This is the first translation of Gudharthadipika the great work of Madhusudana Sarasvati in English. The translation by Mr. Gupta is authentic and literary and present the real significance of the concepts. The translator has taken great pains to render archaic words in semantics of modern vintage, keeping strictly to the imports and without detracting from the concepts. An alphabetical index of verses of the Text of the Bhagvadgita has been appended to the work which has made the book more useful for the readers. It is indeed a great book whi h will help the English knowing readers in grasping the real significance of the Bhagvadgita as viewed by Madhusudana Saraswati. The translator as well publishers deserve thanks for doing great service to the cause of Indian culture by getting this book published in English.

Mark Mac Dowell : *A Comparative of the Teaching of Don Juan and Madhyamika Buddhism*—(Knowledge and Transformation) pp. 116, Motilal Banarsidass, Publishers, Delhi, Varanasi and Patna, 1981, Price Rs. 50/—

The author of this book is a scientist and obtained his B. S. Degree in Physics in 1971 from the University of Toledo, Toledo, Ohio (U.S.) He subsequently undertook graduate studies in philosophy from the University of Toledo in 1977. His areas of interest are Philosophy of Science, Indian Philosophy and Comparative Philosophy.

The author was engaged in the study of Indian Philosophy with special reference to Madhyamic Buddhism, as formulated and expounded by Nagarjuna and during this period he came across Carlos Castaneda's works on the teachings of Don Juan, a Yaqui Indian seer and was struck by the profound similarities between the teachings of Don Juan and Nagarjuna—in particular concerning Samvrti and Paramartha of Madhyamaka and the Tonal and Nagual of Don Juan and the concept of categorical frameworks. The contents of the book have been divided into eight chapters besides Prologue, Bibliography and Index. The eight chapters were divided as follows: I. Introduction II. The Madhyamaka III. Consciousness : Ordinary and non-ordinary Modes IV. Language and Reality in Don Juan V. The Metaphysics of Don Juan ; His Conception of Reality VI. Don Juan's Conception of Man as "Warrior" VII. Knowledge and Power : The Psychological Teachings of Don Juan and VIII. Freedom and Soteriology in Don Juan.

The author has written this book in a clear and lucid style which may easily be understood by the non-specialist as well as by

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the inquiring reader. The essential unity of human experience is clearly demonstrated by the fact that human beings widely separated in space, time, language and culture, discern, at their wisest, the same fundamental truths concerning man and the world.

Mr. Mark Mac Dowell has very ably compared in this book the teachings of two great thinkers which are similar in many ways. It helps man to know the sense of mystery of his own existence and spurs him to enquire and know more about him. The main purpose of this book according to the author is to explore the parallels between the teachings of Don Juan and those of non-Western philosophies—in particular Buddhism, as expounded by Nagarjuna in his Madhyamic (middle way) philosophy. The author hopes by studying both of these teachings we will come to a better understanding of their basic insights and surely of ourselves and of the at once familiar and mysterious world we inhabit.

The book is written in a simple style and gives a clear view of the ideas of two great thinkers in a comparative manner.

L. Thomas O'neil : *Maya in Sankara* Measuring the Immeasurable, pp. 222. Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, Patna and Varanasi, First Edition (1980) Price Rs. 60/--

Dr. L. Thomas O'neil the author of this book is Assistant Professor of the History of Religion at the Missouri School of Religion at the University of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri. He is the religion-philosophy editor of South Asia in Review and has previously published—Towards the Life Divine—Sri Aurobindo's Vision. His specialization in the History of Religion is Indian Philosophy and comparative Methodology.

Advaita Vedanta is one of the most important philosophical/Religious Systems in Indian Thought. The modern world has placed upon Sankara the burden of maintaining that the word is maya or illusion. In this book Dr. O'Neil has analysed whether or not this interpretation is philosophically or historically correct. The book has been divided into two chapters : Part One : Historical Survey—historical overview of the conception of maya from the earliest Vedic material upto and including its Post-Sankara expression. The second part views the philosophical/Religion conception of maya with special reference to Sankara's commentary on the Vedanta Sutras. The whole book is divided into eight Chapters : I. Introduction II. Maya in the Early tradition III. Samvrti Doctrine of Nagarjuna Through Gaudapada IV. Samvrti in Sankara V. Maya in Post Sankara Advaita VI Language and Reality (Nama-Rupa) in Advaita VII. The use of Analogue in the Brahma Sutra and VIII Conclusion. In the end Appendix A and B have been provided, along with Bibliography and Index.

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The book is a based on a very thorough research work on Sankara's concept of Maya in the light of several important studies made by several eminent scholars in the field of Indian Philosophy and Vedanta. It is a good contribution by an American scholar in the field of Vedanta Philosophy. It is a methodical and systematic treatise on Maya by Dr. O'Neil based on the existing literature and he deserves our congratulations on this wonderful work.

John C. Plott with James Michael Dolin : *Global History of Philosophy* Volume III The Patristic-Sutra Period, pp. 604, Moti Lal Banarsidass, Delhi, Patna and Varanasi, First Edn. 1980 Rs. 90/—

John C. Plott, Editor and author of this great monumental work is Professor of Philosophy at Marshal University in U.S.A. He has done a great service to the world of Philosophy in bringing out three Volumes of Global History of Philosophy so far and will bring two more volumes in near future. The publishers have notified that Volume IV and V are coming shortly. The third volume continues to trace parallel developments of the different systems and traditions from 325 to 800 A.D. During this Patristic Sutra Period there emerges the rich variety of Chinese Buddhist philosophies alongside the later developments of the varieties of non European Christianity, as well as the early Byzantine heritage in contrast with the Roman/Latin tradition.

The Global history of Philosophy, is a continuing process; and the compiling of such histories is a continuous effort to "make sense" as new research and new perspectives become available and new values come into focus challenging reinterpretation. Especially in this volume the spirit of exploration prevails as increasingly questions arise which may take a long time to answer.

The contents of the book have been divided into
Introduction : 1. India, 2. Heresy and Orthodoxy and 3. China.
Fourth Century (325 400) 1. Chih Tao-lin, 2. Vatsyayana, Tao-an Nemesius of Emessa and 5. The Cappadocians.
Fifth Sectury (400-500) 1. Kumarajiva, 2. Seng-chao, 3. Hui Yuan, 4. Pelagius, 5. Theodore of Mopsuestia, 6. Augustine, 7. Buddhaghosha, 8. Tao-sheng, 9. Bhatrihari, 10. Dignaga, 11. Proclus 12. Pseudo-Dionysius and 13. Babylonian Talmud
Sixth Century (500 625) 1. Nestorius and Boethius, 2. Pujyapada 3. Prasastapada, 4. Fan Chen and Hsun Chi, 5. Gaudapada, 6. Bodhidharma, 7. Candrakirti, 8. Leontius of Byzantinum, 9. John Philopon, 10. Bhavya, 11. Dharmakirti and Akalanka, 12. Samantabhadra, 13. Gregory the great and 14. Udyotakara.
Later Patristic Sutra Period (625-800) 1. Islam, 2. T'ang Buddhism—Vinaya, Three Treatise School, Fa-hsiang, Pure Land, Tien-t'ai, Hua-yen, Ch'an, Tantra, 3. Isidore of Seville, Maximus Confessor, Kumarila and Prabhakara, 6. Santideva, 7. John of Damascus

8. Vinitadeva, 9. Santaraksita Kamalasile, 10. Haribhadra Suri and 11. Tsung-mi.

In the end Notes have been provided, biographical sketches have been given and glossary is appended, Index of personal Names and subject Index is also given which has added to the utility of the book for research scholars.

On the completion of volume III of the Global History of Philosophy both the authors Dr. John C. Plott along with James Michael Dolin deserve to be congratulated. Really a very great task has been achieved in bringing out such an exhaustive global history of Philosophy. Prof. Siu-Chi Huang has very aptly remarked in his Foreword to this book : The author shows in the present volume, as in the previous two volumes, historical leaning and understanding and earnest investigation of the facts in global perspective... the work will meet the needs of a unique text for students of philosophy who wish to learn and understand the development of thought, not only in one's own historical tradition but also in that of other races and cultures. It goes without saying that such knowledge acquired by means of a comparative, historical study expands the dimensions of the human outlook and, even more importantly, provides a necessary condition of peace and of human existence."

The author and publishers both deserve our heartfelt congratulations on bringing out such a nice compendium of knowledge which will help the coming generation in their researches.

Prof. W. Caland (Translator) & **Dr. Lokesh Chandra** (Editor & Introduction writer) : *Sankhayana-Srautasutra,* pp. 484, Motilal Banarsidass, Patna, Varanasi and Delhi 1st Edition 1953, Reprint 1980 Price Rs. 150/—

The translator of this great work is a Dutch scholar Prof. Caland He completed translation from 1st to the 16th chapters and unfortunately he could not complete it and died in 1931 of heart disease. Prof. Caland was very eminent Vedic ritualist of the West. Prof. Caland willed that his work which has remained incomplete be revised, corrected and completed and passed through the press by Prof. Raghu Vira, a great indologist, who entrusted this work to his son, Dr. Lokesh Chandra. Prof. Caland's translation has been deciphered rather than read. References have been verified. Dr. Lokesh Chandra had taken great pains to make this translation a valuable one. He has added a detailed introduction on the grammatical peculiarities, lexicographical entries, corrections in the Sanskrit text, comparison with other Brahmanas and relative chronology, schemata, analysis of the contents of Sankhayana.

Prof. Caland has done a great service in translating this great work Sankhayana Srautasutra in English. So this great work has reached English knowing world. Dr. Lokesh Chandra's contribution in editing and bringing out this book is praiseworthy. Motilal Banarasidass the publishers deserve congratulations and thanks for bringing out this book.

PW
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